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2ABSTRACT
The subject of this thesis is the history of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan during the govemor-generalship of Sir Lee Stack, 1917-192^. The 
study is based primarily on the unpublished records of the Sudan Go­
vernment and various collected private papers.
The first chapter deals with the appointment of Stack to succeed 
Sir Reginald Wingate; the economic and political effects on the Sudan 
of the first world war; the structure of the central government and the 
officials who directed it; and provincial administration. Stack's rela­
tions with Wingate and Viscount Allenby as high commissioners in Cairo 
are discussed.
Among the most important developments of Stack’s tenure were the 
emergence, on the one hand, of Sayyid ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi as leader 
of the revivified Mahdist sect, and, on the other, of secular opposition 
to the Sudan Government. The second chapter traces the rise of Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman, the nature of his support, and the government's attempts 
both to utilize and to limit his influence. The second part of the chap­
ter charts the tentative beginnings, after the war, of secular opposi­
tion, and in focussing on the disturbances of 192*f attempts to analyse 
the motives of this opposition and the response of the government to it.
The surge of Egyptian nationalism following the wax led to a fun­
damental change in the relationship of Egypt and Britain, the co- 
domini in the Sudan. The Sudan's prominent place in the complicated 
series of negotiations before and especially after the British declara­
tion to Egypt in February 1922, is considered in chapter three. An 
attempt is made to analyse the reasons for the breakdown in negoti­
ations that culminated in the British ultimatum to Egypt in November 
192^ following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. The ultimatum itself
and its consequences in the Sudan are considered in detail.
Revived Mahdism, secular opposition, and Egyptian hostility, com­
bined with a latent mistrust of educated Sudanese led the administration 
under Stack away from the direct, "bureaucratic” methods of the Wingate 
era toward Indirect Rule. This development is traced in the final chap­
ter, in which conclusions are reached regarding the nature of Indirect 
Rule in the Sudan and its consequences for the political future of the 
country.
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INTRODUCTION
The governor-generalship of Sir Lee Stack in the Sudan (1917- 
192*f) was a period of crucial importance in the political and economic 
history of the modem Sudan. It was a period both of transition and of 
rapid change. By 1917 the work of pacification and consolidation after 
the upheavals of the Mahdist era had been largely completed, at least 
in the north, by the Anglo-Egyptian condominium; by 1925 the Sudan had 
witnessed profound changes in its internal political environment, its 
relationships with Britain and Egypt, its economic base and administra­
tive attitudes and machinery. Presiding over this troubled and uncertain 
situation was Sir Lee Stack, the hand-picked successor of Sir Reginald 
Wingate. It was upon the foundations laid during Wingate's seventeen 
years as governor-general that Stack's, and all subsequent administra­
tions, were based.
When Stack assumed the govemor-generalship in 1917» the revenues 
of the Sudan stood at £E2, 1951355; by 192*f they had almost doubled, 
amounting to £Eft,298,856. The Gezira Scheme, at the time of its incep­
tion the most ambitious venture of its type ever undertaken in Africa, 
progressed in those eight years to near completion, and was to be the 
cornerstone of the future economic development of the country.
At the beginning of Stack's tenure the Ansar, the followers of 
the Mahdi, were only beginning to reemerge under the government- 
sponsored leadership of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, the Mahdi's son. But by 
1925 he had become arguably the most powerful man in the Sudan outside 
of the government, and in 1926 was made a K.B.E., culminating a spec­
tacular rise from the status of an obscure outcast to that of a reli­
gious and political force the government could not ignore. This evo­
lution was of great significance to the subsequent politics of the Sudan.
11
When Stack took office the government still viewed as the grea­
test threat to internal security renewed outbreaks of Mahdist-style
r
opposition, a revolt of irreconcilable, religiously motivated tribes­
men. At the end of his govemor-generalship, however, while this danger 
remained a cause for concern, domestic tranquility seemed most serious­
ly threatened by the emergence of a "Sudanese nationalism", traceable, 
in the government's view, to the influence of Egyptian nationalism and 
its agents in the Sudan, the Egyptian civil and military personnel. The 
rise of a secular opposition with real (if poorly articulated and mis­
understood) grievances was another landmark in political development.
That the Sudan Government saw (or chose to see) this new politi­
cal challenge as the result of Egyptian intrigue led inexorably to a 
crisis of Anglo-Egyptian relations in 192^, a crisis culminating in the 
British ultimatum to Egypt following the assassination in Cairo of Sir 
Lee Stack. In 1917 relations between the co-domini had been quiescent, 
for Egypt was a British protectorate, ruled in theory by the sultan 
and his ministers but in fact by a British high commissioner and advi­
sers to the ministers. When at the close of the world war Egyptian na­
tionalism burst ferociously to the surface it became clear that the in­
dependence of Egypt, however flawed its exercise, could be delayed but 
not prevented. The British declaration to E&ypt in 1922, however, re­
served certain points to future negotiation. In the ensuing series of 
abortive negotiations the Sudan figured prominently.
The relatively still waters of Wingate's Sudan had therefore been 
troubled under Stack by new and potentially dangerous forces: the per­
sonal authority of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, the unpredictable progenitors 
of nationalism, and the hostility of independent Egypt. This rapid 
change in circumstances produced a reaction in the attitudes prevai­
ling in the Sudan Government. Wingate's regime had. seen a slow and
12
steady extension of direct administration, a system buttressed by the 
certainty of its authors that they had brought peace and were now 
bringing the administrative, political and economic fruits of peace 
upon which the future of the modern Sudan would be solidly established. 
But opposition, whether irrational, externally-inspired or genuinely 
subscribed, produced in the minds of many officials, and in the spirit 
of the administration itself, profound doubt about this policy and a 
bitterness and resentment against those who appeared to reject what the 
British considered a selfless and heroic achievement. Hie result of these 
feelings was recourse to Indirect Rule, or rather, to invoking an 
amorphous concept of Indirect Rule to suppress the educated class the 
government had itself called into being and to rely instead on the dis­
integrating tribal structure for collaboration in building the institu­
tions of government. This change in policy, intrinsically attractive to 
leading figures in the government, was only encouraged by events. The 
dual policy of recruiting educated Sudanese for government service and 
co-opting traditional authority was the mainstay, of Stack's administra­
tive policy, but was finally abandoned at his death as the government 
fell into the hands of men committed to what was, in effect, a policy 
of tribalisatlon.
Sir Lee Oliver Fitzmaurice Stack was bom in India in 1868 and was 
educated at Clifton and Sandhurst. He joined the Egyptian Army in 1899 
and made his mark commanding the Shambe field force in the occupation 
of the Bahr al-Ghazal in 1902. He was private secretary to Wingate from 
190^ to 1907» when he was appointed Sudan agent in Cairo, a post then 
encompassing the duties of director of intelligence. In 191^ he was 
named civil secretary, a position he held until his appointment as 
acting sirdar and governor-general in 1917 when Wingate became high 
commissioner in Egypt. Stack laboured under the "acting" status dicta-
13
ted by Wingate until May 1919. He was created K.B.E. in 1918, and
G.B.E. in 1923. 1
Stack's citation in the Dictionary of National Biography notes
2
that "no conspicuous achievement stands to his credit", an undeniable 
fact which, however, pays insufficient attention to his role in these im­
portant years. The position of governor-general was such that the exer­
cise of its powers was dictated more by the personality and attitudes 
of its incumbent than by statutory constraints. Stack saw himself not
merely as "a ceremonial figurehead", as one subordinate has described 
3
him, but as constitutional head of state whose most important task 
was the day to day functioning of the administration. He was "very dif- 
fident, not one to throw his weight around".
Few men who served so long in responsible positions in Egypt and 
the Sudan can have been so popular as Sir Lee Stack. His influence in 
Cairo and London as well as in Khartoum was due not to intellectual 
power or military repute, but to his absolute ingenuousness that im­
pressed alike the junior inspector in the Sudan and the senior minister 
in Whitehall. As Sudan agent in the days when the intractable Kitchener 
was British agent and consul-general, Stack proved his mettle through 
persuasiveness and tact, a self-deprecating humour in dealings with 
the great man and an unquestionable loyalty to Wingate, to whom he was
1 P.G. Elgood, DNB, 1922-1930, pp. 802-803.
2 m a .. p. 803.
^ Interview with Sir George Schuster, 19/5/76.
L
Interview with Mr. George Bredin, 10/6/76.
l*f
both lieutenant and friend.  ^These same qualities, together with a 
high purpose, Stack brought to the civil secretary's office and the 
governor—generalship. He was unaffected by a lust for personal aggran­
disement, so his advice to Wingate was unprejudiced and usually accep­
ted. It was his combination of forthrightness and a military acceptance 
of place that made him Wingate's natural choice as his successor.
With remarkable consistency Stack's contemporaries have written 
and spoken of his "great charm" as his most notable characteristic. He 
was a "great gentleman", quiet, unassuming, indeed embarrassed by the 
trappings of his office, which never impressed him. The major criti­
cisms of Stack are that "he hated the idea of violent action", and
2
shied away from "taking the initiative to do unpleasant things". He 
was also, as was said during the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 192*+, 
"entirely ineffective in conversations", ^ although his few surviving 
letters were written in a clear and refreshing style. Stack was, in 
fact, a soldier-administrator of the Wingate school, but without either 
the force of character or the self-importance and penchant for adver­
tisement of his predecessor. One suspects that his relative anonymity 
owes as much to his view of history (he wrote few letters and saved 
none of his papers) as to history's view of him. Thus, in addition to 
all the political repercussions of his death, there was a genuine and
 ^In describing for Wingate a disagreement with Kitchener over arma­
ments, Stack wrote that he "felt on the whole [that his point of vie^ 
would be rather too strong a criticism for a major to make to a 
Field-Marshal.... I might as well have been talking to the Sphinx." 
(Stack to Wingate, 6/4/12, SAD l8l/l/3.) Stack signed his letters 
to Wingate simply, "Ever yours, Lee Stack".
2
Interview with Sir George Schuster, 19/5/76.
^ R.E.H. Baily, journal entry for 7/10/2*+, SAD *+22/13/1.
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universal outrage at the fact that he, of all people, should fall vic­
tim to the political currents of the time.
The record of Stack's govemor-generalship is therefore not domi­
nated by his or any other personality. As he- accepted his own limita­
tions, so he recognised the need for forceful and intelligent subordi­
nates. But the informality of Sudan Government procedures was such that 
a lack of leadership in one area was likely to be filled by someone 
charged with responsibility in another. Thus individuals could and did 
come to enjoy influence out of proportion with their places in the ad­
ministration without apparent attempts by the governor-general to put 
them in their place.
In the eight years of Stack's govemor-generalship he and they 
were tested as they had not been in the more controlled and predictable 
atmosphere of the Wingate years, though the problems they faced were 
rooted in events preceding even the Condominium. How they were tested 
and how and why they responded as they did form the subject of this 
study.
16
Chapter Is The Sudan Government Under Stack
Stack as governor-general
When Kitchener agreed to accept the post of secretary of state for 
war in 1914, he did so on the understanding that at the war*s conclu­
sion he would return to the Residency in Cairo. With his death on the 
••Hampshire” on 5 June 1916, the foreign office began the search for a 
successor to Sir Henry McMahon \  whose appointment had always been con­
sidered as temporary and who had, in any case, not made a success of
his term in Cairo. Several names came under consideration. In mid-July 
2
Lord Hardinge , the permanent under-secretary of state at the foreign
3
office, wrote to Sir Ronald Graham that both Graham and Sir Reginald 
Wingate were in the running. Graham had long wanted the post, and had, 
in fact, been considered for Cairo as early as 1911, but was unsuccess­
ful then because "everybody, with any knowledge of Egypt [agreed] that 
it would be a mistake to turn him on the spot from being a servant of
^ Col. Sir Arthur Henry McMahon (1862-1949) had spent most of his career 
in India where he was foreign secretary to the government from 1911 to 
1914. (MB, 1941-1950, pp. 563-#+.)
Charles Hardinge, first Baron Hardinge of Penhurst (1858-1944) was 
permanent under-secretary of state for foreign affairs from 1906 to 
1910 and from 1916 to 1920, and was viceroy of India from 1910 to 1916. 
(DNB. 1941-1950, pp. 356-58.)
^ Sir Ronald Graham (1870-1949) was adviser to the Egyptian ministry of 
the interior from 1910 to 1916, and minister plenipotentiary in 1916. 
He served as assistant under-secretary at the foreign office from 
1916 to 1919 and was H.B.M. ambassador in Rome from 1921 to 1933.
(MB, 1941-1950, pp. 313-14.)
4 Hardinge to Graham, n.d., quoted in Janice J. Terry, Sir Reginald 
Wingate as high commissioner in Egypt, 1917-1919. London, Ph.D.,
1968, p. 35.
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1 2 the Khedive into his master”. On 12 October 1916 Grey , the secretary
of state for foreign affairs, cabled Wingate that he considered
there is no one so well fitted as yourself, by your 
special knowledge and personal qualities, to fill the 
post, and I should like to submit your name for the 
appointment. Before doing so, however, I should like 
you to consider who could replace you in the Sudan and ~ 
whether you can leave that country at the present time. ^
Wingate did not hesitate in accepting the offer. In his letter to 
Grey he took the opportunity, however, to assert a novel claim to per­
sonal influence if he should be named high commissioner:
When the people and tribes [of the Sudan] understand that, 
from Egypt, I should continue to exercise supervision over 
their welfare, I venture to think any disquietude my de­
parture might cause would be allayed, and it is largely on 
this account that I would suggest that the officer ap­
pointed to carry out the dual duties of Governor-General 
and Sirdar should be, until the war is over, considered as 
holding these appointments temporarily, after which the 
question of his confirmation or otherwise could be gone into.
In the person of Colonel Stack, C.M.G.... I have an 
officer well-qualified to hold such a temporary position. He 
has considerable ability, is full of common-sense and tact, 
and has now had a combined military and civil experience ex­
tending over fifteen years in this country.... Also he is 
suitably married and he and his wife are good from the 
representative point of view. In order to give him the ne­
cessary prestige as Acting Sirdar, I consider that he might 
be made a temporary Major-General which would give him the 
required seniority. ^
tyrrell to Hardinge, 8/6/11, quoted in Terry, Sir Reginald Wingate, 
p. 30n. William George, first Baron Tyrrell (1866-1957) was senior 
clerk at the foreign office and private secretary to Girey from 1907 
to 1915. He was assistant under-secretary of state from 1919 to 1925 
and permanent under-secretary from 1925 to 1928. (DNB, 19^1-1950» pp. 
893-896.)
^ Sir Edward Grey, Bt., first Viscount Grey of Fallodon (1862-1933) 
was under-secretary of state for foreign affairs from 1892 to 1895» 
and secretary of state from 1905 to 1916. (DNB, 1931-1W), pp. 366-375*)
o
Grey to Wingate, 12/l0/l6, quoted in Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the 
Sudan. 2nd ed., Westport, Conn., 1975» P* 201.
a
Wingate to Grey, 12/10/16, F.O. 8^8/2.
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The foreign office consequently agreed to the appointment of Stack as
acting sirdar and acting governor-general. There seems to have been no
question at the time of separating the two posts, both tradition and
the exigencies of the war working against such a reform. In November the
following communique was released in Khartoum:
The appointment of Sir Reginald Wingate to be His Majesty's 
High Commissioner for Egypt will not involve a severance of 
His Excellency's connec+ion with the Sudan and its admini­
stration. On this account His Excellency deprecates, as un­
necessary and out of place, formal demonstrations or cere­
monies of farewell on his departure to Cairo.
The dual functions of Governor-General of the Sudan 
and Sirdar of the Egyptian Army will be performed, under 
Sir Reginald Wingate's general direction, by Colonel 
L.O.F. Stack Pasha, C.M.G., the Civil Secretary, Sudan Go­
vernment, who will be appointed Acting Governor-General 
and Acting Sirdar for the period of the War.
Some members of the personal staff of His Excellency 
the Governor-General and Sirdar will accompany His Excel­
lency to Cairo to maintain close and constant inter­
communication between Sir Reginald Wingate in Cairo and , 
the Acting Governor-General and Acting Sirdar at Khartoum.
Stack's appointment came as no surprise. If the choice was to be 
made from the ranks of the Sudan Government, and since the sirdarship 
and govemor-generalship were to continue to be combined, a military 
man of some experience in the country was required. Stack's long working 
relationship with Wingate, and his discretion and ability to work well 
with his chief left little room in Wingate's mind for a rival, and the 
appointment was clearly Wingate's to make. To the outside world, how­
ever, Stack was an unknown quantity. General opinion might well have 
been summed up by Cromer, who told Wingate, "I thought you would name
Stack to act at Khartoum. I believe he is a good man, though I do not
2
remember much about him.”
^ F.O. 371/3722. Stack's appointment was announced in the Sudan Gazette 
on 1 January 1917. (Sudan Gazette. No. 312, l/l/l7.)
 ^Cromer to Wingate, l/l2/l6, SAD 202/5.
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What remains something of a mystery is Wingate's stipulation that 
Stack be appointed as "acting" sirdar and governor-general. Both pub­
licly and privately Wingate's only reason for this was his concern with 
the possibility of some kind of Sudanese reaction to his departure 
which might have a detrimental effect on the war effort. He felt, he 
later said, that the "acting" arrangement had "evidently pleased the 
people of the Sudan, who are peculiarly susceptible to individual go­
vernment, and having been with them for the last 17 years the idea of 
a complete severance was repugnant to them". ^ How he gauged this plea­
sure and potential repugnance is not clear, and, in any event, the ap­
prehended dangers required only one day's consideration before he ac­
cepted transfer. Further, if considerations of "individual government" 
and prestige were of a paramount nature, the "acting" status of a suc­
cessor implicitly lacking the full confidence of the British government 
might be thought to have exacerbated any unsettled public mood. The suc­
cess of the Sudan Government in winning Sudanese opinion to the British 
side in the war was, at least as viewed and expressed by Khartoum, a not 
inconsiderable achievement, but it is valid at least to speculate how 
far this was due to Wingate's personal prestige as distinct from the 
policies of the government from the outset of war and conditions pre­
valent in the Sudan that favoured tranquility. Further, that Wingate's 
supervision, as exercised from Cairo was, despite his expressed inten­
tion, in fact minimal, argues against the idea that he planned an active 
role in Sudan affairs. It is reasonable, therefore, to attribute Wingate's
 ^Wingate to General (later Field Marshal) Sir W. Robertson, 23/11/16,
SAD 202/3. To a mass of congratulatory telegrams Wingate replied in a 
similar vein. To a relation he wrote that "the new arrangement where­
by I continue to generally control the affairs of the Sudan from Cairo 
mitigates the general regret, especially on the part of the natives, 
at our severance". (Wingate to Capt. G.M. Wingate, 10/12/16,
SAD 202/4-. )
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designation of Stack as his "acting” successor to personal rather than 
political motives.
Wingate had, at the time of his appointment to Cairo, been 
governor-general for seventeen years. Under the terms of the 1899 con­
vention, and by virtue of his own instincts he had become a virtual 
autocrat in the Sudan. That this was politically justifiable and psycho­
logically effective does not detract from the view that Wingate felt a 
personal stake in the Sudan. Indeed, he went so far as to write that he 
would "have in Stack an excellent 'wekil'".  ^While there is no direct 
evidence that Wingate entertained a plan to return to the Sudan (his 
appointment to Cairo was not, after all, on an "acting" basis) his bio­
grapher writes that in a confrontation with the foreign office in March 
1917 over the incumbency of Lord Edward Cecil as financial adviser in 
Egypt, Wingate threatened that he was "'prepared to make room for some­
one else, and to return to the Sudan'", and, if he did, he would require 
direct access to London rather than the customary indirect access through 
Cairo. Two facts therefore emerge from Wingate's attitude toward his 
successor: that to Wingate the Sudan had assumed the dimension of a 
personal fief, something, perhaps, to "fall back" upon; secondly, and 
more important, if things in Egypt went badly, that his long-standing 
arguments in favour of lessening Cairo's control over Khartoum were not 
entirely based on bureaucratic and political grounds, but were operative 
only so long as he himself was governor-general. In any event, it was 
only with Wingate's departure from the Residency that Stack was con-
1 Wingate to Lt. Col. S.S. Butler, 10/12/16, SAD 202/4. A "wekil" is
a proxy, agent, trustee.
2
Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, p. 208.
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firmed in his dual position, in 1919» six months after the armistice. 
Stack by then had laboured under the "acting" label for two and a half 
years. More important than the reasons behind Stack's status were the 
effects it had on his performance as governor-general, and on his re­
lationship with Wingate in Cairo.
The proper relationship between His Majesty's representative in 
Cairo and the governor-general cf the Sudan had never been clearly de­
fined, and this had led inevitably to conflicts as to the areas of re­
sponsibility of each. Under Cromer, Gorst \  and Kitchener, Cairo's 
right of ultimate control was never openly questioned by Wingate, es­
pecially before 1913? until which date Egypt contributed an annual sub­
vention to the Sudan budget. Cromer had constantly sought to check a 
desire he perceived of the Sudan Government to strike out on its own.
As he wrote to Wingate in 1904s
I constantly notice a tendency to consider the Soudan as 
a separate and independent Government, more or less un­
connected with Egypt. It is nothing of the kind.... In 
politics, as in music, those who pay the piper have a 
right to call the tune.... 2
Cromer's position and enormous prestige made it impossible for Wingate
to counter such an argument. There is no doubt that he resented this
Sir John Eldon Gorst (1861-1911) was financial adviser to the Egyptian 
government from 1898 to 1904, and assistant under-secretary of state 
at the foreign office from 1904 to 1907» at which point he succeeded 
the retiring Cromer in Cairo. (Hill, BD, p. 141.)
. ^  Cromer to Wingate, 25/1/04, F.O. 633/8/390. A few months later Cromer 
wrote in even stronger terms: "the only justification for paying 
large sums from the Egyptian Treasury to the Soudan Government is that 
the Soudan is not independent of Egypt.... To suppose that the Soudan 
Government can be left without some effective control is not merely a 
dream, but a most pernicious dream". (Cromer to Wingate, 3/5/0^?
F.O. 633/8/396.)
control, as he wrote to Gilbert Clayton  ^that Cromer had been "con­
sidered by our Govt, as the supreme authority - both Civil and Mili­
tary - in Egypt and the Sudan although - if one hunted up chapter and
2
verse for his Constitutional right to this, one would not find it". 
Unable to loosen the ties between Residency and Palace, Wingate was re­
stricted to other fields in his quest to exclude Egypt and Egyptian in­
fluence from the Sudan. This can be seen in his censorship of Egyptian
newspapers coming into the Sudan, and the award of British rather than
3
Egyptian honours to distinguished Sudanese. But Cromer left the scene 
in 1907. Under his successors, Gorst, Kitchener, and especially 
McMahon, control from Cairo continued to decrease.
The relations between Wingate as high commissioner and Stack 
were coloured by the latter's "acting" status. Stack's reports and pri­
vate letters to Wingate make evident the feeling, which was mutual, 
that Stack was very much the junior partner. Stack continued to refer 
to Wingate, in his personal correspondence, as "Master"; the latter was 
unquestionably the dominant personality. This is not to say that Resi­
dency supervision of the Sudan increased during his tenure. Indeed, de­
spite his knowledge of Sudan affairs and his relegation of Stack to the 
role of "wekil", Wingate did not exercise greater power over Khartoum
 ^Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton (1875-1929) became Wingate's private 
secretary in 1908, and Sudan agent in Cairo in 191^» when he was 
also director of military intelligence. He bacame adviser to the 
Egyptian ministry of interior in 1919» resigning in 1922. He was 
chief secretary in Palestine from 1922 to 1925. (DNB, 1922-1930,
P. 187.)
^ Wingate to Clayton, 13/9/16, SAD ^ 70/3.
^ See Wingate to Grey, 8/10/16, SAD 202/1; and Wingate to Graham, 
16/3/l7» F.O. 371/3711. See also Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan under 
Wingate, administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1916. 
London, 1971* PP. 16-19.
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than did his Residency predecessors. The power to do so remained "con­
stitutionally" (that is to say, by tradition and foreign office fiat) 
intact, but went largely unexercised.
Indeed, Wingate's involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the 
Sudan during the early wax years had been considerably less than it had 
been previously. Even before Wingate's departure for Cairo in late De­
cember of 1916, Stack complained that
For a fortnight at least the Sirdar has done nothing in 
the way of either commanding the Army or governing the 
country, and comes across to me with 'This will affect you 
more than me'. Hedjaz and Hedjaz alone has occupied him....
For some time after Master gets down to Cairo I doubt his 
having the time to worry much about the Sudan and in fact 
his only instructions to me are to carry on and keep him 
informed of anything which I consider he should be told. 1
And while attempting to grapple with the problems of the Sudan in his
first months as governor-general, Stack complained: "Not much do I get
from the Residency. It is a case of 'out of sight cut of mind' as far
2as the poor old Sudan is concerned." And again, two months later, he 
wrote that "Master has been very good up to a point but I notice a dis­
tinct waning of interest in any problems that axe likely to be trouble- 
3some". So far from any direct influence being brought to bear by the 
Residency, the opposite was the case; Wingate's claim Id "general su­
pervision" of Sudan affairs was thus at most a formal restatement of 
the traditional but ill-defined dependence of the governor-general on 
the Residency. Wingate's claim was little more, in effect, than to an
^ Stack to Clayton, 18/12/16, SAD 470/7. Wingate had been made General 
Officer Commanding the Hedjaz in June 1916.
^ Stack to Clayton, 22/3/17» SAD 470/6.
3 Stack to Clayton, 19/5/17, SAD 470/6.
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honorific implication of a power which, whether potential or not, was 
rarely exercised by him.
There is no doubt, however, that Stack's anomalous position was
personally and professionally detrimental. He expressed his annoyance
to Clayton, a trusted confidant:
You have hit the nail on the head when you say that this 
acting business hampers me considerably. If the war goes on 
a good bit longer it will be neither satisfactory to myself 
nor in the interests of this country. I have never seen the 
telegrams which passed between the late Governor General 
and the F.O. on the subject but the former gave me to un­
derstand that I was to be acting for the duration of the 
war and that no promises could be made as to the future.
Prom whom the suggestion emanated that this should be the 
position I don't know but it is possible that it was put 
forward as the best policy to adopt in order to persuade 
the people of the Sudan that the Governor Genl. of the 
Sudan was only moving his headquarters to Cairo but would 
still look after them through a 'wakil' - myself, whom they 
knew. The changed order of things has now been generally 
accepted and as far as the people here are concerned they 
never think of my being Acting so there is no reason for 
it on that score. Prom a personal point of view it does 
not seem fair to continue it much longer. I get the re­
sponsibility but not the pay nor do I benefit my pension 
by a farthing and at the end may be shelved with thanks 
as I have no job to go back to. Prom the public point of 
view there is no doubt in my mind that a permanent man 
should be appointed soon and I would be quite prepared to 
make way for him by asking to be allowed to retire....
With this insecurity of tenure, it is not much good my 
sitting down to think out reforms that are needed which I 
may not be here to put through. 1
He reiterated the point two months later:
The more experience I get in my acting capacity, -the more 
I realize it would be in the interests of all to appoint 
some one definitely to the job. It is unsettling for the 
official class who don't know exactly where they are and 
this 'stop gap* business is rough on the country. I don't 
want it permanently for myself and would not take it if 
offered as I think someone of seniority from home should 
be appointed and not one like myself who has risen from 
the 'bunch'. 2
1 Stack to Clayton, 19/5/17, SAD 470/6.
2 Stack to Clayton, 15/7/17, SAD 470/6.
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No doubt concerned that his motives might be questioned, Stack 
was reluctant to broach this matter with Wingate until he felt certain 
that political considerations demanded it. Thus, during the Egyptian 
crisis of 1918-19, when the status of the Sudan was openly questioned 
in Egypt, Stack wrote to Wingate suggesting that one way to "dispel 
any doubt there may be in the native mind as to the intentions of His 
Majety's Govt, in regard to the future of the Sudan" would be "the de­
finite appointment of a Governor General and Sirdar". Stack hastened to 
add that he was "willing to retire at any time" in favour of a succes­
sor. ^ Wingate agreed with Stack's argument, and urged the foreign of­
fice to act on Stack's "confirmation or otherwise" with a view toward
" 2
"keeping the Egyptian and Sudan questions totally apart". The explo­
sion of the 1919 Egyptian revolt intervened, however, and the official
3
announcement of Stack's appointment was not made until 12 May 1919.
Wingate as high commissioner was preoccupied, with much greater 
issues than the administration of the Sudan; among them difficult prob­
lems of personnel; matters relating to the prosecution of the war; and 
the nationalist threat. Indeed, as has been touched upon, his last 
months in Khartoum had been devoted largely to affairs outside thfe 
Sudan. Because of this, Stack's first problems as governor-general had 
to do with transition, staffing, and matters neglected by Wingate. For 
such work he felt himself well prepared; "My time as C.S. Qcivil secre-
^ Stack to Wingate (personal), 22/12/18, F.O. 371/3711.
^ Wingate to Hardinge (private), 27/12/18, F.O. 371/3711.
3
Journal Officiel du Gouvemement Egyptien, no. 43, 12/3/19,
F.O. 371/3711.
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tary] ”, he wrote, "was most useful as owing to Master's absorbtion 
in propaganda, private letters and Hedjaz a lot fell into my hands".  ^
Staffing was a serious and persistent problem. When Wingate left 
for Cairo he took with him a number of his most important and know­
ledgeable lieutenants, apparently without regard to how they would be 
used in Cairo, or of how they could be replaced in Khartoum. Stack 
wrote that
Symes as I told you I expected him CWingate] always to 
take as he has become so dependent on him for all drafting 
purposes but K-B 3 he might have left. Patterson has been 
for so many years his stenographer and has typed his most 
private letters that he would never let him go.... I really 
think that what decided him to take all these with him is 
the Hedjaz business. He hates being parted from any of those 
who have been helping him in that connection....^
The problems of staff - the consequence of Wingate's requisition, the
limitations on recruitment caused by the war, and personal conflicts -
severely limited Stack's ability to get on with the job. He complained
that he was
1 Stack to Clayton, 14/1/17, SAD 470/6.
p
Lt. Col. Sir George Stewart Symes (1882-1962) had served as A.D.C. 
to Wingate and as assistant director of intelligence. At the time of 
Wingate's departure for Cairo, Symes was his private secretary. He 
later became governor of Tanganyika and was governor-general of the 
Sudan from 1934 to 1940. (WWW, 1961-1970, p. 1098.)
^ Sir Alexander William Keown-Boyd (1884-195*0 was a member of the 
Sudan civil service from 1907 to 1916, and was private secretary to 
Wingate in Cairo from 1917 to 1919. He was Oriental secretary to Lord 
Allenby, Wingate's successor, from 1919 to 1922, and held several 
posts in the Egyptian interior ministry. (WWW. 1951-1960, p. 614.) 
Keown-Boyd was sent to Khartoum in 1920 by the Milner mission to 
report on several areas of Sudan affairs, and the Miner report's 
recommendations regarding the Sudan were largely his.
** Stack to Clayton, 18/12/16, SAD 470/7.
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working here in the Palace with practically one of 
everything in place of two or three as the case may 
be under the old regime. One Private Sec., one native
A.D.C., one stenographer, no Arabic clerk. This shor­
tage with an Acting A.G., acting C.S. and Acting M.S. 
throws a good deal more on me personally than should 
be the case. 1
In addition to his army and government work, Stack also decided to sit
on the Promotion Board, in consequence of which he wondered "what would
be thought if it was known that 2 hours a day is all ... I have been
2
able to devote to what I am being paid for". When the work of the 
Promotion Board was completed he had still to deal with the other per­
sonnel problems - "legacies", as he called them - left by Wingate.
While it seems that most members of the Khartoum establishment 
cooperated with Stack in this transition period, differences only with 
difficulty submerged during the Wingate years could not be prevented 
from surfacing. Stack was fortunately well aware of the problems of tem­
perament he would have to face after his years as civil secretary, and 
was confident that while "one or two may possibly try to bounce me to
3
begin with", he would soon be able to control the situation:
The endeavour to reconcile clashing personalities such as 
the intractable Kennedy, 4 the dilatory Bernard, 5 although
^ Stack to Clayton, 22/3/17> SAD 470/6. The initials refer respectively
to adjutant—general, civil secretary, and military secretary.
2 Stack to Clayton, 4/l/l7, SAD 4-70/6.
^ Stack to Clayton, 14/l/l?, SAD 470/6.
^ Macdougall Ralston Kennedy Pasha (1873-1924) was director of the pub­
lic works department from 1906 to 1916, and was largely responsible 
for the construction of Port Sudan. (Hill, BD, p. 198.) He resigned 
on 4 April 1917. (Sudan Gazette, no. 319» 14/7/17.)
Sir Edgar Bernard Pasha (1866-1931) served in the Nile campaign of 
1898 and was assistant adjutant-general of the Egyptian Army in 1899. 
He became financial secretary to the Sudan Government in 1902 and re­
tired in 1922. (Hill, BD, p. 79.)
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the latter as far as in his nature lies, is playing up,
Hewison and Sawer 2, Crispin and Christopherson 3 all 
requires an amount of patience. Yet I do not despair of 
getting them all to work eventually as far as they can 
for the good of the whole and sink their individualities. ^
But the problem continued:
Kennedy is a bit trying these times. He has taken the 
opportunity of the change I am afraid to bring things 
to a head with Bernard. I am being deluged with corres­
pondence objecting to most minutes he gets from the lat­
ter and questioning his right to give certain financial 
decisions without previous reference to me. It makes it 
very difficult for me as I have been gradually getting 
Bernard to see the desirability of altering certain 
methods of his and given time I feel I shall be able to 
effect a certain improvement, but I want the time. We 
are being desperately handicapped for want of staff and 
now the War Office say we can only have 2 out of 5 Agri­
cultural Officers and 1 out of 4 Veterinary Officers we 
asked for. 5
The most serious shortage was caused by the curtailment during 
the war years of recruitment into the Sudan Civil Service. In the years 
1910-1914, twenty-on** new officers had been taken on. But for the period 
1915“1918, the total was a mere six. That this was much fewer than nee­
ded may be seen by the number of new officers recruited immediately
R. Hewison (1876-1975), then assistant director of agriculture, en­
tered the Sudan Government service in 1904, and later became direc­
tor of agriculture and a member of the governor-general*s council.
2
E.R. Sawer was appointed to the government in 1912 and was principal 
of the agricultural school and the experimental station at Khartoum 
North.
^ Dr. E.S. Crispin (1874-1958) was appointed in 1901. Dr. J.B. Chris- 
topherson (1887-?) was mistakenly offered the same post, and was 
eventually appointed in 1902. In 1904 Christopherson was appointed 
director of the civil medical service, whereupon Crispin resigned and 
took up an independent post at the building site of Port Sudan. In 
1908 Chris topherson was appointed director of hospitals and Crispin 
became assistant director of the medical service. In 1915 he was made 
director, and in 1919 was appointed to the governor-general's council, 
a seat he held until his retirement in 1922. For details see H.C. 
Squires, The Sudan medical service, London, 1958, pp. 4-5, et passim.
4 Stack to Clayton, 22/2/17, SAD 470/6.
5
^ Stack to Clayton, 22/3/17, SAD 470/6.
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after the war: in 1919-20 they totalled no fewer than thirty-four. ^
It should be remembered also that Darfur was annexed in 1916, adding 
a huge new territory that must be staffed, however inadequately, at 
least to keep the peace.
A further difficulty resulted from the poor organisation of the 
central government. Wingate's methods, uninfluenced from the start by 
personal administrative experience, evolved therefore along military and 
highly personal lines. The regime of Wingate and Slatin Pasha, his in­
spector-general and closest associate, was characterized by an insuf­
ficient delegation of authority, and this resulted, in Stack's words, 
in a "mass of trivial detail that is daily poured into the Palace in 
the shape of unimportant correspondence and returns - but when a whole
administration has been trained to report the most minor matters it is
2
difficult for it to switch off and draw a line.” Stack tried to cor­
rect this, but the habits of long years of at least theoretical authori­
tarian control by the Palace and the poorly delimited areas of respon­
sibility within the bureaucracy made this a difficult if not impossible 
problem. Its solution was to await gradual and important changes of 
personnel.
In his role as sirdar, too, there were immediately matters to 
clear up. Stack complained of yet another "legacy" in this regard, in 
the form of Egyptian officers "being placed on disponibility, interned, 
etc. without adequate record being left of the reasons for disposing
^ MacMichael, SPS.
2 Stack to Clayton, 28/6/17, SAD 470/6.
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of them thus...." ^ Stack took his military duties seriously, probably
the more so because he considered that the army was suffering from a
long period of neglect. In March 1917 he reported that he was "having
a series of inspections, not hunts looking about whom to shake hands
2
with and acknowledge the salutes of". In June he wrote that he was
looking into Army matters and find a good deal of reorga­
nizing wants doing there. Some of the various matters are 
Pensions for old Sudanese soldiers, adoption of double 
company system, new military law, regulations as to putting 
officers on disponibility, the block in promotion ... the 
rearmament with the magazine rifle, the reequipment with 
webbing.... I have not too much time to devote to it my­
self so have Committees at work ... tackling details. 3
Wingate, by virtue both of position and inclination, had built up 
a strong personal influence in the Sudan, based on a correct but pater­
nal relationship with leading Sudanese personalities. Stack, because 
of his "acting" status, his rise from the ranks of Wingate's subordi­
nates, and his own <?5.sinclination to the type of pomp beloved of Win­
gate, was never to achieve a similar relationship. In the early part of 
his regime he was wary of the native reaction to him personally, and, 
as it was bound to be influenced by this, to his government generally. 
He suffered no illusions about his own position, as evidenced by a let­
ter written in his first month as acting governor-general, in which he 
noted that "a steady stream of notables paying their visits of ceremony 
(are) to be interviewed, a case of . ..'le roi est mort vive le roi*".
1 9 
Stack to Clayton, 28/6/17, SAD 470/6.
2 Stack to Clayton, 22/3/17, SAD 470/6.
^ Stack to Clayton, 28/6/17, SAD 470/6.
^ Stack to Clayton, 7/1/17, SAD 470/6.
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Stack did. not evade the ceremonial aspects of his offices. He looked 
upon them not as a source of entertainment or test of popularity, and 
certainly not as rituals to he disdained, hut as an integral part of 
his work. Indeed, in this sense he viewed the post of governor-general 
rather as that of head of State than head of government. While, of 
course, there was no constitutional or legal hasis for this view, it 
is nonetheless indicative of the way the governor-generalship evolved 
under him in respect to the other offices of government in the Sudan. 
His early embarrassment with the ceremonial side of office can he seen 
\ in his uncertain reaction to his first official tour as governor-
general. He told Wingate that the apparent enthusiasm of his reception 
was "due", in at least one instance, "to merissa" and to the nostalgia 
evoked hy a telegram of greeting from Wingate which Stack read to the 
assembled shaykhs "in all the places I visited'*.  ^But a 1921 tour to 
the south of Khartoum, for example, was conducted with an unabashed en­
thusiasm and appreciation of the value to the government's currency
2of conducting his office with a high degree of dignity.
But hy virtue of character and personality and his experience 
as Sudan agent and civil secretary, Stack was much more of a "team 
player" than his predecessor. Whereas Wingate was inherently suspicious 
of any limits imposed upon his authority either from within the Sudan 
or from Cairo, Stack envisaged his role as a constitutional one - the 
1899 convention and subsequent ordinances and informal arrangements 
forming his stautory limits. Whereas Wingate relegated some matters,
1 Stack to Wingate, 22/4/17, SAD 470/6.
2
Luther Martin, "H.E. the sirdar and governor general's inspection 
tour south of Khartoum, March 1921", n.d., SAD G// s 421.
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in'which he was unintersted or for which he had not the time, to subor­
dinates, Stack was to rely increasingly on subordinates, individually 
and collectively. This can be seen clearly in the greatly increased re­
sponsibility, throughout the Stack years, of the governor-general's 
council. Established in 1910, it was intended as a purely advisory 
body whose advice could be accepted or rejected without obligation to 
the governor-general. Its general effect, in one view, was to ’’intro­
duce a greater element of constitutionalism into the administration”.  ^
Since the Condominium Agreement had vested sole responsibility in the 
governor-general, it was a sound policy that some statutory delegation 
of that responsibility should be devised. But under Wingate the council 
was little more than a grouping together in one place at one time of 
officials whom he continued as before to consult privately as subor­
dinates. In a letter to the war office in 1919# Major Kennedy complained 
of Wingate*s dealings with the council, of which he had been a members
When anything really important had to be discussed and 
definitely dealt with, it was never, if such a course 
could be avoided, brought before the Council in accor­
dance with the rules of the Council, but it was dis­
cussed informally and, if a smooth and easy path did not 
become evident at the informal discussion, the matter 
was conveniently shelved. 2
The council was, therefore, not an independent authority but, in fact,
could be used by Wingate to add weight to his own position in dealings
with Cairo. His council consisted of the inspector-general (Slatin),
the civil, legal and financial secretaries, and between two and four
additional members appointed by the governor-general. In 1919# the
Governor-General*s Council Ordinance was amended so that the council
^ Sir Harold MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. London, 193^ # p. 113.
For details see Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 7 -^77.
 ^Kennedy to war office, 10/1/19# F.O. 371/3712.
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would be composed of the three secretaries, "together with not less 
than two or more than five additional members to be appointed by the 
Governor-General".  ^This amendment removed the anomaly of the inspec­
tor-general' s seat on the council, as with his departure in 1914,
Slatin's post became defunct. The number of council meetings diminished 
steadily under Wingate from twenty-five in its first year to a mere 
four in 1916. ^
This trend was reversed under Stack. In 1917 the council met
nine times; in 1916, eleven times; in 1919» seventeen times; in 1920,
sixteen times; in 1921, fifteen times; in 1922, seventeen times; in
1923» nine times; and in 1924, seventeen times. J From the time of
Stack's appointment the council gradually gained more authority. The
principle of consultation having been established, it would have been
difficult for Stack, who in any case considered himself primus inter
pares, to ignore the council's advice or diminish its role. In 1919 it
felt sufficiently sure of its position to note that "its duties cannot
be properly discharged by merely registering decisions reached else- 
4
where". At its next meeting, the council referred to this complaint 
(which had dealt with a decision to raise the price of sugar, a govern­
ment monopoly) and retracted somewhat, yet noted that
 ^Sudan Gazette, no. 342, 16/2/19. The appointed members were usually 
heads of the more important departments such as the general manager 
of the Sudan Railways, the director of education, and the director 
of medical services. Other officials were, as occasion required, in­
vited to participate, and during leave season acting directors sat 
on the council.
2
Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 76.
3
Minute-books of governor-general's council meetings, 1917-24.
4 Governor-general's council minute-book: record of meeting of 
11/11/19.
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The Council recognises that His Excellency in everything 
that was done in London and Cairo considered he was car­
rying out the wishes of the Council, and regrets that their 
understanding of the situation was not made clearer to 
His Excellency. ^
This reference to "carrying out the wishes of the Council” is impor­
tant. It certainly marks the first time a council implied that its 
wishes should Le carried out. Such a claim would have been highly un­
likely in Wingate's day. Stack's relations with the council, insofar as 
they may be gauged from the formal record of the minute-books and 
sketchy personal recollections, were consistently harmonious and reflec­
ted both his respect for its implicit function as a cabinet and his own 
lack of jealousy for maintaining the govemor-generalship in the form 
in which he succeeded to it. In 1926 the council was instrumental in 
forcing the resignation of Sir Geoffrey Archer, Stack's successor.
After many disagreements, culminating in Archer's ostentatious visit 
to Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi at Aba Island in February 1926, which 
the council felt to have been in contravention of its advice, the
council passed what amounted to a vote of "no-confidence” in Archer.
2This left no alternative for the governor-general out to resign.
^ Governor-general's council minute-book: record of meeting of 
15/11/19.
^ See Lloyd to Chamberlain, 10/4/26, F.O. 371/11612. Cf. Archer's 
memoirs, Personal and historical memoirs of an East African admini­
strator t London, 1963* pp. 241-254.
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The Sudan during the later wax years (1917-1918)
The outbreak of the European War had been a source of great con­
cern to the Sudan Government. Occuring as it did just fifteen years 
after the Anglo-Egyptian occupation, it was feared that the opening of 
hostilities between Britain and the Ottoman Empire would elicit a sym­
pathetic reaction for the latter based on common religion and in dis­
regard of the historic Sudanese antipathy toward the Turk.
The attitude of the Sudanese toward the Ottoman Empire was not 
left to chance. An intelligence report for October, 1914 had suggested
that, in the event of Turkey's entering the war, "native opinion and
sentiments ... will require to be carefully studied and discreetly 
guided."  ^This was to be done by informing "the more intelligent sec­
tions of native opinion, through their leaders and the efficient medium
2
of the local press", of the "facts". It is impossible to judge how 
great was the actual danger, still harder to assess the validity of the 
Sudan Government's concern based on the information at its disposal. But 
clearly the apprehended threat of a Sudanese reaction, based on religious 
appeal, was strong enough to evoke memories, only dormant, of the early 
days of the Mahdia. Indeed, Wingate is reported to have been "obses­
sed with the idea that if Turkey joined Germany against us the Sudanese
3
would feel bound to co-operate with the Turks". ^ If he were to respond
1 SIR, October 1914, F.O. 371/3711.
2
Report by the governor-general on the general situation in the Sudan 
during the first two years of the war, enclosed in Wingate to sec­
retary of state for war, 8/8/16, F.O. 371/3713.
3
C.A. Willis, "Sidelights on the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan", unpublished 
memoir, n.d., p. 72. Gorst once wrote that Wingate was "by nature 
an alarmist". (Gorst to Grey, 22/6/08, quoted in Warburg, The Sudan 
under Wingate, p. 38.)
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inappropriately, it would be on the side of too great rather than too 
little vigilance. It was, he wrote, "essential ... to disabuse the na­
tive mind of the notion, which was being insidiously introduced from ex 
ternal sources, that the British power was on the wane; most of the pre
liminary measures taken were directed toward this end.”  ^These inclu-
2
ded a "rigid censorship of the press and telegrams , which, as evi­
dences of enemy propaganda multiplied, was subsequently extended to all 
correspondence"; searches of baggage and persons at the frontiers; and 
"an active counter-propaganda, directed against Germany and her allies" 
Conveniently, martial law had never been lifted, thus obviating its im- 
position in 191^ » and deportations occurred under its provisions. J
Report by the governor-general on the general situation.
2
Internal censorship was instituted "in consequence of a very serious 
campaign of seditious literature being started in Egypt". But "the 
censorship was very considerably modified after Dec. 18th, 1916 as 
it was found that the greater part of the inhabitants were entirely 
out of sympathy with the movement and nothing was discovered to 
cause uneasiness in internal communications". ("Report on the censor­
ship in the Sudan from the outbreak of hostilities in August 191^" 
by A.E. Robinson, chief censor, Sudan Government, 10/3/20, SGA,
INTEL 1/20/106.) It will be noted that this "modification" coinci­
ded with Wingate’s departure for Cairo, which suggests a difference 
of opinion between Wingate and Stack over the necessity for internal 
censorship.
3
Report by the governor-general on the general situation.
4 "Report on the censorship".
^ M.V. Morris, "Political intelligence report", 12/7/18, SGA, INTEL 
l/8/4o. For details of the precautions taken by the government at 
the beginning of the war, see Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, 
pp. 106-108.
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Such measures as censorship and deportations aside, however, it 
was considered of paramount importance to associate the Sudan Govern­
ment with the religious and secular notables in the minds of the 
people. This was to be done primarily through religious appeals. In his 
famous address to the *ulama1 on 8 November 1914 (which was released 
outside the Sudan only in edited form) Wingate portrayed Britain as the
historic defender of Islam, and the Turks as the real enemies of the
Sudanese:
Not content with the overthrow of the Sultan 
Abdul Hamid ... unrestrainedly the loss, through 
their mismanagement and maladministration, of the 
European and other former provinces of their Empire, 
these men - this syndicate of Jews, financiers and
low-born intriguers - like broken gamblers ... have- - * - ■ - *...
gone to war with the one Power who has ever been a 
true and sympathetic friend to the Moslems and to 
Islam. 1
While deportations, censorship, and assurances to the<ulama1 
were designed to allay the townspeople, the real cause for concern was 
the revived spectre of fanatic hordes of tribesmen rising up in pseudo- 
Mahdist revolution. Wingate viewed the Sudanese as possibly biding 
their time until just such a moment as this to eject the British and 
revert to their old ways. Such incidents of "revivalist activity” as
did occur were promptly dealt with, "with or without xhe despatch of re-
2 3gular troops to the scene". The high commissioner’s Report for 1914-19
"His Excellency the governor-general's speech to the ulema", en­
closed in private secretary to Symes, 20/3/19» SGA, INTEL l/8/4l. 
The phrase "this syndicate of Jews ... intriguers" was omitted by 
Stack when the speech was passed on for use in The empire at war, 
a history of the period.
2
Report by the governor-general on the general situation.
3
Reports were not issued during the war, but one Report for the 
years 1914-19 appeared in 1920. From 1921 the Reports, which were 
published as command papers, were filed separately for the Sudan 
rather than combined with the Reports for Egypt.
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noted that the estimated population of the Sudan in 191^ was four mil­
lion,  ^who were "governed hy about 110 British officers and offi- 
2
cials". The total strength of regular forces in the country was
3
elsewhere listed as fourteen thousand of all ranks. This was consi­
dered insufficient. Wingate felt it necessary, therefore, to agree to 
a fundamental change in government policy that was to have profound 
and long-range effects.
Until the war the government had recognised the*ulama' as the 
sole spokesmen for religious sentiment. Tariqas. although officially 
ignored, were of course closely watched. The Ansar were strictly en­
joined from all outward displaying of their faith, and Mahdist ex­
officials remained imprisoned, or under house arrest, or were carefully 
restricted in their activities. The family of the Mahdi were especi­
ally suspect. But at the outbreak of the war it was reluctantly and 
tacitly admitted that the only supra-tribal figures with any personal 
authority were the religious leaders, notably the "three sayyids": 
Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi^ and, especially, Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani and 
Sayyid*Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, the Mahdi's son. The government consi­
dered that there was little alternative to lifting some of the restric-
 ^Annual Report for 191^-19» 1920, Cmd. 957• Population figures given 
in various Sudan Government publications from the time of the occupa­
tion should be taken cum grano salis, if not rejected outright. It is, 
in fact, possible that the Sudan's population was deliberately under­
estimated at the time of the Anglo-Egyptian occupation, in order to 
stress the catastrophe of Mahdism and the beneficence of Condominium 
rule, under which the growth of the population, if taken at face va­
lue, would be quite remarkable. In any case, no reliable statistics 
exist for this period. Cf. the League of Nations, International sta­
tistical year-book, 1926, Geneva, 1927, in which the population of 
the Sudan was listed as 5*825,000 in 1913 and as unchanged in 1925*
o
Annual Report for 191^-19.
3
Report by the governor-general on the general situation.
tx «. _ _.
Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi (c.1865-19^2), head of the Hindiyya order.
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tions on SayyidcAbd al-Rahman who had, in any case, indicated a wil­
lingness to cooperate. Significantly, Slatin, as an Austrian national, 
had to resign his post at the beginning of the war, thus removing from 
the scene a formidable enemy of the Mahdi's family, whom Slatin detes­
ted. 1
Thus the Wingate-Slatin line of implacable opposition to the
Mahdists was abandoned, and Wingate agreed to a plan which envisaged
"a generation or two hence, the assumption by the Mahdi of his place as
2
the founder of a tariga”. The relationship of the Sudan Government
and Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, according to the assistant director of intel-
ligence, "altered from one of covert antagonism to tentative alliance”. J
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was encouraged, as his side of the bargain, to
tour those areas in the Blue Nile, White Nile and Sennar Provinces
where Ansar were numerous, but was warned against taking advantage of
these tours to "organise" the Mahdists, for whose loyalty he was to be 
4
guarantor. This caveat, its essential hollowness no doubt recognised 
immediately by the sayyid, was to become familiar in the future of the 
remarkable career on which, at the outbreak of the European War, he em­
barked with the unwitting aid of his father's bitterest enemies. In 
spite of the government's warnings,
^ J.A. Reid, "Note on Mahdism with special reference to the White 
Nile Province", 24/11/3**. SGA, CIVSEC 56/2/18.
2 Minute by Wingate, 16/2/15, SGA, CIVSEC 56/2/18.
^ Willis to private secretary, 29/3/17» SGA, INTEL 1/18/89.
** Symes to Stack, 4/3/17. SGA, INTEL 1/18/89.
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As a reward for services rendered to the Government,
Abdul Rahman, who, in 1914, had been a man of small 
account, struggling for a status amongst the religious 
leaders of the country and closely restricted in his 
means of propaganda, became, by 1919, the head of a 
powerful organisation openly avowing Mahdist tenets 
and observances, was sent by the Government as a mem­
ber of the Sudan Delegation to England, received there 
the C.V.O. and was permitted to present his father's 
sword to H.M. King George V, who returned it to him to 
hold and to use in defence of himself and his Empire. 1
What had thus come about during the war years was a de facto re­
cognition by the Sudan Government of Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman's status, but 
this recognition by no means had the unqualified support of high go- 
\ vemment officials. Provincial governors warned Khartoum of the conse­
quences, in a village or town where Mahdism had been suppressed or at
least ignored for fifteen years, of even an hour's visit, with obvious
-  2
government approval, of the Mahdi's son and spiritual heir. Nor was
Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman the only religious leader to take advantage of the
government's need for native support. In 1915 the acting governor of
the Blue Nile Province wrote that
Apart from recrudescence of enthusiasm among followers 
of Mahdism, all sects represented in this Province have 
been making special efforts since the early days of the 
war to increase the number of their adherents. A concrete 
example of this is that Sheikh Ahmed El Sunni, Omda of 
Wad Medani, became a Khalifa of Sayed Ali Morghani some 
three months ago.... A large number of Medaniin will na­
turally follow their Omda's example and adhere to Sayed 
Ali Morghani.... I am inclined to believe that this ef­
fort on the part of Heads of Sects to increase their fol­
lowers applies to the Sudan generally.
R. Davies, "A note on the recent history of Mahdism and the govern­
ment's policy towards this movement", 6/11/25, SGA, CIVSEC 56/2/18. 
For details of the delegation to London, see below, pp. 128-135.
2
See for example J.A. Reid, "A note on Mahdism in the White Nile Pro­
vince", 7/1/28, SGA, CIVSEC 56/2/18: "Until the Great War the Mahdist 
influence in the White Nile was confined to a number of genuine be­
lievers as supporters.... Though they believed in the old cause, they 
realised that the Sudan had left behind it, the Mahdia and its works. 
...After his visit to England, Sayyid Abdel Rahman emerged as a pre­
ponderating influence. He was regarded as a direct representative of 
the Government, and Zakka was paid to him like a Government tax."
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This, thought the acting governor, was probably for the good, as com­
petition of the "sects” would "not point to unity of opposition against
An important aspect of the government's efforts to keep order 
during the war was resistance of pressure from London and Cairo that 
would have involved a sacrificial Sudanese war effort. In 1918 the Sudan 
agent in Cairo reported to Khartoum that "military authorities are 
anxious to know the possibilities of the Sudan as a labour recruiting 
centre". The idea was to form companies of Sudanese, separate from 
Egyptians, on a contract basis, to be employed in a non-combative role 
as manual labourers. Khartoum rejected this out of hand, reporting that 
the "possibilities of Sudan as labour recruiting centre are practically 
nil", and that the labour force was already employed in cultivation 
and herding that contributed to the war effort in Egypt and beyond. 
Siphoning off of labour would "entail reduction of output of those com­
modities which Egypt and Egypforce are continually pressing us to in- 
2
crease." To this note it was minuted by the private secretary that 
"His Excellency does not consider it advisable to add anything as re­
gards irrigation schemes and cotton growing or any matters which the 
military authorities might possibly say should be postponed during the 
war". ^
^ J.W. Sagar to asst, director of intelligence, 26/11/15, SGA, INTEL 
2/41/345. John Warburton Sagar (1878-1941) entered the Sudan service 
in 1903» was asst, civil secretary, 1909-10, governor of Kordofan 
from 1917 to 1922, and governor of Haifa from 1922 until his retire­
ment in 1924. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 13.)
 ^Telegram, Willis to. Sudan agent, 21/2/18, SGA, INTEL 1/8/40.
3 Governor-general*s office to Willis, 20/2/18, SGA, INTEL 1/8/40.
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Clearly Stack was determined to minimize the Sudan's direct part 
in the war. But this is not to say that the Sudan withdrew from the 
war effort. On the contrary, the war was a definite boon to the Sudan's 
economy and this, more than censorship, martial law, and all the rest, 
served to keep the Sudan generally content. Stack noted in 1917 that 
"we have sent over 20,000 camels now and it is thundering hard to get 
a suitable one at any price. The natives are so well off, they won't 
part” with any.  ^In 1918 a political intelligence report noted that 
"trade is very good and prices are high. The traffic in camels, cattle, 
and durra is now very great". As an example, it was instanced that in 
1898, "the Head Sheikh of the Kababish Tribe ... owned three camelsj 
now, as a nucleus of a camel stud, he owns 2,000 female camels". To il­
lustrate what this meant in financial terms: before the war, a camel's 
market value was put at £E5-£E6; in mid-1918 it was £EL8-£E20. A sheep's
value had risen from 50 P.T. to £E2, and a cow's from £E4 to £E11-£E12
2
in the same period. In 1915» 20,000 cattle were exported, and more 
than 87,000 sheep and goats. Between January and October of 1917 alone, 
18,518 head of cattle and 101,597 sheep were exported. In the corres­
ponding period of 1918, the numbers increased to the quite remarkable 
figures of 31»782 head of cattle and 151»712 head, of sheep. ^ For cul­
tivators too the results were good. In 1917» 84, 779 tons of dura were 
exported; in 1918, the figure was put at 5^*9^5 tons. But in 1919» the
1 Stack to Clayton, 28/6/17, SAD 470/6.
^ M.V. Morris, "Political intelligence report", 12/17/18, SGA, INTEL 
1/8/40.
3J Naval Staff Intelligence Division, A handbook of the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan. 1922, p. 411.
first year of peace, only 1,656 tons were exported.  ^Dura exports from 
1912 to 1914, a time of low Niles and poor floods, amounted to a mere 
3,500 tons; in the period 1915-17 the figure was about 200,000 tons. ^ 
The value of external trade increased from £E3,056,530" in 1914 to 
£E6,889,443 in 1917. Imports of what might be called luxury items 
(cotton fabrics, sugar, coffee, tea and spices) increased in value in 
the same period (1914-17) from £2684, 328 to £E1,428,507. 4 In 1918 the 
figure was put at £E2,062,63l. Similar increases in the values of ex- 
ports and imports were experienced across the board.
^ A handbook of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 388.
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An index of selected prices for the war period shows large in­
creases (the pre-war price at Khartoum is expressed as 100): ^
Pre-war Nov.. 1919
Dura 100 281
Butter 100 234
Mutton 100 171
Beef 100 16?
Abyssinian coffee 100 204
Rice 100. 300
Wheat flour 100 373
Tea 100 22 5
Sugar 100 344
Cotton fabrics 100 368
Petroleum 100 ^ 361
Over the same period, however, wages rose from a reported average
of P.T. per day for an unskilled worker in the North, to at least
5-6 P.T. per day, and in many localities to much higher rates. In 1919
a report from the Blue Nile Province noted wages as high as 45 P.T. per 
2
day. The seasonal nature of much work and widely varying conditions 
and supply of labour make averages misleading, but there can be little
3
doubt of general prosperity. Significantly, however, Sudan Government 
remuneration of its employees did not reflect this general rise of
^ A handbook of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 465.
2 Ibid.. p. 483.
3
For further details of the labour situation, see Appendix I.
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wages and prices. A note prepared by the civil secretary in 1919 com­
mented that "it is evident that the pay and prospects of sub-mamurs do 
not at present attract the most desirable candidates”. For the training 
programme of Sudanese sub-ma *murs in 1918, the average salary was £E6 
(per month). In 1919 it stood at £E7.50. Indeed, translators and clerks 
in the civil secretary's department were making more, ± although their 
salaries as well did not reflect the general rise. These subordinate 
officials may well have gained least from what was otherwise a boom
period, even as they might have expected, because of their training and
2
education, to have seen their financial positions improved. In any 
event, the political intelligence report cited above closed by noting 
that prosperity and faith in the Sudan Government were the two factors 
contributing, in 1918, to the "present state of quietness". J
These two factors were, of course, inseparable, the level of 
prosperity being a ready gauge of the government's efficacy. The govern­
ment had recognised this from the outset. In the high commissioner's 
Report for 1914-19 it was noted that
1914 was a bad year for the north and centre of the 
country. The 1913 rains were scanty and the Nile flood 
abnormally low.... During the period of distress from 
May till November, the work of the administration was 
centred on famine relief measures. The situation was 
greatly restored by the importation of large quantities 
of millet from India. This step was not without its
 ^Civil secretary to legal secretary and others, 18/12/19,
SGA, CIVSEC 50/1/5.
2 All salaries were increased by 20$> from 1 October 1919. (A handbook 
of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 297.
3
Morris, "Political intelligence report".
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effect during the critical time of the war....
Rains and flood, however, in the autumn of 1914 
were excellent, and the people, busy with the pros­
pect of a good season, paid little heed to the out­
break of war. 1
The health of the economy, then, and the government's refusal of more
involvement of Sudanese in the war, were probably more important for
ensuring internal security than all the special precautions taken to
avoid disorders.
Such incidents of unrest as did occur were minor. Certainly the
departure of Wingate and the succession of Stack excited no passions.
The most serious of the several recorded incidents was a "rising” at
Kassala which has come to be known as the Sambo revolt after its leader,
2
Muhammad Sanbu, a Fellata. This man, of obscure origins, had first 
come to the government's attention in 1909. He led a peripatetic exis­
tence in several northern provinces, earned a living in various menial 
positions, and was occasionally noted as having made disparaging re­
marks about the administration. In 1916 he was deemed "a meskin, half­
witted creature" with "no influence and no one heeds him or considers 
him other than imbecile and beggar.... He used to suffer from severe
3
fits, and used to climb trees, go down into deep wells etc. Illiterate."
On the night of 28 December 1918» Muhammad Sanbu led thirty men, 
mostly Hadandua, against the government fort at Kassala. Twelve N.C.O.s
Annual Report for 1914-19. Dongola was especially hard hit by the poor 
Nile. C.A. Willis, then inspector in Dongola, was sent to Khartoum 
to plead the province's case. According to him it was Stack who, as 
civil secretary, having seen photographs of famine victims, took the 
immediate step of ordering grain from India. (Willis, "Sidelights", 
p. 68.)
2
Fellata was a term used to describe persons of Northern Nigerian 
origin.
3
Asst, director of intelligence to civil secretary, 31/12/18, SGA,
CIVSEC 5/1/17.
and men were killed, along with eight of the attackers. ^
Although the attack never came close to success, and its nature 
might he deduced from its hopelessness, several aspects of the misad­
venture worried the government. It had at first been reported that the 
attackers "appear to have all been believers in the Mahdi", and all go­
vernment reports of the incident referred to them as "Dervishes". Fur­
ther, though the number directly involved was small, they were thought 
to be "supported morally if not actively by a considerable body of men 
living in Kassala itself". Also, the evocative name of *Ali€Uthman Diqna, 
son of the famous Mahdist amir futhman Diqna, who was still alive, in 
detention) was at first erroneously linked with the attack. Interes­
tingly, while the several reports of the incident all pointed to Mahdist
3
inspiration or "fanatic" instigation, Lyall , the governor of Kassala, 
in another brief note, shifted the focus of the attack from the govern­
ment by stating that "the outstanding characteristic of the Hadendoa 
is their dislike and contempt for the Egyptians and while any part of 
the Kassala garrison is Egyptian there is a possibility of another at- 
tempt being made on it." There had not been, in any of the reports,
1 SIR, December 1918, F.O. 371/3724.
2 Lyall to civil secretary, 16/1/19, SGA, CIVSEC 5/1/7. -
^ Charles Elliott Lyall (1877-1942) served in Kordofan, 1901-05, White 
Nile Province, 1906, in the legal department, 1907, White Nile Pro­
vince for a second tour from 1908 to 1912, and in the Red Sea Pro­
vince from 1912 to 1914. He was governor of that province in 1914, 
governor of Haifa from 1914 to 1917, and of Kassala from 1917 to 
1921. He was civil secretary from 1921 until his retirement in 1926. 
(MacMichael, SPS, p. 11.)
h
Lyall to asst, director of intelligence, 15/4/19, SGA,
INTEL 2/24/345.
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any indication that this hatred was behind the Sanbu attack, and while 
the significance of the incident should not be over-emphasized, it is 
noteworthy that the governor should lay the blame on the presence of 
Egyptians rather than simply on the antipathy of the Hadandua to the 
government.
A similar incident occurred in the spring of 1919. One Muhammad 
Ibn Sacid Hamid, a "nephew of the late Mahdi ... suddenly announced in 
April that he was 'Isa'." A following quickly developed and on 1 June 
they were engaged by the Sennar Province Mounted Police and forty of the 
"rebels" were killed. There were no government casualties.  ^Muhammad 
Sacid was executed at Singa in August. While this incident was of no 
great import, it was, typically, considered a "movement" capable of as­
suming dangerous proportions. ^
By far the most serious threat of this type to government authori­
ty in the north during Stack's govemor-generalship occurred at Nyala 
in southern Darfur in 1921. Because of its implications, this will be 
discussed in the following chapter.
The succession of Allenby as high commissioner
Lyall's remark, laying the blame for the Sanbu attack on the pro­
vocative presence of an Egyptian garrison at Kassala, is indicative of 
a change of thinking among British officials in 1919. This was due
1 SIR, June 1919. F.O. 371/3729.
2 SIR, August 1919, F.O. 371/3729.
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largely to events in Egypt. For at the close of the wax, an outburst 
of Egyptian nationalist feeling radically changed the assumptions on 
which British authority in Egypt - and therefore in the Sudan - had 
for long been based.
The British war effort in Egypt, unlike that in the Sudan, which 
had been indirect and economically beneficial, had been extremely un­
popular and burdensome. Declaration of the Protectorate at the outset 
of the wax, while not effectively altering the de facto relationship 
of the British occupation and the Egyptian populace, had been consi­
dered a gratuitous insult to Egyptian nationalist aspirations. Immedi­
ately after the war's conclusion, years of pent-up frustration burst 
to the surface. The disturbances in Egypt in 1919 arose directly out 
of the refusal of the foreign office to allow Egyptian representation 
at the Versailles Peace Conference. President Wilson's widely discus­
sed fourteen points and the Anglo-French declaration of 7 November 1918 
to the effect that national regimes would be established in former 
Ottoman territories had led Egyptians to believe that the protectorate, 
which had always been considered a war-time improvisation, would be 
abolished. Independence was expected soon to follow. When an Egyptian 
delegation was barred from the conference and the Egyptian prime minis­
ter, Rushdi Pasha, was refused permission even to come to London to put 
the Egyptian case, the British intention of retaining the protectorate 
seemed clear. Serious disturbances broke out throughout Egypt, with 
considerable loss of life and property damage. Wingate was made the 
scapegoat and recalled, to be replaced by Lord Allenby, who was appoin-
50
ted on 5 May 1919 as "H.M. Special High Commissioner for Egypt and 
the Sudan". ^
As Allenhy remained in office until 1925» the entire period of
Stack's term as full governor-general was served with Allenty in the
high commissioner's chair. Stack's promotion from acting to actual
2
governor-general came about on 12 May 1919» and was a direct result 
of the Egyptian troubles. At the foreign office his definite appoint­
ment was seen as a way of allaying Sudanese doubts and denying Egyptian 
hopes as to Britain's future role in the Sudan. A foreign office mi­
nute spoke of Stack's appointment as a way to show "that we mean 
3
business". J The appointment was further seen as a way of keeping, in
If *
Wingate's view, Sudan and Egyptian affairs "totally apart".
When finally relieved of his title, Wingate threatened to make pub­
lic the manner of his dismissal. Writing bitterly to Lord Milner, 
he said: "The general impression will be that - as I kept silent - 
there must be something against me which I dare not tell for my own 
sake.... It is possible my reputation may not be publicly attacked, 
but I shall have to undergo an even worse ordeal, viz. 'to be damned 
with faint praise'...." (Wingate to Miner, 12/10/19, DEP MILNER 163.) 
Wingate finally took the advice of his friends, remained silent, was 
given a baronetage and disappeared into the oblivion he had feared.
See "Main points which have given rise to the present situation",
Nov. 1919» SAD 238/3, an aide-memoire in which Wingate recorded the 
web of personal and political differences at the Residency, the 
foreign office and in influential London circles that led to his 
downfall. See also Ronald Wingate, Wingate of the Sudan, pp. 237-24-6.
2
Journal Officiel du Gouvemement Egyptien, no. 4-5, 12/5/19.
3 Minute by A. Loyd, n.d. (1919), F.O. 371/3711.
Wingate to Hardinge, 27/12/18, F.O. 371/3711.
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The departure of Wingate was significant from the Sudan point of 
view. His knowledge of and sympathy for the country were unquestioned, 
and while his interest had flagged in recent years, there could be no 
doubt in Khartoum that while Wingate was high commissioner the Sudan's 
interests would be taken into account. His attitude toward the country 
was paternalistic. Stack, despite his criticisms of "Master's” style 
and increasing lack of interest in day-to-day affairs, nevertheless was 
doubtless sincere when he wrote to Wingate that "it is with a sad heart 
I am going back Cto Khartoum] knowing that I shall not have you to go 
to in difficulties".  ^Whether or not one subscribes to a judgement of 
Wingate as "father" of the modem Sudan, he was certainly the father-
figure to the first generation of the Sudan Government, and his style
and attitudes would long outlive his direct influence.
Allenby was quite another matter. The war-time career of Edmund 
Henry Hynman Allenby is well known. Taking command of the Egyptian Ex­
peditionary Force in June 1917» a series of famous victories - Jerusalem, 
Damascus, Aleppo - ensured his place in history. His reputation as 
soldier and leader and his great prestige made his selection as Win­
gate's replacement, despite its circumstances, a natural one. But 
Allenby's experience of Egypt had been brief and of an exceptional na­
ture; his experience of the Sudan was non-existaent.
Whether or not he was disposed to take an interest in Sudan af­
fairs, Allenby had little choice in the matter. His time as high com­
missioner was one during which the Sudan was of prime concern in Cairo 
and London. Direct Residency involvement in the Sudan's internal af-
 ^Stack to Wingate, 21/10/19, SAD 238/2. In an earlier letter, Stack
had told Wingate that the whole matter of the latter's supersession
had "given me such a distaste for public service that did I not think 
... it would not be playing the game to the Sudan I would gladly 
leave it." (Stack to Wingate, 17/10/19, SAD 238/2.)
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fail's, however, continued to decline. In 1922, Allenby reminded Stack 
that it was within the province of the high commissioner to authorise 
"punitive expeditions" in the Sudan, though notification after the fact 
had become the practice.  ^In 1923* Allenby sought to revive the pro­
cedure, which had lapsed, by which the governor-general's annual re­
port was first sent to Cairo, to be forwarded, with deletions and ad­
ditions, to London. These incidents should be considered as indications 
of how independent of the Residency the Sudan Government had become, 
rather than as parts of a concerted effort to reimpose detailed Resi­
dency supervision. Indeed, in late 1924, one Residency official com­
plained:
Unless and until the established relations between Cairo 
and Khartoum are changed, it seems that due forms ought 
to be observed. During the last two months they have been 
flagrantly neglected. Stack and Sterry 2 arrange things 
between themselves direct not only without consulting us 
but without even informing us of things wc ought to be 
told at once were Khartoum as separate from Cairo as it 
is e.g. from Jeddah. 3
The one area in which Cairo was to seek to maintain control was 
what the Sudan Government saw as its "foreign relations", that is, re­
lations among the Sudan, Egypt and the British government. It was in 
this area, as hinted in the above quotation, increasingly during Stack*s 
administration, that the Residency and the Palace were to fall out. By
1 Allenby to Stack, 24/1/22, F.O. 371/7/68.
2
Sir Wasey Sterry, legal secretary. See below, p.63n.
^ R.A. Furness to Walford Selby, foreign office, 27/9/24, F.O. 800/218. 
Sir Robert Furness (1883-1954) served in the Egyptian civil service 
from 1906 to 1923 and was Oriental secretary to the high commissioner 
from 1923 to 1926. (WWW, 1951-1960, p. 401.) For a note on Selby, 
see below, p.258n.
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late 1924 there was distinct hostility between the two great bastions
of British power on the Nile. This will be detailed in Chapter III. But
it might be mentioned here what was the crux of the problem. In the
words of one foreign office experts
Khartoum thinks Cairo ignorant and unsympathetic....
Cairo thinks Khartoum self-centred. Khartoum desires 
emancipation from Cairo and I doubt whether anybody 
in Cairo wishes to retain a control over Khartoum 
which is in practice vexatious and ineffective....
What Cairo needs is a diplomatist. What Khartoum 
needs is an administrator. 1
That anyone should have written of Khartoum and Cairo as if they were
co-equal centres is itself a comment on the increased significance of
the Sudan in British thinking after 1919» and especially after nominal
Egyptian independence, which was embodied in the British government's
declaration to Egypt in February 1922. And that one should remark that
"Cairo thinks Khartoum self-centred" is an indication of the natural
development of the Sudan, under Stack, and more importantly, of the
self-perception of the Sudan Government as being in some way responsible
for and even answerable to the Sudan above all else, rather than as
servants of British policy in Egypt.
The central government under Stack
Ihe reasons for the increasing tendency of the Sudan Government 
to view itself as autonomous are to be found both in the Sudan and in 
Egypt. Wingate had sought, as governor-general, not only to detach the 
Sudan from Egypt politically, but also to combat a British perception
^ Foreign office memorandum by Mervyn Herbert, 2/4/25, F.O. 371/10908.
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of the two countries as halves of a whole. His view, coupled with the 
remoteness of the Sudan and consequent independence of action of its 
government, and the real affection with which British officials viewed 
the Sudanese, led inevitably to a feeling of responsibility for and de­
fence of the Sudanese as against Egyptian (and even, it would seem, 
home government) interests. Further, Egyptian independence, no matter 
how limited by the so-called "reserved points” of the 1922 declaration, 
meant that the Egyptian government's stance on the Sudan could be influ­
enced but no longer dictated by the British.
By the 1920s the Sudan Government, even in its highest echelons, 
had begun to pass out of the hands of those British officers of the 
Egyptian Army who had administered the country since the occupation. In 
their stead as provincial governors and heads of departments in Khartoum 
were cooler, more professional administrators who had either risen from 
the ranks of the civil service or had been recruited from outside the 
Sudan because of special expertise.
The civil secretaryship, under Stack, slowly assumed more sig­
nificance, a trend begun when he himself served as Wingate's last civil 
secretary.  ^The exact functions of the civil secretary had never been 
enumerated. In practice he headed the civil service and acted as liaison
between the provinces and the governor-general in all matters outside
2the direct responsibility of the governors themselves. Stack's first
3
civil secretary was Lt. Col. R.M. Feilden , who wan not, however,
See Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 63-66.
p
Keown-Boyd, Memorandum dated 24/2/20, DEP MILNER l6l.
^ Lt. Col Randle Montague Feilden (1871-?) served in the Bahr al-Ghazal 
in 1904-05t in the Red Sea Province from 1905 to 1908, and as asst, 
civil secretary from 1908 to 1910. He was governor of Bahr al-Ghazal, 
1910-1917# and civil secretary from 1917 until his retirement in 
1921. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 11.)
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Stack's first choice for the post. Stack Jiad offered the position, even 
before Wingate's departure for Cairo, to his old friend Gilbert Clayton, 
who preferred, however, to stay on in Cairo as Sudan agent and director 
of intelligence. Feilden*s experience had been mostly in the South, 
where he had served in the Bahr al-Ghazal (in 1904-05 and as governor 
from 1910 to 1917). His was a lacklustre occupation of the civil secre­
tary's office. On his retirement from the Sudan in 1921, he was succeeded 
by C.E. Lyall, whose experience was much wider than Feilden's, but whose 
mark on the Sudan administration was hardly noticed. The appointment 
went to him purely through seniority,  ^and he was variously described
\
2by colleagues and subordinates as being of "limited intelligence" and 
lazy and uninterested. In any case, both of Stack's civil secretaries 
were little more than figureheads, as the department was, almost from 
the moment of his appointment as assistant civil secretary in 1919» run 
by Mr. (later Sir) Harold MacMichael, ^ who finally succeeded to the 
civil-secretaryship on Lyall's retirement in 1926.
Interview with Sir Angus Gillan, 24/5/76. Gillan served in Khartoum, 
1909; Kordofan, 1910-16; Darfur, 1917-18; the Red Sea Province, 1919- 
20; and Berber, 1920-21. He was deputy governor of the Nuba Mts. Pro­
vince, 1921-28, and governor of Kordofan, 1928-32. He was asst, civil 
secretary, 1932-34, and civil secretary from 1934 until his retire­
ment in 1939. (See MacMichael, SPS, p. 21.)
p
Interview with Sir George Schuster, 19/5/76.
3
Interview with Brigadier Maurice Lush, 7/10/76. Lush was posted to 
the intelligence department, 1923; served in Kassala, 1923-26; Khar­
toum, 1927; and as asst, civil secretary, 1928-29. He was private 
secretary to the governor-general, 1929-30; deputy governor of the 
White Nile Province, 1931-32; deputy governor of the Upper Nile, 1932* 
35; and Sudan agent in Cairo, 1935-38. He was governor of the Nor­
thern Province, 1938-41. (See MacMichael, SPS, pp. 30-31.)
^ Sir Harold MacMichael (1882-1969) served in Kordofan, 1905-12; Blue 
Nile, 1912-13; and Khartoum, 1913-15. He served on the Red Sea patrol 
of 1915 and in the Darfur campaign of 1916. He was sub-governor of 
Darfur, 1917-18; and asst, civil secretary from 1919 until he became 
civil secretary in 1926. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 15.)
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It is difficult to overestimate MacMichael*s significance in the 
Sudan Government during the Stack years and during his tenure as civil 
secretary (1926-3*0. In the words of a contemporary, MacMichael "was 
really the moving spirit in the government from 1919 'til 1933....
There was a profound trust in him" by the civil service. "Govemors- 
general could come and go but MacMichael was the head of the service to 
whom we gave unqualified loyalty."  ^To the civil secretariat MacMichael 
brought fourteen years of experience in Kordofan (where he played an 
important part in establishing patterns of future administrative deve­
lopment), Khartoum, the Red Sea Province, and Darfur. Reserved (and 
therefore thought to be cold and unapproachable by the Sudanese), and
scholarly, a stickler for detail and exacting as a manager, he came to
3
be known to subordinates as "The Great White Chief". His experience as 
administrator and, during Stack's govemor-generalship, his role as 
policy-maker, set a standard that greatly increased the importance of 
the civil secretariat, as evidenced by the calibre of his successors.
Interview with Mr. Martin Parr, 3/6/76. Martin Willoughby Parr served 
in Kordofan, 1920-23? the Blue Nile Province, 1923-24; and as asst, 
civil secretary, 1925-27 and 1931-33. He was private secretary to the 
governor-general in 1928-29; deputy governor, White 'file Province,
1930? and deputy civil secretary, 193**. He was governor of the Upper 
Nile from 193*+ to 1936; and governor of Equatoria from 1936 until 
his retirement in 19*+2. (See MacMichael, SPS, p. 29.)
p
Interview with Sir Gawain Bell, 2/6/76. Bell served in Kassala, 1931- 
33? Kordofan, 1933-38; Blue Nile, 19*+l-*+2; Kordofan, 19*+5-*+9; and in 
the Sudan agency, Cairo, 19*+9-51. He was deputy civil secretary, 1953- 
5*+i and permanent under-secretary in the ministry of interior, 1954- 
55. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 60.)
^ Interview with Sir Shuldham Redfem, 8/10/76. Redfem served in Khar­
toum, 1920-21; Darfur, 1922-23; Blue Nile, 1924-29; was asst, civil 
secretary, 1930-32; and served in the Port Sudan-Suakin administration, 
1932-3*+. He was governor of Kassala in 193*+“35. (See MacMichael,
SPS, p. 31.)
Hie post of financial secretary during the Stack regime was oc­
cupied by two men. The first was Sir E.E. Bernard (see page 12n.), 
known, without affection, as "Ikey", who had assumed the post in 1902.
A Catholic of Maltese origin, he was regarded always as an outsider by 
the rest of the government establishment.  ^Like those of the civil 
secretary, the duties of the financial secretary had never been set
down clearly. It was his responsibility to draw up, control and adminis-
2ter the Sudan’s budget. "Every expenditure, even if sanctioned in the
3
budget, had to be authorized by him." The great power therefore in­
herent in the position, while curtailed somewhat by Wingate, nonetheless 
proved a stumbling block in Stack's time, since the financial secre­
tary's ability to veto expenditures gave him an effective power to con­
trol the implementation of policy. This was evidenced especially when 
the seed of Indirect Rule began to germinate in the early 1920s (see 
Chapter IV). In 1902, when Bernard was appointed, the Sudan's revenue was
lL
£E126,569; in 1923» the year after he resigned, it was £E3,766,133. 
Bernard was simply unable to cope with this growth and its concomitant 
complexities. He was, in the words of a contemporary, "a good regimen- 
tal paymaster", but much more than this was required in the post-war
^ Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 63.
^ Keown-Boyd, memorandum entitled "The Sudan", n.d. (1920), DEP 
MILNER 161.
3
Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 64.
4 ,Ibid.
^ Interview with Sir Angus Gillan, 24/5/76.
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Sudan, Apparently notorious for the lengths to which he would go to re­
main outside the Sudan, he personally prepared the budget in Cairo, at­
tending to everything from the negotiation of a loan to "the numbers of 
forks and spoons".  ^But possessed of seniority and well-established in 
his office, Bernard was to remain financial secretary until 1922, when 
a financial crisis forced his resignation and replacement by Mr. (later 
Sir) George Schuster.
Schuster, like MacMichael, was to wield great influence in the 
Sudan Government. Because of the amorphous nature of the central admi­
nistration and the blurring of areas of responsiblity, and by virtue of 
his intellect and forcefulness, Schuster’s effect was to be felt far be­
yond the sphere of finance. This was especially true during the gruel­
ling Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1924 in London, when, by default, 
he was chief spokesman for the Sudan. Schuster, unlike his colleagues, 
had not risen from the ranks, but was appointed at the insistence of 
London during the crisis precipitated by the financing of the Gezira 
Scheme (see Appendix i). At that time
It was suggested^that some official in whose ability 
[the Treasury] had confidence should be appointed Finan­
cial Secretary to the Sudan Government. In this capacity 
he could furnish their Lordships with all the information 
they might require, and direct financial policy in the
 ^Interview with Sir George Schuster, 19/5/76.
n
Sir George Ernest Schuster (l88l- ), a barrister and director,
held numerous financial advisory posts, within and outside govern­
ment, before his appointment as financial secretary to the Sudan 
Government in 1922. He resigned in 192?% and became finance member 
of the executive council of the viceroy of India in 1928, resigning 
in 1934. He was M.P. for Walsall during World War II.
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Soudan along general lines indicated by their Lord­
ships. Nor would this constitute any interference 
with the financial independence of the Soudan or im­
pair the sense of responsibility of the Soudan 
Government. ^
Schuster, because of his extensive experience, was the choice. Although
an outsider, Schuster was not resented as such. Indeed, the closedness
of the Sudan Government and the general dissatisfaction with Bernard
made Schuster's appointment a welcome one. His coming, said one offi-
2
cial, was "a real blessing. We needed somebody from the outside".
The Sudan's finances during the Stack administration did not al­
low extravagance. The general poverty of the country and the ineffi­
ciency of tax collection, the increased costs of labour and of goods 
of all kinds, financial demands made by external forces, and the agreed 
political necessity of self-sufficiency combined to make the Sudan fi­
nancially insecure throughout the Stack years. The facts that, on the 
one hand, the Sudan Government desired to eliminate financial depen­
dence upon Egypt, and, on the other, that it could not depend on the 
British government, dominated financial matters.
Even though the annual Egyptian subventian, of varying amounts, 
had ceased in 1912, the Sudan continued to rely financially on Egypt in 
two important ways. First, the Sudan benefitted from the "reproductive 
capital expenditure" invested by Egypt, on which no interest was being
Foreign office to Treasury, 7/10/21, F.O. 407/191. Indeed, when 
Schuster was to leave the Sudan in 1927» Sir John Maffey, then 
governor-general, proposed creating a special post for him, as ad­
viser to the financial department in Cairo, but with Schuster based 
in London. Maffey's confidence was evident: "The main basis of the 
position should be acceptance of the principle that no step that 
might materially affect the general financial position of the Sudan 
will be taken without reference to Sir George Schuster." (Memo­
randum by Sir J. Maffey, 27/10/27, F.O. 371/12379.)
 ^Interview with Sir Angus Gillan, 24/5/76.
paid. Secondly, the maintenance of the Egyptian Army in the Sudan was 
not only charged solely to Egypt, but was an indirect source of revenue 
to the Sudan Government.  ^In 1924 the financial secretary reported that 
since the institution of the Condominium, Egypt had advanced £E5,584,525 
for development, and £E5,353,215 to cover the Sudan's budget deficits. 
Egyptian expenditure for the army in 1922-23 alone amounted to £E515,725. 
Thus even without actual subventions, Egypt still contributed heavily 
to the Sudan's solvency, and was a major creditor. (See Appendix II, 
table 1.) Throughout the Stack years the budget was in surplus. Re­
venues increased from £E2,195,355 in 1917 ^ to £E4,298,856 in 1924. ^
For complete figures, see Appendix II, table 2. A breakdown of the 
sources of the government's revenue shows a heavy reliance on the rail­
ways and steamers, and posts and telegraphs departments for income. In 
1924 direct taxes accounted for only 10.9$ of government revenue; royal­
ties and receipts from irrigation projects for 7$; consumption duties 
(including the sugar monopoly) for ZZ%\ and miscellaneous taxes and dues 
for 8.8^ . Gross revenue from railways and steamers, posts and tele­
graphs, timber and government commercial undertakings amounted to 51.3$ 
of revenues. ^(For complete details see Appendix II, table 3.) The fi­
gures for previous years show a similar reliance for revenue on these
1 Schuster to civil secretary, 9/4/2*+. SGA, CIVSEC 50/15/6?.
2
Schuster, "Note on the payments made by Egypt to the Sudan since 
1899", July 1924, F.O. 371/10068.
Annual Report for 1920, 1921, Cmd. 1487.
4
Annual Report for 1927, 1928-29, Cmd. 3284.
6l
Government monopolies. This reliance and the inconsequential percentage 
of revenue from direct taxation were not encouraging. But until the war, 
all seemed to be running smoothly, and the war itself brought prosperity. 
The Sudan Government was, at least on the face of things, "paying its 
own way". The future was thought to be assured by the Gezira Scheme, 
which was intended to make the Sudan a major cotton exporter, to earn 
foreign exchange and-to bring prosperity to the cultivators of the 
Gezira.
But because of faulty estimates of the costs involved and in­
creased prices of materials and labour after the war, the Sudan faced 
a financial crisis over the funding of the scheme. This crisis was re­
solved only after a series of negotiations in London in 1921-22, in 
which the Sudan officials were able to convince the British government 
of not only the economic but also the political necessity for carry­
ing out the scheme. These negotiations are discussed in detail in Ap­
pendix I.
One immediate result of the financial crisis was a change in the 
financial secretary's office. Curzon, the British foreign secretary, 
wrote in 1921 that Bernard, "though not directly responsible for the 
present difficulties ... cannot be held entirely blameless for the 
situation"?" Sir Murdoch Macdonald, adviser to the Egyptian public
Foreign office to Treasury, 19/8/21, F.O. 4-07/190. It is undoubtedly 
true that Bernard had either been unaware of or insufficiently con­
cerned by the general state of finances. In 1920 he led Keown-Boyd, 
the Milner mission's representative in the Sudan, to believe that 
"the Sudan Government have every reason to be sanguine". (Keown- 
Boyd, "Col. Sir E. Bernard, X.B.E., C.M.G., civil secretary" (sic), 
n.d. (l920), DEP MILNER 161.) Others were less optimistic. Willis 
wrote privately in 1921 that "money is going to be very tight this 
next year.... Things are going to be difficult and Bernard will have 
a job to make out his budget without a deficit, and personally I 
think it would be much more truthful to show it so than to fake the 
figures as he generally does.... I do not think there is much doubt 
that we have been living over our income lately". (Willis to "Pasha", 
8/12/21, SAD 204-/3.)
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works department, had been summarily sacked by Allenby after the for­
mer's revised estimates of March 1921 had been digested.  ^Criticism
of the Sudan Government, however, seems to have been directed solely
2at Bernard. Lindsay, the under-secretary of state at the foreign of­
fice, thought that the governor-general's council, through Bernard, 
should have exercised more control over Macdonald, but Lindsay conclu­
ded that it was "not surprising that the Maltese gentleman should fail 
to restrain a rough headstrong Scotch engineer." But suggestions that 
the Treasury should take on some kind of direct supervision of Sudan 
finances were rejected. Lindsay disdained the idea, writing that he knew
"from experience how easily the Sudan can cheat Egypt", and felt
4"frankly sure they will be able to cheat the Treasury". The result 
was the appointment of Schuster, whose own representations concerning 
the Gezira Scheme must have carried great weight at the Treasury.
Schuster immediately reformed the system of accounting and re­
constructed the system of pay and promotions. In the period 1919-24, 
government expenditure for pensions and gratuities increased from
 ^Sir Murdoch Macdonald (1866-1957), adviser to the Egyptian public 
works department, 1911"1921, was M.P. for Inverness, 1922-1950.
(WWW. 1951-1960, pp. 696-697.)
Sir Ronald Lindsay (1877-1945), was under-secretary of -state at the 
foreign office, 1921-24, permanent under-secretary of state, 1928- 
30, and ambassador to Washington, 1930-39. (MB. 19^1-1950, pp. 
507-508.)
^ Lindsay to Curzon, 5/6/21, F.O. 371/6319.
4
Minute by Lindsay, 1/11/21, F.O. 371/6320.
£E30,9^+ to £E96,000.  ^Promotions, which had been almost automatic and 
based on seniority, were to depend in future on efficiency tests and 
educational qualifications. These and other reforms, affecting as they 
did subordinate Sudanese officials, were in part responsible for their 
increasing dissatisfaction.
At the very time the Sudan Government was embroiled in negotia­
tions for Gezira financing, the prices of cotton and cotton seed plum­
meted. This was due in large part to a general world-wide slump after 
the war, but only served to raise further doubts as to the viability 
of the scheme. It also pointed out what would in later years be a major 
economic problem for the Sudan: the early and continuing over-reliance 
on the Gezira and the dangers of a one crop economy. The difficulties 
of planning and budgeting which the government faced can be deduced 
from the erratic nature of prices in the Stack years. It should be 
noted especially that while production increased from 89,224 kantars 
in 1920 to 117,659 kantars in 1921, the value of the crop decreased 
from £E1,608,407 to £E385,138, a truly disastrous fall. ^
The third of the "three secretaries", the legal secretary, under 
Stack, was Mr. (later Sir) Wasey Sterry. The first civil judge in the 
Sudan (in 1901), he became acting legal secretary in May 1917, when
1 Stack to Allenby, 6/8/24, F.O. 371/10068.
2
One kantar = approximately 100 lbs. of ginned cotton.
^ Annual Report for 1922, Cmd. 195° (1923).
^ Sir Wasey Sterry (1866-1955) was a barrister at Lincoln's Inn, 1892, 
and civil judge in the Sudan from 1901. He became chief judge in 
1903, and from 1915 was styled "chief justice". He served as legal 
secretary from 1917 to 1926. (WWW, 1951-1960, p. 104l.)
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Bonham-Carter  ^went on leave. On the latter's retirement later in the
2
year, Sterry was made legal secretary, a post he held until resigning 
in 1926. Having collaborated with his predecessor in the establishment 
of the Sudan's legal system, Sterry more than anyone in the country 
was acquainted with it. Like Schuster and MacMichael, Sterry was to 
have influence well beyond the scope of his official duties, especially 
during the crisis of 1924 and its aftermath. He was often acting governor- 
general in Stack's absence.
Another important post in the central government was that of 
private secretary. Most government departments reported to the governor- 
general through the private secretary's office, and it was he who draf­
ted the governor-general's replies, reports, minutes and recommendations. 
Three private secretaries served under Stack. The first was Lt. Col.
(later Sir) Mervyn Wheatley, ^ who held the post from 1917 to 1920. He
4was succeeded by his assistant, A.B.B. Howell, who served until 1923.
Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter (1870-1956) entered the Sudan Government 
in 1899 and held the post of legal secretary until his retirement 
in 1917. See Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 17n.
^ Sudan Gazette, no. 318, 14/6/17, and no. 324, 18/10/17.
^ Lt. Col. Sir Mervyn Wheatley (1880-1974) was deputy asst, civil secre 
tary from 1907 to 1911, served in Kordofan in 1912, and was asst, 
civil secretary from 1913 to 1916, when he acted as civil secretary. 
After his service as private secretary he was governor of the Bahr 
al-Ghazal, whence he retired in 1928. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 19.)
4 Alban Berkeley Butts Howell (1884-1966) served in Khartoum in 1908, 
in Berber, 1909-12, and in the financial department, 1913-16. After 
serving as asst, private secretary and as private secretary he was 
deputy governor of the Red Sea Province, 1924-23, and served as go­
vernor of Dongola from 1926 until his retirement in 1930.
(MacMichael, SPS, p. 20.)
Howell was in tum succeeded by his assistant, R.V. Bardsley,  ^who 
served in the post until 1925. The private secretary, in addition to 
his other duties, acted as secretary to the governor-general*s council.
Throughout the early Condominium the position of Sudan agent in 
Cairo was an important one. His duties were defined in several circu­
lars issued between 1903 and 1910. The 1903 circular described the 
Sudan agent as
The channel of communication between the outer world and 
the Civil Administration of the Sudan Government.... He 
will be the channel between the Sudan and the various 
offices of the Egyptian Ministries and the Army of Oc­
cupation.... He will be the sole channel between the 
Departments of the Sudan Government ... and the British 
Agent and Consul-General. 2
The last-mentioned duty was the most important in practice. As liaison 
officer between Palace and Residency, the Sudan agent had to be some­
one in whom the governor-general could repose total confidence. Having 
been Sudan agent himself - at a time when this meant dealing with Win­
gate on the one hand and Kitchener on the other - Stack was well aware 
of the diplomatic skills required by the occupant of the post. When 
Clayton declined his invitation to come to Khartoum as civil secretary, 
Stack was not overly disappointed, as Clayton would be staying on in 
Cairo as Sudan agent. New in his own post, it was all the more impor­
tant for Stack to have Clayton as his spokesman and, perhaps more 
significantly, as his source of information in Cairo. Indeed, he admit-
Robert Vickers Bardsley (1890-1952) served in Khartoum from 1913 to 
1915» and in the Blue Nile Province from 1916 to 1920. After serving 
as asst, private secretary and as private secretary he was briefly 
asst, civil secretary (1926), and was governor of the Blue Nile from 
1928 until being invalided in 1932. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 24.)
Quoted in Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 60.
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ted to Clayton that "one letter of yours owing to its frankness gives
me more insight into the 'heart of things' than a dozen from other
sources".  ^Even before it was decided that Clayton should stay on, a
2
possible successor was being considered, and when Clayton retired in 
3
1920, R.E. More, who had sought the post in 1917» became Sudan agent. 
He served from 1 February 1920 until his retirement in 1931.
The intelligence department
Of the occupants of the chief posts of the Sudan Government during
Stack's administration, the only one other than a secretary to play a
5
leading role was C.A. Willis, the director of intelligence. As an in­
stitution, the intelligence department was a direct descendant of the 
Egyptian Army intelligence department. In part because its functions 
were so broad and ill-defined, it was to become a source of embarrass-
1 Stack to Clayton, 19/5/17, SAD 4-70/6.
2 Stack to Clayton, 7/6/17, SAD 4-70/6.
^ Richard Edwardes More (1879-1936) served in the Red Sea Province, 
1902-03, in Kordofan in 1904-, in the White Nile Province in 1905, and 
in Khartoum from 1906 until 1919. In 1914- he served briefly as go­
vernor of Khartoum. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 11.)
h
Sudan Gazette, no. 357, 13/4/20.
^ Charles Armine Willis (1881-1975) served in Khartoum in 1905 and in 
Kordofan in 1906-07. In 1908 he worked in the legal department. He 
was posted in Kordofan, 1909-12, the Red Sea Province, 1913, and in 
Dongola, 1914—15. He was asst, director of intelligence, 1915-19, and 
director from 1920 until 1926, when he was made governor of the Upper 
Nile, where he remained until his retirement in 1931. (MacMichael,
SPS. p. 16.)
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merit, ridicule, and serious misunderstanding during the Stack period.
In 1919 Willis was asked by the war office in London for an account of
the department's history and duties, and his reply well describes the
confused state of affairs:
The Intelligence Department of the Sudan Government 
holds a somewhat anomalous position. The organisation 
previous to the outbreak of war consisted of a Di­
rector Cand assistant director} in Cairo, and an Asst.
Director and Intelligence Officer in Khartoum. The 
Director was also Sudan Agent ... and he included in 
his duties Intelligence work to do with the Sennoussi, 
and Tripoli, and Sinai. On the outbreak of war the Di­
rector became immersed almost wholly in work for the 
British Army.... Both A.D.I.'s were taken into military 
\ employment in Egypt and the whole work devolved upon the
Intelligence Officer. Temporary assistance was brought 
in, amongst others the present writer, who was lent in 
November 1915» and- finally transferred as A.D.I.' in'
March, 1916. Previous to the war the Inspector-General,
Slatin Pasha, had had so predominating an influence in 
Intelligence matters that any questions requiring ex­
pert knowledge tended to be referred to, and decided by, 
him rather than the department. 1
Thus the duties of the intelligence department came to be as few 
or as many as the government chose to pass its way. In regard to the 
Egyptian Army, the department was, in the 1920s, still responsible 
for collecting information "regarding the political situation, the geog­
raphy and resources of the Sudan and neighbouring countries", compiling
2
and publishing reports, and for preparing and issuing cyphers. The 
department was to collect information as to "races, tribes and natives 
of the Sudan"; to "make and maintain acquaintances as far as possible 
with all Sheikhs and notables who are of influence with the natives"; 
to maintain and compile archives; "to keep account of all Robes of Honour
^ A.D.I. to director of military intelligence, war office, London, 
31/5/19, SGA, INTEL 1/20/105.
2
Standing order for intelligence department, 17/1/20, SGA,
CIVSEC 36/1/2.
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issued and withdrawn"; to arrange detention and maintenance of politi­
cal prisoners; to examine refugee cases and generally supervise the 
pilgrimage to Mecca; to advise the chief censor; to oversee the local 
press; to act as a liaison between native notables and the government; 
to maintain the labour bureau (which was itself to keep records of la­
bour resources, arrange for employment of surplus labour and act as a 
central reference bureau); to intercept obscene and politically undesi­
rable films; etc.  ^Willis, in fact, writing much later, noted that
"the central government had a way of throwing at the Department any
2
job that was not specifically defined elsewhere."
To perform these myriad duties the department employed in Khartoum, 
as of January 1920, in addition to the director, assistant director 
and intelligence officer, seventeen classified staff, most of whom 
were clerks. Several officers were stationed in Cairo and a few inter­
preters posted to provincial towns to deal mostly with matters arising
3
on the eastern borders.
While the intelligence department had evolved from the Egyptian 
Army's intelligence department and had, in the absence of any reorgani­
sation or rationalisation of its functions, continued to perform many 
duties relative to military intelligence, it had, after 191^ , also 
taken on the responsibilities of the inspector-generalship, a post 
created for and held only by Slatin Pasha until its abeyance at the 
outbreak of the war. The assumption by the department of the duties of
^ Standing order for intelligence department, 17/1/20, SGA, CIYSEC
Wl/2. .
2 Willis, "Sidelights", p. 72.
Standing order for intelligence department, 17/1/20.
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that office, which were themselves sweeping and nebulous, can be seen 
in Willis's description under such headings as "Robes of Honour" and 
"acquaintances ... with all Sheikhs and notables."
The intelligence department became the focus for a good deal of 
bitter complaint during Stack's administration. This can be traced to 
several causes, among them the department's inefficiency (which in part 
resulted from its institutionalized disorganisation), its methods, and 
above all its director, G.A. Willis.
Willis's appointment as director in 1920 marked the first time 
the director of intelligence was to be stationed in the Sudan itself. 
From the outset he was hampered by the memory of Slatin, whose influ­
ence and tactics had made him extremely unpopular, especially with pro­
vincial officials. Slatin's methods had been highly personal, and the 
complete freedom given him by his intimacy and influence with Wingate 
brought him often into conflict with other members of the administra­
tion. His legacy to Willis was an amalgam of duties sc disparate as to 
be conveniently referred to only as dealing with "native affairs" (which, 
by definition, might include anything), and an inherent distrust of and 
prejudice against the intelligence department. As Willis himself later 
observed,"the maintenance of an Intelligence system, however carefully 
kept separate from Slatin's old organisation, was suspect, both by na­
tives and officials". ^
This problem was exacerbated by Willis himself, who, lacking 
both the personal prestige and the native contacts of Slatin, was, how­
ever, altogether too willing to see himself, both personally and profes­
sionally, as the successor to the inspector-general. It was at least in
 ^Willis, "Sidelights", p. 4-1. For details of Slatin*s role in the 
administration, see Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 46-58.
70
part due to this that Willis's relations with other senior officials 
were notably unsuccessful. His great rival was MacMichael, who became 
assistant civil secretary at about the same time as Willis was made 
director of intelligence. Aside from their policy differences, which 
were many, Willis "was always at daggers drawn" with MacMichael.^ By 
some Willis was considered clever - too clever - and all resented the 
influence which by government default and historical accident had come 
to be his. It was, however, in the area of intelligence work itself 
that his critics were most vociferous.
Because of his personal attention to detail, Slatin had left be­
hind him no system of intelligence-gathering except for a collection 
of "agents", whose very numbers and identities can probably never be 
known. Willis found it easy to fit into this method of operating. But 
a contemporary inspector reports that Willis's agents "blackmailed"
people, saying "'Give me this horse', or 'give me a girl tonight or
2
I'll report you'". In a report commissioned by Stack just before his
death (but which did not appear until January 1925) the matter of "secret
agents" was prominent:
The use of unofficial 'agents' ... requires to be 
definitely regulated.... There is no justification 
for the employment of ostensibly secret agents for 
contact with public opinion..,. Officers in Provinces 
and Departments should .,. have the assurance that un­
official agents are not being employed for general 
espionage or for reporting on local matters without
1 Interview with Mr. Martin Parr, 3/6/76.
2 Interview with Sir James Robertson, 18/6/76. Robertson served in the 
Blue Nile, 1923-25,* White Nile, 1926-31; Fung, 1931-3**; Kordofan, 
1934-36; White Nile, 1936-39; and as deputy governor of the Blue 
Nile Province, 1939-4-0. He was asst, civil secretary, 194-1-42; de­
puty civil secretary, 194-2-4-5; aad civil secretary, 194-5-53. (See 
MacMichael, SPS, p. 39.)
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their cognisance.... the bad odour in which the 
Sudan Intelligence Department is at present held 
in many quarters is largely due to ideas, often 
erroneous, as to the extent to which 'agents' are 
employed. 1
When writing to a provincial governor, Willis was in the habit of be­
ginning with the words, "Agent reports...". The information subsequently 
imparted might be (and often was) wholly trivial, but the governor had 
nonetheless been put on notice that an "agent" from Khartoum was at 
large in his province. While a governor might have nothing to hide, com­
plaining of the presence of agents might give the opposite impression.
On purely practical grounds, the exaggerated cloak and dagger aspect 
of these agents, their often amateurish methods and undeniably poor re­
sults, all called into question the necessity for the inconvenience 
they undoubtedly caused. One former official recalls that at Nahud in 
1915 a- wire arrived informing him that a spy, disguised as a merchant, 
would soon be arriving. No one, save the inspector, was to know of this.
Subsequently a local vendor appeared at the office and said? "'Sir, the
2
government spy has arrived. Where shall we put him?'" Such ludicrous 
happenings only increased annoyance with the intelligence department.
Report of Mr. J.M. Ewart, Indian Police, on the organisation of 
public security intelligence in the Sudan, 8/6/25, SGA, GIVSEG 36/1/2. 
Stack had expressed "decided dissatisfaction" with the intelligence 
reports he was receiving in London in 192*+, and asked the Indian Go­
vernment to second to the Sudan Government someone who could report 
on the subject and suggest reforms. Ewart was selected..
Interview with Sir Angus Gillan, 2*+/5/76. Willis's successor, Regi­
nald Davies, recalled that "In Darfur ,we had been unconscious of the 
existence of the Intelligence Department; and in Kordofan we were 
inclined to laugh at it. The secret intelligence agent sent out from 
Khartoum was a figure of fun." (Davies, The camel's back. London,
1957, p. 180.)
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Attempts were made, without much success, to put a stop to what 
was seen as clear interference in province affairs. At the Northern 
Governors* Meeting of 1922, the governors felt forced to resolve that 
"The Meeting were of opinion that direct communications between the 
Director of Intelligence and Province staff should be restricted to 
correspondence between the Director of Intelligence and the Governor...." * 
The clear implication, of course, was that the intelligence depart­
ment had been communicating directly with subordinate officials with­
out the knowledge of the province governor.
The general criticism of the "bad old days" of Slatin notwith­
standing, an important aspect of his method had been constant direct 
contact with native opinion, especially with tribal leaders, through 
his friendships and frequent treks into the hinterland. This, because 
of the increased responsiblities of the intelligence department and by 
personal inclination Willis was uanble to do. Combined with the often 
useless information retrieved by agents and the" unsophisticated and 
disorganised methods of collation, the result was the department's in­
ability to perform much in the way of useful service. In the words of 
one who served in the department under Willisj the intelligence depart­
ment "was very bad.... We didn't really know much about the Sudan. It
wasn't a police intelligence...." Willis "was quite useless ... a lone
2
wolf". The department "was just on its own."
These sentiments were echoed in Ewart's report on public security 
intelligence in 1925. The fault was not altogether with Willis. But cir-
^ Record of the Northern Governors' Meeting, 1922, SGA, CIVSEC 32/1/3.
2
Interview with Brig. Maurice Lush, 7/10/76. Indeed, Willis wrote that 
"a system of Intelligence for the Sudan has largely to be based on a 
very full and personal knowledge of the leading personalities ... and 
if possible ties of personal friendship with them". (Willis to direc­
tor of military intelligence, war office, 3l/5/l9» SGA, INTEL 1/20/105.)
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cumstance, historical and personal, combined to make cooperation be­
tween the provinces and the department, always difficult, at last im­
possible. The lack of cooperation ensured in turn that the work actu­
ally done by the department was often valueless.  ^Ewaxt reported that 
the method therefore followed by the department was always deficient:
The Intelligence Department amasses a vast amount of 
inchoate detail, which, tested by the experience of 
the Director, enables the latter to form opinions upon 
the problem as a whole. The value of such opinions 
would be greatly enhanced if their formation had been 
influenced by a wider and more general knowledge of the 
subject, and by the informed views of equally experi­
enced provincial officials. Further ... even the Intel­
ligence Department itself ... is usually following on 
events instead of anticipating them. 2
The Ewart report on public security intelligence -sealed*WiHi&'s 
fate. In 1926 he was made governor of the Upper Nile Province, a 
transfer nearer to exile than to promotion. It has often been assumed 
that the departure of Willis from the intelligence department was a 
result of the 1924 disturbances, but the problems of that department, 
noted above, and Willis's unpopularity, were the real causes for his 
removal. The 1925 report simply legitimized the feeling against him. 
Indeed, in a private letter to MacMichael in 1924, Schuster, by then ac­
tive in many areas of the government, joked that "'C.M.G.' might be our
^ Ewart report on the organisation of public security intelligence.
2
Ibid. As an example of "following on events" one may cite the Sudan 
Intelligence Reports. While, like the annual Reports, these were 
rather official press releases than organs for disseminating current 
information, they were nonetheless the chief periodical source of 
intelligence, on the Sudan as a whole, available to the provincial 
authorities. Yet they were often issued months after the occurrence 
of the events they described, obviously limiting their utility, if 
any, to their recipients. Rather than syntheses on which local policy 
could be based, they became simply interesting historical accounts, 
processed for consumption outside the Sudan.
?4
slogan", meaning Charles (or "Chunkie"', Willis's nickname) must go. ^
We have dwelt somewhat on the deficiencies of the intelligence 
department for two reasons. First, of course, it is useful to under­
stand, before discussing the security problems of the period, which 
were many and varied, what apparatus the government had available for 
obtaining information about and dealing with those problems. It will 
have been seen that the apparatus was inadequate and, indeed, became 
itself a problem to be dealt with. Further, the unique position of the 
director of intelligence gave him a strong voice in determining policy, 
which, £rom several points of view (not the least being that intelligence 
y work should be independent of policy-formation) was to be discountenan­
ced. Thus, the importance of Willis himself, especially in his dealings 
with leaders of Sudanese opinion and his consequent recommendations, 
was inevitably exaggerated beyond that appropriate to the head of a de­
partment. Secondly, in the examples of the intelligence department and 
the financial secretaryship can be noted the parallel of two arms of 
the government without clearly limited areas of responsibility. Both 
were headed by men who, while perhaps equal to the tasks facing the 
young Condominium, when pacification on the one hand and only rudimen­
tary fiscal management on the other had priority over the development 
of a bureaucratic structure, were not competent to deal with increa­
singly complex post-war realities. These deficiencies, compounded by 
structural and personal problems, were part of the "legacy" of the 
Wingate-Slatin regime. Both situations were not to be dealt with until 
crises demanded urgent action. It must be concluded that Stack and his 
immediate advisors, most of whom, to be sure, were imbued with the same 
preconceptions and hampered by their parochial experience, failed to 
respond to the challenge to the Sudan's administration by streamlining
1 Schuster to MacMichael, 30/9/24, MECOX.
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the old or creating the new machinery necessary to deal with the chal-
i
lenge.
The provinces
Even with the best intentions and most efficient methods, the in­
telligence department's communications with the provinces would have 
suffered. Great distances and poor internal communications led on the 
one hand to Khartoum's feeling that the provinces were insufficiently 
receptive to the views of the central government, and on the other, to 
the feeling of provincial officials that Khartoum lacked understanding 
and knowledge of the conditions in the provinces. This fact, reflected 
in (and exacerbated by) the powers devolved upon provincial governors, 
gave great independence to the governors - at times more than they 
would have liked. Khartoum's control was felt mainly in financial mat­
ters  ^but, of course, differed from one province to another.
With the conquest of Darfur in 1916, the Sudan had a total of 
2
fifteen provinces. Local conditions varied so greatly, not only from 
one province to another, but even within a province, that standard pro­
cedures were often difficult to adopt. Thus certain provinces in the 
northern riverain areas were closely administered - areas of "direct" 
rule - whereas others, notwithstanding official policy and government 
pronouncements to the contrary, were from the beginning loosely adminis­
tered. The number of staff, the state of the local tribes, and the atti­
tudes of the individual British official were determinants of the form 
of administration.
 ^Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 71“73.
2
Bahr al-Ghazal, Blue Nile, Darfur, Dongola, Haifa, Khartoum, Kordofan, 
Mongalla, Nuba Mts., Red Sea, Sennar, Upper Nile, Equatoria, White Nile, 
and Berber.
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The provincial administrations were all theoretically centralised. 
The governor (mudir) was responsible directly to the governor-general, 
though communication was in fact through the appropriate secretary or 
department. Each province was divided into districts (marakiz: sing.: 
markaz) presided over by a British inspector (mufattish) who from 1922 
was styled "district commissioner”. Each district in its turn was di­
vided in sub-districts (ma'muriyat) under a ma'mur (usually an 
Egyptian, though increasingly, in Stack's time, a Sudanese). The pro­
vincial governor was the supreme authority within his province. He was 
charged with preserving order, maintaining the system of justice, and 
regulating the province's staff. He was the province's chief magistrate. 
He drew up the provincial budget and was responsible for supervising 
conformity to the financial regulations.
When Stack took office in 1917» his provincial governors had all 
had long experience of the Sudan. They, like Stack himself and the cen­
tral government hierarchy, were graduates of the Wingate-Slatin school, 
possessing many of the same virtues and prejudices of those two great 
figures. The British service in the Sudan, while often called a corps 
d'elite, suffered because of its isolation, not only from administrative 
and political developments in Britain's colonial empire, but also with­
in the Sudan itself. Thus, while well-versed in the history and ways 
of the country (or, at least, of their particular provinces) they were, 
as a group, rather too parochial, uncritical and satisfied with the pre­
vailing state of affairs. Stack's tenure saw the retirement of many of 
this first generation of British officials. Of the fifteen governors in 
office when he was confirmed as governor-general, one (Sir Herbert
77
Jackson Basha)  ^had served since 1899; three since 1901; four since 
1902; one since 1903; three since 1904; and one since 1905. The re­
maining two had served since 1912, hut they (Hawarden Bey and North- 
cote Bey) were both military men and governors of southern provinces 
(Bahr al-Ghazal and Nuba Mts. respectively).
In practice, the role of governor in the north was very different 
from that of a southern governor. Even in Stack's time, after twenty 
years of Condominium rule, the southern Sudan could hardly be said to 
have been administered at all. The southern governor's chief responsi­
bility was to maintain order. Poor communications, even by Sudan stan­
dards, the climate, terrain, a heterogeneous and suspicious population 
made the whole south unattractive even to the adventurous types of the 
Sudan civil service. The southern governors were usually military or 
ex-military men. The so-called "Bog barons" were a breed apart from
Sir Herbert Jackson (l86l-193l) was governor of Berber, 1899; civil 
secretary and deputy governor-general, 1900-01; and governor of Don- 
gola, 1902-22. In 1922-23 he was styled "inspector-general". (Mac- 
Michael, SPS, p. 9.) Why Jackson was given this title is unclear, but 
it was possibly to give him more prestige when he was acting go­
vernor-general in Stack's absence.
^ Viscount Hawarden (1877-1958) served in the Bahr al-Ghazal from 1912 
until he retired in 1920. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 24.) Cecil Northcote 
(1878-1945) served in Bahr al-Ghazal, 1912-17» and was governor of 
Mongalla in 1918-19. He was governor of the Nuba Mts. from 1919 until 
he retired in 1928. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 21.)
3
MacMichael, SPS, passim.
4 —This is a reference to the Bahr al-Ghazal Province, which was
popularly known as "the Bog".
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their northern counterparts. The central governments ignorance and
neglect of the south allowed the Bog baron to assume
the role of paternal autocrat and benevolent despot.
He hammered out peace in his district, fought off in­
numerable diseases, and paid little heed to the pious 
and well-meaning administrative diktat which reached 
him from Khartoum. This life attracted the self- 
sufficient officer who could shoot, an officer who 
did not need the companionship of the mess, a man who
was resilient to the isolation and loneliness yet
with the sympathy and understanding to win the loyalty 
of what were in reality his people, his subjects. 1
Not infrequently the central government was called upon to send
2troops against one or another recalcitrant tribe in the south.
Stack himself had gained a modest fame from his command of the Shambe
3
Field Force in 1902. ^ "Patrols" were, in fact, simply a continuation 
of the process of pacification begun with the annihilation of the 
Mahdists. Even as late as the 1920s a patrol might be the first govern­
ment contact with a tribe. A typical campaign was that in the Lau-Nuer
country in 1917. ^he motive for this operation was that no administra­
tive post had yet been established there due to a "paucity of staff" 
and lack of funds. The Lau section of the Nuer had evaded its tribute 
payments and was equipped with rifles obtained from Abyssinia. They 
were therefore to be made an example, to show the whole of the Nuer 
that the government must be obeyed. In several engagements the govern­
ment force was successful. Stack’s report to Wingate concluded that
R.O. Collins, "The imperialists - the Sudan political service", un­
published paper, n.d., p. 10. Differences also existed in the method 
of recruitment of southern officials. Ex-officers were often taken in­
to service, usually on a contract basis. (See MacMichael, SPS, p.6)
2
See Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 147-15^.
3
Report of the Shambe Field Force, SIR, May 1902.
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Although no decisive defeat was inflicted owing to the 
enemy not having effected any large concentration, they 
were severely punished by loss of prisoners, casualties 
and captured stock. They have learned that Government 
is strong enough to enforce its orders....1
Other such operations, some on a large scale, punctuated the Stack 
years. A major campaign was fought in the Nyima Hills of the Nuba Mts. 
Province in 1917-18. "The patrol's objectives were limited to the ha­
rassing of Nubas while cultivating, the destruction of crops and vil-
2
lages, and the capture of cattle," The record of this campaign is of 
almost incredible Nuba tenacity and courage, of tribesmen dying of 
thirst rather than surrendering, villages burnt and whole herds cap­
tured.
In 1919 the Aliab Dinka revolted. A police post south of Bor was
attacked by a force of some three thousand Aliab in October. In Decem-
3
ber the column led by the governor of Mongalla, Major C.H. Stigand, 
to restore order, was ambushed. The column lost twenty-five men, in­
cluding the governor himself.
The loss of Stigand ... and White, the officer comman­
ding the Equatorial Battalion, embittered officials 
from Khartoum to Mongalla.... Throughout March, April, 
and May 1920, nearly a thousand Sudanese and Equatorial 
troops scourged the three thousand square miles of 
Aliabland, supported by gunboats on the Nile and equip­
ped with artillery and the ubiquitous machine guns....
Over, four hundred Aliab, Atwot, and Mandari [[were]]
1 Stack to Wingate, lVll/l7. F.O. 371/3711.
^ "Operations in the Nyima Hills. Patrol no. 32", 23/2/18,
F.O. 371/3203.
^ Chauncey Hugh Stigand Bey (l877-1919)» Egyptian Army, was governor 
of the Upper Nile, 1917-18, and was appointed governor of Mongalla 
in 1919. For biographical details, see Wingate's memoir in Stigand's 
Equatoria. the Lado^  Enclave, London, 1923.
8o
killed, seven thousand cattle seized, and every vil­
lage burned and the durra destroyed. Peace and famine 
settled over the Aliab country. 1
But after 1920, it was later reported, the
Governor-General set his face against any more patrols, 
and especially against cattle-raiding. A return was made 
to the old plan of peaceful penetration, but under cir­
cumstances far more difficult, as the natives were sus­
picious and over-confident in the value of their own 
arms. But from 1920 on there is the growth of new spirit.
It took several years before even the Shilluk could be 
trusted to let a D.C. enter their village without show­
ing fight, whilst the process with the Nuer was bound 
to be slower....There were still places that were un­
known and practically inaccessible. 2
Thus, while administration in the north, however unsystematic, 
was at least continuing, the south under Stack was still undergoing
3
the process of pacification. Indeed, in 1920, Woodland, the new go­
vernor of Mongalla Province, was "all in favour of withdrawing our very
4advanced posts and only grabbing what we can really administer". One
R.O. Collins, Land beyond the rivers, the southern Sudan. 1898-1919. 
New Haven, 1971 * p. 214. The British tended to play down the revolt. 
Allenby told Curzon that "Unrest amongst such partially administered 
tribes is a normal feature of work in equatorial provinces. There is 
nothing unusual in this particular occurrence, except the accidental 
death of a British officer.... The case, as a whole, is quite nor­
mal". (Allenby to Curzon, 19/1/20, quoting telegram from Khartoum, 
18/1/20, F.O. 371/3722.)
2
C.A. Willis, "A brief survey of the policy of the Sudan Government 
in the Upper Nile", n.d,, SAD 212/10/1.
^ Vincent Reynolds Woodland (1879- ?) served in Dongola, 1905-08; 
Kordofan, 1909-11; White Nile, 1912-17; Kordofan, 1917-18; Kassala, 
1918-19; and was governor of Mongalla from 1920 until his retire­
ment in 192^. (MacMichael, SPS. p. 14.)
^ L. Phillips to Somerset, 24/4/20, MEC0X.
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inspector, in a private letter, described the situation in Mongalla 
(and the relationship between the provincial and central governments) 
thust
The S.G. CSudan Government] are a stiff-necked lot of 
sods. How they expect anyone to administer a district 
without knowing the language I don't know. One doesn't 
realize how much it means till one gets down here and 
has cases to try and no one but a useless interpreter 
to explain it to one..., They are short of Inspectors 
now ... the whole of the west bank is inspectorless....
There is a new post now just under the Boya at Khor 
Losinga. There is a company there and an Inspector.
The latter's job is purely an Intelligence show, as he 
doesn't administer or take tax.... The present Inspec­
tor (at Torib) complains that now the troops are gone 
... he can't get carriers, not even dura owing to the 
famine, and of course he doesn't know the language....
Everyone has gone ... Barker and I are afraid the ad­
ministration is in a bad way. They'll never do anything' - - 
in this place unless they make roads and give a fellow 
a long enough time to know his district before shifting 
him round. They've had. an extraordinary number of changes 
both in the Civil and the Equats lately - about a dozen
fellows one after the other.... Owing to dura shortage
all Equat dura has had to be brought from. Khartoum - 
also 500 donkeys to transport it.... You should have 
seen the song Khartoum made at having to fork out this 
£5000 extra-budgetary expenditure. Keep troops on patrol 
for 8 months in a famine season and then expect them to 
grow their own dura.... It is most refreshing having 
Woodland as Governor ... but, as he says, the whole pro­
vince is in such a muck-up state he doesn't know where 
to start, especially as they won't give him any staff....
Am now at Rejaf and going to 'inspect' details. Can't
get ashore as stuck on a sandbank. ^
A reflection of the differentiation of north and south was the 
institution of governors' meetings. Because of the distances involved 
and the different nature of the problems faced in the two halves of
the country, each group of governors met separately on an annual basis.
L. Phillips to Somerset, 24/4/20, MECOX. In 1920 Sterry, in commen 
ting on southern policy, said that "what a failure it is after 20 
years can be seen (a) from the frequency of semi-military opera­
tions, (b) from the appalling excess of expenditure over revenue." 
(Sterry to Woodland, 23/9/20, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/31.)
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Yet even at this it was recognised, after several of these meetings, 
that the discussion of common problems and the coodination of policy 
were impossible even within the narrower context of the northern pro­
vinces alone because of the varying conditions obtaining in one pro­
vince from another. The meetings thus tended toward the discussion of 
trivialities, and in 1927 formal annual meetings were abandoned. ^
Below the governor in the chain of command (and far more impor­
tant both in day-to-day administration and to the people to whom he was 
often the only contact with the government) was the inspector (after 
1922 called "district commissioner"). In a memorandum on the duties of 
the inspector written in 1920, MacMichael noted that for the whole 
country, with an estimated area of one million square miles, budgetary 
provision existed for a mere seventy-three inspectors. Even with this 
small provision there was "a large number of present vacancies". The in­
spector's duties were listed under nine main headings: land, taxation,
municipal, civil suits, matrimonial, personnel, criminal, police and
2prisons, and "miscellaneous".
The first area of responsibility, land, referred to the settling 
of disputes over land ownership, a time-consuming and difficult job 
because only a small fraction of the country's land was registered. 
Ownership of cultivable land, grazing rights, boundaries of gum gar­
dens, and watering rights made up the bulk of the cases. In the area of 
taxation, supervision was required of ushur and herd tax assessment and 
dues collection. Municipal responsibilities (where applicable) inclu­
ded "inspection of sanitary arrangements", town planning, allotment of
Civil secretary to all governors, 29/11/27, SGA, CIVSEC 32/1/1.
2 MacMichael, "Memorandum on the duties of inspectors in charge of dis­
tricts", 1920, SGA, CIVSEC 50/15/67. See also Warburg, The Sudan under 
Wingate, p. 73.
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sites, organising markets, prices, licenses, etc. Civil suits, again 
especially in towns, took up an enormous amount of time, and the num­
bers of these tended to increase in proportion to urbanisation (and con­
comitant de-tribalisation). Under "personnel” were included investiga­
tion of complaints against shaykhs and supervision of police and office 
staff. Criminal cases made up perhaps the bulk of the inspector's work, 
as
The powers of a Mamur or Sub-mamur are very limited and 
consequently almost every case of major or comparatively 
major theft has to come before the Inspector. In more im­
portant cases a court has to be formed and its sittings 
often take away the whole administrative staff of the 
district from their other duties. Cases of cheating, 
grievous hurt, abduction, slave dealing, false evidence, 
dishonest receiving or concealing, and offences under the 
various ordinances are also common and almost all have to 
be dealt with by the Inspector.
Finally, under "miscellaneous”, MacMichael listed the duties which con­
tributed to the inspector's characterisation as the "jack of all trades", 
and made obvious the impossibility of one man's carrying them out: the 
preparation of an annual local budget; confidential correspondence; in­
specting accounts; issuing of licences; compiling reports; control of 
cattle diseases; recommendations regarding agricultural loans; contracts 
for markets, ferries, etc.; erection and upkeep of rest-houses; super­
vising matters relating to construction and maintenance of roads and 
wells; supervising schools; formalities regarding sales, leases, and 
mortgages; sitting on compensation boards; recommendations for local 
honours, etc. ^
The time consumed by performance of these duties varied, of course, 
from district to district. In western Kordofan, for instance, cases
 ^MacMichael, "Memorandum on the duties of inspectors..."
 ^Ibid.
mconcerning camel theft and problems relating to gum gardens were pre­
dominant concerns. Also, "there were streams of petitions, petitions 
about tebeldi trees,  ^gum gardens, or how the local omda had oppres­
sed someone ... interminable petitions. You might get fifty in a day. 1
2There was no one to decide these disputes except the commissioner".
This picture of the harried inspector has been re-inforced in the
memoirs and histories published by former Sudan Government officials.
A quotation from one is illustrative:
We spoke of the many criminal and civil cases to be 
heard, land disputes to be settled, the maintenance 
of law and order, building of stores and police lines, 
the development of the economic possibilities of the 
country, the issuing of licences for various enterpri­
ses, and the thousand and one duties involved in the 
administration of a large and backward district....
We spoke of constant bouts of fever, the exacting 
climate, vast distances to cover with slow and in­
adequate means of transport. We told of different 
languages still to be learnt, of tribal customs and 
characteristics which we were striving to understand 
... of the great tracts of land still unmapped which 
we hoped to explore and, some day, to administer. To 
this information we added the somewhat staggering fact 
that there were, of course, practically no funds to 
finance our efforts. 3
The impression given is of exactly the sort of "jack of all 
trades", working in intolerable conditions, that MacMichael described 
in his memorandum. But while the inspector was, in fact, theoretically 
responsible for all these varied works, is this an accurate impression 
of his actual performance? Another former inspector wrote:
Tebeldi trees were hollowed out to form cisterns, and were therefore 
a valuable asset.
p
Interview with Mr. Martin Barr, 3/6/76.
3
H.C. Jackson, Behind the modem Sudan, London, 1955# PP* 39-60.
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The only member of the Political Service in the station 
[Medani on the Blue Nile] when I arrived was W.R.G. Bond. 1 
... The District Inspector whom I was supposed to succeed 
had been absent on leave for a considerable time owing to 
ill-health so there was nobody I could take over from. I 
had an interview with Colonel Dickinson 2 ... and asked 
him if he would explain to me what I was supposed to be 
responsible for. He answered shortly that I would find 
out, but that was not exactly helpful. I did, however, 
gradually discover ... what my duties were.... Amongst 
other things I found that I had under my immediate command 
a force of police and a prison and I was in addition re­
sponsible for a good deal of magisterial work. 3
_ He went on to describe the routine under his next governor, J.H. Butler:
He did not seem to bother over much about how his Province 
was administered so long as the local inhabitants appeared 
to be happy and content.... [He] used to spend a good deal 
of time going up and down the White Nile in the Province 
Steamer and stopping here and there to see the local in­
habitants and ... where possible, having a duck shoot....
[He] used to come into my office and say 'I think it is 
about time you went on circuit. I would like you to come
William Ralph Gameys Bond (1880-1952) served in Dongola, 1905-07; 
in the legal department, 1908-09; in the White Nile Province, 1910- 
15; in Dongola, 1916-19; and in Khartoum, 1919-21. He was governor 
of the Fung Province from 1921 to 1924, and governor of Dongola from 
192** until his retirement in 1926. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 1*1.)
Colonel Ernest Arthur Dickinson (1864- ?) served in the Blue Nile 
Province from 1903 to 191**. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 12.)
3
E.G. Sarsfield-Hall, From Cork to Khartoum, privately published, 1975» 
pp. 29-30. Edwin Geoffrey Sarsfiel'd-Hall (1886-1975) served in 
Khartoum, 1909; in the Blue Nile Province, 1910-12; in the legal de­
partment, 1913-16; in Darfur, 1917-21. He was deputy governor of 
Kordofan, 1921-26, and governor of that province from 1926 to 1928.
He served as governor of Khartoum from 1929 until retiring in 1936. 
(MacMichael, SPS, p. 21.)
^ James Henry Butler (1863-1927) served in Sennar in 1899-1900, in 
Kordofan from 1901 to 1904, and was governor of the White Nile Pro­
vince from 1905 until his retirement in 1913. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 9.)
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with me on the Province Steamer tomorrow*. I had prac­
tically no work to do as a District Judge in the Pro­
vince headquarters and I don't think I ever heard a case 
on circuit....^
Added to the vicissitudes of "on the spot training" (perhaps as
well described as trial and error) was the language problem. Even though
all candidates for the civil service had to spend a year studying Ara-
2bic before they were posted to the Sudan, this was seldom sufficient
to conduct a district's administration with confidence. H.C. Jackson,
* in describing as his most "distasteful" duty "having to try a man for
his life", noted that
the trial was in a foreign language ... the accused was 
usually ignorant and unable to make the best of any de­
fence he might have. He had no counsel to plead for him; 
there was no jury. The Major Court ... was presided over 
a Britsh officer whose difficulties were increased by 
the fact that he sometimes had to prepare a case which he 
afterwards had to hear. 3
With such obvious liabilities as staff shortages, lack of funds,
language difficulties, etc., how, then were the. "thousand and one"
duties of the inspector performed? It must be concluded that what the
inspector could not do either went undone or, to a much greater extent
than the government admitted (or was even aware of) was done through
and by traditional native authority. This will be discussed at greater
length in Chapter IV; it will suffice here to note that Direct Rule,
outside of the large towns, remained more theoretical than actual, more
a part of the Sudan Government's self-view than of objective reality.
Below the inspector in the province hierarchy were the ma'murs
and sub-ma'murs. At the beginning of the Condominium this class of of-
 ^Sarsfield-Hall, From Cork to Khartoum, pp. 39-^ K).
2
"Information to candidates. Egyptian and Sudanese Civil Services",
June 1913, F.O. 371/2938.
^ Jackson, Behind the modem Sudan, p, 121.
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ficial was made up almost entirely of Egyptians seconded from the 
Egyptian Army. They were, in fact, an intervening class between the Bri­
tish inspectors and the Sudanese population, with whom they shared a 
common language and religion. A ma*mur served as local police official 
and "revenue and executive officer and magistrate as well, but always 
under control of a British officer to every three or four Egyptian 
mamurs."  ^As early as 1912, Sudanese sub-ma*murs had been introduced, 
both as a matter of administrative necessity and as an extension of the 
policy of reducing the numbers of Egyptian officials with a view toward 
their eventual elimination. These Sudanese were selected "in conformity 
with the Government policy of giving authority to persons of good secu­
lar, as opposed to religious standing", and in keeping with this prin­
ciple, "careful consideration" was given to their family connections
2
as well as educational qualifications. After the troubles in Egypt 
in 1919» this process was accelerated. In 1920 the composition of the
ma*mur and sub-mafmur class was as follows: there were three Egyptian
3 _
sub-inspectors, fifty-three Egyptian mafmurs and eighty Egyptian
sub-ma*murs; one Syrian ma'mur and two Syrian sub-ma'murs; four Suda-
q ,  —
nese ma*murs and fifteen Sudanese sub-ma *murs; one Arab ma*mfir and
forty-five Arab sub-ma’murs; and four ma*murs of "mixed" descent and
ten sub-ma*murs of "mixed" descent. ^
 ^Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts", 14/3/20, DEP MILNER 161.
2 Ibid.
3 _
When an Egyptian ma*mur who had been seconded from the army came up 
for promotion to the rank of sagh (adjutant-major), he was either re­
turned to the army or promoted to sub-inspector. The title indicated 
seniority and implied no added responsibility. Egyptians never became 
inspectors.
4 "Sudanese" refers to southerners; "Arab" refers to northerners.
^ "Mixed" refers to muwallads, persons of mixed Egyptian-Sudanese parentage. 
^ Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts".
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As of the time of Keown-Boyd's report (March 1920) the White Nile and 
Darfur provinces were staffed entirely by Sudanese of sub-ma'mur rank 
(called macawinin; sing.: muc5win), and the system was being extended.  ^
At the height of the Egyptian crisis of 1919» a commission was es­
tablished under the chairmanship of Viscount Milner, secretary of state 
for the colonies, to report to the British government on the situation 
and to make recommendations as to Egypt's future. (See Chapter III^ ) No 
mention was made of the Sudan in the mission's terms of reference, but 
considerable attention was paid to the country in the final report,
\ based on memoranda written by Keown-Boyd, who was delegated to Khartoum
in the winter of 1920 to investigate all aspects of the Sudan's posi­
tion. Another indication that the future status of the Sudan was of con­
siderable concern to the mission is the amount of private and official 
correspondence dealing with the country undertaken by Lord Milner.
Among Milner's observations (discussed in Chapter III) was that
It is undesirable to multiply propagandists of 
Egyptian Nationalism in the Soudan. Egyptian Na­
tionalism has its good as well as its bad side in 
Egypt. But it has no raison d'etre in the Soudan, 
and its introduction into that country is simply 
an element of disturbance without any corresponding 
advantage. 2
The Milner report saw the education of Sudanese on an increased scale
as one solution to the problem, but warned that "care should be taken,
in the matter of education, not to repeat the mistake made in Egypt of
introducing a system which fits pupils for little else than employment
in clerical and minor administrative posts, and creates an overgrown
3
body of aspirants to Government employment."
* Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts".
Private and confidential general comments, n.d. F.O. 371//+978.
3
Report of the special mission to Egypt, 1921, Cmd. 1131.
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Thus there was concern, even at this early date, not simply with 
the potential threat of Egyptians in the Sudan, but also with the pros­
pect of a large and inevitably expanding Sudanese official class which 
might take on the same anti-British characteristies of its Egyptian - 
and Indian - counterparts. Certainly the Sudan Government, or at least 
elements thereof, were alive to this possibility as the logical require­
ment of "direct" rule for closer administration. This awareness is re­
flected in the early recourse to Indirect Rule. (See Chapter IV.)
The policy of diminishing the numbers of Egyptians in the adminis­
tration was greatly accelerated after 1919 > and while this question 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV, it might be pointed out here 
that at the time of the Milner report's composition there were 130 
British, 533 Egyptian, 605 Sudanese, 2b Syrian, and 9 "others" employed. 
Clerical staff positions were being reserved for Sudanese, and Egyptian 
clerical staff allowed to diminish through retirement, resignation, etc.  ^
These figures are for classified personnel only, and therefore do not 
include, for instance, the Egyptian Army railway battalion, which num­
bered some 2500 Egyptians. Although reductions in Egyptian personnel 
were deemed desirable in all departments, in only a few were Egyptians 
thought to be an immediate danger. Posts and telegraphs was described
as "a thoroughly Egyptian Department", whose staff, while efficient,
2were "troublesome, discontented, and politically disaffected". But re­
placement by Sudanese would be difficult because "the work is very ar­
duous and hours are long: Sudanese or Arabs are temperamentally un­
suited ... only boys who have failed to attain a high standard of
See Appendix II, table b,
2
Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts".
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education will go to £the department] and many of those who do come 
leave after six months or so".  ^The railways and steamers department 
similarly caused alarm. At Atbara, the railway headquarters, it was 
said that "the Egyptian Staff is so numerous that the railway canton­
ment is practically an Egyptian village. The Egyptian clerks were in-
2
clined to be troublesome during the disturbances in Egypt...."
In summarising his report on the Sudan's civil administration, 
Keown-Boyd made the following recommendations:
(1) The replacement of the mamur system with the 'muawen* 
system.
(2) Prohibition of the employment of any further Egyptian per­
sonnel in permanent posts - except in a few special cases.
(3) Expansion and enlarging of the educational system, 
p) Reduction of the Railway Battalion.
(5) Greater facilities for Egyptian officials of the Sudan 
Government to find posts in Egypt. 3
The point of this summary was that greater numbers of Sudanese should 
be trained to replace Egyptians. From the inception of the Condominium 
the Sudan Government had pursued a policy of educating Sudanese with 
this end in mind, but progress toward it was slow. As early as 1901, 
a principal aim of the education department was expressed as "the crea­
tion of a small native administrative class who will ultimately fill 
many minor posts". This was to be done primarily through the medium 
of the Gordon College. In 1905 there were but fifteen boys enrolled.
By 1917 the number had increased to seventy-four. The substantial in-
 ^Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts."
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
l±
Annual Report for 1901, Cd. 1012.
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crease from that year can be attributed directly to this need to re­
place Egyptian civil^servants* the figures for 1921 (the year of the 
Milner report) and for 1926 (reflecting the evacuation of Egyptain of­
ficials following the 1924 troubles) are especially noteworthy. ^
Gordon College became, in fact, and despite the warnings of Milner and 
others, such a training ground for government employment, that a govern­
ment position came to be considered as the natural outcome of gradua­
tion. In 1933, lord Lloyd, Allenby's successor as high commissioner, 
wrote, however, that "any idea that the education given in [the govern­
ment schools] was in any way a qualification for government service was
2
deliberately and actively discouraged". The fact remains, however, 
that the "western-educated" Sudanese began to see himself as the na­
tural heir at least to the gradually departing Egyptian official, a 
perception which, while perfectly valid, was to have increasingly sorry 
results as time went on.
To conclude, the central government under Stack faced certain 
structural and related political problems. The degree to which the 
government of the Sudan was a centralised administration, even in the 
relatively accessible north, must be assessed with caution, and care 
must be taken not only to distinguish north from south, but also town 
from village, and sedentary from nomadic areas. For instance, when
1 Enrolment in 1917 stood at 79; in 1918, 86; in 1919, 11**; in 1920,
13**; in 1921, 180; in 1922, 191; in 1923, 207; in 1929, 212; in 
1925, 233; and. in 1926, 303. ("List showing number of boys in Gordon 
College", 10/3/33, SGA, CIVSEC 1/37/162.)
o
Lord Lloyd, Egypt since Cromer, London, 1933, vol. 1, p. 324.
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asked by the writer if he Iiad ever met the governor-general, one former 
inspector, who had been stationed in Darfur, responded in the nega­
tive, commenting that "for Stack to see me would have taken him out of 
Khartoum for two months".  ^Another former official remarked that he
"didn't think Khartoum was very much in touch ... like the chap on the
2front line in a war", there was little contact with headquarters.
The inefficiency of a theoretical Direct Rule that was, in fact, in 
many cases indirect or merely the most general supervision and main­
tenance of law and order was one, if not the major impetus, toward ac- 
\ ceptance, in Stack's time, of the efficacy of formal Indirect Rule.
In would be incorrect to assume, notwithstanding the critiques 
cited above, that Khartoum was blissfully unaware of the plight of the 
provincial administrator. But before the Egyptian crisis of 1919 had 
shaken British confidence, and before the idea of Indirect Rule had 
consequently taken hold, the usual remedy for administrative problems 
was to increase the numbers of British staff. Thus, in 1920 a propo­
sal was made to create "double inspectorates", that is, to assign two 
inspectors to one district, with the aim being that while one inspec­
tor was on leave or on tour, the other would be at the district head­
quarters. Greater continuity would be achieved, since one man familiar
with the district would always be available to train a replacement for
3
his fellow inspector. The governors were m  agreement with the idea. 
But Stack, while agreeing in principle, warned that "one of the ob­
jects of putting two or more Inspectors in a District should be to
 ^Interview with Sir Shuldham Redfem, S/10/76.
2
Interview with Sir James Robertson, 18/6/76.
3
MacMichael, "Memorandum on the duties of inspectors".
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eliminate or reduce the subordinate administrative staff....”  ^This 
theme was articulated more forcefully by Schuster, the financial secre­
tary, who warned in 1924 that there was already a tendency to overstaff, 
at least from the financial point of view, in some provinces. He asked: 
”If the administrative organisation is allowed to grow unchecked is 
there not a danger that it will always be in advance of what the country 
can economically support, so that it will be unable to pay its way 
- without charitable supplements to its income?”
By "charitable supplements" Schuster referred, of course, to the 
past and present Egyptian contributions discussed above. The double­
inspectorate idea prevailed, but in the concerns voiced by Stack and 
Schuster are traces of the political and financial motives for moving a- 
way from Direct Rule, a system which built up large staffs which the 
country could not afford. Stack’s desire to eliminate "subordinate 
staff" was the administrative side of the problem; Schuster's concern 
that the Sudan should "pay its way" was the financial side. Indeed, 
Schuster warned that it was "very urgent that we should not allow a 
system of administration to grow which will be such a burden on the 
country's back that it can never stand without the support of demorali-
3
sing subsidies from Egypt." It was imperative, therefore, that the 
Sudan should achieve financial independence and make the_ administra­
tive changes necessary to attain that overriding end.
The outcome of the financial crisis precipitated by the funding 
of the Gezira Scheme was a happy one, politically, as viewed by the
 ^"Remarks of H.E. the governor-general on the subject", 23/3/21,
SGA, CIVSEC 50/13/67.
 ^Schuster to civil secretary, 9/V^» SGA, CIVSEC 50/15/67.
3 Ibid.
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Sudan Government. They had succeeded not only in ensuring the comple­
tion of the irrigation works, hut had also managed to increase Britain's 
financial involvement in Sudan affairs, which could only strengthen 
British resolve to resist Egyptian nationalist demands. The major po­
litical argument in favour of continuing the Scheme had been of a fami­
liar dual nature: it was essential to reduce or even eliminate Egyptian 
influence in the Sudan, on the one hand, and, on the other, the con­
tinuance of the irrigation scheme would prevent the emergence of radi­
cal Sudanese opposition. Stack's remarks in this regard were not an 
isolated expression of concern. Rather, they reflected what, up to 
the point of the Gezira negotiations (1922), were, in the eyes of the 
government, the two basic problems of the Sudan's internal security.
(See Appendix I.)
The first of these was the sinister, anti-British propaganda 
emanating from Egyptian nationalists which was seen as seducing the 
emerging educated class of Sudanese officials and officers. Discerned 
as the inevitable continuation of a pattern evident in Egypt and In­
dia, spawned by the war and the concomitant rising expectations of 
embryonic nationalist movements, the emergence of Sudanese nationalism, 
or, at least, of what in later decades was seen as its first manifes­
tation, came as a made shock to the Sudan Government. The government 
had no experience of opposition that stressed a secular rather than 
religious motive. But the second of the government*s major concerns 
regarding internal security, the resurgence of Mahdism, met with a 
similarly bewildered response. The Sudan Government as a whole was 
committed to a view of Mahdism that relied on the psychological de­
tritus of the Gordon legend. Conceived by the Gordon literature and 
nurtured by the Wingate-Slatin world-view, the idea of Mahdism was 
frozen in time and incapable of modification. Thus, when as a result
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at least in part of the government's own policies the "recrudescence" 
of Mahdism took place, it was inevitably seen as reactionary and im­
placably anti -British. Indeed, by government definition it could be 
nothing else.
We have seen that the Sudan Government emerged from the war un­
prepared for the harsh new realities with which it would have to cope. 
The Gezira funding crisis was, among other things, an example of how 
deeply the government could become involved in matters with which it 
was incapable of dealing in a business-like way. The almost farcical in­
adequacies of the intelligence department are evidence enough of the 
government's staidness and complacency, and of its deficiencies of 
staff. The experience of provincial administrators point to the hap­
hazardness and inefficiency of general administration. Thus, when con­
fronted after the war with the complex threats of Egyptian nationalism 
and its Sudanese parallel, and of a seemingly resurrected Mahdism, the 
government was ill-equipped, structurally, financially, and intellec­
tually, to deal with them.
It is not surprising, then, that the record of Stack's govern­
ment in dealing with these problems is, at best, mixed. Wingate's ten­
tative rehabilitation, during the war years, of various religious lea­
ders, had presaged an era of changing patterns of collaboration and, 
indeed, of resistance. Old friends became threats to security. Inve­
terate enemies became new friends. The record of this process is com­
plicated and many faceted, with a history pre-dating the Condominium.
It seems ironic that C.A. Willis, writing in later years, pointed out 
that "the principle of 'Quieta non movere' or Let Sleeping Dogs Lie, 
was one any administrator is only too glad to support". ^
 ^Willis, "Sidelights", p. 47.
96
Chapter II: Sudanese Resistance To British Rule 
R?.rt One: The Development Of Mahdism During The Stack Years
Introductory
It has been possible only in recent years for students of Sudanese 
history to obtain an objective picture of the Mahdia. ^ Even today, how­
ever, the legends persist and, indeed, are reinforced. Propaganda has 
been accepted as fact both through its repetition and because of a gene­
ral lack of interest in a truth less thrilling and more complex than 
myth. If false impressions are accepted uncritically today, how much 
easier must their acceptance have been by the British officials of the 
early Condominium?
The three outstanding works on the Mahdia to be published before
the Anglo-Egyptian conquest were Wingate's own Mahdiism and the Egyptian 
2
Sudan (l89l), Father Joseph Ohrwalder's Ten years 1 captivity in the
o a
Mahdi's camp (1892), and Slatin's Fire and sword in the Sudan (1896).
The publication in 195& of Holt's The Mahdist state in the Sudan 1881- 
1898, a study of its origins, development and overthrow (2nd ed. Ox- 
ford, 1970), and the availability to scholars of the Mahdist archives 
at Khartoum have been important developments in reaching an under­
standing of the organisation and administration of the. Mahdist state. 
See also Holt's “Modernization and reaction in the nineteenth century 
Sudan” in W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (eds.) Beginnings of modemiza- 
tion in the Middle East, the nineteenth century, Chicago and London, 
1968, pp. 401-415.
p
F.R. Wingate, Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan, 1891 (2nd ed. Lon­
don, 1968.)
3
J. Ohrwalder, Ten years* captivity in the Mahdi's camp 1882-1892, 
London, 1892. Father Ohrwalder (d. 1912), an Austrian priest, was sta- 
tiorjd at Dilling in the Nuba Mts. when he was captured by Mahdists 
in 1882. He escaped from Omdurman in 1892, and returned there after the 
Anglo-Egyptian occupation. (Hill, BD, p. 298.)
k
Rudolf von Slatin, Fire and sword in the Sudan. London, I896.
All, according to Holt, “should be regarded primarily as war-propaganda"^ 
because of Wingate's editing and because of their common thrust: unres­
trained depiction of the horrors of the Khalifa eAbdallahi's regime and 
the call for military action to destroy the Mahdist state. It is im­
portant in investigating the political history of the period not only 
to avoid over-reliance on these (and other) works of dubious evidential 
value, but also to realise that it was upon such accounts that the opi­
nions and attitudes of the early Condominium official were founded. 
Examples abound in Wingate's private correspondence of his own tena­
ciously held opinion of Mahdism as essentially a wrong-headed doctrine 
cynically exploited by Muhammad Ahmad, and wantonly perverted by the 
Khalifa for worldly ends. In this view Mahdism's early success was based 
on widespread dissatisfaction with Turco-Egyptian rule, but its sustained 
cohesion was attributable solely to the tribal dictatorship of the 
Khalifa's own Tacalsha over an increasingly disenchanted and miserable 
population. This attitude was, of course, reinforced by publications 
subsequent to the foundation of the Condominium, and provided as well 
a useful (and often used) argument with which the Sudan Government 
could threaten Cairo and London with the danger of renewed Mahdist oppo­
sition unless one or another of the government's policies was approved. 
Stack, for example, warned of the rise of "a reactionary movement with 
the unexpectedness characteristic of Eastern countries" if the Gezira 
Scheme was not completed. Wingate's official correspondence frequently 
emphasised this possiblity, which, among other things, made the harsh 
suppression of "disturbances" more acceptable to remote Cairo and 
London officials unconcious of Mahdism's dangers.
 ^Holt, "The source-materials of the Sudanese Mahdia", SNR, XL, 1959» 
p. 107.
 ^Stack to Lindsay, n.d. (1922) F.O. 371/7753.
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In 1908, for instance, the Dongola authorities reported a rumour 
that an ex-Mahdist at al-Debba was planning an insurrection. An inspec­
tor sent from Khartoum to investigate reported that the matter was in­
significant, and that members of the "Tariget el Mahdi" in the area 
were few and discredited.  ^Wingate, however, ordered that the legal 
secretary draft legislation (which was, of course, never enacted) making 
illegal "all beliefs in the Mahdi or practice of Mahdist doctrines"; 
he brought the grand qadi. the mufti, and the Board of Ulema into the 
case; ordered the ex-Mahdists at Debba detained until he could discuss 
the matter with Slatin in London; forwarded the entire dossier to Gorst, 
the agent and consul-general in Cairo; and deduced from the case that
"all children of the Mahdi and Khalifa sire a serious danger". In a
subsequent letter, Wingate, in describing the inspector's report, wrote
that "when he talks of the 'Tariget el Mahdi' as he would talk of any
3
more or less legitimate Tariga it rather takes one's breath away".
In communicating the views of the mufti and Board of Ulema, however,
Bonham-Carter, the legal secretary, wrote:
There are a considerable number of men who believe in 
the Mahdi. Although logically a belief in Mahdism should 
necessarily involve disloyalty to the Government, in fact
it does not do so necessarily. Most of these u,en are ig­
norant and illogical. Others, who are better educated, 
are attracted by the puritan element in the Mahdi 's 
teaching and reject the political side of the teaching. ^
Wingate was unprepared to accept this view, which was, in any case,
 ^Woodland to governor, Dongola, 25/5/08, SGA, INTEL 9/l/9. For a note 
on Woodland, see above, page 80.
^ Wingate to asst, director of intelligence, 6/6/08, SGA, INTEL 9/l/9.
^ Wingate to Jackson, 10/6/08, SGA, INTEL 9/l/9. 
k
Quoted in R. Davies, "Memorandum on the policy of the Sudan Govern­
ment towards the Mahdist cult", 11/12/26, F.O. 371/1237^. (Hereafter 
referred to as "Davies Memorandum, 1926.")
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very advanced for its time. He had, in fact, to some extent been per­
suaded by his own propaganda: certainly he had not seen fit to alter 
the view of Mahdism he had formulated and expounded in the 1880s and 
’90s.
It is not difficult to appreciate the effects of the Wingate- 
Slatin view of Mahdism on their subordinates. The new inspector arri­
ving in Khartoum would have had at his disposal information of limited 
scope and common viewpoint: the journals of Gordon, the propaganda of 
Wingate and others, dramatic stories of the fall of Khartoum, of the 
menacing, fanatic tribesmen imbued with the spirit of jihad and rushing 
to certain death before the Maxims at Kararij Kipling's fuzzy-wuzzies; 
and Sudan Government communiques. H.C. Jackson, for example, wrote that 
during his first journey to the Sudan he was thrilled at the prospect 
of living "in a country of which we knew but little, and that little 
we had learnt from various British officers in the Egyptian Army who 
had been our companions on the way out".  ^Once in the Sudan, the new
inspector would see what was passed off as the result of the Khalifa's
2
barbarous rule: poverty, under-population, ignorance, suspicion. Any 
opposition expressed in religious terms was seen as "revivalist", 
"fanatic", or "Dervish-inspired" (see above, pp. ^7-^8). Further, oppo­
sition characterized as "fanatic", seemingly irrational and without 
specific direction, could easily be explained away as an inevitable
reaction of undisciplined barbarians to just and orderly administrar- 
♦
tion. But if a disturbance occurred with some religious implication or 
motivation, was it therefore "Mahdist"? Was the Mahdism of the Stack
^ H.C. Jackson, Sudan days and ways, London, 195^» p. 15«
2
For a note on population statistics, see above, page 38.
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era identical to the movement of Muhammad Ahmad, was it a lineal de-
scendant, or was it something entirely different? ^
Within a few months of the Mahdi's greatest victory, the capture
of Khartoum and the death of Gordon, he himself died. At the pinnacle
of success, the limits of his military power - and therefore of his very
claim to Mahdi-ship - had not yet been realised by his followers. With
2
his death the common problem of all charismatic leaders, that of
Unfortunately, reliance has been placed on the Wingate-Slatin line 
not only for the facts about and an interpretation of the Mahdia, 
but also for the very concept of Mahdism in Sudanese Islam. In his 
treatment of the subject, Margoliouth, for instance, writing in the 
Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics ("Mahdi", p. 339)» accepted un­
critically the received Wingate views "After the strong hands of 
Zubair Pasha, Samuel Baker, and General Gordon had been withdrawn 
from the Sudan, that country was subject to violent oppression". 
Muhammad Aljmad, Margoliouth asserted, identified himself as the Mahdi 
"in the Shi'ite sense; he claimed to be the twelfth imam, the son of 
Hasan Askari". This assertion is a mere re-wording of Wingate's odd 
and completely unfounded claim in Mahdiism and the Egyptian Sudan 
(2nd ed., p. 5)- Margoliouth also accepted the canard that "Success 
also appears to have made of the Mahdi a coarse voluptuary". Sir 
Winston Churchill, in his introduction to R.A. Bermann's The Mahdi 
of Allah (London, 1931» p. xiv) referred to the Mahdi as "the Twelfth 
Imam that was to come". Incidentally, Bermann devoted a page of 
acknowledgement to both Wingate and Slatin who had "read this work 
in manuscript and made many valuable suggestions and corrections".
I use the term in the Weberian sense, as describing one whose legi­
timacy rests not upon "rational" authority but upon his own extra­
ordinary quality. The relationship of this concept to important as­
pects of Sudanese Islam (baraka, saint-veneration, and sufism ge­
nerally) is a close one. One published attempt to relate Weber's 
concepts to the Sudanese Mahdi is R.H. Dekmejian and M.J. Wyszomir- 
ski, "Charismatic leadership in Islam: the Mahdi of the Sudan", in 
Comparative studies in society and history. XIV, 1972, pp. 193-214. 
For a concise discussion of the Mahdist phenomenon and the Sudanese 
example, see Holt, The Mahdist state, pp. 22-31. For the concept of 
charismatic authority, see Max Weber, From Max Weber: essays in so­
ciology. trans. and ed. by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, London, 
1948.
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"routinization", or the inevitable compromising of the revolutionary- 
ideal, was avoided, or, in the event, bequeathed to his successor. The 
ultimate failure of the Mahdist state to defend itself could be (and 
therefore was) ascribed to the real or imagined shortcomings of the 
Khalifa cAbdallahi. The image of the Mahdi, the successful revolutionary, 
"national" leader and holy man, would survive. The regime of the Khalifa, 
so often compared unfavourably by and with the Condominium government, 
appeared equally disastrous in comparison with the vibrant days of 
Mahdism triumphant. Thus the prestige of the Mahdi survived both the 
process of routinization, involving the hard-reality .of coping with in­
ternal disorder and external threats, and also the Anglo-Egyptian con­
quest which, while discrediting utterly the Khalifa who bore its brunt, 
left the MahdT, by comparison, a shining symbol of independence. The 
psychological importance to Mahdism during the Condominium of the fact 
that the Mahdi had, after all, defeated the Europeans in battle, should 
not be lost sight of.
There is another aspect of the process of routinization aside
from the purely politicals that is, the effect on the cult of the Mahdi
of its apparent total defeat. Holt has pointed out the problem faced
by the Expected Deliverers
If he fails in his mission, the Golden Age is again de­
ferred. If he gains power, expectation is cheated when
the Golden Age does not ensue. In either event the hopes
of his followers are disappointed, and the expectation 
reverts to a passive belief. 1
In this respect the eschatalogical aspect of the Mahdist concept gains
further significance. Among the ascriptions to the Expected Mahdi is
that his coming heralds the end of the world, that he will be succeeded
 ^Holt, The Mahdist state, p. 23.
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by the Anti-Christ (al-Dajjal) who, in turn, will be followed and de­
stroyed by the Prophet Jesus (al-NabIcIsa). In this scheme of things, 
the disastrous events subsequent to Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdl's death 
might not only be mitigated but indeed be seen as the unfolding of an 
expected schedule of events. The identification of al-Dajjal and 
al-NabicIsa thus becomes a central problem and a constant source of 
dispute.
It is not difficult, given the nature of Sudanese Islam, to com­
prehend the important role that might be assumed in this scheme by the 
descendants of Muhammad Ahmad. Nor is it surprising that a multiplicity 
of NabicIsas (and even Mahdis) presented themselves during the early 
Condominium. The government was determined to deal harshly with these. 
The most effective method of coping with one who claimed some super­
natural characteristic was naturally thought to be a clear demonstra­
tion of his mortality. The demoralisation of the Mahdi's surviving fol­
lowers, the incarceration or conciliation of his lieutenents, the de­
monstrable absurdity of the claims of various NabicIsas, a partial 
reassertion of traditional tribal and religious authority, and the re­
lative prosperity of the early Condominium years worked against all but 
the most fleeting attempts to revive militant Mahdism.
At the time of the Anglo-Egyptian conquest of the Sudan, the 
family of the Mahdi was in disarray. After the Mahdi's death in 1885,* 
his family (the Ashraf) had been unsuccessful in two attempts (in 1886 
and 1891) to seize power,  ^and in August 1899 the Khalifa Muhammad 
Sharif and the two eldest of the Mahdi's surviving sons were killed.
1 See Holt, The Mahdist state, pp. 141-146, 197-203.
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This incident, at Shukkaba on the Blue Nile, is a controversial
one. The Khalifa Muhammad Sharif and the Mahdi's sons had been sent
there after the battle of Kararl. On 27 August the khalifa and the two
eldest sons, Plidil and Bushra, were arrested and charged with planning
a revolt. An attempt was made to rescue them, during which the Mahdi's
youngest son, eAbd al-Rahman, was wounded.  ^A court martial ensued and
the khalifa, Fadil and Bushra were executed. Whatever the exact circum-
  2
stances of the Shukkaba incident, it resulted in the disappearance 
from the scene of those most qualified by birth immediately to lead the 
disorganised remnants of the Mahdi*s followers. Of the Mahdi's survi­
vors, cAli al-Mahdi (1881-19^0 was interned at Rosetta until 1905* at 
which time he entered the government service, which he resigned in 1926
 ^Reid, "Note on Mahdism with special reference tc the White Nile 
Province".
2
K.D.D. Henderson, in Sudan republic, London, 1963» p. 6^, wrote that 
"A small force was sent to arrest them and while discussions were go­
ing on there was an attempt to rescue the prisoners. After a drum­
head court martial the Khalifa Shereef and the two adult sons ... 
were executed". Holt, in The Mahdist state, p. 2^ 2, has essentially 
the same account. But Reid, governor of the White Nile Province from 
1931 to 1937 (see note on following page) wrote in 193^ that "whilst 
negotiations were going on in quite a normal manner, a fanatical 
westerner who had been gathering wood, rushed in and attacked a sol­
dier. The troops fearing treachery opened fire and the Khalifa with 
both the Mahdi's sons were shot-dead with about twenty others.... 
There is little doubt that the order to fire was given In misappre­
hension but to the Mahdists in the Sudan Shukaba is what Glencoe is 
to the Highlanders of Scotland." ("Note_on Mahdism") The account in 
SayyidcAbd al-Rahman's memoirs, Jihad fi sabTl al-istiqlal. Khartoum, 
n.d. (1965)t PP. 10-11, disagrees: soldiers arrived at Shukkaba, a 
drunken man raised an axe and the soldiers then opened fire, killing 
seventeen people; a military tribunal decided upon the execution of 
the three Ashraf and this was carried out. This account, inciden­
tally, adds that the bodies of the three were tied to stones and 
thrown into the Nile, probably to avoid the possibility of pilgri­
mage to their tombs.
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to become an agent of his younger brother;  ^cAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi 
(1885-1959) was at first lodged with a government official near Wad
Medani, and was brought to Omdurman in 1906 where he lived under the tu-
_ 2
telage of the mufti and the president of the Board of Ulema. cAbd
al-Rahman and other members of the Mahdi's family were subjected to 
3
what Reid unabashedly called "The Vengeance of Slatin”:
Slatin was regarded as the implacable foe of the Mahdi's 
family. It was his doing which kept them poor, it was his 
hatred which continued to degrade them and denied to the 
Mahdi's son and heir even his courtesy title (Sayed) and it 
was only his departure which enabled them to leave the 
vally [sic] of despond [sic]. This was the view of the man 
in the street in the Sudan. 4
Davies, writing in 1926, stated (with much less sympathy than Reid):
1 ffl.ll, BD, p. 49.
2 R. Davies, "A note on the recent history of Mahdism and the govern­
ment's policy towards this movement", 6/11/25, SGA, CIVSEG 56/2/18. 
(Hereafter referred to as "Davies note, 1925"#)
John Alexander Reid (l890- ?) served in Khartoum in 1914, in Kordo- 
fan in 1915 > and in Khartoum in 1922-23. He was deputy governor of 
the White Nile Province from 1924 to 1929» deputy governor of the 
Blue Nile Province in 1930-31» and governor of the White Nile Pro­
vince from 1931 to 1937. He served as personal assistant to the 
civil secretary in 1937-38. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 26.)
^ Reid, "Note on Mahdism".
^ Reginald Davies (l887-197l) served in Khartoum in 1911/ in Kordofan 
from 1912 to 1920, and in Darfur from 1920 to 1924. He was asst, 
director of intelligence from 1924 to 1927» and director in 1927-28. 
He served as asst, civil secretary in 1929 > asst, financial secretary 
in 1930-31» secretary for economic development in 1931-32, deputy 
financial secretary in 1932-33» and director of the department of 
economics and trade from 1933 to 1935* (MacMichael, SPS, p. 23.)
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Sayed Abdel Rahman was kept in a decent retirement.
About 1909 the Inspector-General issued instructions
that he was not to be accorded the title of Sayed, nor 
was he to be permitted, in official correspondence, to 
sign himself Abdel Rahman-el-Mahdi, but only Abdel Rahman 
Mohammed Ahmed.... In 1909 and 1910, £E9^ was considered 
an adequate building loan for Abdel Rahman and his family, 
and this was recovered by docking an allotment which then 
stood at £E5 per mensem. In 1911 the families of the 
Mahdi and his khalifas made a written appeal for better 
treatment, social and economic.... They received a severe 
and public snub at the hands of Slatin Pasha. 1
The psychological effect on SayyidcAbd al-Rahman of the Shukkaba 
episode and the subsequent years of humiliation should not be over­
looked. He could not have been left in doubt of the governments ability, 
in the last resort, to apply whatever sanctions it wished against him.
This realisation may well have been responsible for the~nature‘of his
early relationship with the government, one which saw him tentatively 
probing for weakness.rather than boldly reaching for political power.
But the Mahdists were not alone in suffering the disfavour of the go­
vernment. The tariqas. in general, were also subject to regulation, 
suspicion and non-cooperation. This government policy was unrealistic,
of course, for it ignored, or chose to undervalue important traditions
♦
of Sudanese Islam.
One of those traditions has been the emergence of what have been
2
called "holy families". Baraka, the peculiar quality of grace that 
sets apart the holy man, is heritable. Thus, in the Sudan, the 
Majdhubiyya, the Khatmiyya, and other gufl orders were established by 
holy men whose descendants, imbued with the baraka of the founders, 
have maintained and extended their influence. In this context the re­
establishment (or "recrudescence", as the government called it) of
 ^Davies memorandum, 1926.
2
P.M. Holt, "Holy families and Islam in the Sudan", in Studies in the 
history of the Near East, London, pp. 121-13^.
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Mahdism during the Condominium can be seen as another example of this 
repeating phenomenon. Thus, despite the governments attempts to sup­
press Mahdism and Slatin*s attempts to downgrade SayyidcAbd al-Rahman, 
they could never successfully cut the essential tie of baraka that 
bound the son to the father. It was, of course, that link which the 
sayyid exploited to increase the numbers of his followers and, there­
fore, augment his influence and potential value - or danger - to the 
government. In this evolution from resistance to collaboration we see 
the real process of routinization at work. The manoeuvering, compro­
mises, and agreements, the letters of loyalty, and the urging of sup­
port for the government were hardly the marks of a revolutionary. To 
suggest, as many did, that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahnian was pretending coopera­
tion but "biding his time" until he could destroy the government, was 
to refuse even the possibility of change, a refusal inherent in the 
view that Mahdism was essentially revolutionary. But, as will be seen, 
change had in fact Occurred.
The notable exception to the government's policy of non­
cooperation with the tariqas was the Khatmlyya. This order had main­
tained close relations with the Turco-Egyptian regime. An example of 
the influence a shaykh could have occurred in 1864, when Sudanese troops 
at Kassala mutinied and Sayyid al-Hasan al-Mirghani, the head of the 
tariqa, was asked by the government to intervene. For his” efforts on 
this occasion (which ended with a massacre of the rebels) he was granted 
a government pension.  ^With prophetic irony, a contemporary wrote:
 ^D.C. Cumming, "The history of Kassala and the province of Taka",
SNR, XXIII,1, 1940, pp. 44-32.
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As for Sayed el Hassan it is difficult to give an 
idea of his real power. A word from him would suffice 
to unite all these discordant elements against the 
Egyptians; the Arabs know him alone. The Egyptians, 
who sought his help in their hour of danger, almost 
fear him because they know he has small liking for 
them. They are wrong for Sayed el Hassan is too intel­
ligent to change the moral and constant power he now 
enjoys, for the temporal and ephemeral power that was 
his for the taking.... It is to be hoped that ... 
there will always be these prophets, venerated and 
feared, who when governments totter in the throes of 
revolution, are there to throw themselves between the 
combatants, to quieten for the salvation of society 
the passions and hate that are let loose. 1
These sentiments could as well have been applied to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman 
\ half a century later, but they were not. Because of the limitations
imposed by their particular view of Mahdism, the British found it dif­
ficult to believe that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman would not, in fact, seek 
that "temporal and ephemeral power" at the risk of the "moral and con­
stant power" he already had. To be sure, he wanted both, but Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman never forgot that his influence derived from the latter.
The special status of the Khatmlyya continued in the early Condo­
minium, because of the tariqa's opposition to the Mahdists and long 
record of cooperation with government.
Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani was awarded the C.M.G. in 1900, 
thus becoming the first and only notable of the Sudan 
to receive a British decoration until the First World 
War. Furthermore, the central mosque of the Khatmiya 
which was destroyed during the Mahdia was rebuilt by the 
government in the Khatmiya quarter ofJCassala despi'te 
the official policy not to assist sufT zawjyas.... In 
1912 ... Wingate wrote a letter to SayyidcAlX, which 
granted him semi-official recognition as head of his 
family.... When Cecil in 1916 suggested that their 
subsidy should be stopped, Wingate objected strongly, 
stating that they were 'amongst the few who are genu­
inely and entirely on our side....* ^
Cumming, "The history of Kassala", citing J.A.W. Munzinger,
Affaires etrangeres, Corresp. consul.. Massawa, from Kassala, 
1278/1866. Munzinger (1832-1875) was French consul at Massawa, 1864- 
70. (Hill, BD, pp. 281-82.)
2
Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 98-99.
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While the policy of suppression of Mahdism during the Wingate years is 
taken for granted, towards the end of that period it was not systema­
tically implemented. It was, on the contrary, inconsistent, without 
clear objectives, and often whimsical. As in the cases of other aspects 
of central government administration, this was the result of mismanage­
ment, carelessness, and the nature of the person responsible for fra­
ming the policy. In the case of Mahdism, that person was Slatin Pasha.
Slatin first came to the Sudan in 1874, when he was employed by 
the German vice-consul at Khartoum. In 1878 Gordon, then governor- 
general, invited Slatin to join his staff. He was made governor of Dara 
in I876, and governor of all Darfur in l88l, when he became caught up 
in the Mahdia. In March 1884 he surrendered to the Mahdists at Dara, and 
spent the next eleven years in Omdurraan before escaping in 1895. He pro­
vided valuable information for Wingate, who was then director of mili­
tary intelligence of the Egyptian Army, and served in the Dongola and 
Nile campaigns. When Wingate was made governor-general, he created the 
post of inspector-general especially for Slatin, who held it until, as 
an Austrian national, he was forced to resign in 191^ .  ^One of the most 
controversial aspects of Slatin's career was his supposed conversion 
to Islam before his surrender to the Mahdists. In Fire and sword in the 
Sudan, Slatin wrote that he had done this to boost the morale of his
depressed soldiers, who were blaming Slatin's Christianity for their
2
dire circumstances. Be that as it may, Slatin was later to be criti­
cized and mistrusted because of his apparent apostasy, and, of course,
1 Hill, BD, pp. 339-3^0.
2
Slatin, Fire and sword, pp. 214-217.
109
despised by many Sudanese for his rejection of Islam upon his escape 
from the Khalifa. In any case, Slatin's contempt for the Mahdists gene­
rally and for the families of the Khalifa cAbdallahi and the Mahdi in 
particular is well documented. This animosity in itself would not have 
assumed significance had Slatin not been invested with almost unlimited 
authority as inspector-general. This was no mere delegation of authority 
by Wingate, but was rather a free hand to deal in whatever way he saw 
fit with matters affecting '’tribal" and "religious” affairs. Ihough usu­
ally seen as self-assured and confident in his own knowledge of the 
Sudan, Wingate came, in fact, to be increasingly reliant on Slatin's 
advice. The Debba incident is a case in point (see above, p. 98). Regar­
ding Mahdism, Wingate wrote in 1911 that "It has been my invariable 
rule, in all matters appertaining to the families of the Mahdi and the 
Khalifa, to accept without question the views of the Inspector-General, 
who can claim an absolutely unique knowledge of all the intricate facts 
connected with those families...."  ^ Wingate might have written the 
same in regard to a whole range of matters. It is no exaggeration to 
note that in questions affecting especially nomadic tribes and the 
jariqas and Mahdists, Slatin guided Sudan Government policy until the 
outbreak of World War I. As will be seen, a similar concentration of 
authority, though not nearly so great, existed through the Stack years. 
Willis clearly dominated the government's treatment of Mahdism. Stack 
himself seems to have made little or no contribution to the formulation 
of policy toward Mahdism.
The focus of Slatin's contempt, SayyidcAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, 
came into prominence only after Slatin's departure. It should not,
1 Wingate, 18/5/11, quoted in Davies memorandum, 1926. Symes later 
wrote that despite Wingate's "wide experience and knowledge" he "sel­
dom took an important decision without consulting" Slatin. (Symes,
Tour of duty. London, 19^6, p. 16.)
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however, he thought that the sayyid was a mere opportunist who other­
wise would have remained discreetly in the background. Whatever his 
dealings with the government through a long and complicated period, the 
extraordinary nature of the man was evident. K.D.D. Henderson,  ^himself 
no great friend of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, has offered this description:
He was a man of considerable height and presence, western 
Sudanese in appearance (his mother came from the west), 
emotional, sometimes petulant, with a keen sense of the 
dramatic. He never failed to rise to the occasion or 
seize an opportunity. Irked to ask as a favour what he 
felt to be his of right; prone at times to listen to un­
sound advice, yet always basically shrewd; moving in 
public with a studied grace and dignity, yet capable of 
throwing the whole thing aside with his ceremonial head­
dress and going down on his knees to play with a three- 
year-old child.... He had a very endearing quality. 3
At least in retrospect, almost all those ex-officials interviewed in 
connection with this work expressed liking, even admiration, for Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman. But the experience of later years cannot erase the opi­
nions and attitudes of the 1920s, and at that time there is no doubt 
that despite his charm and apparent loyalty, he was considered "a very 
cunning creature" who was not to be trusted.
The great rivalry between Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman and Sayyid cAli 
al-Mirghanl is a theme running through Sudanese history until the death 
of cAbd al-Rahman in 1959. Much less active personally in public affairs 
than cAbd al-Rahman, Sayyid cAli was, because of the Khatmiyya’s long
Kenneth David Druitt Henderson (1903-) served in the Blue Nile Pro­
vince from 1927 to 1930, in Kordofan from 1930 to 1936, in the White 
Nile Province from 1936 to 1938. He was in the civil secretary*s of­
fice from 1938 until 1944. He served in Kassala from 1944 to 19^ +6» was 
asst, civil secretary from 19^6 to 1949» and. governor of Darfur from 
1949 until his retirement in 1953. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 49.)
o
Interview with K.D.D. Henderson, 21/6/76.
o
Henderson, Sudan republic, p. 60.
^ Interview with Sir Angus Gillan, 24/5/76.
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association with the government, at an enormous advantage. But it was 
probably that unquestioned loyalty of the man and the quiescence of his 
followers that proved in the end to be a disadvantage: in the words of 
one ex-official, "SayyidcAli Mirghani was perhaps a safer bet, a bul­
wark against the danger of Mahdism”.  ^Thus, his support could be taken
for granted in the Stack years, and by disdaining direct involvement in 
2
politics, he confirmed that view. An example of the continuing rivalry 
occurred in 1917 when some merchants at Wad Medani applied to Willis 
for permission to erect a tent, to be considered that of the Mahdists, 
at the mawlid al-Nabi celebrations. A similar application came from 
Nahud. The dilemma posed by this had two aspects. If the tents were not per­
mitted, the government would make enemies of those prominent citizens 
who had made the applications. Secondly, there would inevitably be cri­
ticism from the tariqas if the project was approved. But Willis felt 
that the criticism would be based on jealousy, and that by approving 
the requests the government would be able to obtain "the whole-hearted
public support of that section of society, which has been, up to the
3
outbreak of war opposed to it". The requests were, in the end, ap­
proved .
 ^Interview with Sir Gawain Bell, 2/6/76.
Interview with Sir James Robertson, 18/6/76.
^ Willis to private secretary, 29/3/171 SGA, INTEL 1/18/89.
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Government policy towards Mahdism: the years of drift
Like so many other aspects of the government already discussed, 
its conduct toward the heads of tariqas and the Mahdists was overly per­
sonalized. We have noted the effects on the intelligence department of 
Slatin*s methods. In his important memorandum on Mahdism written in 
1926, Davies, in discussing changes in government policy toward the 
Mahdists, saids
Of these changes some ... have been due to a modifica­
tion of policy deliberately proposed; others have been 
the unforeseen consequence of action taken; others, per­
haps the majority, appear superficially to represent a 
gradual drift, of which the Government was at the time 
unconscious. 1
This drift is certainly evident in government policy after 191^ , 
and was caused by several related factors. Until then, Slatin's hand in 
policy formation wac so strong as to allow his personal aversion to the 
Mahdists (a result, one must assume, of his years of captivity) to dic­
tate the government's attitude. This element of personal bias, together 
with Slatin's methods and secretiveness, served to make that official 
attitude increasingly irrelevant and obscure even to his colleagues and 
subordinates. Decisions had to be made without reference to any clear 
guidelines, and therefore had to be left to him to decide on a case by 
case basis. Even Wingate, as we have seen, deferred decisions until he 
could consult the inspector-general. Records were poorly kept or not 
kept at all, thus rendering valueless to the administration the un­
doubtedly detailed knowledge of personalities and personal and tribal 
affairs that Slatin had gained. With Slatin's sudden and unexpected
 ^Davies memorandum, 1926.
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departure from the scene, the Sudan Government was therefore faced, at 
a time of great uncertainty, with a vacuum of knowledge in the one area 
that had always been considered the potential source of its greatest 
danger. This was the major cause of the "drift” of which Davies later 
wrote. The apparent about-face of government policy at the outbreak 
of World War I was not so much the result of a reasoned analysis carried 
out in order to determine the best way of adapting the administration 
to a war situation; it was, in fact, the precipitate reaction of an ad­
ministration that lacked both the facts on which to base such an ana­
lysis and the confident executive authority to decide what must be done.
It must be noted that in relaxing its attitude toward Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman 
and the Mahdists, the Sudan Government was not taking the confident 
action of a regime safe enough to reconcile its old enemies. In attemp­
ting to conciliate Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman and the Mahdists Wingate was 
dealing, not from a position of strength, but from one of real, or 
imagined, weakness.
The oft-discussed "modification" of government policy toward the 
tariqas and Mahdists was not, in any case, fitted into a theoretical or 
political framework until mid-way through the war. The change in policy 
- the drift- was gradual and not without opposition. Ac the beginning 
of this new phase in the relationship of the government and Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman, distrust was profounds "policy" may have undergone change, 
but the ideas behind it had not. This simple distinction, however, was 
never fully realised by government officials. It was unarguable, after 
all, that the British had come to destroy Mahdism. How then, and why, 
were they now to allow its regeneration? A tension began between those, 
on the one hand, who believed that Mahdism could evolve from its admit­
tedly revolutionary beginnings into a religious force devoid of poli­
tical content, and those, on the other hand, to whom Mahdism wets, by
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definition, in fanatical opposition to the government. Both views re­
cognised Mahdism as potentially dangerous. The disagreement, based on 
different interpretations of Mahdism's twentieth-century nature, con­
cerned how best to deal with it - by suppression, which seemed to have 
been unworkable, or by cooperation, which seemed a promising but deli­
cate and risky path. In other words, could Mahdism be routinized and 
still retain its cohesion, or must it honour the avowed aims of Muhammad 
Ahmad? Davies reported in 1926 that
It was realised at the time that this change of policy 
involved an element of risk, for in 1917 Colonel Symes 
... with the concurrence of General Wingate, placed it 
on record that, when sending out Sayed Abdel Rahman in 
1915t he warned him against taking this opportunity, to, . ......
organise Mahdists and told him plainly that he would be 
held personally responsible if the Government was kept 
in ignorance of any revivalist activity amongst them.
Davies went on to opine that "the event proved that Colonel Symes had
estimated the Sayed's docility and powers of self-effacement too
highly". 1
A word about Davies is appropriate here. His name is not often 
met in general histories of the Condominium, yet he had great influ­
ence in the evolution of administration in the Sudan. He was a member 
of the Ewart committee of 1925 that dissected the intelligence depart­
ment and delivered the coup de grace to Willis, and he thereupon suc­
ceeded Willis as director of intelligence. Davies's memoranda while 
acting director of intelligence bristle with thinly-veiled or outright 
insults of his predecessor's capabilities and policies: a correspon­
dence between the two in 1926, carried out through the medium of the 
civil secretary's office, was extremely acrimonious and centred, as al­
 ^Davies memorandum, 1926.
ways, on the nature of and proper conduct toward Mahdism.  ^Davies was 
the greatest exponent of Indirect Rule to serve in the Sudan until the 
arrival of Sir John Maffey as governor-general in 1927. This advocacy 
is inseparable from his disapproval of SayyidcAbd al-Rahman, to whom 
the strengthening of native authority was considered an antidote. Davies 
was Resident in Dax Masalit at the time of the Nyala rising (see below, 
pages l¥f-l6l ) and had seen the impact and influence of Mahdism in the 
west. In 1923 he toured Northern Nigeria to study the workings of In­
direct Rule, and upon his return to the Sudan gave a theoretical basis 
for the codification and extension of tribal authority. Thus, in two 
important areas, policy toward the Mahdists and the adoption of Indirect 
Rule, Davies played a key role. His relative obscurity may well be, 
as is so often the case, because of personal conflicts within the go­
vernment hierarchy. Davies's colleague in Dar Masalit, Redfem, believed 
Davies to be ’’the best administrator in our service”, one who had "im­
mense resources". But, possibly because of differences with MacMichael,
2Davies never became even a provincial governor.
Notwithstanding Davies's criticism, SayyidcAbd al-Rahman cer­
tainly never intended to assume the role that Wingate naively envisaged 
for him. Why should he? Indeed, could either party to the "bargain" 
tentatively reached in 1915 have expected the son of the Mahdi to be­
come a mere unofficial apologist for government policy, ready to be 
called out when the need arose to reassure the populace of the Govern­
ment's righteousness?
1 SGA, INTEL 9/3/31.
 ^Interview with Sir Shuldham Redfem, 8/IO/76.
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In December 1915 Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was sent to the Gezira,
Hwith private instructions from his Excellency the Governor-General,
of which there seems to be no written record",  ^to urge support for
the government during the war, the first of several such tours. The
comments of one of Willis's agents on a tour give a picture of how a
visit by Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was conducted!
At each Hilla or tribe he visited he was welcomed with 
rejoicing and ecstasy and extolled, many people carry­
ing spears and swords came to meet him, as they did in 
Dervish days, addressing him by '0 son of our Mahdi, hap­
py is the day in CsicD which we see you', and offering 
him presents, such as dura, goats, sheep, cows, money....
\ The following is the speech of Abdel Rahman addressed to
Arabs at their meetings:
'You should be devoted to your religion, read, your . . . 
Rateb, pay Govt, taxes, do not listen to those that sow 
corruption as by listening to them you will bring trouble 
on yourselves. Listen not but to the words which we say.'
After Sayed Abdel Rahman's return ... it was ru­
moured among the Arabs that 'the time has approached', 
otherwise Govt, would not have permitted the son of the 
Mahdi ... to visit them. They believe that God has willed 
that this visit should be made. 2
Reports from other localities told of a similar enthusiastic 
reception of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman. This confronted the government, of 
course, at an early date, with the problem with which it was to grapple 
throughout the post-war period: to ensure its security the government 
hoped to rely on the personal prestige of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman to con­
trol the distrusted masses; but this very process naturally increased 
that prestige to the point where it was itself perceived as a definite 
threat to the government. This was the result of a change in govern­
ment policy unsupported by a prerequisite change in the attitude of 
British officials toward SayyidcAbd al-Rahman and his supporters. In
 ^Davies memorandum, 1926.
2 "Report by an agent, dated Kosti 13/2/16", SGA, INTEL 2/4l/3^5.
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practical terms this was succinctly put by a provincial governor who
noted that "at Wad El Shigl", SayyidcAbd al-Rahman "was received in
full Dervish manner but his conversation there resulted in a letter of
loyalty from the Sheikh of the village...."  ^Another governor quoted
a private letter from a Sudanese correspondent who thought that it was
"rather strange that the Government allows such a person to wander in
the country and deliver speeches" because these would surely serve to
2
incite the Mahdists. J.W. Sagar, then stationed in the Blue Nile
Province, described in a letter to Willis what he considered to be the
effect of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman *s toursi previous to these, he wrote,
The Mahdists kept very much to themselves, and were^al^ . 
ways afraid of making themselves in any way conspicuous.
.,. now they have come right out into the open boldly.
They consider that they have been officially recognised 
and that the Government needs them. 3
An agent's report from Kamlin gave similar information, but with a dif­
ferent conclusion:
Abdel Rahman El Mahdi is believed in, in this district a 
great deal - it is safe to say the greatest percentage 
are Mahdists. Since the visit of Abdel Rahman they read 
the Rateb openly. The talk of Abdel Rahman, in the open 
was loyal - but secretly the Mahdists believe he will 
one day rule as his late father. Abdel Rahman El Mahdi 
is here next to God in the eyes of natives. ^
Thus the inevitable result of the government's expedient use of
Sayyid fAbd al-Rahman without at the same time its actually feeling
satisfied with the arrangement or certain of his intentions, was con-
"Extract from a report by governor,Blue Nile Province", 5/3/16,
SGA, INTEL 2/41/345.
^ "Extracts from a private letter? dated 1/1/16", SGA, INTEL 2/41/345.
3 Sagar to Willis, 11/5/16, SGA, INTEL 9/1/13.
4 "Extracts from reports by secret agent, Kamlin district, 24th March 
to 1st April 1916", n.d., SGA, INTEL 9/1/13.
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fusion in the minds of populace and officials alike, as to what exactly 
the government policy was toward Mahdism. One example of this confu­
sion was the government's attitude toward the possession and reading 
of the Ratib. This was a collection of Qur'anic and other religious 
verses compiled by the Mahdi which had been, and continued to be used 
by Mahdists in private and public devotions. Its use had been officially 
proscribed, although possession of the book was not technically illegal. 
Indeed, in 1917 Willis, then assistant director of intelligence, sub­
mitted the Ratib to the grand qadi  ^and asked for his opinion. The 
grand qadi replied that
There is nothing in the Ratib, from the beginning to the 
end of it, that shows a call for Mahdism or alludes to 
same in the least.... There is also nothing objectionable 
in it from a religious or political point of view..., I 
advise the Government not to prevent the people from using 
the Ratib, but to give them a free hand to use it as they 
like. 2
Shaykh Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi (l88l-19^5)» an Egyptian, was 
grand qadT of the Sudan from 1908 to 1919. (Hill, BD, p. 267.) s©e 
also Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 131.)
o
Quoted in Davies memorandum, 1926. Davies was later highly critical 
of the grand qadi. going so far as to impugn his loyalty: "Prom mo­
tives which must necessarily'be a matter of speculation", Davies 
speculated, "but which may have been connected with the course of the 
war, he [the grand qadij began, towards the latter part of 1916, to 
cultivate an intimate friendship with Sayed Abdel Rahman-el-Mahdi. 
They were continually meeting and exchanging visits....- it is not 
unjustifiable to suspect that the influence of the Grand Cadi was 
partly responsible for the forward movement towards the unofficial 
recognition of Mahdism, which seemed then to acquire a new impetus". 
In answering enquiries about the Ratib and other matters, the grand 
qadi had, in Davies's opinion, conveyed "the impression that his in­
tention was to encourage Sayed Abdel Rahman and actively to assist 
him towards the realisation of his ambitions." Davies's conclusion 
j tarred Stack himself with the same brush: "It is clear", he wrote, 
"that Wingate would not have permitted any such pronouncements by 
the official spokesman of Islam in the Sudan Government." (Davies 
memorandum, 1926.)
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Davies, in his 1926 memorandum, pointed out that the last seizure
of a Ratib from its owner had occurred in 1917» at which time Willis
had advised that no definite action should be taken regarding the whole
matter of the Ratib. "pending the consideration of the whole question
of the Mahdist Sect" by Stack.^ Yet, according to Davies, the governor-
general apparently made no pronouncement on the subject before 1921.
At that time the civil secretary, Lyall, wrote that "His Excellency
considered that no general ruling in regard to the reading of the Rateb
is possible, and directs me to say ... that the local authorities must
2use their discretion in each individual case."
What, then, was the government's policy toward the possession
and reading of the Ratib? In early 1919 Willis wrote that the
fact is that a very large proportion of the people here 
always followed the Ratib El Mahdi and are doing so 
openly instead of secretly.... In a very short time 
every cne wi.j.1 be used to it and it will not matter.
The Rateb is a very innocent in fact, a highly moral 
work. 3
A year and a half before Stack's statement of "policy" quoted above, 
which Davies later described as the first on the matter, Willis had told 
the governor of Darfur that the "policy of the Government is not to in­
terfere with the reading of the Rateb, provided that this causes no
if
breach of the peace or hindrance to the administration". Finally,
 ^Willis to H.C. Jackson, acting governor, Blue Nile Province, 
lo/n/17, SGA, INTEL 9/l/2.
Davies memorandum, 1926. Davies went on to mention, in obvious cri­
ticism of the treatment given the matter by Willis, a 1921-22 edi­
tion of the Ratib. of which no copy reached the intelligence depart­
ment before December 1926.
^ Willis to Cameron, 2/3/19» SGA, INTEL 9/l/2. Cf. the conclusion of 
Symes that the Ratib "combined the incitement of Mein Kampf with the 
solace of a missal." (Tour of duty, pp. 11-12.)
^ Willis to governor, Darfur, 6/7/20, SGA, INTEL 9/l/2.
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Davies himself, who in 1926 would note that official policy, in the 
absence of its emendation by the governor-general (which had come on­
ly in 1921) remained suppression of the Ratib. wrote, as Resident in Dar 
Masalit, that "it may be stated confidently that there is no prevention 
of the reading of the Rateb" in that area. ^
Thus, in this as in so many areas of administration generally 
and in dealings with Mahdism specifically, Khartoum failed to define 
policy. The result was an unavoidable confusion as to what the policy, 
if any, was. Indeed, Stack's pronouncement in 1921 that "no general 
ruling" was possible and that the "local authorities must use their 
discretion in each individual case" only served to ratify both existing 
practice and the confusion of officials and public alike. Davies could 
well write of "drift" regarding the government's attitude, for this 
drift was made inevitable by the lack of definition of the problem 
itself and of consensus in how to deal with it.
The problem of the reading of the Ratib - and the larger prob­
lem of how much latitude to allow the Mahdists in their activities - 
were therefore left in large degree to the local official. Because of 
the widely differing views as to the nature of Mahdism and its poten­
tial threat, widely different treatment ensued. This soon developed, 
however, into a conflict pitting provincial officials on the one hand 
against, on the other, Willis. He was one of the very few who perceived 
in Mahdism, as it was constituted in war-time and post-wax Sudan, not 
the antipathy to government inherent in the Mahdi's call, but an evol-
^ Davies to Savile, governor of Darfur, 15/8/20, SGA, INTJ3L I/I8/89.
Lt. Col. Robert Savile (1873-19^7) served in Kassala, 1902-06; Don- 
gola, 1906-0?; and as asst, civil secretary, 1907-08. He was governor 
of the Bahr al-Ghazal, 1908-09; governor of Kordofan, 1909-17; and 
governor of Darfur from 1917 until he retired in 1923. (MacMichael, 
SPS, p. 12.)
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ving confraternity, much like a tariqa. with Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman as
its leader. In early 1917 Willis penned his first elucidation of this
theme, noting the anomalies of the government's present position and
suggesting a real revision in official thinking:
Since the outbreak of the European wax, the whole stan­
dard of loyalty in the Sudan has been altered. Previous 
to the war, disloyalty implied a hankering after the 
Dervish Regime and an active desire to restore it....
The war has made the Turks the enemy of the British 
Government and in enmity of the Turk the most fanatical 
Dervish can meet the Government on common ground....
Hence disloyalty is now the sign of sympathy with the 
Turk, the long-standing enemy of the Sudan.
This does not mean that the danger of Mahdism is 
dead, for there is not a year in the history of the Sudan 
Government in which at lea&t one false prophet has not 
arisen against the Government. This however is the re­
sult of a natural and endemic fanaticism which may only 
after generations if ever be eradicated.... But it does 
mean that the danger of the old Mahdism is infinitely 
less.... Not only have the old followers of the Mahdi 
got the common ground of enmity of the Turk to unite 
them with the British rulers, but they feel to a great 
degree that they have risen from the ranks of the enemy 
outcast to that [sic] of an effective if humble ally. I
Willis went on to point out the anomalies of the present posi­
tion. One the one hand the government had admitted the existence of 
Mahdists, and on the other could not condone the existence of a "sect" 
the views of which were (supposedly) opposed to the government. Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman had shown "by his loyalty and good will to the Government" 
that restrictions should be lifted from him. But if restrictions were 
removed, the tariqa leaders would be alarmed and uncertain of the go­
vernment's intentions. On the other hand, if restrictions were not 
lifted, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman might be driven into opposition. Willis 
pointed out that he had "carefully avoided at any time enquiring from 
the Grand Cadi ... whether the Mahdists could be accepted as true Mos­
lems, as if he answered in the affirmative the Government would find
1 Note by Willis entitled "Mahdism", 17/2/17, SGA, INTEL 1/18/89.
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difficulty in suppressing them and if in the negative a very large body 
of public opinion ... would be profoundly shocked”. Willis's proposed 
solution was to treat the Mahdists as an offshoot of the Sammanlyya 
tainqa (to which the Mahdi had once belonged) and that in all matters 
Mahdists should be treated as would any others - on the bases of per­
sonal merit and loyalty. ^
The opposing view was put by Symes in Cairo. ”*?y their fruits 
ye shall know them' is the safest guide”, he wrote. It would be "inex- 
pedient and possibly dangerous to afford the same tacit recognition to 
Mahdists as we do to other religious sectsf He reminded Stack that 
Mahdism "was a national (and therefore political) revolt against a 
foreign government”, and advised the continuation of the same dual poli­
cy: "Let us continue to deal with those of their leaders who seem to be 
intelligent and well disposed to us .., j on the other hand let us show 
clearly that we regard Mahdism as an exploded cult and that we cannot 
sanction its followers advertizing their creed or organizing themselves 
on tarika or other lines.” Symes appended to this note that the high 
commissioner (Wingate) "agreed with these views". This debate was to 
continue but, significantly, without resolution.
Willis gained the reputation of, at the least, the chief sympa­
thiser in the government toward Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, at most, the 
sayyid's credulous dupe. Willis, indeed, made much of his friendship 
with SayyideAbd al-Rahman, to the point that their fortunes became 
linked. A colleague in the intelligence department has said that Willis
1 Willis, "Mahdism”.
2 Symes to Stack, V3/17. SGA, INTEL 1/18/89.
"saw SayyidcAbd al-Rahman coming to the fore and put his cards on him." 
i It is of course possible that the dislike for Willis throughout the 
government was extended to his protege. In any case Willis never changed 
his opinion of the proper way in which to deal with the Mahdists. His 
personal relationship with Sayyid 6Abd al-Rahman continued after his re­
tirement from the government, as he paid many visits to Khartoum, stop­
ping at the Grand Hotel as the guest of the sayyid, to the profound an-
2
noyance of his ex-colleagues.
While the arguments went on, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was not rele­
gated to the sidelines. The simple fact that he had been allowed to 
tour the provinces with government approval had already altered his sta­
tus, no matter what the government decided. By the end of the war it 
had become clear that he was actively "organising" his followers.
Again the government was faced with a problem of policy. Sayyid 
fAbd al-Rahman had been warned not to make use of his tours for the pur­
pose of organising. The government were generally agreed not to allow 
this. But what exactly was "organising"? Again, lack of a coherent po­
licy (rather than a vague attitude), and conflicting views led to "drift 
on a large scale. Davies pointed out in 1926 that Sayyid rAbd al-Rahman
— 3
had instituted a system of "agents" (manadTb; sing.i mandub) in the 
provinces as early as 1916. His ability to do this resulted directly, 
Davies said, from the tours in the early years of the war. In a letter
 ^Interview with Brig. Maurice Lush, 7/10/76.
2
Interview with Sir James Robertson, 18/6/76.
3
^ Apart from its literal meaning, this term may have had psychological 
import. During the Mahdia a mandub (translated by Holt as "deputy") 
was a low-grade administrative official, who could be involved in 
tax-collection. (Holt, The Mahdist state, pp. 248, 262.)
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of 29 November 1921, Sayyid fAbd al-Rahman listed his agents in the pro­
vinces and stated that he had begun appointing them five years earlier, 
that he had "submitted the project" to the director of intelligence, 
and that "all agents appointed, in the provinces or in smaller dis­
tricts, were appointed after consulting the Governor of the province 
concerned and after obtaining his verbal approval". 1 How this could 
come about without arousing concern in Khartoum (and whose fault it 
was) is clear from the Davies memorandum of 1926:
In the Fung Province the system of agents comes to no­
tice at the same time as in the Blue Nile [1916] ....
Thus in May 1916, there is correspondence about the 
affairs of an agent collecting grain from the faithful, 
and this agent's name appears in the list of 1921.
Western Kordofan was visited in 1917-18 by Mohamed * - « - ■ - * - 
Ibrahim (El Taalbawi) ... who, in January 1922, was 
appointed as agent for Darfur.... He collected 'zeka' 
and informed the Mahdists that they could practice 
their rites and read the Ratib without fear and should 
pay Government taxes regularly. This visit only came 
to the knowledge of the A.D.I. in June 1918. In Kassala, 
the question of agents seems to have been raised for­
mally, for the first time, in 1919. On the 7th May,
1919, D.I. telegraphs to Governor, Kassala, as follows1 
•Abdel Rahman-el-Mahdi receives reports about alleged 
followers of Mahdi in your province. He knows little 
about them and suggests he should send agents on his 
behalf to visit them and if necessary instruct them 
to follow Government loyally....* In Berber Province, 
the Sayed's agent is first heard;of in April 1917 as 
his representative in a business matter concerning land.
Davies concluded that
the truth seems to be that, by getting assent to -the 
sending of individual agents to particular places, and, 
ostensibly, for particular and innocuous purposes, Sayed 
Abdel Rahman gradually familiarised the minds of Govern­
ment officials with an idea which would have encountered 
considerable opposition had it been brusquely presented 
without concealment of its implications. 2
 ^Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman to intelligence department, 29/11/21. 
Quoted in Davies memorandum, 1926.
2
Davies memorandum, 1926.
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According to Davies and others, SayyidcAhd al-Rahman's favourite 
tactic in dealing with the government was the fait accompli. The sayyid 
would do something covertly of which he knew the government would disap­
prove, and when the government finally expressed concern, he would 
either disclaim knowledge or rightly state that the activity had been 
going on for years and the government had never objected before. Why 
did it object now? One ex-official said that Sayyid rAbd al-Rahman would 
"start a pump scheme, then express no knowledge when the government 
brought the matter to his attention - then he'd ask for permission". 1 
Davies noted several examples of this "method", which he saw as an over­
all scheme of the sayyid to enhance his prestige with the unwitting aid 
of the government. But Davies's anger was misplaced. If, for instance, 
the existence of manadlb in a particular province, or in all the pro­
vinces, went unnoticed for years, this was, of course, the fault of the 
government itself, specifically of the intelligence department and the 
provincial governors who were supposed to be reporting to it. Again the 
government was shown to be "drifting", to be reacting rather than carry­
ing out a predetermined and coherent policy. As a result, Sayyid fAbd 
al-Rahman emerged from the First World War greatly enhanced in the eyes 
of the Sudanese, feared and envied by the heads of tariqas. and the ob­
ject of a continued ambivalence by the government.
As was noted above, however, the Mahdists were not alone in or­
ganising during the war. Reporting in late 1915 that "heads of sects" 
were apparently all actively recruiting members, the acting governor of
 ^Interview with Mr. George Bredin, 10/6/76. Bredin served in the White 
Nile Province, 1922; Kordofan, 1922-26; as asst, civil secretary, 
1927-29, and 1932-33. He served in Darfur, 1930-31, was deputy go­
vernor of Kordofan in 193^-35, and deputy governor of the Blue Nile 
Province, 1935-39. He was deputy civil secretary, 1939-^1, and go­
vernor of the Gezira Province from 19^1 until he retired in 19^8. 
(MacMichael, SPS, p. 35.)
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the Blue Nile Province opined that "it may be that they feel that there 
is possibility of change in the air, and wish to be in as strong a posi­
tion as possible should any such change occur".  ^The same sentiment was 
expressed by a loyal shaykh at Kamlin, who said that the Mahdists were
"preparing ... to be strong and to become masters of the country, should
2the Government fall or leave the country from any outside cause".
A feeling of uncertainty as to the outcome of the war, and the simple
_ taking of advantage of the government's preoccupation dictated that the
tariqas and the Mahdists alike should seek to enhance their positions
vis a vis each other. Sagar, at the time acting governor of the Blue
Nile Province, offered a further elaboration of this idea by suggesting
"a more comfortable explanation" for the "special efforts ... to increase
... adherents":
Since the War started Religious Sheikhs and Heads of 
Sects have been taken much more into the confidence of 
Government, and have been consulted more freely on all 
sorts of subjects. Consequently they have, I think, ten­
ded to vie with one another to gain importance in the 
eyes of Government, and to do this they make every effort 
to increase the number of their follower's and, in conse­
quence, their prestige and wealth. 3
So far from worrying about this increase in activity, he saw it as fa­
vourable to the government,since "by keeping a strong hold on the Heads 
of Sects we can control an increasing number of people". This, in a 
nutshell, was the theoretical basis of government policy"in the post­
war period, Sagar, in fact, went so far as to suggest extending official 
*
 ^Sagar to acting director of intelligence, 26/11/15, SGA, INTEL 2/41/345.
 ^Sagar to acting director of intelligence, 13/5/16, SGA, INTEL 2/41/345.
^ Sagar to acting director of intelligence, 26/11/15, SGA, INTEL 2/41/3^5.
recognition to local religious shaykhs.  ^This was not an entirely
^ 2
isolated position. K.C.P. Struve, writing from the White Nile Pro­
vince, had stated after a meeting with Sayyid *Abd a-Rahman in 1914 that
the sayyid struck him "as being very young and unbalanced” and that he
3
could "be pretty easily frightened when necessary". This was a recog­
nition of the government's attitude not only toward Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, 
but toward the shaykhs of tariqas as well. As we shall see, this was 
more in the way of wishful thinking - an outcome to be hoped for as the 
result of lifting restrictions - than it was a practical cause for their 
relaxation. So long as the war continued, however, and so long as Khar­
toum felt it necessary to curry the favour of influential Sudanese, con­
cern over such things as the Ratib or competition among tariqas were 
secondary to the paramount interest in preserving order. As Sagar pointed
out to Willis in another connection, the alleged misdeeds of<Abdaliah 
4 /Abu Sinn (who was described as "probably corrupt ... but...undoubtedly 
loyal ... hates the Mahdists, and has very wide influence"): "If you
^ Sagar to acting director of intelligence, 26/11/15, SGA, INTEL 2/4l/345.
p
Kenneth Chetwood Struve (1876-1961) served in Sennar in 1901-02; in 
Khartoum, 1903-Q5; and in the Upper Nile Province, 1906-10. He was 
asst, civil secretary, 1911-13, and was stationed in the White Nile 
Province from 1913 to 1919, where he was governor in 1914. He was 
governor of the Upper Nile Province from 1919 until his retirement 
in 1926. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 11.)
3 Struve to Lewis, 30/11/14, SGA, INTEL 2/41/345.
^ ^ Abdallah cAwad al-Karim Abu Sinn ( -1923) an ex-Mahdist, shaykh of 
the Shukriyya tribe from 1902 until his death. (Hill, BD, p. 4.)
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want the support of big men, which we undoubtedly do at present, we 
must be prepared to wink at several things...." ^
The delegation to London. 1919
In July 1919 a delegation of ten Sudanese notables went to Lon­
don and were received by King George V, ostensibly for the dual purpose 
of proffering their congratulations to him upon the successful conclu­
sion of the war, and his recognition of their part in the Sudan's con­
tribution to the war effort. The delegation was composed of representa­
tives of the three classes by then most closely associated with the
Condominium government. These were Shaykh al-Tayyib Ahmad Hashim, the
-  -  3mufti of the Sudan; Shaykh Abu'l-Qasim Ahmad Hashim, the president of
1 Sagar to Willis, 11/3/16, SGA, INTEL 9/1/13.
^ Shaykh al-Tayyib Ahmad Hashim (c. 18.57-192*0, a Jacali Arab, was a 
cjerk of court at Berber before the Mahdia, during which he held se­
veral important posts. On the conquest he became the first Islamic
judge at Khartoum, and served as mufti from 1900 until his death in
192^. (Hill, BD, p. 354.)
^ Abu'l Qasim Ahmad Hashim (7-1934), brother of al-Tavyib Ahmad Hashim, 
the mufti. had been secretary to the Khalifa cAbdallahi, and after the 
Anglo-Egyptian conquest became a judge in the Blue Nile Province. He 
served as president of the Board of Ulema from 1912. (Hill, BD, p. 23.) 
A secret "Personality report form" on Abu'l Qasim (n.d.-, 19277, ob­
served that he was "very intelligent and capable; reticent in his 
dealings, ... to all practical purpose loyal and useful, and has ren­
dered many good services both as Kadi and in his present office. Am­
bitious both for himself and for Islam. Overestimates his own worth. 
Went to England in 1919. Is a Mahdist at heart." (Personality report 
form, n.d., SGA, CIVSEC 69/l/l.)
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the Board of Ulema; and Shaykh Ismacil al-Azhari,  ^qa&T of Darfur;
Shaykh cAbd al-Azim Bey Khalifa,  ^riagir of the cAhabda; Shaykh cAli
3 —  —  q
al-Tum, J nagir of the KababTsh; Shaykh Ibrahim Far ah of the
. _ tf
Jacaliyyin; and Shaykh cAwad al-Karim Abu Sinn, "deputy Nazir of the 
Shukriyya”; ^ Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani, Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi, and Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. ^
The importance of this delegation, indeed the Sudan Government's 
reasons for sending it, went far beyond its formal purpose. For by the 
spring of 1919» when the idea was first raised, the violent surge of
1 —  —  —
Ismacil al-Azhari (1868-1947), after serving as a provincial, judger
was mufti of the_Sudan from 1924 to 1932. He was the grandfather of 
Ismacil al-Azhari, the first prime minister of the Sudan. (Hill, BD, 
p. 184; Holt, "Holy families and Islam in the Sudan", p. 128.)
O
cAbd al-fAzIm Bey Khalifa (c.1830-1928) led his cAbabda forces for the 
Anglo-Egyptian side against the Mahdists. He was nagir of the cAbabda 
firom 1899. (Hill, BD, p. 8.)
^ SircAli al-Tum (1874-1938) was appointed nagir of the KababTsh, a post 
previously held by his father, upon the Anglo-Egyptian occupation. In 
1915 he was appointed nagirSimum. He was knighted in 1923. (Hill,
BD. p. 32.)
^ Ibrahim Bey Muhammad Farah (7-1926) was ^ treasurer of Metemma during 
the Mahdia, whence he fled from the Khalifa in 1898. He led a force 
of irregulars under the Anglo-Egyptian command. (Hill, BD, p. 173.)
■^ cAwa$ al-KarTm cAbdallah Abu Sinn (1877-1943) succeeded his father as 
nagircumum of the Shukriyya in 1923. He had previously served ascumda 
and shaykh of khut. (Hill, BD, p. 63.)
^ His father was too infirm to make the trip.
^ Willis, in_"Sidelights”, p. 87, adds another member- to the delegation, 
Shaykh Ibrahim Musa of the Hadandua.
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nationalism in Egypt altered the thinking of the government and made 
collaboration with influential elements of the population all the more 
important. Thus the delegation was to represent insitutional religious 
and tribal authority and, significantly, the still formally unrecog­
nised authority of the tariqas and Ansar, as being supporters of the 
British position in the Sudan.
At the height of the troubles in Egypt the government received 
welcome support from this last sector. On 2lr April 1919 Sharif Yusuf 
al-Hindi wrote to Stack to assure him of his personal loyalty and that 
of all the Sudanese, as against the pretensions of Egyptian nationa­
lists, who were claiming Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan. The Su­
danese, he wrote, were ’’confident that they have been finally separated 
from [/the Egyptians] since the Re-Occupation", and declared that "the
Sudan is capable now of bearing its own expenses and of carrying out
1
its own independence under the protection of Great Britain". The im­
portance of this statement goes far beyond its assurances of loyalty, 
for it embodies, in its reference to "independence under the protec­
tion of Great Britain" an early, if not the first public reference of 
a Sudanese to the idea that Britain was acting as trustee for the Su­
danese nations in other words, the concept of "the Sudan for the Su­
danese".
Two days later, on 23 April 1919t a similar letter arrived from 
more high-powered sources. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, SayyidcAli, the mufti. 
the president of the Board of Ulema, al-Azhari, and Sayyid Mirghani 
al-Sayyid al-MakkT, the head of the Ismaciiiyya order, the signatories, 
claimed to speak not only for themselves but for "the whole population
1 Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi to Stack, 21/4/19, F.O. 371/3717.
131
of the Sudan". They expressed gratitude to the British for all they
had done "for the welfare of the Sudan, which has resulted in the
country's advancement and progress". And they expressed their "great
loyalty and sincerity to the British Government which is unalterable".
They added an assurance that they had "no hand in, or connection with
the movement which is now in progress in Egypt, nor is the movement in
accordance with our wishes ", 1 This was not the first indication Sayyid
cAbd al-Rahman had given of his sentiments. He had previously received
an anonymous letter urging him "to emulate his father and take over"
the country. "This threw him into a great state of alarm and he at once
brought the letter round to the Intelligence terrified lest he should
2
be suspected of intriguing against us".
It was against this background of the challenge of Egyptian na­
tionalism and the expressed loyalty of the Sudanese notables that the 
idea was conceived of a delegation to London. The Sudan Government was 
more, anxious to send the notables than London was to receive them, and 
Stack expressed gladness that the foreign office "consented to receive"
3
the delegation. The delegation, as can be seen from the brief notes 
on its members, was dominated by long-standing supporters of the govern­
ment, but contained the new element of Sayyid cAli (who was styled in a 
foreign office list of the delegation as "principal Religious Notable 
of the Sudan, Descendant of the Prophet") and Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi and 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman. It is interesting to note that the last-named was
1 Notables to Stack, 23/4/19, P.O. 371/3717.
2 Stack to Wingate, 7/4/19, P.O. 371/3722.
3 Stack to Wingate, 8/5/19, P.O. 371/3711.
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listed as "El Sayed Abderrahman Mohamed Ahmed (son of the MAHDl)",  ^
yet another reflection of the government's ambivalence: at the very time 
when it recognised the sayyid as one of the premier figures in the 
Sudan, Slatin's" petty refusal ofcAbd al-Rahman's courtesy title was ho­
noured. This is further reflected in the account of the delegation given 
in Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's memoirs, wherein it is stated that he was 
happy to be part of the delegation because it meant recognition of his 
position, despite his rivals' opposition. But even though the king re­
ceived him with friendship, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was told that since
it was a private meeting, the king's attitude need not signal a change
2
in the official attitude toward the sayyid.
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman had been rather a last-minute addition to 
the delegation. Stack wanted him included because the sayyid had been 
"constantly loyal through the war and the recent trouble, and he fur­
ther stands for a big following in the Sudan". The governor-general 
feared, however, that the sayyid might not be "an acceptable visitor to 
England, as there may be some sentimental objection". In any case, as 
Stack told Wingate, he considered the inclusion of the Mahdi's son as
"living proof of the change that can be effected in one generation of
3
sympathetic administration".
Willis was put in charge of the delegation and accompanied it 
ftom Khartoum. They stopped only briefly at Cairo because "there had
1 "Deputation of Sudanese notables visiting England for the purpose 
of congratulating His Majesty on the conclusion of a victorious 
peace", n.d., F.O. 371/3722.
^ Jihad fT sabil al-istiqlal, pp. 23-2^f.
^ Stack to Wingate, 8/5/19» F.O. 371/3711.
been threats of violence against the party as being 'pro-British' and 
it was thought advisable to get them out of Cairo as soon as possible". 
At Port Said "there were rather futile but noticeable efforts to make 
'demonstrations' against the Sudanese party, stone throwing and slogan
shouting but not more than enough to show the party that they had not
2the sympathy of the Egyptians". Similar incidents occurred on the re- 
3
turn journey.
In London, after initial mix-ups that relegated the Sudanese to 
tents at Hampton Court, the party was shown the sights and prepared for 
their audience with the king. At their interview Wingate acted as in­
terpreter. The queen was also present, and she recalled meeting Sayyid 
*Ali on her visit to Port Sudan in 1912. When she failed to recognise 
Sharif Yusuf, Willis told her that the sharif "was in gaol" during her 
visit because "Slatin Pasha was cross with him". When Sayyid cAbd
al-Rahman came along the queen asked if he too had been in gaol, to
.......................................... - ................ q.
which Willis replied that "it was only luck that he hadn't been".
It was during this audience that the famous presentation took
place of the "Mahdi's sword" to the king. The authenticity of this
sword was seriously in doubt. Upon presentation of the sword to His
Majesty, he returned it to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman "to keep in defence of
the Sudan and the Empire forever". ^ The presentation apparently caused
1 Willis, "Sidelights", p. 89.
2 Ibid.t p. 90.
3 Ibid., p. 102.
^ Ibid., p. 99.
The African world, 2/8/1919.
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no misgivings at Buckingham Palace, where all were, in Willis's words,
"quite accustomed to the business of 'touch and return' with Indian
princes and took it as quite natural and simple”.  ^But the manner in
which the presentation had been decided, and its later effects, carried
more importance. According to Davies,
El Sayed Sir Ali Mirghani, the leader of the delegation ... 
heard of the proposed presentation of the sword, which he 
and the other members knew to be a forgery ... and an­
nounced that he refused to be presented to His Majesty 
and that he wished to return to the Sudan at once. It 
required an all-night argument to convince him that he 
must repress his chagrin, and he remained angry for the 
rest of the tour....
The following extracts from a written Mahdist ac­
count of the incident speak for themselves?.'There he 
presented to the King the sword of the Khalifaship of 
his father the Mahdi, and the King received it with plea- ■ * 
sure, and exalted him above the other notables who were 
with him.... Then they engraved the following words on 
the swords "This is the sword of the Imam the Mahdi...."
Now Saiyid Abdel Rahman presented it to the King of Bri­
tain, who accepted (or approved of) Mahdism, and returned 
the sword to Saiyid Abdel Rahman in order that he might 
protect his Sudanese subjects'. 2
The conduct of the 1919 delegation showed the importance to the 
British of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's help, and also indicated that he had 
no intention of acting as a mere rubber-stamp of British policy without 
extracting some personal advantage. The 1919 delegation marked, however 
tacitly, official government recognition of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's in­
fluence and standing. But his presence in London was not only, or even 
primarily, a reward for past services, as the government described it, 
but a service in itself, since it came at a time when the government
was attempting to muster Sudanese opinion against the claims of Egyptian
 ^Willis, "Sidelights", p. 99.
2
Davies memorandum, 1926. I have seen neither any other reference to 
this "written Mahdist account", nor the account itself.
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nationalism. To ascertain the value to the British position of his pre­
sence in the delegation, it has only to be considered what interpreta­
tion would have been placed on a refusal to participate. This is fur­
ther emphasised by the demonstrations against the delegation in Egypt. 
The Sudan Government, however, seems not to have appreciated fully the 
value to the sayyid's standing in the Sudan of the publicity he would 
receive, especially from the ingenious presentation of the sword.
The delegation also had an interview with Lord Curzon, the foreign 
secretary, during which SayyidcAli spoke favourably of Egypt's historic 
role in the Sudan and the common "religion, language and custom" of the 
two countries. Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi thereupon "rose in his wrath" and 
decried Egyptian influence and "how it had always been for the worse". 
Willis acted as interpretor at this meeting and felt that the interview 
had at least impressed Curzon that the Sudanese "had very definite 
views as to the degree they were prepared to accept any guidelines or 
superiority from Egypt."  ^ The interview must also have completed 
SayyidcAbd al-Rahman's coup: by stealing the show at the royal audi­
ence and by Sayyid cAli's impolitic defence of Egyptian influence at 
such a critical juncture in Anglo-Egyptian relations, Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman's position was greatly strengthened.
The relationship of the government and Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman be­
tween the close of the war and the upheavals of 1924 should be consi­
dered against this background of Anglo-Egyptian relations and the un­
certain status of the Sudan, as well as in the context of increasing 
Sudanese opposition to the Condominium. Ptom 1919 to 1924 SayyidcAbd 
al-Raluiian's progress was in the nature of "two steps forward, one step
1 Willis, "Sidelights", pp. 101-102.
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back” as his influence and power increased and the government adminis­
tered occasional "checks". It was a process full of tension, the re­
sult of government indecision and of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's determi­
nation.
As Davies pointed out in his memorandum of 1926, the status of 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was not "uniformly the same throughout his fol­
lowing". This was in fact true and was to a great extent responsible 
both for his rise to prominence and for the government’s internal divi­
sions of opinion as to how to deal with him. In the sedentary, riverain 
areas of the central Sudan, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's influence increa­
singly was felt as that of any other traditional religious notable* , .  
and in these districts the local officials looked upon him not with 
great alarm but as an influential leading citizen. But in the western, 
nomadic areas, in Darfur, Kordofan, and the White Nile Provinces, Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman was viewed by his followers as a "deliverer'*, as the 
NabicIsa, occasionally even as embodying the spirit of the Mahdi. The 
authorities of those provinces therefore considered the sayyid as a 
real and increasing danger. In 1923 Willis articulated this division 
by referring to "the modernist Mahdist sect" on the one hand, and "old- 
fashioned Mahdism" on the other.  ^It was, in effect, a distinction 
between the emerging modern Sudan and those parts of the Muslim north, 
still largely nomadic, where government control had been late in coming 
and light when it came. This distinction was rejected by most provin­
cial authorities as an artificial one, one that in fact played into the 
hands of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman since he, while rejecting the claim to
1 Willis to private secretary, 28/5/23. SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
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NabicIsa-hood, nonetheless drew much of his support from those who ac­
cepted him in that sense.
A 1926 report listed four categories of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman^ 
followers: relations and ex-lieutenants of the Mahdi, who felt entitled 
to a share of the increasing power and prestige of his son; manadlb and 
.jallaba. mostly Dongalawis whose only motive was in collecting zakat 
for themselves; muha.iirin  ^from Darfur and elsewhere who considered 
the sayyid "the most important person in the world and beyond the power 
of the Government", and who were instrumental, in their comings and go­
ings, in spreading the faith; and lastly, "Ansar", or old Mahdists who
followed Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman because they had followed his father or
2
because their fathers had. A later note further'supported the Willis 
view of the dual nature of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman *s following. This re­
port, written in 1930, spoke not of Mahdism at all, but of the 
"Rahmania sect" - so central had the sayyid himself become in the minds 
of Mahdists. This report further broke down the category of "sincere" 
believers in the sayyid by distinguishing two types of these: those who 
compared the Mahdi with the Prophet Muhammad and thus believed that, 
after his having been succeeded by his four khalifas, the khalifate of 
the Mahdi had been passed now to one of his own blood; and those who 
recognised Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman as NabicIsa or "the body into which the 
spirit of the prophet Jesus will descend on his second coming". The 
holders of these two views were, the report noted, easterners and wes­
terners respectively. ^
 ^Muha.iirin ("exiles"; sing.: muha.jir). The parallels to the hi.ira of 
the Prophet and to that of the Mahdi himself in 1881 should be noted.
 ^Karrar Effendi Muhammad Beshir, "Mahdism", n.d. (1926), SGA,
CIVSEC 56/2/18.
3
Karrar Muhammad Beshir, "Note on the Rahmania sect in the White Nile 
Province", 1/6/30, SGA, CIVSEC 56/2/18.
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The concern of the western governors was early voiced over the 
matter of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman*s agents, referred to above. The re­
cruitment and passage of manadTb were facilitated by the "pilgrimage” 
to Aba Island, which, as Davies later pointed out, had several aspects: 
"visits" (ziyarat) to SayyidcAbdtal-Rahman to pay respects; "large, 
organised congregations ... for the Ramadan festival"; and finally, 
Davies said,
pilgrims from the unsophisticated, fanatical tilbes 
of the west have been exploited for economic purposes 
by the Sayed, by means of a specious propaganda en­
couraging them to *exile* ('muhajara*) by quotations 
from the Koran promising spiritual benefits and rewards 
in the life to come to those who undergo hardship and 
toil for the sake of the faith.
These distinctions, Davies said, had "only become clear with the lapse
of time". ^
An undated report by a sub-ma *mur at Tendelti in the White Nile 
Province, probably written in late 1923 or early 1926, described the 
way in which belief in Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman had spread as being the re­
sult of "deliberate propaganda ... the use of the Sayed*s name by un­
scrupulous people for the furthering of their own ends ... and uninten­
tional but natural development". Propaganda, the report indicated, was
deliberately spread by Gellaba, who live in the Sayid's 
entourage, and wish to increase their own wealth and 
standing through association with his name, and who tour 
the country collecting zeka, 2 some with the knowledge of
 ^Davies memorandum, 1926.
2 Zakat, the Muslim alms-tax, one of the principal obligations of 
Islam, is to be paid by all Muslims who can afford it. Based on a 
percentage of crops and animals, money and goods, the amount to be 
paid varies. During the Mahdia this was made a direct government tax. 
(J.S. Trimingham, Islam in the Sudan, London, 19^9, p. 133; see Holt, 
The Mahdist state, p. 126.) In the early Condominium the term zakat 
was used for an animal tax. (Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 167.) 
But the original meaning remained, and zakat continued to be paid, 
despite government objections, to various religious leaders.
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the Sayid and by his orders, and others on their own 
initiative. These all in their own interests magnify 
the Sayid's name, describing him as the Nebi Isa that 
is to come, ... saying that they are his representatives 
and the ’keys of him the Door'.... They add that to see 
the Sayid's face once is equal to seventy pilgrimages to 
Mecca, and that to visit Aba is the same as to visit the 
holy places. Their assertions are made as if backed by 
the Sayid's authority, and the gullible Arabs readily 
believe them, with the result that these Gellaba, who 
call themselves 'manadib el Sayid' profit by this 
teaching both in wealth and influence, as well as by 
the commissions they receive from the Sayid. When the 
Government occupied Darfur and allowed Gellaba to en­
ter, the manadib rapidly arrived spreading their propa­
ganda....
Then the policy of Gellaba merchants and pedlars 
in the villages of Kordofan, W.N.P., and Darfur, was, 
on finding the Arabs devoted to Mahdism, to repeat in 
exaggerated form the stories of the manadib about the 
Sayid, thus succeeding in attracting the custom of the 
Arabs, whom they cheated....
In one instance a pedlar of Urn Ruaba merkaz, by 
producing a letter written by S.A.R. on his printed 
notepaper, attracted a large number of Arabs, who came 
to place the letter on their heads to obtain merit 
(baraka), and stayed to buy all the goods in the ped­
lar's shop. The result was that other pedlars and even 
merchants in merkaz towns, obtained letters written on 
the Sayid's printed notepaper, which was identified by 
Arabs through fikis who read the address on the paper.
The merchant would pretend to read out from the paper 
a message from the Sayid, admonishing the Arabs to fol­
low his sect, and mentioning the most important of them 
by name. The merchant would say that it was he who had 
first acquainted the Sayid with the mem's name, and that 
the Sayid asked after him personally, and hoped to see 
him in Aba on a visit before long.... The sheikh, who 
hitherto had not been an Ansari, would immediately con­
sider himself as such, and would be flattered to think 
that the Sayid knew of him. He would then repeat the 
merchant's tale to many others in order that they might 
accompany him on his journey to Aba,... 1
By the end of the war, Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman already had a con­
siderable establishment at Aba. Since 1908 he had been allowed to cul­
tivate there, and in 1915 "a large and fertile tract" on Aba, "contai-
 ^Karrar Muhammad Beshir, "Mahdism".
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ning rich forests" was allocated to the Mahdi *s family.  ^Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman was given large government contracts for wood, especially du­
ring the construction of the Sennar Dam. The government reasoned that
if Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman became absorbed in business he would have lit-
2
tie time or inclination for politics. In the twenties he was, in fact, 
generally considered to be the richest native of the Sudan. A report of 
1926 on the sources of the sayyid's wealth, listed zakat collected in 
his name by agents; muha.iirTn who cut wood or cultivated for him on Aba 
and received no pay; and wood contracts. It was reported that in 1926 
Sayyid*Abd al-Rahman *s wood contracts brought in £El4,000.  ^Many re­
ports of the Stack period referred to the sayyid's extravagance, osten­
tation and un-businesslike management of his affairs. None, however, 
took note of his obligations. In a note written in 1934, Reid pointed 
out that at that late date there were still fourteen widows of the Mahdi 
alive (including "concubines"), another son fAli), "a number of grand­
sons and great-grandsons with their families, and ... a very large num­
ber of more distant relations". Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman paid about £E300 
per month in support of these relations.There was also the matter of 
"constant appeals from the indigent and the afflicted" and requests for 
loans (which were seldom if ever repaid). "His position", Reid said,
"and Sudanese custom" precluded refusing to meet such claims. Until the 
establishment of the Aba cotton scheme in 1928, Sayyid *Abd al-Rahman
Davies note, 1925.
p
Interview with Sir James Robertson, 18/6/76.
3 Karrar Muhammad Beshir, "Mahdism".
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was, in fact, Mat his wits ends to find sufficient money to satisfy his
dependents* demands".  ^In 1926 Davies reported, characteristically,
that be the middle of that year "the large profits made by the Sayed,
out of contracts in connection with the construction of the Sennar dam 
and with the supply of wood to Government Departments, had been squan­
dered in extravagant living and in various speculative and unprofitable
enterprises". The sayyid thus found himself in debt to the amount of
2
£E3400. The government lent him £E4500 but his financial straits
3
damaged his prestige.  ^If this was true, then it was a tacit admis­
sion of the failure of the government policy to deflect Sayyid cAbd
al-Rahman from political to economic pursuits: if financial problems 
lowered his prestige, it must be reasoned that financial success would
increase it. In any event, despite a commonly held view that his aspi-
4rations were "purely financial", he did not become the single-minded 
man of affairs the government expected.
As early as June 1918, the inspector at Kosti, Guy Pawson, had
 ^Reid, "Note on Mahdism".
This loan was later made a gift. (Gaafar Bakheit, British administra­
tion and Sudanese nationalism 1919-1939# Cambridge, Ph.D., 1965t p. 117.
3
J Davies memorandum, 1926.
^ "Comments by C.G. Dupuis", n.d. (9/25)» SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
^ Albert Guy Pawson (1888-) served in Khartoum in 1911» in the White 
Nile Province from 1912 to 1914, in the legal department in 1915» 
in the Upper Nile Province from 1917 to 1920, and in Khartoum in 
1921-22. He was deputy governor of the White Nile Province in 1922, 
and deputy governor of the Blue Nile Province from 1923 to 1926. He 
was governor of the White Nile from 1927 to 1931» and governor of 
the Upper Nile Province from 1931 until his retirement in 193^ . 
(MacMichael, SPS, p. 23.)
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reported the increasing influence of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman at Aba Is­
land. Pawson had no doubt that ’’discontented men" of the Jawamaca,
Salim, and other tribes were visiting the sayyid there, and while he 
had no evidence that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman gave them anything but "sound 
and loyal advice", he was concerned about the "position of influence" 
the sayyid was acquiring. "Omdahs like Mohammad Hamad Abu Jojo", he re­
ported, were "puzzled how to treat" the sayyid, "and the latter even 
asked if he was supposed to go and pay court to him like everyone else".'*' 
Pawson's point was taken up by the acting governor of the province, who 
\ wrote to Feilden, the civil secretary, that it was being openly stated
that people came even from Kordofan to work for Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman 
without remuneration. The acting governor asked ironically if it was 
the intention of the government "to make a Mahdist Centre of power in
this province", and he asked in exasperation: "What is the government 
2
policy?" In answering this, Willis wrote to the civil secretary that
The policy of the Govt, though no doubt never very ac­
curately defined is not one of repression but of absorp­
tion.... Sayed Abdel Rahman el Mahdi is a special case.
Owing to his lineage and the hold he has over the minds 
of a very large proportion of the population it is neces­
sary for the Govt, to control his movements to a certain 
degree, not because he is in himself suspect but because 
his more ignorant followers make his position impossible 
by overdoing their veneration for him. It must be remem­
bered however that in the case of the Mahdists ... 
though they may be for an increase in temporal power, 
there can be no question in their case of another Mahdi....
I am confident that Sayed Abdel Rahman is loyal to the 
Govt., and I would add that it is not a question of al­
lowing him to acquire influence but seeing that he does 
not misuse an influence which he has already got. 3
Pawson to governor, White Nile Province, 3/6/18, SGA, INTEL 2/41/341.
2
Acting governor, White Nile Province, to civil secretary, 6/6/18,
SGA, INTEL 2/41/341.
^ Willis to civil secretary, 24/6/18, SGA, INTEL 2/4l/34l.
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The immediate occasion for the concern voiced by the White Nile
v
Province officials was Willis's proposal for the settlement of members 
of the Khalifa's and MahdT's families on a plot of cultivable land some­
where, in an apparent attempt to rehabilitate them and "assimilate" 
them by economic integration into the population as a whole. To this 
proposal the provincial governors agreed in principle, but none would 
agree to his province as the site for the proposed settlement. ^ As has 
been noted, the White Nile authorities objected because of the already 
great influence of Mahdism there; the Berber authorities pleaded an in­
sufficiency of arable land; Kassala objected because of "the recru-
2
descence of Mahdism among the Hadendoa"; Dongola, like Berber, argued
3
the unavailability of land. The acting governor of Sennar reported
that his experience compelled him to disapprove of the scheme, as his
province was "probably a happier hunting ground for these parasites 
4than any other". The governor of Kordofan thought it "inadvisable to 
settle the Khalifa Abdullahi's family in a Province where they would be 
in close touch with the Baggara tribes." ^
1 MacMichael to Willis, 28/4/20, SGA, INTEL 2/41/341.
2 Willis to civil secretary, 4/2/20, SGA, INTEL 2/4l/34l.
3 Jackson to Willis, 9/5/20, SGA, INTEL 2/41/341.
^ Acting governor, Sennar, to Willis, 13/5/20, SGA, INTEL 2/41/341.
Sagar to Willis, 10/5/20, SGA, INTEL 2/41/341. The scheme was eventu­
ally launched at al-Makhalif, near al-Jabalayn on the White Nile, 
but failed and was abandoned in 1926, after Willis left the intelli­
gence department. (See Hasan Ahmed Ibrahim, "The policy of the con­
dominium government towards the Mahdist political prisoners, 1898- 
1932", SNH, LV, 197k, pp. 33-^ 5.)
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Prom this response can be clearly seen the lines of division be­
tween the "policy" of the government and the attitudes of provincial 
governors (and, incidentally, a weakness of the central government in 
dealing with the provinces). This division became more and more pro­
nounced as SayyidcAbd al-Rahman was seen to be daily increasing his in­
fluence. By 1921 it appears that concern in the west bordered on panic. 
And it was at this time that one of the most serious uprisings of the 
Condominium took place, at Nyala in Darfur.
Unrest in the west: the Nyala rising and its consequences
The attack on Nyala on 26 September 1921 became a landmark of 
Stack’s administration. It was certainly the most widely discussed and 
worrying incident of anti-government feeling to occur before 1924. Why 
this was so, however, is not at all a straightforward or easily under­
standable matter. There had been, after all, numerous similar outbreaks 
throughout the short history of the Condominium, and Darfur was notori­
ous as a hotbed of "fanatical" opposition to the government. The impor­
tance of the Nyala rising was, in fact, mostly psychological, firstly 
because it nearly succeeded in its apparent immediate objective, and 
secondly because it fully revived the old fear of large-scale, reli­
giously inspired revolt, at a time when concern in the west over the 
"recrudescence" of Mahdism was already at a high pitch.
On 22 September 1921, the acting governor of Darfur, at Fasher,
1 2 received a letter from the inspector at Nyala, Mr. McNeill, stating
There was as yet no telegraph line between Fasher and Nyala.
 ^Tennent McNeill (1887-1921) served in Khartoum, 1912; in the Blue Nile
Province, 1913-16; and in Darfur from 1917 until his death.
(MacMichael, SPS, p. 24.)
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that a faki, cAbdallahi al-Sihayni, had declared himself to he the Nabi 
cIsa and that "steps were being taken to effect his arrest". A force of 
fifty mounted infantry was despatched to assist in tracking down the 
faki. There was at that time no concern about an attack on Nyala. On 
23 September another letter from McNeill reached Fasher, indicating im­
minent danger of an attack, and another detachment with two machine guns 
was sent out. As "no combatant British officer was available at the time 
to go with this small force", a veterinary officer, Captain H. Chown, 
volunteered to accompany it to Nyala to help McNeill. On 26 September 
a force estimated at between five and six thousand tribesmen led by the 
faki cAbdallahi attacked Nyala. In the ensuing battle McNeill and Chown 
were among the forty-one officers and men killed. Only because the at­
tackers failed to follow up their initial success and because cAbdallahi 
was wounded did the remaining defenders manage to hold out. According to 
the government, at least six hundred of the insurgents were killed in 
the attack.  ^cAbdallahi was later captured by "friendlies" and brought 
to Nyala, where he was tried and executed on 28 October 1921.
If this had been the entire story, Nyala would have gone down as 
just another of the periodic revolts so common in the early Condominium. 
The extent of this revolt, however, was much greater than the typical 
faki-led affair. The sheer numbers involved in the attack indicate this, 
even though an early report stated that perhaps as many as two thousand 
of them "were either there to see what was going to happen, or those 
who had joined the Fiki by persuasion of his followers and were not in
1 Stack to Allenby, 30/11/21, F.O. 371/6340.
2
Yockney to Savile, enclosed in Savile to civil secretary, 8/2/22,
Sga, INTEL 2/50/422.
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a position to refuse".  ^Further, although an estimated eighty percent
of the rebels were "either Massalat or Fellata", andcAbdallahi himself
was a Masalati, the "Gimr, Fur, Beigo, Bergig, Beni Halba, Beni Hussein,
Zayadia, Habbania, Messaria, Taaisha, Rizeigat, Turmani and Murrati"
2
tribes were also represented, a collection that would, of course, 
indicate a very widespread interest and involvement.
The cause of the uprising was at first put down to the usual re­
ligious instigation of a wild-eyed faki promising the certain defeat of 
the alien and irreligious government. Willis’s first despatch to the
provinces on the matter stated flatly that "the rising was purely lo-
3
cal and had no political significance." The governor of Darfur, Col.
Savile, was not even in the Sudan at the time, but on leave in England,
and on 3 October he wrote to the foreign office requesting an interview
to discuss the Nyala situation, "of which", he said, "I have heard
4nothing beyond what I have seen in the papers". Having admitted that, 
he claimed the next day that he "was at a loss to explain this out­
break as the people were prosperous and contented". He therefore deter­
mined: "that the rebels must be composed of Baggara Arabs who are liable
5
to outbursts of religious excitement...." Savile's reflexive response 
shows how stolidly the "official" view of events in the Sudan was main-
 ^Yockney to Savile, enclosed in Savile to civil secretary, 8/2/22,
SGA, INTEL 2/50/422.
2 Ibid.
^ Willis to all governors, 29/9/21, SGA, INTiiL 2/50/923.
^ Savile to asst, secretary (Egypt and Sudan), foreign office,
3/10/21, F.O. 371/6340.
Minute by J. Murray, 5/10/21, F.0. 371/6340.
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tained. Indeed, to claim as Savile did that "the people were prosperous 
and contented" was to contradict the fact that the rising had taken 
place. And to explain the rising out of hand as another outburst of 
"religious excitement" without recourse even to the earliest of govern­
ment investigative reports showed clear prejudice.
The inability of senior officials to explain immediately the 
causes of the revolt stemmed from the very remoteness of Nyala, and 
their absence from the scene. The Residency in Cairo told the foreign 
office on 22 October that reinforcements were being sent to Kereinik 
"which may also be attacked".  ^Despite the fact that this was almost 
a month after the attack on Nyala, the foreign office could not even de­
termine where Kereinik was, nor was its location known to anyone in the
London offices of the Sudan Government, "as Darfur Province has not yet 
2
been surveyed".
Later reports suggested other than purely religious motivation
for the attack on Nyala. In any event, the capture and execution of the
faki cAbdallahi did not end the affair. Information was received that
"ringleaders" had reassembled the rebels and were determined to attack
any patrol sent against them. Another faki, "Mohamed el Tor" emerged
as a leader, and the rebels attacked in a strength of between two and
three thousand a patrol on 27 November and were beaten off with at
least eighty-seven dead. The patrol then proceeded through the Masalit
country without organised resistance,and captured considerable numbers
3
of horses and cattle.
1 Scott (Cairo) to foreign office, 22/10/21, F.O. 371/63^0.
2 Minute by J. Murray, 24/10/21, F.O. 371/6340.
3
Yockney to Savile, enclosed in Savile to civil secretary, 8/2/22,
SGA, INTEL 2/50/422.
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The facts of the Nyala rising as such were not debated. But, as 
has been noted, arguments began as to the reasons behind it even before 
any investigation had begun into its causes. Inevitably certain people 
considered the possibility of SayyidcAbd al-Rahman's involvement. To 
discourage such thinking he offered to do what he could to restore calm 
in Darfur. On 30 October Willis wrote to Darfur that "Sayed Abdel Rahman 
el Mahdi fears that ignorant followers of his sect may be misled into 
involving themselves in Nyala troubles and suggests Yaghub Ahmed might 
be allowed to go and instruct them that they are to keep quiet and obey 
Government orders".  ^The governor replied in the negative, as he did 
not consider the suggested emissary a "suitable person for such a mis­
sion". Savile went on to say that Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman had for years 
been writing many letters to people in Darfur which, while "possibly
2
perfectly innocent" in intent, had nonetheless had a disturbing effect.
On 3 November the governor of Kassala reported that several Fellata
had been arrested after spreading rumours to the effect that the Nyala
- 3rising had been organised by Sanusi agents. ** The governor of Darfur 
quickly rejected this suggestion, and said that he was confirmed in his 
belief that
all unrest here and in Masalit is due to Mahdist acti­
vities and recrudescence of their propaganda. No evi­
dence here to support report of Senussist participation.
Attitude of leading Senussists here has been consistently 
correct. Abdallahi himself apparently a Mahdist....^
1 Willis to governor, Darfur, 30/10/21, SGA, INTEL 2/50/423.
 ^Governor, Darfur to Willis, l/ll/21, SGA, INTEL 9/1/8.
 ^Governor, Kassala to Willis, 3/11/21, SGA, INTEL 9/1/8.
^ Governor, Darfur to Willis, 5/11/21, SGA, INTEL 9/1/8.
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Three days later Savile wrote that he had confirmed from the son 
of Sihaynl that his father had been "a Mahdist and was continually rea­
ding the Rateb".  ^Willis used this occasion of Savile's second con­
nection between Sihaynl and "Mahdisra" to deliver yet another exposi­
tion of what he was convinced was the real nature of the movement.
"Re Mahdist tendencies'*, he wrote, the "word is used in dual sense as 
indicating belief in MohammediAhmed El Dongolawi as true Mahdi, secondly
as revolutionary movement under religious leader claiming to be true
2
Mahdi. Translation of Abdallah's proclamation more approaching second
1 Governor, Darfur to Willis, 8/11/21, SGA, INTEL 9/1/8.
2
The proclamation to which Willis referred was, in fact, a letter from 
Sihayni to Nazir Ibrahim Musa. It read as follows:
"In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Gracious. Praise be to 
Allah, the Lord, the Gracious, with prayers and peace.
"Now then, from the slave of Allah, Abdalla El Hussein (Siheini) 
peace be to him, the chosen for fight against the enemies of Allah, 
the infidels and other hypocrites - solely for the sake of Allah, 
the Gracious - 0.' Sultan Ibrahim Musa, blessings be upon you, you 
should rise to fight the enemies of Allah - the infidels and other 
hypocrites who follow them, and you are hereby told by El Sayid Abdalla 
El Husseini peace be to him, 0 you Ibrahim Musa, don't do any harm to 
the faithful, but you should rise for the sake of religion and fight 
for the sake of Allah, and die. On your way with firmness, 0 you 
slaves of Allah, you faithful, rise up to fight for Allah's sake 
without delay, and come to the place Urn Belula to El Sayed Abdalla, 
the Khalifa of Allah on earth and the Khalifa of the prophet of 
Allah on his nation .... Don't fail to turn up for the Jehad quickly." 
(My underlining.)
Clearly Willis's assessment of the letter's character is cor­
rect, and Sihayni was making no claims for Sayyid^Abd al-Rahman.
(This translation, without the original, of Sihayni's letter was 
enclosed in Nicholls, acting governor, Darfur, to_director of intel­
ligence, 8/11/21, SGA, INTEL, 9/1/8.) See also cAli cAbdallah Abu Sinn, 
Mudhakhira ta'rikhiyyacan mudiriyyat Par Fur, Khartoum, n.d., 
pp. 44-51.
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them first,..." He added that the "Rateb consists of extracts ftom , 
Koran and teaching of highly moral character and being only prayer 
book available to large sections of natives is not necessarily indi­
cation of Mahdist tendencies either kind."  ^This was stretching a 
point. As Davies pointed out in his 1926 memorandum*
The more ignorant Mahdists do not, and the Government 
cannot, view these texts in the setting of the Rateb 
with the detachment which is justified towards them 
when they are read as part of the Koran. The Rateb, 
moreover, is much more the outward and visible symbol 
of Mahdism.... It must not be forgotten ... that most 
of the copies must fall into the hands of people who 
cannot read them. 2
The extent to which Willis was willing to defend Sayyid cAbd
al-Rahman soon became clear, as Willis forwarded to the"governor of
Darfur for his approval a draft letter by the sayyid to the governor.
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman wrote:
It is to my great regret to hear of the recent distur­
bances caused by the so-called Abdulla El Soghayer which 
would have a detrimental effect on the country, besides 
the fact that they stand as obstacles in the way of its 
advancement and prosperity.
Therefore I beg Your Excellency to make it clear 
to all, particularly those who attribute to us disloyal­
ty ... that we are loyal and sincere to this Government 
which is sparing, and has spared, no pains to make our 
country flourish and prosper and grow in wealth, which 
is building our mosques and giving us full freedom of 
religion ... and which is assisting the inhabitants in 
every way possible and looking after their well-being 
and success.
Anyone, however, who claims that he is a messenger 
ftom us or who fabricates false charges against us to 
serve his own purposes - contrary to the things I have 
expressed above - he is nothing but a liar and defama- 
tor we that he should be dealt with drasti­
cally, in order that our innocence is shewn.
 ^Telegram, Willis to governor, Darfur, 10/11/21, SGA, INTEL
9/1/8.
2 Davies memorandum, 1926.
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Further, any letter that we may send to any 
wakil of ours there, he is directed by us to bring 
the same to you to see....l
Without knowing to what use this letter was put in Darfur, the 
records suggest that it served to suspend debate, at least between 
Willis and the Darfur authorities, as to SayyideAbd al-Rahman's sup­
posed indirect involvement in the Nyala rising. This was probably not 
because the governor had been convinced of the sayyid*s loyalty, never 
explicitly at issue, at least openly, in the terms in which the debate 
was phrased. Rather, the complaint from Darfur (and elsewhere) had been 
of SayyidcAbd al-Rahman's contacts as being, in themselves, conducive 
to increased interest in and adherence to him. The fact that at this 
juncture (December 1921) this argument was temporarily shelved, was more 
likely the result of new facts related to the Nyala rising being un­
covered in Dar Masalit. And these facts pointed not to religious fana­
ticism but to simple resistance to the imposition of government control 
as the cause for the disturbance.
It should be remembered that Darfur came under the administra­
tion of the Turco-Egyptian regime only in 1874, and under the Condomi­
nium only in 1916, and that for the duration of the war only the most 
superficial attempts had been made to govern. But whatever claim the 
government had to Darfur, its attempt to extend administration into 
Dar Masalit, west of Darfur proper, was seen by the Masalit tribesmen 
rather as an invasion. Davies, who was Resident in Dar Masalit in 1921, 
pointed out that the government's claim to that territory on the grounds 
that it had formed a part of Darfur before the Mahdia, whatever its va­
lue in boundary negotiations with the French, was
Draft letter from SayyidcAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi to governor, Darfur, 
enclosed in Willis to governor, Darfur, 15/11/21, SGA, INTEL 9/1/8.
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too remote to carry weight with a tribe and its ruling 
family who successfully maintained their independence 
for nearly forty years. Our moral claim to their loyalty 
is nil. No widespread oppression has been removed or 
exists to be removed.... Under these circumstances the 
words 'loyalty' and 'disloyalty' are inappropriate to 
an account of the recent unrest. 1
This truly remarkable statement, probably as forceful an argument as
there could be for Indirect Rule, was partly acknowledged by Stack in
his report to Sultan Ahmad Fu'ad of Egypt on the Nyala rising*
The people of Southern Darfur in the vicinity of Nyala 
consist partly of 'Baggara' tribes of Arabs, partly of 
Fellata ... and partly Masalat.... The first of these 
are notoriously fanatical, the second are equally fana­
tical, ... and the third, the Masalat, are intolerant 
of outside rule.
Under the rule of Sultan Ali Dinar these people 
were sufficiently strong to evade any but a minimal 
taxation, and the introduction of a closer system of 
administration inevitably aroused an undercurrent of 
discontent, especially amongst the Chiefs and ruling 
classes.... their prejudice against a change of Govern­
ment, coupled with discontent at direct administration 
would prepare a field in which the seeds of rebellion 
would rapidly thrive. 2
But Stack was apparently unwilling to allow this interpretation, un­
qualified, to stand as the last word. Interestingly, the annual Re­
port for 1921 contained an explanation almost identical to that given 
to Sultan Fu'ad, but with a new emphasis: "this discontent, coupled 
with resentment at an external domination of any kind and a non-
Mahommedan one in particular, would provide sufficient fuel for the
3preaching of a fanatical agitator to kindle".
Another point worth noting is that the conquest of Darfur in 
1916 had brought with it not only the first attempt at the imposition
^ Davies to governor, Darfur, 5/12/21, SGA, INTEL 2/51/430.
 ^Stack to Sultan Fu'ad, 28/12/21, SGA, INTEL 2/50/425. Stack was re­
porting in his capacity of sirdar.
^ Annual Report for 1921, 1923 > Cmd. 1837.
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of European control, but it also accelerated the previous very gradual 
island zation of the western Sudan. Trimingham has stated-that Darfur 
"was pagan in all but name before Mahdist agents arrived”,  ^a remark 
that is borne out by provincial officials in the early and mid-twenties. 
Recent events - the destruction of the Fur sultanate, the defeat of the 
Masalit at the hands of the French in 1911 and the consequent partition 
of their dar, the gradual but inexorable increase in European penetra­
tion and concomitant interference - coincided with a marked increase
in proselytization. As it happened, this was to an extent carried out
by agents of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman and by fakis claiming that status.
In an area of relatively backward tribes, the result was a fusion of
these new influences, easily viewed respectively as disaster and sal-
2
vation. A.J. Arkell, reporting on Mahdism in the west in 1926, 
wrote that
Mahdism in Darfur and parts of Northern Nigeria, 
especially Bornu, as far as my knowledge goes, is the 
only definite current in the sea of native thought.
There is very little religion except where Mahdists
abound. For the rest the people, though Mohammedan 
in name, are virtually pagans, more or less contented, 
except where the coming of civilised government has 
curtailed their natural pursuits such as cattle raiding.
There is no getting out of it that Cthe tribal leaders] 
have a fundamental belief that the Government is not
here for ever. As the old 'Turkeia' was replaced by the
Mahdia, so the present 'Turkeia' will be replaced by 
the coming of the true Messiah. 3
 ^Trimingham, Islam in the Sudan, p. 160. See also R.S. O'Fahey and 
J.L. Spaulding, Kingdoms of the Sudan, London, 197^ » pp. l6*f-171.
 ^Anthony John Arkell (1898- ) served in Darfur, 1921-26; in the White 
Nile Province, 1927-29; in the Blue Nile Province, 1930-32; as deputy 
governor of Darfur, 1932-37; and in the civil secretary's office in 
1937. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 32.)
^ A.J. Arkell, "Mahdism in the western Sudan", 1926, SGA, CIVSEG 
56/2/18.
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This raises yet another question not only in regard to the ge­
neral unrest in Darfur in 1921 but in the spread of Mahdist propaganda 
throughout the northern Sudan. That is the spread of the Mahdist idea 
and, specifically, of the reputation of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, in various 
forms, beyond the boundaries of the Sudan into the French possessions 
and Nigeria. This was inevitable owing to the steady passage of pil­
grims on their way to and from Mecca. This passage could take years, as 
pilgrims would stop to earn money, travel on and stop again until they 
reached the Holy Places. Crossing the Sudan they came into contact with 
the agents, legitimate or self-appointed, of SayyidcAbd al-Rahman. Con­
tact between Mahdists and the far west dated from the days of the Mahdi 
himself; the Mahdia undoubtedly influenced events as far off as Northern 
Nigeria.  ^Thus, "the Eastern Sudan was regarded as the main source of
Mahdist beliefs, with the Hijaz as a secondary focus and the frajj route
2
providing the main communications network". In an interview with 
MacMichael, Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani claimed that a major reason for the 
coming of the pilgrims from Nigeria was expectation of the imminent ap­
pearance of the NabicIsa. Because there had been no Mahdi in Nigeria, 
there was no hope there of a NabicIsa, he said. But in the Sudan, "as 
they think the Mahdi has already come, it follows that the Nebi Isa
3
must be about due". There was an intense feeling of expectation among
 ^See Muhammad al-flajj, "Hayatu b. Sacid: a revolutionary Mahdist in 
the western Sudan", in Yusuf Fadl Hasan (ed.), Sudan in Africa, 
Khartoum, 1971» PP. 128-141. Hayatu b. Sacid (d. I898), a great- 
grandson ofcUthman dan Fodio, adhered to the Mahdi. Although he 
never performed the hi.jra to the east, his activities further sti­
mulated western interest in Mahdism.
2
Thomas Hodgkin, "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism in the African set­
ting", in Yusuf Fadl Hasan (ed.), Sudan in Africa, p. 117. See also 
‘Umar al-Naqar, The pilgrimage tradition in West Africa, Khartoum,
1972, pp. 82-91.
3
MacMichael to director of intelligence, 13/6/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
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these pilgrims, and their readiness to accept a self-proclaimed Nabi 
cIsa was therefore great. Their contribution to the general rise in ten­
sion in the west, while obscure, was nonetheless a real one, and no 
doubt had its effect in the events leading up to the Nyala rising. The 
government always considered these Fellata a danger. ^
Stack and the government generally were, of course, well aware 
that local political grievances had often exhibited themselves under the 
cloak or with the impetus of religious reaction. But in all such cases 
the religious appearence rather than political complaints was stressed 
in official reports. In the Sudan Intelligence Report for November 1921,
Willis listed five causes for unrest in the west that had erupted at
the same time as and immediately after Nyala. These were
(1) The world-wide condition of unrest which has affected 
even the most remote tribes.
(2) The fact that the older men have seen the disappearance
of two regimes in the Sudan and feel that the present Go­
vernment has lasted its allotted time.
(3) False reports of the successes of the Nyala rising.
(4) The unsettling effect of seditious circulars.
(5) The increase this year of the Homr herd tax rate. 2
Suggesting that the ’’world-wide condition of unrest” was responsible 
seems to have been the sheerest fantasy, probably considered capable 
of ingestion in London, but never taken seriously in the Sudan. Not­
withstanding the fact that in a "confused and shadowy way 'Mahdist 
propaganda was thought of ... as associated with Bolshevism, the Third 
International, Egyptian nationalism, Pan-Islaraism, and ideas of "world
Interview with Sir Gawain Bell, 2/6/76. Bell noted that each large 
town had its Fellata quarter. In El Obeid, in fact, there was a 
clearing of about four hundred to five hundred yards kept between 
the Fellata section and the rest of the town in the event of the 
necessity of taking action against them.
2 SIR, November 1921, F.O. 371/77^6.
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revolution" in general'",  ^there was no evidence of any such associa­
tion in fact. It is more likely that for reasons of "public relations", 
more specifically relations with London, responsibility for domestic 
opposition was, as in the case of the Sanbu rising of 1919, being feebly 
and unconvincingly deflected from the Sudan Government to external
sources. As a former member of the intelligence department put it: the
2
Sudan Government called all who disagreed with it "'bolshies'". The 
disappearance of the two previous regimes may well have been a psycho­
religious factor, but it was given no prominence in reports at the time, 
either by Willis or be provincial officials, as an underlying cause of 
the troubles. The "unsettling effect of seditious circulars" is a re­
ference to alleged Egyptian nationalist propaganda in the Sudan, but 
its invocation here is, again, of the same calibre as Lyall's attribu­
tion of the Sanbu rising to the presence of Egyptian troops at Kassala 
(see above, page 47). It should be borne in mind, of course, that Anglo- 
Egyptian relations were at a critical stage in early 1922, and the sta­
tus of the Sudan itself was in question. "False reports of the succes­
ses of the Nyala rising" may well have caused more general unrest, but 
this does not explain the Nyala rising itself. Finally, Willis's un­
qualified mention of the increase in herd tax should be noted as a pro­
bable cause of unrest, as it was one of the very few points of contact 
between the government and the tribesmen, and the methods of collection
3
were reportedly reminiscent of Turkish times. Indeed, Willis himself
 ^Hodgkin, "Mahdism, Messianism and Marxism...", p. 117, quoting G.J.F. 
Tomlinson and G.J. Lethem, History of Islamic -propaganda in Nigeria, 
London, 1927, passim.
2 Interview with Brigadier Lush, 15/10/76.
^ cAli eAbdallah Abu Sinn, Mudhakhira , p. 44.
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seems to have felt fairly certain that taxation was the single most
important cause of unrest. Notwithstanding his official pronouncements,
he wrote in a private letter in December 1921 that he
was always sure that these Southern people in Darfur
would give us trouble sometime, as they were never 
really handled by anyone, and they think that they 
can defeat anyone. Besides, I think that we went a 
little too quick with them and put them on taxation 
etc. too soon. But the young inspector is like that, 
as I know. I was one once. ^
It is interesting to note, in Willis's letter, the criticism of
McNeill, which was not echoed in any of the official correspondence,
let alone in the published reports. It may, however, have been generally
accepted in the government that his manner or methods had been incorrect.
In 1928 Sir John Maffey, then governor-general and paying a visit to
Darfur, wrote privately to MacMichael: "What a bad show Nyala was.'
And terribly unnecessary if McNeill had only played his hand with a
2
little common sense, poor fellow". Davies, in his reminiscences, 
wrote that McNeill "had been slow to appreciate the magnitude of the 
danger which threatened. He reported the first news of the false pro­
phet's appearance in a letter which was not even marked 'Urgent' and
3
did not ask for immediate military support". There was also talk at 
the time that an Egyptian ma'mur in the vicinity had been a cause of 
discontent.
No matter what various officials believed to be the underlying 
cause of the Nyala rising, it was easier and more convenient to blame
1 Willis to "Pasha", 8/12/21, SAD 204/3.
2 Maffey to MacMichael, 25/11/28, SAD G// s *+69.
^ Davies, The camel's back, London, 1957» P. 1^ 9.
^ Interview with Mr. George Bredin, 10/6/76.
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it on "fanaticism” than to admit the possibility of dissatisfaction
with government policy. This explanation, after all, conformed with the
traditional view of the Sudanese and was one that apparently could be
put repeatedly to London without engendering embarrassing questions.
But whatever the inaccuracies involved in blaming "fanaticism" for the
outbreak, it was not the most outrageous of the suggestions made. Willis
wrote a long and tortured essay vaguely linking the defeat of "the
Caliph" (i.e. the Ottoman Sultan), the emergence of Egyptian nationalism,
and the Sanusiyya taxiqa with the Nyala rising, although he had not an 
1 2iota of proof. Col. Balfour, assistant director of intelligence, 
in a letter to Cairo, opined that a. French-Sanusi intrigue may have un­
derlain the rising, saying that "it is noteworthy that there has been 
native talk at El Obeid - and possibly elsewhere - that the French axe
3
mixed up in it somehow". ^ While the casualness of these and other un­
substantiated theories - not only rumours but "possible" rumours, un­
informed guesses, really - is striking evidence of the way in which the
1 Willis to governors, 7/12/21, SGA, INTEL 9/1/8.
^ Lt. Col. Francis Campbell Balfour (1884-1965), served in the public 
works department from 1906 to 1912 before being appointed to the poli­
tical service. He was posted in Berber, 1912-15; in the Nuba Mts. 
Province in 1916; and in Kassala in 1916-17. He was seconded for ser­
vice in Iraq from 1917 to 1920. He served as asst, director of in­
telligence in 1921-22, was deputy governor of Kassala in 1923-24, 
deputy governor of the Red Sea Province in 1926, and governor of 
that province in 1927. He served as governor of Mongalla from 1929 
until his retirement in 1931. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 23.)
Balfour to Major C.M. Tweedy, 4/11/21, SGA, INTEL 2/51/429. 
The underlining is mine.
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intelligence department operated, so is the apparent necessity of go­
vernment officials to look for external causes for their troubles, a 
procedure which was followed time and again. But the Nyala rising con­
firmed the western governors in their determination to oppose the in­
creasing influence of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman and the government's colla­
boration with him.
One we.y in which to do this was to counter that influence with 
_ another. In the west, in the years immediately following Nyala, a com­
mon complaint of the governors was of the disturbing effect on tribal 
leaders and tribal authority of the manadib of SayyidcAbd al-Rahman. It 
was early recognised (even before Nyala) that whereas an increase in 
SayyidcAbd al-Rahman's influence would necessarily mean a diminution 
of tribal authority, the converse was also true* that enhancement and 
extension of tribal authority would tend to diminish Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman's influence. This was to be another of the factors that led 
to the government's adoption of theoretical Indirect Rule. In the first 
chapter it was noted that finances dictated recourse to this system; 
reaction to SayyidcAbd al-Rahman demanded it as well. At the 1920 Nor­
thern Governors' Meeting, C.P. Browne,  ^governor of Berber, put forward 
proposals that were to lead eventually to the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs 
Ordinance in 1922. He noted that "One of the principle reasons for these
recommendations is to counteract the present preponderating influence
2
of religious leaders in the Sudan". Nyala only increased the fear of
 ^Cecil Pownall Browne (1876-?) served in the Blue Nile Province, 1902- 
04, 1906-09, and in 1913, in Sennar, 1905-06; in the Upper Nile Pro­
vince, 1910-12; and in Berber, 1913-21, where he was governor from 
1914. He was governor of Kassala from 1922 until he retired in 1926. 
(MacMichael, SPS, p. 11.)
^ Browne to Northern Governors' Meeting, 1920, n.d., SGA, CIVSEC l/9/30.
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that influence and the pressure to respond to it. But another lesson 
that could also have been learned from the relationship of Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman and the tribes was that it was in those areas where central 
authority was weakest that "fanatical" influence was greatest. On the 
other hand, where direct rule had been strongest and tribal authority 
weakest, in the riverain provinces and towns, Mahdism tended to be 
quiescent. Also ignored was the question of how the strategy of prop­
ping up tribal authority to counter Mahdism would fare if tribal leaders 
themselves were to become followers of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman.
A related consequence of the Nyala rising was the new life it gave 
to the old Gordonesque imagery of the political service. In his pre­
liminary report to Allenby, Stack described the deaths of the two En­
glishmen at Nyala thus:
Captain Chown emptied his revolver, and then seized 
his rifle, which unfortunately jambed fsii/J. He was 
then surrounded and died fighting gallantly inside 
the Square. Mr. McNeill rallied the retreating troops 
and police and made a determined stand, but he was 
forced slowly backwards through the fort, and was killed 
150 yards to the North of it. He fell pierced by four 
spears....1
It took little imagination to picture that scene - the two Europeans 
and a handful of Egyptian and Sudanese police and troops facing thou­
sands of screaming tribesmen - it did, in fact, confirm the worst fears 
that had been harboured for two decades. Though the rising failed to 
destroy the government, its limited success was taken as a warning.
Mr. Martin Parr, who was stationed in western Xordofan at the time of 
the rising, said that he and his colleagues "had a pretty bad week,
1 Stack to Allenby, 30/11/21,. F.O. 371/63^0.
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wondering if the whole thing was going up in smoke.... It was the only 
time I was ever thoroughly alarmed in the Sudan, much more than 
in 1 9 2 V  1
The attitude consequently taken by the western governors and by
some members of the central government at Khartoum was therefore that
The fanatical rising of Abdullah-el~Siheini at Nyala ... 
cannot be regarded as independent of the spreading in­
fluence of Mahdism in the west. That- this fiki and his 
followers were Mahdists is a legitimate inference from 
his claim that he was Jesus, the Prophet of God, 2 
it is to be noted that the scene of the rising had been 
visited, within the year preceding its outbreak, by fikis, 
newly returned from Aba Island, though it would not be 
justifiable to infer a direct eastern instigation of the 
rebellion from those visits. 3
Government relations with Sayyid cAbd al-Rahmah after Nyala, 1921-23.
Whatever the relation of these visits to the troubles at Nyala 
and elsewhere, the effects of the agents (and of those who simply claimed 
to be agents) of SayyidcAbd al-Rahman in the west were great. After the 
Nyala rising the sayyid was asked to provide information about his 
agents. According to him, their duties consisted in:
 ^Interview with Mr. Martin Parr, 3/6/76.
2 —I have seen no direct evidence that cAbdallahi made such a claim.
Rather, as Willis pointed out and as the translation ofcAbdallahi*s 
letter shows (see above,jpage l49n.) he did, however, claim to be 
the "Khalifa of God". cAli cAbdullah Abu Sinn, in Mudhakhira , p. 45, 
says thatcAbdullahi claimed to be a "prophet sent by God"._It might 
be argued ,_however, along the lines suggested by SayyidcAli 
al-Mirghani, that a claim to prophethood made by a Mahdist was im­
plicitly an assumption of the role of NabicIsa.
3 Davies memorandum, 1926. In this memorandum, Davies used as an evi­
dential document "the Intelligence Department’s note of 1924". That 
note was, in fact, written by himself, in 1925» and was speculative.
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Notifying me about all important events - also about 
any state of things in the relations between the people 
and the Government which may reflect badly on the Mahdist 
believers. They represent me in all affairs I have with 
local Governors.... This is as far as the Government’s 
interests, in people who are related to me, are concerned.
As far as private affairs are concerned, they re- 
.present me in all interests I have with natives and are 
entrusted with anything which the natives wish to trans­
mit to me. They act, further, as commercial and agricul­
tural agents. The same may be said are the duties of the 
local agents. They transmit to the local authority and 
... to me, all that there is of interest - since the na­
tives in the districts are Arabs or nomads, who cannot 
read or write. 1
Clearly the agents were active. The governor of Kordofan wrote 
that whereas in 1916 "Mahdism was almost non-existent in Northern Dar­
fur", by 1922 it had "gained a firm footing". Whereas in 1918 only 
"four or five men" among the Humr tribe used the Ratib, by 1922 
"Mahdism had obtained an amazing hold on the Baggara tribes ... there
was a constant coming and going of Homr, Messeria and Rizeigat to and
2
from Aba Island and Qmdurman". In February 1922 Willis questioned
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman about these visits, and the sayyid replied that
there had been in the course of the last two years a 
considerable number of such; they had caused him consi­
derable expense as his guests and had never brought him 
in the value of 10 p.t. so that it was not to his profit 
that they should come. Besides that, they never made any 
enquiry on matters of faith and it was only indirectly 
that he could obtain information as to their object in 
coming. He found that there was considerable disaffection 
to Govt, amongst the Darfur tribes who looked upon the 
taking over of Darfur as an encroachment of the Christians, 
and he was of opinion that the visits had been useful in 
demonstrating to the natives that the best friend of the 
Mahdist sect was the Government.... In the matter of 
agents, he admitted that there were agents appointed by 
agents in places remote from Government posts and not 
easily accessible to his regular agents; but he main­
tained that they were only his eyes and ears, and enabled
 ^Davies memorandum, 1926, quoting letter from SayyidcAbd al-Rahman,
29/11/21.
2
Quoted in Davies note, 1925.
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him to know what was going on, and he felt confi- ^
dent that this was to the advantage of the Government.
This was the argument usually put forward by Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman 
to justify the presence in the west of his agents. If the government 
wanted his cooperation and that of his followers, surely it must con­
cede the necessity of his having contact with the people there. But the 
western officials argued that this very contact was what excited the 
populace against the government. Indeed, in a 1924 letter Stack wrote
'that "it is undoubted that Mahdist agents played their role in the ini-
2
tial propaganda" that resulted in the Nyala rising. But what "role"? 
The government officials opposed to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman found them­
selves in the position of a prosecuting attorney who is sure of the de­
fendants guilt, but has no evidence sufficient to obtain a conviction.
The alarming reports and pressure from the west culminated in 
1923. "The crop of incidents detrimental to tribal discipline became so 
heavy and so deeply resented by the Nazirs of the western tribes" that 
on 11 March 1923 SayyidcAbd al-Rahman was told that the use of agents
in Darfur, Kordofan, and among the Salim Baggara of the White Nile Pro-
3
vince must be discontinued. The situation in the west continued to 
worsen. In May Willis reported the findings of an investigation among 
certain western tribes, that the Baggara were "seething" with Mahdist 
propaganda and that "with few exceptions" were awaiting "the call to 
be first in the field". Propaganda emanated from at least three sources.
 ^Willis, "Review with Sayed Abdel Rahman on the 6th of February 
1922", 7/2/22, SGA, INTEL 9/1/7.
2 Stack to Allenby, 20/3/24, SGA, CIVSEC 36/4/10.
3
Davies note, 1923.
I6*f
The first was reportedly Ibrahim Tarjama wT, identified has having been 
an official of the KhalTfa cAbdullahi, who had a considerable reputation 
in Kordofan. He had been interned at Damietta from 1901 to 190?. He 
was removed from there to Haifa where, in Willis's words, "his digni­
fied appearance and impressive beard enabled him to lift the fortuitous 
florin from tourists". From that time he was not closely supervised be­
cause he was reported to be 85 years old in 1920, and therefore unlikely 
to cause trouble. ^
But in 1923 this man was reported to be "constantly touring" in 
the west. He taught that after the Mahdi must come the Dajjal, to be 
followed by the NabicIsa, He described the Dajjal in detail: "he wears 
a crescent in his hat and garters on his legs and puffs smoke like the 
smoke of hell, and the donkey of the Dajjal is black". In fact, Willis 
explained, "the Dajjal is the British officer". Further, Ibrahim taught 
that Sayyid cAbd al-Ralman was the NabicIsa and that the probable date 
for his manifestation was in July of the following year (192 )^.
Two other sources of propaganda were mentioned in Willis's letter, 
both simply fakis whose whereabouts were unknown. Willis wanted them 
rounded up, but was uncertain whether it was possible to bring criminal 
charges against them. In early May, Reid, who was then district commis­
sioner in Omdurman, reported rumours to the effect that Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman had been asked "when the 'sign' would be given" and had re­
plied that the "sign" would be given "when the hands of the Government 
were fully employed with other things and the breath of the Prophet Isa
 ^Willis to governor, Nuba Mts. Province, 1/5/23» SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
Ibid. Al-Tarjamawl was placed under surveillance in Omdurman in 1923 
and was allowed in the following year to move to El Obeid, where he 
died in 1929. (Hasan Ahmed Ibrahim, "The policy of the condominium 
government", p. 39n.)
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had descended on him”. Reid suggested that these rumours might have had 
a "Mirghanist or Khalifa Abdullahi source”.  ^But whatever the source, 
it is difficult to imagine any thoughtful member of the government cre­
diting Sayyid cAbd al-Rahmah with such stupidity. These rumours were only 
what had percolated down to Omdurman from the west, where the situation 
gave greater alarm every day. On 13 May Willis concluded that
without being unduly alarmist a situation has arisen in 
the western Sudan which requires careful and immediate 
consideration. From reports received the whole of the 
Baggara country from the Nuba Mountains Province west­
ward and throughout Darfur the natives are on the tip­
toes of expectation for the Second Coming. This they inter­
pret in their several ways, and being largely Mahdist, the 
form of rumour is that Sayed Abdel Rahman el Mahdi is Nebi 
Isa and is shortly to declare himself.,., the Governor,
Darfur, reports unwillingness ... to pay taxes on the 
eve of the new Government. ^
Willis felt it urgently necessary to empower local officials to
apprehend and send to their homes "strangers” who were spreading these
rumours. On 16 May a meeting of Stack, Willis, and MacMichael was held
to consider the situation, and it was decided that it was to be
explained to Sayed Abd el Rahman el Mahdi that the situ­
ation Chad] got beyond him and the Government must now 
set things right, and he must remain remote; and if he 
cannot do so, he will have to be put somewhere out of 
the way....
The C.S. will arrange to get legislation to enable 
undesirables who without strictly speaking breaking the 
law are a source of danger and mislead the people, to be 
removed to their original homes and kept under surveil­
lance or imprisoned if necessary. 3
It was decided to allow governors to act immediately "in flagrant ca­
ses”. The civil secretary was also to inform the governors of Darfur
1 Reid to Willis, 9/5/23. SGA, INTEL 9/2/26,
 ^Willis to civil secretary, 13/5/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
3
"Note of a meeting between H.E. the G.G., the D.I., and the 
A.C.S.”, 16/5/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
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and Kordofan that "Fekis are absolutely forbidden to collect Zeka".
Willis was to go to Abu Zabad to explain to the local shaykhs and cumdas 
that they must assist the government in stopping all the NabicIsa talk. ^ 
On the day after this meeting Stack wrote to Allenby to request 
authority under martial law, until the necessary legislation was pre- 
pared, to detain "rumour-mongers". On the 19th MacMichael told all 
governors that because in many cases "the provisions of the Penal Code 
are not technically applicable without an undue strain of interpreta­
tion", wider powers would soon be available. Until then, however, they 
were empowered to arrest and confine anyone whose "offence is one which 
would normally be punished under martial law and if the case is a fla-
3
grant one". Any "strangers" causing unease should be sent to their 
homes "by order but if necessary under escort". The governors were as­
sured that the governor-general would support them "if at any time they 
may have occasion to deal with cases of the sort described by emergency 
measures of an administrative nature."
In mid-May 1923 the "pilgrimage" to Aba Island assumed what to 
the government seemed to be alarming proportions. On the occasion of the 
Ramadan Bairam a crowd of people estimated by the government at between 
five thousand and fifteen thousand "charged with religious excitement" 
had gathered at Aba. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was called to Khartoum "to 
remove ... the objective of the pilgrims" and he was ordered to dis-
 ^"Note of a meeting between H.E. the G.G., the D.I., and the 
A.C.S.", 16/5/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
2 Stack to Allenby, 17/5/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
^ MacMichael to all governors, 19/5/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
Ibid.
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perse them, which he did. The government considered the particularly 
large assemblage so soon after the sayyid had been ordered to discon­
tinue the use of agents in the west as a purposeful demonstration by him 
of his power.  ^ At the time, the incident was treated with the greatest 
seriousness. Reid, however, writing later as governor of the White Nile 
Province, stated that the importance of the gathering had been exaggera­
ted, that the case had probably been "worked up" by anti-Mahdist ele­
ments, and that British witnesses had discerned neither a fanatical
— 2nor an anti-government tone in the Aba proceedings. This was what 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman himself argued at the time. Upon his recall to 
Khartoum he had a meeting with Willis. Willis told him that the gathering 
of large numbers of people, especially from the west, was "embarras­
sing", to which the sayyid replied that he had no idea the government 
wished to curtail visits to him. Willis argued that Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman*s actions were misinterpreted by his ignorant followers, who
spread rumours that he was the NabicIsa. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman responded
3
that whenever he heard such a rumour he repudiated it. Willis said 
that the rumours had been increasing and had now to be stopped, and 
SayyidcAbd al-Rahman agreed, saying that Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi was be­
hind the rumours and that Sayyid cAli al-Mirghani as well was "stirring 
up trouble against him". If anyone asked him, he said he was Wad 
al-Mahdi, and "his hope was that his position could be defined, simply
 ^Davies memorandum, 1926.
 ^Reid, "Note on Mahdism".
 ^Even Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi had attested to this. In an interview_with 
Willis he had recounted that someone had called the sayyid NabicIsa 
at public prayers on Aba and Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman had imprisoned the 
man. (Note by Willis, 21/5/23, SGA, INTEL, 9/2/26.)
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as a religious notable, the head of a known sect widely distributed in 
the Sudan". Towards the end of the interview SayyidcAbd al-Rahman men­
tioned the presentation of his father’s sword to the king as "proof of 
his special position of confidence". In concluding his minutes of the 
meeting, Willis noted that "Abdel Rahman said he can guarantee all 
Mahdists who know his name - but not those who don't. That, I said, was 
just the point and the latter outnumber the former, and the Government 
had to control them." ^
Willis conveyed to the private secretary his thoughts on this in­
terview. He had concluded that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman contemplated a 
Mahdist Sudan developing under British rule. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, Willis
felt, meant well and any impression that the government impugned his
2
"personal loyalty" should be avoided at all costs.
At a susequent, "very strenuous interview" with Sayyid eAbd 
al-Rahman, Willis forced him to admit that he had been in the wrong 
(presumably in the matter of the Aba congregation) and then, Willis 
wrote, the sayyid "broke down completely and wept like a naughty childs 
and a broken and contrite heart I was not prepared to despise". But 
SayyidcAbd al-Rahman recovered sufficiently to argue again that his 
troubles were the work of his competitors who, now that he was down and
 ^Report dated 27/5/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26. SayyidcAli insisted that 
all the "loose talk" was caused by "Mahdist influence". After all, 
he said, only a Mahdist could logically expect the coming of the 
NabTcIsa. J^ Note by Willis on a conversation with SayyidcAli 
al-Mirghani, 1/6/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.)
^ Willis to private secretary, 28/5/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
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in disfavour, would "jump on him in their hob-nailed boots".  ^This epi­
sode may well reflect the lingering lesson of Shukkaba and the sayyid's 
realisation that he may have tried to push the government too far.
Thus the next day the sayyid wrote to Willis protesting his loyalty
and at the same time reiterating that his enemies were responsible for 
—  —  —  2all the Nabi cIsa talk. Willis seems to have been sufficiently impres­
sed by this to write to the governor of Xordofan two days later that it 
appeared "that a good deal of the rumours that Sayed Abdel Rahman El
Mahdi is the Nebi Isa is being disseminated by envoys of Sayed Ali and
3
Sherif Yusef El Hindi". As part of his campaign to convince the go­
vernment of his good intentions (and probably urged by Willis) Sayyid 
fAbd al-Rahman thereupon announced his intention of performing the fra.j.j 
to Mecca in July. Willis, writing to the British consul at Jedda to 
ascertain whether automobile transport would be available for the sayyid,
f
stated that Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman had proposed the pilgrimage "in ofder
Willis to Stack, 16/6/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26. On the same day, some­
one identified only as "sayed A.R.'s correspondent (Ibrahim) in 
Obeid" wrote to the intelligence department that an agent of Sayyid 
cAli was touring in Kordofan and "telling people that A.R. is the 
Nebi Isa.* He covers his face and leaves his eyes only to be seen - 
so as not to be known (and to_impress people)". Furthermore, a dis­
ciple of Sharif Yusuf al-Hindi was reported to be in El Obeid and to 
be swearing some colleagues to go out and pretend they came from 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahmah to tell the people he was the NabTcIsa.
(Note entitled "Sayed A.R.*s correspondent (Ibrahim) in Obeid writes 
to me", 16/6/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.)
2 Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman to Willis, 17/6/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
^ Willis to governor, Kordofan, 19/6/23, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
^ Willis to governor, Red Sea Province, 22/6/23, SGA, INTEL 2/38/321.
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counteract rumours amongst Mahdists that pilgrimage to Aba Island ...
is more efficacious than Mecca”. ^
The dispersal of the crowds from Aba in 1923 succeeded neither in
ending the "pilgrimage” nor in returning the thousands to their homes.
In fact, very few seemed to return to their provinces; most had settled
2
in various agricultural colonies in the Gezira, where their labour
3
was required for the Gezira Scheme. ^ After the dispersal in May 1923, 
various provincial governors were instructed that this pilgrimage was 
to be prohibited, and pressure should be exerted to prevent its being 
made. This pressure might take the form of confinement or being put on 
gurantee, or having one’s animals seized as a pledge. Governors were 
told to limit Fellata pilgrims to the main routes, and to turn back 
emigrants from Darfur. But regarding the Masalit, for example, it was 
reported two years later that none who had joined Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman 
at Aba had yet returned to Dar Masalit, and that tribesmen were still
K
leaving for the east. ^ The governor of Darfur reported in 1925 that
1 Telegram, Willis to consul, Jedda, V7/23, SGA, INTEL 2/38/321.
Later in July the trip was abruptly cancelled. (Willis to consul, 
Jedda, 17/7/23, SGA, INTEL 2/38/321.) Sir Shuldham Redfern, who was 
stationed in Darfur in 1922-23, recalls inspection tours on which he 
would meet a "string of pilgrims” who were told by Mahdist agents 
"’don't go to Mecca, go to Aba Island and do your pilgrimage to Sayyid 
cAbd al-Rahman'”. (interview with Sir Shuldham Redfern, 8/10/76.)
^ Davies to governor, Darfur, 21/8/25, SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
3
See Isam Ahmad Hassoun, "'Western' migration and settlement in the 
Gezira", SNR, XXXIII, 1952, p. 67; and Warburg, The Sudan under 
Wingate, p. 98.
Davies memorandum, 1926.
 ^Davies to governor, Darfur, 21/8/25., SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
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prohibition of the pilgrimage to Aba had obviously failed and that
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's influence continued to spread, even to tribes
previously without interest in him. 1 A report from Obeid in early 1926
spoke of Mahdism "spreading among the Arabs to a shocking extent....
They go to Abba Island on pilgrimage. They believe that anyone who is
not Ansari is an infidel.... The Mirghania and Ismailiyya Tarikas in
2
El Obeid are practically 'nil'". These were just two reports of many 
which were to indicate the futility of half-hearted government restric­
tions or, worse, of restrictions the enforcement of which the govern­
ment was incapable.
In attempting to turn back immigrants from the west and control 
the flow of Fellata pilgrims, the government embarked on an inevitably 
vain course. It is, in fact, difficult to believe that provincial au­
thorities could have expected such a policy to be effective. The pil­
grimage from West Africa was well established, as we have seen, and had 
increased in the first two decades of this century because of the im­
position of colonial rule in West Africa and the effects of Mahdist pro-
3
paganda and rumours. After the battle of Burmi in 1903* which marked
the end of Fulani resistance to the British in Nigeria, twenty-five
thousand Fellata were allowed to settle on the Blue Nile, where "they
were welcomed by the Sudan government on account of their thrift and 
4industry". Indeed, the government had long encouraged the fraj.j because
Acting governor, Darfur to director of intelligence, 8/10/25,
SGA, INTEL 9/2/26.
2 "Report from EL Obeid", 22/3/26, SGA, IHTEL 9/2/26.
‘Umar al Naqar, "The historical background of 'The Sudan Road'",
in Sudan in Africa, pp. 104-105.
4 Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 104.
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of the acute shortage of labour in the Sudan. This was partly allevi­
ated by the settlement, temporary or permanent, of Fellata pilgrims 
going to or coming from Mecca.  ^Wingate once reported a saying of the
townspeople to the effect that "*Allah took away our slaves, but sent
2
us the Fellata.,M Major communities of Fellata had grown up. To stop 
the flow of pilgrims was impossible.
In the last months of 1923 Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman was suffering 
his worst setback since the "drift” had begun during the war. This was 
because, simply, the "bargain" of collaboration had become too one­
sided: his position and influence had been growing tremendously, but he 
had failed, at least in the eyes of some, to restrain his followers. 
Nyala had resulted. His agents had disrupted the west, incurred the 
wrath of the governors, and been ordered out. In short, he had, it was 
felt, the influence and prestige accruing from his large following in 
the west, but had not the responsibility for their actions. Thus, 
while a situation like Nyala would increase his power, the only apparent 
way to prevent another such situation was to allow him direct access 
to the western tribes, which would, again, inevitably increase his in­
fluence. The result of this, Davies warned in 1925» was bound to be an 
"imperium in imperio", which would itself be only a step toward esta­
blishment of SayyidcAbd al-Rahman as undisputed ruler of the Sudan,
3
an end which the sayyid "no doubt" foresaw.
But at the same time as the government was administering one of 
its periodic "checks" to SayyidcAbd al-Rahman, it was also being con-
 ^Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 98. See also Appendix I.
2
Quoted in Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 181.
3
Davies note, 1925.
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fronted, with the rising tide of what it saw as an embryonic modern na­
tionalist movement. This movement may have been deprecated publicly, 
sneered at in official reports and minimized in retrospect, but in late 
1923 and in 192^ its character, membership and potential were unsure, 
and therefore the danger it posed was ungauged. If, as had happened in 
Egypt, nationalist propaganda could be used to stir up the latent hos­
tility of the mass of the population, especially in the west, with what 
could the government combat it? Worse, if this new, secular opposition 
exploited rumours of the NabicIsa and the like simply to cause unrest 
and to publicise opposition to the government, could the government 
stop such propaganda? And, worst of all possibilities, if an educated 
elite of purposeful nationalists could ally itself with the traditional 
authority of the tribes or with the Ansar, could the government with­
stand such a concerted opposition? The answers to these questions had 
to be viewed in the context of Anglo-Egyptian relations and the conse­
quent importance of maintaining, at least publicly, Sudanese support 
for the government and thus for the British position. Thus it was that 
just as it seemed drastic action might be taken, or attempted, against 
him, Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman was again called upon to assist the govern­
ment by influencing his followers and stimulating their protestations 
of loyalty. Within three years of the ’'check" of 1923> SayyidcAbd 
al-Rahman was to be a Knight of the British Empire and had been re­
sponsible, albeit indirectly, for the resignation of a governor- 
general.  ^(See above, page 3^.)
 ^In his memoirs, Symes noted SayyidcAbd al-Rahman’s rise: "I had 
known him anxiously scrounging round the government offices for the 
wherewithal to support his numerous dependents: now [193^3 he was a 
K.B.E. and a considerable cotton magnate." (Symes, Tour of duty, p.221.)
17^
Before considering this new threat to the government, it should 
be noted that the events of 1922-23, despite the useful services of 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman in the crisis to come, were to cause the downfall 
of Willis at the intelligence department. The shock of Nyala, of which 
there had been no warning, and subsequent unrest in the west, the Aba 
pilgrimage, the apparent disregard by Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman of government 
wishes, all served to convince the government of the bankruptcy of 
Willis*s lenient and vague policy toward the sayyid, and, perhaps more 
importantly, of the uselessness of the intelligence department's work. 
Indeed, the services of Sayyid eAbd al-Rahman in 192^ were themselves, 
at least in retrospect, to be a cause for criticism, in the same way 
in which the sayyid's rationale for having agents in the west was cri­
ticized: his "services" only served to increase his prestige, and his 
prestige, it was felt, was the greatest danger the government faced.
The events of 1923» culminating in the banning of agents from the west 
and the break-up of the Aba congregation, indicated the predicament 
not only of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman, but of Willis as well. The official 
position, although still ambivalent, seemed.to be that the sayyid was 
accepted as a religious leader of importance, respected by the govern­
ment, but that any "political" activities, or religious or other acti­
vities that might take on a "political" colour, must be avoided and, 
if necessary, would be forcibly halted.
Was this distinction of religious and political functions valid?
It is easy to observe that most officials of the Sudan Government 
thought that it was not. This is understandable, as the received view 
of Mahdism made no provision for such a distinction, indeed contra­
dicted it. Thus, Mahdism was inherently political, incompatible with 
any government, and could not be reconciled. To this view, as we have 
seen, Willis took early exception.
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Willis had come to see in "Mahdism" first a semantic problem* 
a single word was used to describe, if not two entirely different move­
ments, two very different facets of one. There was, on the one hand, 
the Mahdism of the west which was, admittedly, closely akin to that of 
the 1880s, radical, unconsolable, complex in its motivations and uncom­
promising in its dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs. The 
expression of this dissatisfaction was turning to belief in the Nabl 
cIsa, a belief, in its motives, no different from that of so many of the 
futile uprisings that punctuated the first two decades of the Condomi­
nium. Newly and imperfectly island zed, roused by the wildest rumours, 
susceptible even to the least artful charlatans, but instinctively op­
posed to the changes imposed on them by a remote and foreign govern­
ment, these tribesmen made up the great numerical bulk of Sayyid cAbd 
al-Rahman*s followers.
On the other hand, in the east, among the sedentary, more so­
phisticated population, Mahdism had assumed the character of a t&riqa. 
Its followers were quiet, more interested in the conduct of their day- 
to-day existence than in the approaching millenium. To them Sayyid *7Vbd 
al-Rahman was Wad al-Mahdi, the possessor of his father's baraka, a 
holy and revered figure. But his importance lay chiefly in his pres­
tige, his obvious influence with the government, and in his wealth and 
generosity. It should not be forgotten that we are considering his rise 
from what has been called a life of "disagreeable penury" before the 
war,  ^to the status of first citizen after the war, a spectacular rise 
in any society, and to the people of the Sudan a phenomenal one con-
Holt, "Holy families", p. 132.
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sidering the obstacles the sayyid originally confronted. Thus, in the 
eastern areas, among a sedentary, often urban population, the revolu­
tionary element of Mahdism had been successfully routinized by the 
Mahdi's son. Loyalty and devotion remained, but expectation of the mil- 
lenium was dormant.
Willis recognised this distinction of the two "branches" of 
Mahdism. Clearly SayyidcAbd al-Rahman recognised it as well. While he 
no doubt saw himself in the position he occupied in the minds of the 
eastern "neo-Mahdists", he depended, however, on the unsophisticated 
westerners for mass support and, more importantly, for provision of the 
ready threat to security that gave him his influence with the government.
To many in the government that influence was not only dangerous,
but an affront. By what right did he have it? Had not the government
come to the Sudan to rid it of the movement Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman now
led? To many (most prominently Davies) Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman had no claim
to political or religious legitimacy, but was an impostor cynically
manipulating the superstitious for his own very worldly ends. Thus,
even after SayyidcAbd al-Rahman's role in the 1924 troubles, Davies
considered the Willis line a failure for two familiar but fatal reasons?
It is founded on a distinction between the religious 
and political aspects of Mahdism which has no histori­
cal justification and is not, in fact, recognised by 
the rank and file of the cult.
In practice it has not succeeded in preventing 
a spread of Mahdism in the West, of a kind and on a 
scale to cause anxiety as to its effect on the whole 
fabric of tribal discipline....!
This view of Mahdism, whatever its recommendations, is especially im­
portant because of its effects. First, it dominated government policy 
toward the Mahdists in the decade following the death of Stack, until
^ Davies note, 1925.
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its essential errors were recognised. But even then the thinking re­
flected in Davies's point of view lingered on. Indeed, when asked what 
he thought had been the danger posed by SayyidcAbd al-Rahman, an ex­
official said, in 1976, "Well, what were the dangers of the original 
Mahdi?...If he [Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman3 had called a holy war in the early 
'30s he'd have had a tremendous response. He was wise enough not to."  ^
That, of course, was just the point, and a point which tacitly admit­
ted both the role the sayyid saw for himself and the efficacy of 
Willis's analysis of Mahdism in the 1920s.
A second, and more important result of the ascendancy of the 
Davies point of view, was that it was a major impetus of Indirect Rule. 
Davies's citing of Mahdism*s effect on "the whole fabric of tribal dis­
cipline" was *a clever play on the fears roused by the Nyala and 1924 
disturbances. To be sure, the importance of tribal discipline in the 
minds of British officials increased in proportion to the influence of 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman: The first two decades of the Condominium had seen 
little concern for it. Indeed, its survival at all was the result not 
of careful cultivation but of a lack of funds and staff.
Before discussing the subject of Indirect Rule, its third basic 
cause should be explained: the rise of secular opposition to the Condo­
minium government. It will then be possible to investigate the inter­
action of that opposition with the traditional authority of religious 
leaders, the competition of the two sides, and the policies the govern­
ment adopted to deal with them.
^"Interview with Mr. Martin Parr, 3/6/76.
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Part Two: The Emergence Of Secular Opposition 
Introductory
There is to my mind no doubt that we are face to face 
with the early beginnings of a Sudanese nation and it 
is our business to decide what we are to do with it.
—  Wingate to Curzon, 26/3/19. 1
Just as the Sudan Government's attitude toward Mahdism during the 
early years of the century was the product of the Wingate-Slatin line, 
so to6 was its attitude toward Egypt.While the Condominium Agreement in 
theory called for joint Anglo-Egyptian control of the Sudan, in practice 
Wingate and his government had no intention of allowing more than the 
necessary Egyptian involvement. That involvement, in fact, was to be li­
mited as much as possible to financial subsidies. As has been noted above, 
Cromer never countenanced this view, a fact that curtailed but did not 
prevent Wingate's steady lessening of what he and others called Egyp­
tian "interference". We have seen how, in 1919» the Sanbu rising at 
Kassala was blamed on the presence of Egyptian troops, and how the 
Nyala rising and unrest in the western Sudan was implausibly ascribed 
to Egyptian nationalist propaganda. These were only symptoms of a more 
general problems the danger, at first apparent and later very real, 
of Egyptian nationalist influence in the Sudan and second, the tendency, 
at first restrained but after 1919 quite rampant, of the Sudan Govern­
ment to blame all of its problems on that influence. The former was, 
in part, to lead to the troubles of 1924-; the latter was to lead to a 
lack of anticipation and undersatnding of those troubles when they oc­
1 F.O. 371/3711.
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curred. As an early example of this may be cited the mutiny of the
Egyptian Army in 1900:
All the accounts of the mutiny indicated that its 
major cause was to be found in Kitchener's mal­
treatment of the Egyptian army. Wingate, however, 
was convinced the centre of trouble lay in Cairo 
and was supported by the Khedive. 1
Whether or not Wingate did believe this is less important than the 
results. No attempt was ever made to effect a practical application of 
condominium: Egyptians were employed in large numbers in minor admini­
strative posts; they were employed only because British staff was un­
available or too expensive, and Sudanese replacements took time to 
train. In the Stack years this policy was reemphasised and the govern­
ment accelerated the process of replacing Egyptians with Sudanese.
It is worth noting that, despite all the myriad claims made by 
the British from 1919 onward as to the differences between Egypt and the 
Sudan - the animosity of the Sudanese towards the Egyptians, the dif­
ferent stages of their development, indeed, the very natures of the 
peoples - Wingate and his colleagues clearly always recognised the na­
tural circumstances that drew the two countries together. First and fore­
most of these was what had brought the British to the Sudan in the first 
place: the Nile, the key to Egypt.Then too, the community of religion 
and language and, therefore, of culture, were homogenising, not separa­
ting agents. A political relationship in the 19th century of ruler and 
ruled became in the twentieth century one of equal sufferers under a 
foreign yoke. To be sure, it should not, on the other hand, be consi­
dered that the people of the Sudan longed for a return to the days of 
the Turco-Egyptian regime. What should be remembered, however, is the 
strength and significance of the ties that bound the two countries.
Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 21.
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Sudanese nationalism is a late-comer to the stage we are viewing - 
how it would develop and to whose benefit were very much open questions. 
That the latter question was asked at all indicates the position the 
Sudan occupied in Anglo-Egyptian relations. But it was only natural that 
Egyptian nationalists should look to young western-educated Sudanese as 
potential allies; only natural that discontented Sudanese should look 
toward Egyptian nationalism as an example; and only natural, given the 
information at their disposal, the exigencies of the diplomatic situa­
tion and the legacy of the Wingate era that the British should blame 
Egyptian nationalist "interference" for the rise of a secular, anti- 
British sentiment in the Sudan. Just as Wingate's propaganda line stres­
sed the iniquities of the Khalifa's rule in order to justify the British 
intervention, so too it stressed the corruption and oppression of the 
old Turco-Egyptian rule, an attitude which not only corroborated the 
British justification for occupying Egypt but which also served as the 
standard apology for the necessity of Britain's dominant position in 
the Sudan.
It is important to remember, when discussing the politics of the 
period 1919-1924, that whatever role Egyptian influence played in the 
emergence of a new secular opposition, the British officials believed 
that influence to be paramount. Thus the Sudanese involved came to be 
considered either as dupes of the Egyptians or as merely motivated by 
personal considerations.
The events in Egypt in late 1918 and early 1919 elicited various 
responses in the Sudan. Reports indicate that concern centred almost 
entirely on the attitude of the Egyptian units of the army. In March 
1919 Clayton, the Sudan agent in Cairo, reported to the foreign office 
that the "Black and Arab troops" in the Sudan were "not affected" and 
could therefore be relied on. Further, the senior Egyptian officers
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seemed to "deplore” the disturbances in Egypt "as militating against 
any future measure of self-Govemment". The junior officers, however, 
were reported to be excited and "ready to create a situation embarras­
sing to Government if they dared to." ^
The religious leaders had early sought to associate themselves 
with the government against the claims of Egyptian nationalists. In a 
very important memorandum, significantly entitled "Note on the growth 
of national aspirations in the Sudan", Stack had written in February 
1919 that the three sayyids had expressed their wish that the govern­
ment take firmer action to emphasise "the fact that the Sudan is under 
the British Empire and that its future is identified with British con­
trol". They asked to be allowed "to institute among their followers a 
kind of propaganda ... with the ultimate object of cultivating a spirit 
of national unity among the Sudanese". Stack wrote that "the natural 
accompaniment" of the sayyids* aims was the elimination of the "Egyp­
tian element" from the administration. The governor-general believed 
the sayyids to be sincerely desirous of contributing something "from 
the side of the governed", but he counselled against allowing the 
"propaganda" they suggested. Not only did administrative concerns 
(staffing and finance) argue caution in de-Egyptianizing the adminis­
tration, but also, Stack beleived, "if the sense of nationality is to 
grow, it will do so naturally", and in any case it had always been the 
policy of the Sudan Government "to gradually associate the Sudanese 
with the Government, and to train them to govern themselves". As proof 
of this he instanced the establishment of the Gordon College and the 
institution of the Military School, and also noted that it was pro-
Clayton to foreign office, F.O. 371/371^.
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posed to utilise "sheikhs and Chiefs of Tribes as an element in the ci- 
val and criminal judiciary". ^
This was an important memorandum. First, it can be seen how early
2
the three sayyids rushed to support the government. Secondly, the 
memorandum indicated that the British saw "a spirit of national unity" 
among the Sudanese as potentially of great value, not necessarily for 
the Egyptians but quite possibly against them. Thirdly, it stated, al­
beit in a surprisingly off-hand way and at a surprisingly early date, 
that the Sudan Government had "always" worked toward training the 
Sudanese to govern themselves, and indicated the dual way in which this 
was to be carried outs through the assumption by educated Sudanese of 
positions in the bureaucracy and by the devolution of powers to tribal 
leaders. It need hardly be noted that the Sudan Government had not in 
fact previously entertained the notion that it was training the Suda­
nese to govern themselves. It had, to be sure, been following the
guideline established in 1900 to create a "small native administrative
3class who will ultimately fill many minor posts”. This and other 
policies had not been seen as preparatory for self-government, but 
merely as tending toward inexpensive administration.
^ Stack to Wingate, 23/2/19, enclosed in Wingate to Curzon, 26/3/19, 
F.O. 371/3711.
2
Indeed, a note prepared by Willis in December 1918 indicated that 
"some of the more enlightened natives" had intended circulating an 
appeal requesting the government to remove the Egyptians from the 
country. The appeal had not been sent around, however, because there 
was a fear that "the desired result might not be attained" and that 
the Egyptians might exact revenge. (Willis, "Note”, n.d., enclosed 
in Stack to Wingate, 22/l2/l8, F.O. 371/3711.) It was in this letter 
to Wingate that Stack raised the point of his "confirmation or other­
wise" as governor-general as a way of allaying the fears of the Su­
danese. See above, page 50.
^ Annual Report for 1900, 1901, Cd. 44l.
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The main concern of the government was that the crisis in Egypt 
might drag on over a long period, thus increasing uncertainty as to the 
future status of the Sudan. It was hardly to be expected that a violent 
clash of the co-domini could have no repercussions in the Sudan. Ru­
mours were rife that Britain would soon have to leave Egypt and would 
then and therefore have to abandon the Sudan.
In mid-March 1919 Willis reported that "volunteers on behalf of 
the Zaghloul Party", Mahmud Pasha al-Dib andcIsawi Bey Zayid, had ar­
rived in the Sudan to reassure their sympathisers? to learn "the real - 
attitude of the Sudan in view of their agitation in Egypt"; and to meet 
secretly with some "notables" to "explain to them the value of the as­
sistance they [the notables, could] render by themselves supporting 
the Egyptians to turn out the British from Egypt and the Sudan". Willis 
claimed that these two emissaries had interviewed the grand qadT and 
several other important people.  ^Apparently, again according to Willis, 
the results of their enquiries were disappointing. They were, in fact, 
advised not to speak to any Sudanese (as opposed to Egyptian) digni­
taries, because "’the religious leaders [were] traitors to their reli­
gion who [had] sold their conscience during the war for British money
- and other Sudanese are animals who know nothing except their women 
2
and food.*" The two Egyptians were told that the "hope of Islam" lay 
in "the new generation who are being educated in Government schools" 
and in the new merchant class which "had the making of a violent na­
tionalist party". As evidence on which to base this prediction it was
1 "Report received from assistant director of intelligence Khartoum", 
W3/19, F.O. 371/3716.
2 Ibid. The words are Willis’s.
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explained to the Egyptians that Sudanese employees of the government
Stack took a more pessimistic view. He feared that if the situ­
ation in Egypt continued serious, it would combine with "the high price 
of dura""and shortages of commodities, especially sugar, and lead to 
"outbursts of violence in shape of looting by lower orders". He there­
fore recommended the despatch of a British battalion to reinforce the
2
British garrison. Wingate agreed with Stack's analysis of the dan­
ger, and saw the situation as both a justification of his own fears 
of Egyptian influence and as an opportunity to end that influence once 
and for all. "We have got to recognise", he wrote, "that decent Govern­
ment is producing what it ought to produce - a sense of national self- 
respect - and it is our duty to decide how to turn it to the best ac­
count". But what form was that "sense of national self-respect" assu­
ming? Wingate believed it was "inevitable" that "it should display 
itself primarily in a desire to have done with Egyptian control".
To accomodate this desire, Wingate suggested that the British should
take "steps in the direction of identifying the Sudan more closely
3
with Great Britain than with Egypt".
It should be recalled that Wingate's career had by this time 
been destroyed by the Egyptian crisis, perhaps introducing a new impe­
tus into his campaign to eliminate Egyptian influence in the Sudan.
As if to claim credit for a prophetic understanding of that influence,
were treated badly enough "to breed this spirit". 1
1 issistant director of intelligence Khartoum",
14/3/19. F.O. 371/3716. 
2 Telegram, Stack to Cheetham, n.d., enclosed in Cheetham to foreign 
office, 23/3/19, F.O. 371/3714.
3 Wingate to Curzon, 26/3/19, F.O. 371/3711.
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Wingate wrote to Curzon in April that after the Anglo-Egyptian con­
quest of the country
It was ... soon apparent that the racial antagonism 
between the Sudanese and the Egyptians (generally 
called 'Turks' by the local inhabitants) was far too 
deep-seated to be easily eradicated and it became 
clear that the gradual introduction of a policy of 
the 'Sudan for the Sudanese' 1 was that best suited 
to the condition of the country. This policy was fa­
cilitated by the growth of the Gor*don College and the 
Military School in Khartoum in which institutions 
Sudanese and Arabs were trained for subordinate posi­
tions in the Government and as officers in the Army.
Almost imperceptibly the personnel of the Army was 
changed - Sudanese and Arabs gradually taking the 
place of the purely Egyptian elements. The trans­
formation requires very delicate handling, in order 
to avoid raising fears amongst the Egyptians. 2
Why, indeed whether, Wingate had considered that Sudanese national 
consciousness should inevitably focus on the less powerful of the co- 
domini is an open question. He may well have been indulging his habit of 
telling London what they wanted to hear, or what he wanted them to be­
lieve, or was simply paraphrasing Stack's note. In any case, the next 
day in yet another letter to Curzon, Wingate dared to "go so far as to 
"suggest that ... His Majesty's Government may find the present a sui­
table moment to definitely take over the Sudan, thus eliminating the in­
tensely unpopular Egyptian element" and punishing the Egyptian nationa-
3
lists for their campaign of "lawlessness, pillage and murder."
In May Stack told Allenby (who had by then replaced Wingate) 
that the Egyptian crisis had, if anything, strengthened Sudanese dis-
This is, as far as I am aware, the earliest reference to the phrase. 
Cf. Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's memoirs, wherein it is stated that the 
pretensions of the White Flag League in 1924 caused the sayyid to 
coin the slogan "Sudan for the Sudanese" himself. (Jihad fi sabil 
al-istiqlal. p. 24.)
2Wingate to Curzon, 2/4/19, F.O. 371/3711.
 ^Wingate to Curzon, 3/4/l9» F.O. 371/3711.
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like of Egypt, but that a general feeling was abroad that "a big change
in politics" impended, which would end in Britain's abandoning the Sudan.
Alarm at this prospect, Stack said, had caused the religious leaders
to come forward with the idea of "the Sudanese developing as a nation
by themselves and not as a mere appanage to Egypt. This was said not in
a spirit of hostility to British rule, but by way of suggesting that
they know their interests to be bound up with the British."  ^Such
then, it appears, was the birth of the "Sudan for the Sudanese" idea, a
product as much of Wingate's concern about Egyptian influence as of the
desire of the three sayyids to consolidate their own influence.
Such protestations as Stack's and Wingate's to London produced
the desired effect. A.T. Loyd, who was later to be secretary to the Milner
mission, suggested in a minute to a Stack report on the future status
of the Sudan that it was "very desirable" to "reassure" the Sudanese
as soon as possible: "All the evidence that we have had from Sir R.
Wingate and others shows that the Sudanese are only afraid of one thing
and that is that we shall leave them to the hated Egyptians." More
dangerous than the fear of British abandonment was the fact, according
to Willis, that there was at least by May much
propaganda of a kind we cannot stop. Conversational 
stuff, stories of atrocities by British soldiers - 
criticisms of British methods and imputations against 
our good name.... As the junior administrative of­
ficials are all Egyptians and they deal direct with 
the native, the opportunities are endless. 3
 ^Stack to Allenby, n.d., enclosed in Allenby to Curzon, ^/5/l9,
371/3717.
£
A.T. Loyd, minute, Allenby to foreign office, 8/5/19, transmitting 
a telegram from Stack, n.d.
^ Willis to "0", 7/5/19, SAD 209/ll. "0" was Willis's sister Olive.
It is interesting to note the change in official government pronounce­
ments of this period. After reporting for years that the Egyptian of­
ficial was harsh, dictatorial, usually corrupt and almost universally
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In the Sudan Intelligence Report for May Willis noted the type of 
occurrence that was causing concern."A few drunken Egyptians" created a 
disturbance at Port Sudan by yelling Egyptian nationalist slogans; a wire 
declaring that complete independence had been granted to Egypt caused 
trouble at Atbara; a retired Egyptian officer delivered a "seditious 
speech" in Omdurman mosque, calling on the Sudanese to join the Egyp­
tians in ejecting the British.  ^Subscriptions to the "Afflicted in the
-  -  2Egyptian National Revolution" were solicited by the grand qadi in his 
own name and the names of the senior Egyptian officials in the three 
towns. Apparently few Sudanese subscribed, following the advice of 
"their religious leaders". Junior officials were reported to meet in
3
order to "conspire in a somewhat theatrical but ineffective manner."
While such activities as these were in themselves disconcerting, they 
did not escalate to the scale of widespread anti-government action. Of 
more concern, of course, was the effect such activities, and the authors 
of such activities, were having on the Sudanese.
The Sudan Intelligence Report for June 1919» after reporting the 
plan for the Sudanese notables* delegation to London (the motive of
disliked, suddenly he was presented after 1919 as having the ear of 
the local population. Indeed, MacMichael, writing in the 1930s, sug­
gested that the official's influence was derived from his corrup­
tion: "The somewhat venal methods of the Egyptian official ... con­
sorted with their [the SudaneseJ own inclinations". (MacMichael, 
"Memorandum. The attitude of the Sudanese towards Egypt, 1905-1932", 
10/9/32, SAD '+03/7.)
 ^The ex-officer, Muhammad Amin Hudib, was arrested, tried and sen­
tenced to three years in jail. (SIR, May 1919» F.O. 37l/372^.)
2 — — —- —Shaykh Muljammad Mu§^afa al-Maraghi retired as grand qaflT in 1919.
See above, page ll8n.
3 SIR, May 1919.
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which may be better appreciated in this context),^ " noted that "a few 
agitators"(of unspecified nationality) had "endeavoured to spread the 
story that the notables [had] been induced to go to England to sell their 
country". The same report noted that "propaganda" was producing "an un­
desirable effect ... on a small proportion of junior officials and stu­
dents". Willis minimized this effect, however, in noting that " a word 
of warning" had sufficed "to check occasional undesirable talk", and 
in any case the majority of the population were "too much occupied in 
the prospect of rains ... to evince any interest in politics." Such 
"undesirable talk" continued throughout the summer, becoming more and 
more worrying. But in communicating the situation to Cairo and London 
the Sudan Government faced a dilemmas it wished, on the one hand, to 
minimize the effect of the "propaganda" because it was important to 
show how solidly the Sudanese supported the British; but on the other 
hand it wished to exaggerate that effect in order to convict the Egyp­
tians and hasten their departure from the Sudan. Certainly the Intelli­
gence Reports indicate, at least on the part of Willis, their author,
In November 1919 the British foreign secretary, Curzon, told the 
House of Lords of the "encouraging picture that is presented by the 
Soudan. Under the able rule of the Governor-General, Sir Lee Stack, 
the inhabitants of that country have continued to maintain perfect or­
der and have given notable evidence of their affection towards Great 
Britain by the visit to this country in July of a deputation of no­
tables who were received by His Majesty the King. Both to His Majesty 
and subsequently to myself they expressed their warm appreciation of 
the work accomplished by Great Britain for the regeneration of their 
country and their dissociation from the events which have happened 
in Egypt. Their one desire is to remain in the Empire and not to be 
dissevered from it. This gratifying testimony of loyalty is largely, 
if not entirely, due to the admirable work accomplished by the late 
Governor-General, Sir Reginald Wingate...." (PD, HL, vol. XXXVII,
25/11/19, 3^ 7-3*+8.)
2 SIR, June 1919, F.O. 371/372^.
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an ambivalence which is evidenced by alternate references to the disdain 
of the Sudanese for Egypt and cryptic references to the "subtle poi­
son"  ^the Egyptians were introducing into the consciousness of the 
naive Sudanese.
In August Stack wrote to Wingate suggesting that if the ’-Egyptian 
Government" continued to encourage attacks on the "British Administra­
tion" in the Sudan, then the only course would be to declare a .British 
protectorate over the Sudan. He rejected the idea of outright annexa­
tion because he feared that that might "'switch'" the "Sudan for the
2
Sudanese" party to the side of the Egyptians. Thus it was believed 
that the Sudanese "nationalism" which was emerging (or was expected to 
emerge) must be allied to either British or Egyptian interests. Indeed, 
the Sudan Intelligence Report for November recorded the discovery of a 
violently anti-British pamphlet, in Arabic, entitled "A Call to the Na­
tives of the Sudan", which demanded "perfect independence [for 3 the Nile 
Valley". Willis believed the pamphlet to have been written by Egyptians. 
It stated, among other things, that Gordon had led the Sudan to disas­
ter, that the Mahdi had been its saviour, that the Gezira Scheme repre­
sented British capitalist exploitation and that the British should be 
3
driven out.
The Milner mission
The unrest of 1919, as has been noted, was played down in of­
ficial reports because of the necessity of preserving the appearance
1 SIR, July 1919, F.O. 371/372^.
2 Stack to Wingate, 22/8/19, SAD 237/8.
3 SIR, October 1919, F.O. 371/3724. This "call" was one of many.
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of a united front against Egyptian nationalism. But despite the fact 
that a good deal, if not all, of that unrest was indeed the consequence 
of unrest in Egypt and repercussions among Egyptian officers and offi­
cials in the Sudan, the government was undoubtedly concerned about the 
possibility of future Sudanese eruptions. References are vague in the 
reports of the actual events of that year, and the Intelligence Reports, 
as always, gave (ironically) a heavily censored account. But it is 
clear that the 1919 troubles in Egypt had a profound psychological ef­
fect on the Sudan Government. Indeed, the 1919 rising in Egypt was not 
only a shock to the British in ifeypt but was also very depressing for 
British morale in the Sudan. Ihe possiblity of at least a semblance 
of Egyptian independence meant, inevitably, a whole range of problems 
in the administration of the condominium. Further, the danger posed in 
the Sudan by Egyptian nationalism, notwithstanding the much-publicized 
disdain of the Sudanese, aroused the deepest fears in the minds of go­
vernment officials. The Egyptians, who heretofore had been tolerated 
as necessary cogs in the machine of government, were now viewed as the 
spanner in the works. The emerging western-educated Sudanese, previously 
seen as the natural replacements of the Egyptians, but at no time popu­
lar as a class with the British, now became the object of intense sus­
picion. This distrust of the so-called "effendi class", usually seen 
as a result of the 1924 disturbances, in fact dates at least to 1919 and, 
indeed, was one of the prejudices of the day, nourished by the experi­
ence of Egyptian politics and the social preference of the British 
(see Chapter IV). In any event, from 1919 the goal of the Sudan Govern­
ment was to remove the Egyptians and somehow to circumvent those Su­
danese who were thought to be susceptible to Egyptian "extremist" 
notions.
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This brief analysis is borne out in papers prepared in connection 
with the investigations of the Milner mission in 1920. (See above, pp. 
88-90.) The place of the Milner mission in Anglo-Egyptian relations 
will be discussed in the next chapter. But it is remarkable, in the 
present context, that the British in Khartoum, Cairo and London were 
unanimous as to the desirability of removing Egyptian influence ftom 
civil and military capacities in the Sudan; there was an equal certain­
ty of the grave dangers posed by a Sudanese educated class, and the ne­
cessity of frustrating its development.
The Milner mission arrived in Egypt at the beginning of December 
1919. In January 1920 (if not before) it was decided that representa­
tives should go to the Sudan because, in Lord Milner's words, '‘if, as 
is highly probable, we withdraw more and more from the 'administrative 
occupation' of Egypt, the strengthening of our hold on the Sudan be­
comes increasingly important". But this, Milner said, was "impossible 
if the Sudan service is full of people in open or secret sympathy with 
Egyptian 'nationalism'". ^ Milner's views were strengthened by the sub­
sequent memoranda from and correspondence with officials in the Sudan
2
and his own representatives. It can therefore be said that the recom­
mendations regarding the Sudan in his mission's report had the one 
goal in mind of reducing and ultimately eliminating Egyptian influence 
and the danger of an "infected" Sudanese official class. This, of 
course, provided the third motive - after finances and fear of Mahdism 
- for Indirect Rule. Long before Keown-Boyd went to the Sudan to report 
for the mission on conditions there, Milner wondered whether " a system
Notes by Milner on Sudan, n.d. (Jan. 1920), DEP MILNER 163.
2
Stack himself "put in quite a bit of paper to the Milner commis­
sion". (interview with Sir James Robertson, 18/6/76.)
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like that prevailing in Northern Nigeria" might be implemented, in which 
case "the necessity of creating an effendi class would thus be obvi­
ated".  ^Milner went on to state that he had heard "very unpromising 
accounts of the young Sudanese trained in their own country", but that
they could hardly be worse than the Egyptians and were at least less
2
susceptible to Egyptian nationalism. In February Miner recorded in
his diary a coversation with Keown-Boyd, who was about to leave for
the Sudan:
For some time we talked about the Sudan. He is alive to 
the danger of its becoming infected with the virus of 
Egyptian Nationalism, wanted the Egyptian Army got out 
of the country, also Egyptian Mamurs and other officials
removed as soon as possible.... Different regions of the
Sudan were ethnically quite distinct and should be kept 
as far as possible locally independent. 3
It is therefore clear that even before the mission had begun its
work its views on the Sudan situation were fairly well-formulated. At
the risk of labouring the point, it might be noted that Keown-Boyd did
have a few positive thoughts on the subject of Sudanese nationalism.
These were necessarily hypothetical and are reminiscent of the rather
naive sentiments expressed by Wingate in 1919. Reporting from Khartoum,
Keown-Boyd wrote that
One thing we can be fairly certain of and this is the
growing feeling towards a nationality amongst the Su­
danese themselves. This feeling should be fostered, 
led in the right direction, and as far as possible an­
ticipated by taking them gradually into the Government 
of their country.... But under no circumstances can we 
allow any National feeling to rise that is anti-British, 
such as has occurred in Egypt. ^
 ^Notes by Milner on Sudan, n.d. (Jan. 1920), DEP MILNER 163.
2 Ibid. One assumes that these "accounts" came from within the Sudan 
Government.
Miner's diary of conversations while chairman of the mission, 
24/2/20, DEP MILNER 165.
4
Keown-Boyd, "Sudan 1920", n.d., DEP MILNER l6l.
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These sentiments probably originated with the Sudan Government* 
there was a great deal of communication among Milner, Wingate and of­
ficials in Khartoum, and, of course, Keown-Boyd himself had long experi­
ence of the country. In any event, it is obvious that opinions were 
formed in 1919 and 1920 as to the course that should be followed re­
garding Egyptians in the Sudan, as well as the appropriate attitude 
to adopt toward the impending Sudanese nationalism. These opinions were 
later expressed in the Miner mission's report. The problem soon to be 
faced by the Sudan Government, however, was that the brand of "nationa­
lism" that emerged was not what had been hoped for, but that which had 
been feared* anti-British activity, along l^yptian lines and among go­
vernment employees. The Milner report recognised, as did the Sudan 
Government, the potential danger of an "effendi" class. Indeed, the 
report stated that the mistake made in Egypt, of creating "an over­
grown body of aspirants to Government employment" must be avoided in 
the Sudan.  ^ To a great extent, therefore, tne political orientation 
of the subordinate official class was prejudged. This will be examined 
more fully in the final chapter, but it should be noted here that by 
the time of the Miner report there was already a strong bias against 
the educated Sudanese and in favour of tribal authority.
The League of Sudan Union
In his note of 23 February 1919 Stack had remarked that the three 
sayyids had "asked to be allowed to institute among their followers a 
kind of propaganda which will endeavour to foster loyalty and co-
 ^Report of the special mission to Egypt, 1921, Cmd. 1131. See above,
p. 88.
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operation with the Britisn Imperial idea". Stack rejected the plan as 
"out of keeping with the spirit of our administration and unfair to the
Egyptians".  ^In June 1920, however, the three sayyids were allowed to
-  -  —  2buy Hadarat al-Sudan. a literary paper edited by Husayn Sharif, who
3
stayed on as editor of what became the "mouthpiece" of the sayyids.
In 1915 Husayn Sharaf had been suspected of involvement in the distri­
bution of a "seditious circular" and was exiled to Mongalla and later 
to Dongola until 1917. In 1919 he accompanied the delegation to London 
as a correspondent. A 1925 "Personality report" concluded that he iden­
tified himself with the party "that includes the leading Govt, offi­
cials (graduates of Gordon College) and the senior native Officers 
whose motto is: Nothing to do with Egypt. The Sudan for tne Sudanese:
We want Great Britain to help us but for a fixed period only." In 
August 1920 Husayn Sharif wrote four articles in al-Badara presenting 
the case for "the Sudan for the Sudanese": the continued separation of 
Egypt and the Sudan and a desire for British guidance until the Sudan 
could govern itself. ^
Stack, "Note on tne growth of national aspirations".
2 —  — ■#usayn al-Khalifa Muhammad Sharif (1888-1928) was the son of the
MahdT 's cousin, tne Khalifa Muhammad Sharif, who was killed at Shukkaba 
in 1899 (see above, page 103), and was a grandson of the Mahdi. He at­
tended Gordon College and became a teacher. In 1917 he was editor of 
al-Ra'id al-SudanT, a post he held until it ceased publication in 1919. 
He was editor or Hadarat al-Sudan until his death in 1928. (Hill,
BD, p. 169.)
3
^ Bakheit, British administration and Sudanese nationalism , p. 31.
See also MahgouD Mohamed Salih, "The Sudanese press", SNR, XLYI,
1965, PP. 1-7.
** "Personalities QsicJ report form'\ 22/2/25, SGA, CIVSEC 69/1/1. The 
report commented that Husayn Sharif "probably grasps the political 
situation in the Sudan better than any other native...."
5
Bakheit, British administration and Sudanese nationalism, p. 32.
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In the same year as the sayyids began actively to propagate their 
views as to the future status of the Sudan, there also emerged the 
first of a series of secular political organisations. This was the 
League of Sudan Union. Its five founding members were all from leading 
families, and four of them were graduates of Gordon College. Two were 
sub-ma'murs, two were clerks, and all moved in graduate circles.  ^The 
league was at first little different from the graduate clubs, social 
organisations including among their membership anyone who had gone be­
yond the primary level of education. These clubs had been deemed by the 
government to be perfectly harmless: in fact, the Omdurman graduates'
club , established in 1917 by Husayn Sharif and others, had as its
2
first president a British official, Mr. M.F. Simpson.
The League of Sudan Union was apparently organised, or was at 
least supposed to be organised in a system of cells, each cell consis­
ting of five members, but this system did not work well, nor was it 
really necessary, since
Much of the Union's effort went into organising plays 
and literary festivals, but its chief political work 
took the form of sending attacks on [the] British ad­
ministration and its Sudanese collaborators, the ortho­
dox religious leaders and ulemma through the post.
Topical of this 'patriotism by post' was a circular 
written by Obeid Hag El Amin charging the three tariqa 
heads with 'worshipping King George and Lee Stack, ... 
his prophet*, and with turning the 'Hadara' newspaper 
into a mouthpiece of imperialistic propaganda. He ap­
pealed to the educated to ignore British attempts to 
sow discord among Sudanese and accused the government's 
Gezirah scheme of robbing the Sudanese of their land and 
giving it to a British company.... Another of the Union's 
methods was publishing anti-British articles and poems
Bakheit, British administration, pp. 65-66. They werecUbayd Hajj 
al-Amin, Tawfiq Salih JibrTl, MuhT al-Din Jamal Abu Sayf, Ibrahim 
Badri, and Sulayman Kisha.
2 Ibid., pp. 3/K35» 35n.
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in Egyptian newspapers .,. and it is significant that 
these were more explicitly pro-Egyptian than the leaf­
lets for home consumption.... Lastly, the Union attempted 
to smuggle. Gordon College students into Egypt for higher 
education and sometimes succeeded; hut most of them 
founded [sic] the experience disenchanting because no 
arrangements were made with Egyptian friends or associ­
ations to look after them. 1
This type of activity, on a small scale at that, does not seem to 
have greatly exercised the Khartoum government. Indeed, no notice was 
taken of the Sudanese Union Society until 1922. After a brief tour in 
the Sudan in February 1921, Allenby could report that propaganda was 
"still carried on” by Egyptian officers, officials, and "others", but 
that it met with "contempt or ridicule”. Little was to be feared from 
such crude attempts at subversion "so long as His Majesty’s Govern­
ment make it quite clear that they intend to continue to govern the 
2Soudan". But the publication of the Milner report in 1921 appeared 
to alter the political situation. Whereas Egyptian efforts had, in the 
eyes of the government, been half-hearted before, as uncertainty over 
British intentions and various negotiations occupied attention, the 
Milner report served notice both of Britain’s intention to allow only 
a gradual and limited autonomy for Egypt, and the British goal of fur­
ther separating the Sudan from Egypt.
The Ewart committee’s "Report on political agitation in the Su-
3
dan", issued in 192j>» placed all the blame for the increased troubles 
in 1921 and thereafter squarely on Egyptian efforts to undermine the 
Sudan Government and embarrass the British. While the political climate
 ^Bakheit, British administration, pp. 67-68.
2 Allenby to Curzon, I8/2/21, F.O. 37l/63H.
3
J.M. Ewart, called in to report on the organisation of the intel­
ligence department (see p. 71n.), stayed on after the 192 r^ distur­
bances to report on the whole range of political unrest. On the com­
mittee with him were Davies and R.E.H. Baily.
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prevailing at the time of its composition should he kept in mind, the
Ewart report is nonetheless one of the few documents prepared in the
mid-twenties that took a comprehensive view of the events of the 1919-
192** period, and it is therefore important. Beginning in 1921, it said,
every conceivable subject of grievance was seized upon 
in the hope of stirring up trouble among different clas­
ses; ... the religious prejudices of Moslems, the personal 
grievances of dissatisfied officials, the conceit of the 
educated negroids were each appealed to. The idea of the . 
•Sudan for the Sudanese' was fostered in places where it 
found favour, while simultaneously the essential unity 
of Egypt and the Sudan ... was sedulously preached in 
quarters where such a prospect might find favour. The 
conclusion is irresistable that the object of the direc­
tors of agitation was simply to promote hostility to 
British rule and to use manifestations of such a spirit 
for the furtherance of purely Egyptian political ends. 1
In other words, Ewart argued, Egyptian provocateurs were inciting ag­
grieved Sudanese so as to influence the course of the Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations then (l92l) in progress.
Ewart's reference to "the conceit of the educated negroids" is 
an indication of what is probably the most interesting aspect of the 
pre-192** troubles.These "negroids" were "of slave or ex-slave extrac­
tion", and were thus
detribalised ...[and] outside the orbit of normal con­
trol or of appeal to tribal or national sentiment, for 
[they] have no contact whatever with the southern tribes 
to which they trace their origin. This class has showif 
itself readier in the past than most others to avail it­
self of the educational facilities offered since the 
British occupation, and is, consequently, strongly repre­
sented in the lower ranks of officials, military and ci­
vilian, and similar capacities in commercial life. While 
the best have done well, many have failed and the majority 
have grafted upon an overweening conceit ambitions which 
their capacity makes impossible of fulfilment. These 
failures and their dissatisfied brethren offer a fertile 
field for any propagandist against the state of things 
as they are. 2
Ewart report on political agitation, 1925, enclosed in Henderson to 
Chamberlain, 27/6/25, F.O. 37l/l0905.
2 Ibid.
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From this maligned class was to come the man most closely associ­
ated with Sudanese politics in the period under review - cAli *A'bd 
al-Latif. He was a mulazim awwal (lieutenant)  ^of Dinka origins, who 
first appeared on the scene in May 1922 when he submitted for publica­
tion to al-ffadara an article calling for "self-determination for the 
Sudanese!' In no sense did he advocate union with Egypt or support for 
Egyptian claims. The Ewart report, in one of its more outlandish pas­
sages, is worth quoting in this regard, for it illustrates both the 
tenseness of the government and its ignorance of how to deal with any­
one outside the usual tribal or religious bounds of authority:
Through the influence of an Qmdurman merchant this young 
savage, who had begun life by holding horses for half­
pence outide the Sudan Club, found himself a military 
cadet in his teens, and at the age of 22 became a com­
missioned officer, and so was translated at a bound from 
the dregs to the cream of native society.... even on such 
a stock, no love for Egypt could be grafted. The document, 
for writing which he was convicted, contains no word in 
favour of Egypt; it advocates the government of the Sudan 
by a Sudanese ana the ending of foreign rule. In this re­
spect, and in view of its inflammatory phraseology, the 
document was actionable.... Formulated by minds less ill- 
balanced than that of Ali Abdul Latif, these sentiments 
represent views honestly held and certain to be pressed, 
within constitutional bounds, with growing persistence 
by some of the best elements in the country. 2
Oddly, there is some confusion as to which battalion ^ Ui cAbd al-Latif 
belonged. The 9th, 10th, 11th and lAth all found mention in official 
reports.
9_______________________________________________
Ewart report on political agitation, 1925. cAli cAbd al-Latif seems to 
have enjoyed some success as a cadet, despite the invective of Ewart 
and whatever his later troubles. The Sudan Herald, a weekly published 
in Khartoum for the foreign community, recorded in its edition of 
22 March 1913 the results of "military school sports". In the high 
jump, "Cadet Ali Abd El Latif" placed first, as he did in the 100 
yard. race. It was observed that "the winner in the 100 yards final 
became distressed and showed signs of coming to pieces, but managed 
to clutch himself together and pass the post first. Presumably he will 
look to his buttons on any future occasion." (The Sudan Herald, 
22/3/13, no. 7§.) This is probably the first reference in print to 
cAli cAbd al-La^if.
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cAli cAbd al-Latif was convicted under section ninety-six of the 
Sudan Penal Code for "exciting disaffection of the Government estab­
lished by law in the Sudan" and was sentenced to a year in prison. ^
Why he was arrested at all seems arguable. If, as was admitted, his 
statement was unremarkable, one can only guess. The fact that he was a 
commissioned officer may have been responsible, although this was, of 
course, not stated at the time. Ironically,cAlTcAbd al-Latifs trial be­
came a cause celebre in Egypt, where the newspapers claimed that his only
2
crime had been upholding Egyptian sovereignty. Another factor may have 
been that tension was unusually high following the unilateral British 
declaration of Egyptian independence in February 1922. This reserved 
to the British "absolute discretion" over four matters, the last of 
which mentioned was the Sudan. This declaration was rejected as non­
binding by the Egyptian nationalists and exacerbated the tensions in 
the Sudan. In these circumstances any stirrings in the army, no matter 
how innocuous, probably had to be treated seriously.
The development of opposition, if, indeed, there was significant 
development, during 1922-23, is difficult to trace. This is partly
 ^"Report on general situation in Egypt, 15 June - 21 June 1922", en­
closed in Allenby to Curzon, 25/6/22, F.O. 371/77^2. See Sudan Govern­
ment, The Penal and Criminal Codes of the Sudan. London, 1924, p. 55*
2
"Report on general situation in Egypt, 15 June - 21 June 1922". Another 
account of howcAlicAbd al-Latif^began his opposition to the government 
is given in MuhammadcAbd al-Rahim, al-Sira al-musallabcala 'l-wahda 
fi 'l-Sudan. Cairo, n.d. According to this version, CA1T^Abd_al-Latif 
was mistreated by a British officer who, while walking in civilian 
clothes, took exception when cAlicAbd al-La^if passed without saluting. 
His ambitions having been dealt a mortal blow, he embarked on his ca­
reer of opposition to British rule. (pp. 8-9.) This account is in part
verified by R.E.H. Baily in his journal. Baily wrote thatcAlT cAbd
al-Latif "had been treated with gross discourtesy by a British officer
seconded to the Sudan during the Great War. A tall, fine looking man of 
considerable personality and power of leadership, being embittered he 
became an excellent instrument for the Egyptian agitator.... He was a 
very dangerous man but he was a gentleman." (Baily, journal entry for 
30/11/24.)
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owing to a definite lull in public displays of pro-Egyptian activity, 
and partly the result of the intelligence department's inability to 
probe deeply into the matter. Also worth noting is an instruction given 
by Willis to all provincial governors and the manager of the Sudan 
Government Railways in September 1922 to "destroy ... your whole file 
relative recent Egyptian agitation regarding status of Sudan" and other 
specifically designated telegrams.  ^Why this was done is unknown, and 
what, if anything, of importance was involved must therefore be a mys­
tery. In any case, in 1925 the Ewart committee had no doubt that this 
period was one of deceptive quiet, as Egyptian leadership of the Su­
danese agitation was decided in Cairo, and as more immediate concerns 
occupied the Egyptian masterminds. So many of the committee's conclu­
sions are undocumented, however, that the degree, although not the 
fact, of the Egyptian connection becomes a matter of conjecture.
The White Flag League
By 1923 the League of Sudan Union could not be said to have 
achieved much. This apparently caused a split in the league's ranks 
between those who wished to pursue the same line of relatively quiet and 
largely legal activity, and those who wanted to escalate activities and 
aim for mass involvement. In 1923 cAli fAbd al-Latif, by then released 
from prison and something of a hero because of his widely-publicized 
trial and conviction, andcUbayd Hajj al-Amin (see above, page 195)» a 
founding member of the League of Sudan Union, founded the White Flag 
League. From the beginning its membership was drawn from the same
 ^Willis to all governors and general manager, Sudan Government Rail­
ways, 3/9/22, SGA, CIVSEC 36/Vl6.
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sources as that of the League of Sudan Union -"graduates" who were go­
vernment employees. ^
2Both the Ewart report of 1925 and a memorandum by R.E.H. Baily, 
governor of Khartoum, written in 1925 and included in the Ewart report 
as an appendix, stressed an early connection between the White Flag 
League and Egyptian nationalists. Important negotiations between Bri­
tain and Egypt over the "reserved points" of the 1922 declaration 
were impending, and it was considered, according to these reports, that
the greater the anti-British commotion in the Sudan, the stronger would
3 . —be Egypt's hand in negotiating. In December 1923 Hafiz Bey Ramadan,
leader of the Watanist party in Egypt, visited the Sudan and began to 
make contact with various people. In February 192% according to 
Baily, Hafiz Bey had a "secret meeting in the gardens of the Grand Ho­
tel" with cAlI eAbd al-Latif and Muhammad Tawfiq WahbT, an Egyptian 
judge. ^ Other meetings are noted in several official reports. With the
The first "cell" consisted of, in addition to the founders, three go­
vernment employees: SalihcAbd al-Qadir, a muwallad, who was a post­
master; Hasan Sharif, "an Egyptian from Aswan" who was employed in 
the post office; and Hasan Salih, a minor official in the posts and 
telegraphs department. (Bakheit, British administration, p. 71# and 
SIR, June 192% Annex B, F.O. 371/10039.)
 ^Robert Edward Hartwell Baily (1885-1973) served in Khartoum 1909; 
Kassala, 1910-11; Berber, 1911-15# Sennar, 1915“21; and as deputy 
governor of Khartoum, 1921-25. He was governor of Kassala from 1926 
until his retirement in 1933. (liacMichael, SPS, p. 20.)
^ Baily, "The origin and history of the White Flag League", n.d., 
Appendix 7 to Ewart report.
k Ewart report on political agitation, 1925.
^ Baily, "The origin and history". One wonders how a meeting in the 
gardens of the Grand Hotel could be "secret".
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demise of the Watanist party in the Egyptian elections of January 192*4-, 
however, the Egyptian backing for the league and "other manifestations 
of unrest and propaganda inspired from Cairo" reportedly passed to the 
Wafd of Sacd Zaghlul.  ^cAli cAbd al-Latif was to be president of the 
White Flag League, which took its name from a white banner on which 
were represented the Nile, a small Egyptian flag in one corner, and. 
the word "forward" written in Arabic. From the beginning the ostensi­
ble aim of the league was the union of Egypt and the Sudan.
A note by Willis on the subject attempted to analyse the league's 
motivation at this stage. He listed "the chief items of instructions 
to the new members " of the league as follows:
(a) Every one of them should realise that he is as impor­
tant as any Englishman on earth, and wherever he meets an 
Englishman he should, by his behaviour show him that he is 
such.
(b) The Englishmen have mace donkeys of the Sudanese up to 
now and have ridden on their backs. If the Sudanese are 
brave and know their rights they will ride on the backs of 
the Englishmen.
(c) Wherever a member of the League meets people or sits 
with them he should abuse the British, talk of their re­
pression and speak good of the Egyptians our Mohammedan 
brethren.
(d) Do not believe that the Government is very strong.
Right is on our side and through it we are much stronger.
(e) Take part in any demonstrations that you find taking 
place and do not be afraid. Shout as mucn as you can and 
especially your motto should be 'No God but God, Mohammed 
is the prophet of God'.
(f) Our instructions now are to behave very peacefully and 
to obey the Police in whatever they tell us. But circum­
stances may change and we may receive other instructions.
If these instructions are received then every body should 
be ready to risK his life. It is better for most of us or 
all to die and our sons live free. The British force in the 
Sudan is small and can be disposed of easily. Up to now 
the British get tne Mohammedans to fight the Mohammedans.
...We should do our best to put a stop to tnis.
(g) The Egyptian- Government will shortly come to the 
Sudan and will get rid of the British. 2
 ^Baily, "The origin and history".
2
/'Summary of news", enclosed in director of intelligence to private 
‘secretary and others, 25/6/2*f, SGA, PALACE h/io/ty.
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From these "instructions", as from subsequent communications with 
the government, it is apparent that not only the methods but the goals 
of the Sudan Union League had been discarded by the breakaway White 
flag League. Wo longer was "the Sudan for the Sudanese" the ostensible 
aim. Reliance on Egyptians had taken the place of the "guidance" of the 
British and eventual self-determination. To what degree, if any, this 
was tactical - to win financial and political support from Egypt and 
the publicity of the Egyptian press - has always been the subject of 
argument. Clearly the British saw the White Flag League as no more than 
Egyptian exploitation of socially discontented Sudanese who were tools 
of Egyptian nationalism.
Despite the paucity of reliable information about the origins 
of the White Flag League, a good deal can be deduced as to its actual 
make-up. By June 192^ f the membership of the league was estimated at one 
hundred and fifty.  ^This estimate was based in part on a list, dis­
covered in the house of a member, of some one hundred and twenty-one 
persons identified as members of the league. The Ewart report scorned 
these people for being, with few exceptions, "insignificant persons, 
disgruntled employees with unsatisfactory records or with grievances, 
low-class merchants, negro ex-officers without employment, petty arti­
sans, ex-convicts and vagabonds.... muwallads and Binkas preponderate, 
and Arabs of good family or with tribal ties are very few." 2 Bakheit 
has produced a list of some one hundred and four members of the league, 
of whom thirty-nine were identified as “junior officials**, twenty- 
three as army officers, eleven as artisans, nine as merchants and the
 ^Willis to governors, 12/5/25, cited in Bakheit, British administra­
tion. p. 7^ n.
2
Ewart report on political agitation, 1925.
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remainder as postal clerks, students, teachers, two sub-ma'murs, two 
gadTs. and the imam of the Khartoum mosque.  ^Unfortunately, no tribal 
origins are given in this list, but the records of the prison riot trial 
of December 1924- (see below, p,285 ) include a list of the seventy ac­
cused and their ethnic origins. Of these, eleven were muwallads, eleven
_ 2 
Dinka, nine Jacali, and the rest from some twenty-two tribes, almost
all being northerners. We can conclude from this information that the 
White Flag League was dominated by low-ranking officials and army offi­
cers and that there was clearly no tribal basis to it. There is reason 
to believe that southerners living in the north played an important 
part, but not, as the involvement in the prison riot showed, a dominant 
one numerically.
The first contact made with the government occurred on 16 May 1924 
in the form of a telegram signed by the first five members. The tele­
gram protested against the exclusion of the Sudanese people from the 
coming Anglo-Egyptian negotiations. The Sudanese, the telegram insisted, 
would not "be bought andrsold like animals". They protested against the 
"secret and compulsory methods" by which the Sudan was being separated 
from Egypt. If the government would not listen to them, then they would 
"send delegates to convey our views to our exalted King [Fu'ad] and to
 ^Bakheit, British administration, appendix B, pp. 336-338. The imam of 
the Khartoum mosque, Shaykh Hasan al-Amin, was arrested for preaching 
a "seditious sermon" on 20 June. On 1? July Baily, in lieu of prosecu­
tion, arranged for the shaykh to be sent to live at Hasaheisa. (Baily, 
"Notes on an interview with Sheikh Hassan El Amin", n.d., SGA,
PALACE 4/10/49.) In his sermon the shaykh stressed that the Gezira 
had been stolen from the Sudanese, and said that religion, race, lan­
guage, habits and customs all tied the Sudanese to the Egyptians. 
("Exerpts from sermon given on 20 June by Hassan el-Dariri, Imam of 
Khartoum mosque", enclosed in director of intelligence to private 
secretary and others, 26/6/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49.)
2
Prison riot trial, list of accused and sentences, n.d., SGA,
PALACE 4/10/51.
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the consuls of the European Powers in Cairo".  ^In mid-June Mulazim
awwal Zayn al-Abdin cAbd al-Tamm, a Dinka ex-officer, and Muhammad
al-Mahdi, a son of the Khalifa cAbdallahi and now a clerk in the White
Nile Province, were arrested at Haifa en route to Cairo. Muhammad w •
—  2
al-Mahdi was in possession of petitions of loyalty to the king of Egypt.
He was conveyed back to Khartoum but the authorities suspected that a 
demonstration was planned to coincide with his arrival there, and he was 
removed from the train at Khartoum North. Indeed, about two hundred de­
monstrators had gathered at the station, "to which was added another
3
hundred of the usual riff-raff of the town". Apparently other minor 
demonstrations were also attempted, but these failed to develop, "espe­
cially after the police were provided with a motor lorry and some stout
Special Constables from the Taaisha tribe, who were the Khalifa’s tribe
**and enjoy a little bit of a scrap and hate Egyptians".
Throughout the rest of June, July and August demonstrations oc­
curred in the three towns and in other localities in the northern Sudan, 
all of them, it should be noted, in towns. Few of these incidents were
 ^White Flag League to Sudan Government, 16/5/2**, quoted in SIR. June 
192**, Annex B, F.O. 371/10039.
^ Willis to private secretary, 19/6/2**, SGA, PALACE **/l0/**9. In a note 
on the events of 192**, Willis later reported that "the fun began when 
a young officer went to Cairo ostensibly on leave but really carrying 
documents (probably faked) to show what a lot of people loved the 
Egyptians.... My own belief is that ^Muhammad al-Mahdi] suffers from 
periodic dementia, but anyway he was outwardly sane enough". (Willis, 
untitled note, n.d. (1925)» SAD 212/8.)
^ Willis to private secretary, 19/6/2**, SGA, PALACE **/l0/**9.
**
Y/illis, untitled note, n.d. (1925)» SAD 212/8. The Ewart report on 
political agitation, appendix 7» noted that the acting governor of 
Khartoum (Baily) decided to rely on Tacalsha for security work* "All 
the able-bodied of this colony volunteered and eighty were selected. 
These irregulars were consistently loyal and enthusiastic. They did 
invaluable work".
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o2 individual significance and they are recounted elsewhere,  ^but they
2
increased in frequency and in intensity as the summer went on. Procla­
mations were issued under the Public Order Ordinance of 1921 (which had 
itself been devised to deal with increased political activities) banning 
demonstrations without the written permission of the district commis­
sioner. As of 26 April 1924 it was unlawful for anyone to "organise, 
establish, open or continue a club except with the written consent of 
the Governor given after submission to him of the proposed rules of the 
Club". Once a year a list was to be presented of the officers of all
such clubs.  ^This ordinance was strengthened by proclamation of the
4
"Unlawful Associations Ordinance" on 15 November. Public assemblies
5
were banned in the three towns from 22 June. ^
^ See Bakheit, British administration, pp. 85-94.
2
The Sudan Herald published an aticle in mid-August advising merchants 
to take out "riot insurance" against "loss or damage which may occur 
during the next few months". (Sudan Herald, 16/8/24.)
^ Sudan Gazette, no. 4331 26/4/24.
^ Sudan Gazette, no. 445, 15/11/24. An unlawful association was defined
as one "which encourages or aids persons to commit acts of violence 
or intimidation or other criminal offences or of which the members
or some of the members habitually commit such acts, or ... which has
been declared to be unlawful by the Governor-General in Council...." 
Fines and imprisonment or both could be inflicted.
Acting civil secretary to private secretary, 19/8/24, SGA, PALACE 
4/10/48. Similar orders banned assemblies at Medani and Makwar from 
8 July; in Haifa from 21 July; in the whole of Kordofan from 5 August; 
in Atbara, Shendi, Darner, Berber and Abu Hamad from 11 August; in 
Kerima, Dongola, Merowe and Argo, and in Port Sudan from 16 August; 
and in Singa, Roseires, Kurmuk and Karkaj from 23 August.
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On 3 JulycAlicAbd al-Latif sent a telegram to the British prime
minister, Ramsay MacDonaldi
The Association of the White Standard backed by the 
masses vehemently protests against statements of re­
sponsible Britishers concerning alleged British rights 
in Sudan. No true Sudanese can ever accept imperialis­
tic tactics and capitalistic schemes intended annex 
Sudan forcibly into British Empire. Separation means 
death both Sudan and Egypt. 1
The next daycAlicAbd al-Latif was arrested. His house was searched and
2
"numerous incriminating documents" were found. He was brought to trial 
on 11 July, found guilty under section 90 of the Penal Code and sen-
3
tenced.to three years in prison.
It is probable that cAli cAbd al-Latif was arrested at this junc­
ture not because of his telegram to MacDonald but because of new rumours 
that had reached the government concerning a planned escalation of the 
White Flag League's activities. The civil secretary's office reported 
on 1 July that the league had "received instructions from Cairo to adopt 
measures of violence and crime". The Badara press was to be destroyed 
and several persons murdered, including the superintendant of police 
and Husayn Sharif, as well as Samuel Bey Atiyah of the intelligence de­
partment. ^
On the same day Willis wrote to the Palace expressing his views 
that the White Flag League was "for the time being" quiescent, and that 
two broad groups had emerged which were more "likely to produce some
lcAlicAbd al-Latif to MacDonald, 3/7/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49.
2
Ewart report on political agitation.
^ "Daily bulletin", civil secretary's office, 19/7/24, SGA, PALACE 
4/10/49. See The Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes, pp. 32-53.
4
Civil secretary to private secretary, 1/7/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49.
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results” adverse to the government than was the league. These two groups 
were identified as the "forward” group of intelligentsia who favoured 
the Sudan for the Sudanese at the earliest possible date, who were not 
pro-Egyptian but could "be stirred up to cause trouble to the Govern­
ment"; and the "educated blacks" who saw the Sudan as their own, to the 
exclusion of all others, even the Arab northerners. The "leaders of poli­
tical thought" in Egypt were looking forward to a time "in the near fu­
ture" when these two groups could become a "serious menace" to the go­
vernment, and cause "mutinies, strikes and riots and general confusion, 
thus disproving the British claim to administer the Sudan." ^
One of the chief causes for the spread of the White Flag League, 
and therefore of the disturbances of 1924, was the governments insuf­
ficient action against the league. Instead of arresting suspected or 
proven agitators within the government service, it was more usual to 
transfer them ftom the three towns to some outlying town in order to
islolate the men concerned from their comrades. These men then procee-
2
ded to organise branches of the league in their new posts. Stronger 
measures would have prevented this. But again, it is likely that the 
government wished to play down, whenever possible, the extent of the 
opposition, especially when the officials involved were native Sudanese 
rather than Egyptians.
 ^Willis to private secretary, 1/7/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49.
2 _
There are many examples of this. Salih cAbd al-^dir, for instance,
was transferred on 23 June to Port Sudan where he started a branch 
of the league. He was arrested there on 5 August, after which there 
were disturbances in Port Sudan. (Baily, "The origin and history".)
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The Atbara mutiny and the Military School demonstration
Atbara was the headquarters of the Sudan Government Railways and
therefore of the Railway Battalion which, while composed of Egyptian
troops, was exclusively an engineering unit charged with the maintenance
of the railways. The troubles at Atbara in August 1924 seem to have been
sparked by news of the arrest in Port Sudan of Salih cAbd al-Qadir on the
5th of that month. It was learned that he would be passing under escort
through Atbara en route to Khartoum on the 9th, and a crowd, mostly of
Egyptians, gathered to cheer him at the station. The reception went off
without violence, but later that night a crowd armed with sticks and
clubs assembled. According to the proceedings of the court of enquiry
convened to investigate, the crowd was made up of some thirty to forty
men of the railway battalion, fifty to sixty "boys and loafers from the .
Suk", and twenty to thirty "effendis". They shouted cheers for Zaghlul,
and for King Fu *ad as "King of Egypt and the Sudan". 1 Salih cAbd
al-Qadir delivered an address to the crowd from the train, in what words
it is not known, although according to the Ewart report "it was doubt-
2
less inflammatory". The crowd then marched on, and inflicted damage to 
workshops and other buildings. On the 10th a large crowd of men from the 
railway battalion and others gathered outside the general manager’s of­
fice. The officer commanding, Liwa Muhammad Pasha Fa$Lil was shouted 
down. Province police were pushed aside and the offices were ransacked.
British troops had been called in from Khartoum and these arrived on the
3
evening of the 10th.
 ^Proceedings of the general court of enquiry, Atbara, 16/8/24: P.O. 
Lord, Mirilai, "Memorandum on events at Atbara from the 9th August 
1924 onwards", n.d., SGA, PALACE 4/10/52.
2
Ewart report on political agitation, appendix 9.
3
Proceedings of the general court of enquiry.
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On the morning of the 11th, the rebellious railway troops at­
tempted to break through a cordon of loyal forces who had surrounded the 
barracks. These forces opened fire. The casualties were two dead, eigh­
teen wounded and two small boys in the barracks wounded also? three of 
the wounded died later.  ^According to the Sudan Intelligence Report for 
August, a warning volley had been fired into the air to frighten the rio­
ters, but "the other soldiers hearing the shot opened fire and continued
to shoot for nearly a minute and a half, although every effort was made 
2
to stop them". After several more days of tension it was decided to 
evacuate the entire battalion to Egypt. This was done between the 17th
'i
and 28th of August.
The court of enquiry found that "a spirit of discontent and insu­
bordination" had begun in the battalion when it was learned from the 
Egyptian newspapers that the unit was to be disbanded. "When to the men 
in this bolshevistic frame of mind was added political propaganda mat­
ters came to a head." Thus the court ruled that a lack of discipline,
"the unsettled state of mind of the soldiers", and the "incitement ftom 
civilian influences outside" had been responsible for the disturbances. 
The real significance of the Atbara mutiny was in terms of Anglo- 
Egyptian relations. The rising showed that the British would not hesi­
tate to eliminate Egyptians forcibly if the need arose. Also, the Sudan 
Government used the incident as ammunition in its campaign, then under-
1 SIR, August 1924, F.O. 371/10039.
2 fiid.
3 rwd*
4 Proceedings of the general court of enquiry.
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way in London, to persuade the British government of the necessity for 
evacuating all Egyptian troops from the Sudan (see below, p.261 ).
Like the Atbara mutiny, the demonstration by cadets of the Mili­
tary School in Khartoum was to have wide-ranging effects out of propor­
tion to the event itself. On the morning of 9 August the cadets refused 
orders and told their commandant of their intention to hold a "demon­
stration'*. If interfered with, they said, they would use their arms. 
Carrying an Egyptian flag, they marched, armed, through Khartoum, stop­
ping at the mosque and at the house of cAli *Abd al-Latif, where they pre­
sented arms. They then marched back to their barracks where they were 
surrounded by British troops and persuaded to relinquish their weapons.
The next day eleven "ringleaders" were surrendered. ^ On 10 August the
2
interned cadets were transferred to gunboats in the Nile.
Again, like the riots at Atbara, the cadets' demonstration had an
immediate cause. On 4 August it had been announced that twelve cadets
from the Cairo Military School but only two from the Khartoum Military
School had been commissioned. According to the Ewart report,
This apparent inequality of treatment naturally created 
a grievance, which found a natural expression the same 
afternoon in the telegram of protest signed on behalf of 
-the cadets by the bash shawish of the school ... to the 
War Minister in Cairo.... The facts that the resentment 
of the boys changed direction, four days later, from the 
Egyptian Minister to the British element of the Sudan 
Government, and that its expression took the form of a 
political demonstration, pointed to outside instigation 
from an Egyptian or pro-Egyptian source. 3
1 SIR, August 1924, F.O. 371/10034.
^ Corbyn to private secretary, 18/8/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/48.
J Ewart report on political agitation, appendix 8.
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The British were at a loss to explain the mutiny. The promotion
grievance was a real one, but it could not alone account for the rising.
The court of enquiry found no reasons for it. Col. Huddleston,  ^who was
acting sirdar in the absence of Stack, thought that the mutiny "was the
result of intensive anti-British propaganda carried on by outsiders
probably either Egyptian or young Sudanese officers". - By "Sudanese"
he meant southerners. Indeed, the private secretary reported that there
were indications that the "ringleaders" were southerners rather than 
3
"Arabs", ^ but this was never proved satisfactorily. The Ewart committee 
was satisfied, however, as to the complicity of Egyptian officers in the 
mutiny. According to the committee’s report, a certain mulasim thanT 
IbraHIm Shacban had told the cadets that the Egyptian war minister had 
not been responsible for the inequality of promotions but that the Bri­
tish had arranged this in order to make the cadets hostile to Egypt.
The report also concluded that the cadets believed their demonstration 
to be only a part of a much more extensive show of force to be made that 
day by all the Sudanese battalions.
The most disturbing aspect of the mutiny was that the cadets had 
always been considered "'the best disciplined, smartest, most contented 
and most loyal military formation in the Sudan*". Further, of course,
 ^Sir Hubert Jervoise Huddleston (1880-1950) joined the Egyptian Army in 
1908. He was appointed chief staff officer and adjutant-general in 
1923» and was the first commander of the Sudan Defence Force in 1925. 
He served as governor-general from 19^0 to 19^7. (DNB, 19^1-1950»
P. *U5.)
^ Private secretary to Nichols, foreign office, F.O. 371/10053.
3 Ibid.
L
Ewart report on political agitation, appendix 8.
<:
^ Bakheit, British administration, p. 91» quoting director of intel­
ligence to governor-general, 16/8/2^ .
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the native officers were the basis of all hopes for the future elimina­
tion of Egyptians from the army officer corps. The British attitude to 
the mutiny was well put.in the Ewart report. It was a feeling more of 
sadness and regret than of anger*
In fact, the incident was the half-way house between the 
earlier 'White Flag* demonstrations, than which it was 
more effective and more important but which It otherwise 
resembled in being a defiance of British authority, and 
subsequent disloyal outbreaks by serving soldiers. Had 
it been less tactfully, yet firmly, handled by the 
authorities, this demonstration would have developed 
into a tragedy of the gravest nature. As it was, it 
wrecked the future careers of a large number of carefully 
chosen youths, many of whom bore but little share of 
personal guilt....1
The demonstration by the Military School cadets was the last major
outbreak of unrest until November. A relative lull ensued, although the
mood in Khartoum and Qmdurman was described, in the days immediately
following the demonstration, as of "great uneasiness both as regards
the possibility of trouble among the Sudanese troops and the effect of
2
recent disturbances ... on public opinion in the provinces”. The acting
director of intelligence, in fact, noted that
The general opinion is that the uneasiness felt here 
will very quickly communicate itself to the fighting 
tribes of Kordofan and the fanatical Mahdist element, 
and while immediate trouble is unlikely unless a serious 
mutiny were to break out in the army, trouble is to be 
expected in a month or two unless a demonstration that 
the Government is strong enough to deal with any situa­
tion is made. I am told that any serious mutiny among 
Arab or Sudanese troops would cause an almost immediate 
reaction among the Arabs, parties of whom would at once 
be out for loot all over the Western Sudan. 3
 ^Ewart report on political agitation.
 ^Skrine to private secretary, 14/8/24, SGA, CIYSEG 36/1/3. Arthur Wal­
lace Skrine (1885- ?) served in Khartoum, 1908; in Fung, 1909-12; in 
Dongola, 1913-1?? and in Kassala,1918-22. He was asst, to Willis in 
1923-24, and governor of Mongalla, 1924-29. (MacI4ichael, SPS, p. 20.)
^ Skrine to private secretary, 14/8/24, SGA, CIVSEC 36/1/3.
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To combat the apprehended threat of a large-scale mutiny, a Bri­
tish battalion was added to the one already stationed at Khartoum, The 
letter quoted above raises interesting questions about the participation 
in and effects of the disturbances of 1924. The possibility that the 
Mahdists in the western Sudan might take advantage of a serious rising 
to rise against the government was appreciated. Secondly, Skrine indi­
cated to what extent and with what alacrity the situation had developed* 
what had seemed at first a minor annoyance caused by inept agitators had, 
by August, grown to the point where the government had serious doubts 
as to the loyalty of the Sudanese units of the army, to say nothing of 
the purely Egyptian units. We will take up the former point first. The 
position of the army will be discussed in the next chapter, since its 
future was the chief concern of the Sudan Government in the Anglo- 
Egyptian negotiations of 1924.
The response of traditional authority
From the beginning of the disturbances the traditional leaders of 
the Sudan, the heads of tariqas and SayyidcAbd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, and 
those tribal leaders of high standing, had opposed them. Any concern 
the government had over the disposition of these figures was misplaced, 
since the threat posed by cAlT cAbd al-Latif and his colleagues was direc­
ted as much against the established Sudanese leadership as it was against 
the British. Several approaches were made both to SayyidcAli al-Mirgharu 
and to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahmah in the hope of enlisting the support of one 
or the.other for the anti-government cause, but all failed. The Sudan 
Intelligence Report for June 1924 stated that the White Flag League 
recognised that "unless they could get the support of at least one of 
the chief religious leaders, there was nothing further to be done".
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Unfortunately for the league, they considered that SayyidcAbd al-Rahman
"was simply English”, and Sharif Yuisuf "was too cunning and double-
faced”. They therefore turned to SayyidcAli al-Mirghani, who, despite
supposed grievances against the government and pro-Egyptian sentiments,
rebuffed the overture.  ^No doubt SayyidcAli felt, as had his ancestor
in a similar situation, that it would be foolish "to change the moral
and constant power" he enjoyed "for the temporal and ephemeral power
2that was his for the taking". So complete was the breach between the
White Flag League and the established religious notables, that it was
reported in September 1924 that at the Khartoum North prison, where
most of the political prisoners, includingcAlicAbd al-Latif, were being
detained, a "maglis" was held at which the league members
*tried' Sayed Ali El Merghani, and sentenced him to 
imprisonment for 20 years and banishment from the Sudan 
to Mecca at the end of it; at the same sitting they
tided Sayed Abdel Rahman El Mahdi, and sentenced him to
20 years imprisonment without banishment; also Sherif 
Yusef El Hindi, and sentenced him to 15 years imprison­
ment and banishment; also Sheikh Hussein Sherif, whom 
they sentenced to death; also the Mufti and Sheikh 
Abu El Gasim to 20 years imprisonment each.... 3
No matter how seriously one takes this, the report is a fair indi­
cation of the hostility that developed between the White Flag League and
the recognised Sudanese leadership. It will be recalled that during the
troubles in Egypt in 1919 the Sudanese religious notables had hastened 
to assure the government of their loyalty and their opposition to Egyp­
tian claims to sovereignty over the Sudan. The Sudan Intelligence Report
1 SIR, June 1924, F.O. 371/10039.
2 —
J.A.W. Munzinger writing in 1866 of Sayyid al-Hasan al-Mirghani.
See above, pp. 106-107.
3 Evidence given bu Fu*adcAlT, 7/9/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/44.
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for June 1919 noted that in Egypt and among Egyptians in the Sudan,
the members of the delegation to London in July 1919 were viewed "in
1the light of traitors". From the religious notables, as has been noted, 
came the earliest support for the idea of "the Sudan for the Sudanese" 
as a counter to pro-Egyptian claims. Over the next few years the situa­
tion was not fundamentally different. In early 1922, before the British 
declaration to Egypt, various notables wrote to Willis to assure the go­
vernment that the Sudan*s "attitude with regard to the Egyptian question 
is the same as it has always been", namely "that whatever is given to 
Egypt should have no connection whatever with the Sudan". In a minute 
attached to this letter Willis remarked on the signatures of the muftT 
and his brother (the president of the Board of Ulema) "who hitherto 
carefully avoided any definite opinion on the subject of the Egyptian
3
movement".
The emergence of the White Flag League in the spring of 
prompted greater efforts on the part of the traditional leadership. Ta­
king the initiative in June, to the surprise of many, was SayyidcAbd 
al-Rahman, though a better understanding of his own position would have 
clarified his willingness to defend the government. He was, at the time, 
under grave suspicion because of the events in the west and at Aba Is-
^ SIR, June 1919» F.O. 371/372^. MacMichael later credited the members 
of the delegation with the "failure" of the anti-British "campaign" 
in 1921. (MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 5.)
2 —  —  —  —
Letter addressed to Willis by cAli al-Mirghani, cAbd_al-Rahman al-Mahdi,
Yusuf al-Hindi, al-Tayyib Hashim, Ismacil al-Azhari, Abu*l Qasim 
Ahmad Hashim, cAli al-Tuin, Ibrahim Muhammad Farah, Ibrahim Musa, cAwad 
ai-Karim cAbdallah Abu Sinn, 11/2/22, SGA, INTEL 11/2./8. The letter 
was signed at first only by the religious leaders, but Willis wrote 
to various governors suggesting that the tribal leaders might be 
"desirous" of joining in. (Willis to private secretary, 13/2/22,
SGA, INTEL 11/2/18.)
^ Willis to private secretary, 13/2/22, SGA, INTEL 11/2/ 8.
217
land in 1923? and the opportunity to show his loyalty was too fortui­
tous to be ignored. On 10 June he held a meeting at his house in Qmdur- 
man of a number of the leading religious and secular notables. An in­
telligence department note records that
Sayed Abdel Rahman opened the meeting by calling the 
attention of those present to the political situation 
in Egypt, and to the claims of the Egyptians and said 
that it was high time the Sudan notables gave frankly 
and bravely their opinion? as it was their duty to do 
so and not to leave the future of the nation to be de­
cided without saying a word in the matter. 1
Husayn Sharif then read the draft of a declaration to be submitted to
  2
the governor-general. Two notables, Shaykh Babikr Badri and Shaykh 
_ - 3
Ahmad al-Sid al-Fil, asked that the declaration be amended to the ef- • 9
feet that "demands be made from the English as to the period of Guar­
dianship, and conditions of same, but finding no support, they drop-
4
ped the subject".
Note by intelligence department, 19/6/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/4-9. In 
Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman's memoirs it is stated that the White Flag League 
was "an extension of the nationalist movement in Egypt and although I 
appreciated the courage and patience which characterized the members 
of the White Flag League I did not believe the movement to have been 
representative of the true aspirations of the Sudanese people. This 
made me coin the slogan to which I adhere to this day: the Sudan for 
the Sudanese...." (Jihad fl sabTl al-istiqlal. p. 24.)
Babikr Badri (1861-1954) was a teacher and noted innovator, especially 
in the area of girls' education. His Memoirs of Babikr Bedri was pub­
lished in London in 1969.
3 —  —
^ Shaykh Ahmad al-Sid al-Fil was an inspector of Mabkamas.
^ Note by intelligence department, 19/6/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49. This 
note also recorded that following the meeting there was another, at 
which "the Mufti and Ismail Cal-Azharl] declared, secretly, that they 
had long been waiting for this moment and that they had always held 
this opion Csic}. But that at different times they felt some faint­
heartedness on behalf of England, who tried to arrive at a solution 
by an agreement with the Egyptians". Fearing that they would be ruined 
if they supported Britain only to have the British hand over the coun­
try to the Egyptians, they had preferred silence. "Now that it Cwas] 
obvious there could be no grounds for agreement" with Egypt, they 
could speak their minds.
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The text of the declaration was 5.n part as follows?
The party assembled today in the house of Sayed 
Abdel Rahman El Mahdi at Omdurman comprises personages 
of Sudanese nationality who are enlightened and compe­
tent to give an opinion. They have included in this their 
declaration, details of the general principle upon which 
the whole Sudan has agreed, namely the choice of England 
to be the guardian of the Sudan and to bring up the 
country until they become a self-governing nation.
With this in view we beg to explain and uo declare 
the followings
...When the Sudan began to be administered by Egypt 
absolute chaos prevailed and oppression became paramount, 
so that the Sudanese revolted against the Egyptian admi­
nistration and turned it out of their country by the power 
of the sword, and the Sudan for the second time became in­
dependent from North to South, and from East to West.
The Egyptian Government having decided to occupy the 
Sudan a second time sought the assistance of Englishmen 
and English military leaders and others, and in partner­
ship, they reoccupied the Sudan and concluded a treaty 
known as the 1899 treaty.
This treaty was concluded when the Sudan was emer­
ging from revolution and wars; and was utterly exhausted, 
thus opportunity prevented itself for the Sudanese to 
give their opinion on the treaty or to point out its good 
side from evil side.
The truth about this treaty is that it does gross 
injustice to the rights of the Sudan, its conditions and 
its people, because it places the Sudan in the hands of 
two partners who dispute its administration as time has 
proved. Therefore people of the Sudan who have the greatest 
right in the matter, do not acknowledge this agreement.
The Sudan, further, after being looked upon by the 
Govts, of the world as the home of an independent na­
tionality, begs of these Govts, to pay due and deserved 
attention to the voice of its people. This people wishes 
to declare to the whole world: -
...That they are a poor nation and in need of much 
material progress....
That they are a weak and scattered people, who seek 
leadership and education and the advancement of the levels 
of our minds and of our living ... until we become a li­
ving nation, able to administer our own affairs.
The Sudanese have had the good fortune of experi­
ence of the administration of the English people, they 
were fully pleased with them, they are perfectly conten­
ted with the Englishmen and for these reasons they (the 
Sudanese) ask of their best free will and perfect accord, 
with the greatest pleasure and with the fullest liberty 
and loyalty, that the British Govt, should continue to 
administer the Sudan's affairs, to reform its conditions, 
and to advance its individuals and classes, until they 
reach the stage which they hope that they will attain of 
independence and self rule.
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The question is not a question of hatred of 
either Egypt or the Egyptians who are our neighbors 
' and friends and it is not a question of love to Csic3 
England void of self interest. It is, on the contrary, 
a question of pure self interest.
The people of the Sudan ... refuse any partner­
ship to either Egypt or any other nation, in the ad­
ministration of the Sudan, as well as they do refuse 
to exchange the present English administration for any 
other....
They request that they may have the qualifications 
of nations - which entitles them to take a share in the 
Govt, of their country, to supervise the march of their- 
own interests and the means of their education accor­
ding to the natural laws of progress. 1
The importance of this declaration is that it firmly committed the 
traditional leadership to the side of the British. It must be pointed 
out, however, that this does not imply an unqualified support for the 
British, but rather, sis the statement said, was a matter "of pure self 
interest". If there was any doubt as to this point, al-Uadara of 25 
June dispelled it. Husayn Sharif*s leading article condemned the acti­
vists as tools of Egypt and ridiculed their leaders as men who in their 
own society were "worth nothing ... are composed of stupid discharged
men, small employes CsicJ and some other negligible quantity who are un-
2
able to gain their daily bread...." The same issue of al-Radara pub­
lished a letter signed "Wad A1 Nilein" under the title "Low is a nation 
if it can be led by Ali Abdel Latif":
Letter to the governor-general, 10/6/24-, SGA, PALACE 4/10/4-9. This 
declaration was signed by Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman; the mufti; Ismacil 
al-Azhari; Ahmad al-Sid al-Fil; the president of the Board of Ulema; 
the qacX of Khartoum province; Babikr Badri; and a large number of 
cumdas, shaykhs, merchants and other notables. In a telegram to Khar­
toum from London in August, Stack was to admit that "when in May in­
formation was received, of intensive campaign of Egyptian propaganda 
natives were informed that restraint was removed and they were in­
vited to express their wishes...." (Stack to Hakimam (the palace), 
14/8/2^, F.O. 371/10053.)
^ "Note on the vernacular press", 28/6/24-, SGA, PALACE k/10/^ .
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Who is this Abdel Latif, to what tribe or sub-tribe 
does he belong, who is his chief of tribe and has he 
consulted his chief.,.? The country is not so stupid 
and simple to allow Ali Abdel Latif to subject the 
whole nation to another for his personal interests.
The country has its own chiefs who are working for 
its good...
The attitude of the notables toward cAli cAbd al-Latif, which this letter 
reflected, could be summed up as, "who does he think he is?" Aside firom 
anger at the effrontery of this parvenu and his friends (a feeling 
shared by the British) another more basic consideration brought the no­
tables together: Sayyid ^ bd al-Rahman and his supporters were, of course, 
historically antipathetic toward Egypt; the tribal and other leaders who 
were anti-Mahdist were, however, historically pro-British. On this is­
sue of the status of the Sudan they could all therefore unite. But, as 
the proposed amendment to the June 10th declaration indicated, there 
was in addition to the White Flag League and the highest religious no­
tables a third force, or, at least, a body of opinion unfavourable to 
the former's pro-Egyptian claims but uncomfortable with the latter's 
apparently unqualified backing of the British.
In one of those appreciations of a situation for which Willis 
never received due credit, he wrote in June of the two sections into 
which the "intelligenzia" could be divided. One was that represented 
bycAli Abd al-Latif, which would "undoubtedly grow in future and will 
be the 'noisy party'". The other, however, was that "which has to be 
taken into account in future". This group included Ahmad al-Sid al-FLl, 
Husayn Sharif, and "most of the young province Kadis, District Kadis, 
Schoolmasters, Officers of Arab origin and well to do merchants nearly 
everywhere". This "party", Willis suggested, had no direct relations with 
Egyptians: they believed in the Sudan for the Sudanese. But in resis-
 ^"Note on the vernacular press", 28/6/2^, SGA, PALACE 4/lO/^9.
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ting pro-Egyptian activities they discerned a danger of simply handing 
over the Sudan to Britain. They desired from the British a definite 
statement as to future policy. Willis described them as "the party to 
count as the older generation of present Nazirs and Omdas pass away",  ^
a remark, incidentally, which must have greatly annoyed the proponents 
of Indirect Rule then mustering their arguments.
This group of "graduates" felt entitled, as the educated elite, 
to be consulted over the country's future. This was certainly their ma­
jor tactical demand in the months preceding the Zaghltft-MacDonald nego­
tiations in London which began in September. The vice-president of the 
Graduates' Club, Abu Shama cAbd al-Majid, wrote to Willis in June to as­
sure him of the loyalty of "those among us who have received some edu­
cation" but noted that "those enlightened would like certain reforms".
He proceeded to sum up the political views of the Sudanese. The general 
public, he claimed, had "no opinion to give", since all they desired 
was "to be lightly taxed, to find a cheaper living, and to see slavery 
reestablished". But the "more enlightened class" wanted the present ad­
ministration to remain "for a period sufficient to realize the educa­
tion of the Sudanese to rule themselves after giving them trustworthy 
2
guarantee". As Sterry, then acting governor-general, wrote in August, 
the moderates recognised "that they cannot get on without British as­
sistance now, but they would like not only a pronouncement from us
that we consider ourselves trustees ... but also a promise that we
3
shall clear out at a definite date".
1 Willis, "The political situation", 16/6/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49.
2 Abu Shama cAbd al-Majld to Willis, 7/6/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49.
^ Note by Sterry, enclosed in Kerr to MacDonald, 31/8/24, F.O. 371/10033. 
Sterry was acting governor-general from 16 July. (Sudan Gazette, 
no. *+39, 10/8/2'+.)
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This fear that, should the Egyptians he removed the British would 
have an unrestrained and unlimited power oyer the Sudanese was evident 
also in a letter addressed by Husayn Sharif to The Times, which was, 
however, never sent. Husayn Shainf believed that if the Egyptian propa­
ganda had from the start been "counter-balanced ... by a promise or 
pledge to establish in the Sudan some native form of government which 
guarantees to the Sudanese their participation in the administration 
of their affairs ... this movement would never have come into exis­
tence...." The Sudan question, he stressed, "must be settled on the ba­
sis that the Sudan is for the Sudanese and not for the English nor for 
the Egyptians...." A declaration should be made to this effect by the 
government. The position of Britain should be defined and the legiti­
mate interests of Egypt determined. The Egyptians "should share with the 
English in guiding and teaching" the Sudanese. Further, there should 
be "a sort of union between" Egypt and the Sudan, "to retain the his­
torical ties of these two brother countries".  ^Husayn Sharif and those 
who shared his views hoped to safeguard the Sudan*s future by retaining 
the balancing effect of condominium, but at the same time insisting on 
the naming of a date for independence.
Husayn Sharif to The Times, enclosed in acting assistant private 
secretary to civil secretary, 28/8/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/44. In a let­
ter to the Sudan agent in Cairo in August, Davies, by then in the in­
telligence department, wrote that al-ffadara was not pro-govemment 
and that Husayn Sharif belonged to "one or more of the leagues". He 
said that the "moderation in the tone" of al-ffajara came "solely 
from our censorship" and that an uncensored article by Husayn Sharif 
would be.an "exposition of the views of the Leagues". Davies, as usu­
al, saw the situation in black and white terms, a fact illustrated 
by his remark to the Sudan agent that the incidents of 1924 proved 
that "the tide of gratitude" for the "Pax Britannica" was "on the ebb." 
(Davies to More, 20/8/24, F.O. 800/218.)
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One manner in which the Sudanese might achieve "participation in
the administration of their affairs" was through "native advisory
councils", the discussion of which increased in mid-1924.  ^But the
reaction to this and other suggestions, indeed, to this middle force
of graduates generally had already begun with events in 1919. Indirect
Rule was coming into its own, and the pretensions - for as such they
were viewed - of the intelligentsia were ridiculed and denounced. They
claimed to be "the only reliable raediary between the Government and
the people" but numerically were insignificant: "outside the larger
towns, especially Khartoum and Omdurman" they were not as influential
2
as they believed. In any event, it had already been made clear from
the intervention of the religious and other traditional leadership,
the statements of loyalty they had inspired, and the relative quiescence
of the vast bulk of the population outside the towns, that mass support
still - perhaps more than ever - resided with them and not with this
new class of self-appointed leaders. And it was command of respect that
determined political influence with the government. That being the case,
the claims of the moderate graduates could be tossed on the same fire
as the wild demands ofcAli cAbd al-Latif, for neither had elicited mass
# w
support, whereas their detractors had shown their retention of that sup­
port. But in British eyes the Sudanese minor officials had by mid-1924 
assumed not only some of the posts but also the political ideas of the 
Egyptians, a fact th&t destroyed the rationale for their very existence 
in the bureaucracy. The effect of all this was a strengthening of the
^ See below, pp. 314-15.
2 SIR, October 1924, F.O. 371/10039.
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ties between traditional authority and the government, a tactical al­
liance that froze out radical and moderate alike. The army mutiny of 
November served only to solidify that position, as the risings of tribal 
populations which were postulated to take place as the result of such 
a serious incident did not, in the event, occur, thus giving apparent 
added testimony to the power of traditional leadership. As in the arche­
typal tribal society, in which the tribe exerts influence over its in­
dividual members and in turn protects them, so the individual outside 
of the tribe, while free of the constraints of tribal society, also lo­
ses the protection that society affords. In the Sudanese case the lea­
ders of the White Flag League, and, indeed, the moderates, once the go­
vernment moved against them, were isolated and without support.
Whatever the role of the White Flag League, in terms of its aims 
it cannot be called nationalistic. There is, however, a great deal to 
be said of the role of the league and of the League of Sudan Union in 
the psychological roots not only of latter day Sudanese nationalism 
but in its embryonic development in the 1920s. The search for these 
roots has, however, probably missed the mark in settling oncAli *Abd 
al-Latif and his associates. The roots lie rather in the Sudan Union 
Society and in the middle group of Husayn Sharif and his colleagues.
It was they who, having come from the "best" of the tribal or religious 
notable families, could combine the ideas of nationhood with the fami­
liar socio-political attachments of their fathers. To be sure, this was 
a long and gradual process, but it began with the moderate graduates, 
not with the vocally pro-Egyptian White Flag League. It follows that 
the disturbances of 1924- were not nationalistic in inspiration. Reli­
gious affinity, general dissatisfaction, personal grievances may all 
have played a part, but the same could be said of the Mahdist appeal in 
the 1880s.
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There is an essential point to be drawn here. It has usually been 
assumed, not without reason, that until 1923-24 British policy had been 
to educate and train Sudanese increasingly to administer the country, 
that in 1924 this new elite showed that they could not be trusted as 
collaborators and that therefore the British embarked on a path toward 
full-fledged Indirect Rule. This is only partially accurate. As has been 
noted, policy had been to train Sudanese as minor officials, but the 
acceptance of Indirect Rule as the proper course for the future began 
long before 1924, for reasons already mentioned. In the immediate post­
war period, governors had been canvassed for their opinions as to the 
extension of the powers of shaykhs; in 1922 the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs 
Ordinance appeared (see below, pp.301-309 ). Other related programmes 
were being evolved. The Milner mission's report had been issued. The 
whole future of the Egyptian Army (and its Sudanese components) was be­
ing discussed as early as 1920. The thrust of all this surely did not 
escape the notice of the Sudanese minor officials and officers. In brief, 
it can be argued that a major factor in the attitude of the "disgrun­
tled" Sudanese officials and?officers, and in that of the moderate 
graduates, was their reaction against an apprehended shift of power 
away from them and toward tribal authority. That shift had, in fact, 
already begun: this is the reverse of the argument that presented In- 
diect Rule as a response to the 1924 disturbances.
It will have been noted that Husayn Sharif, in his unpublished 
letter to The Times, stressed the necessity for "some native form of 
government which guarantees to the Sudanese their participation in the 
administration of their affairs". This may have been a plea for further 
democratization, or for the opening up of more positions to Sudanese: 
it was surely not a call for statutory increases in tribal authority.
The presence of Egyptian ma'murs and other officials at least ensured
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the continuation of a bureaucratic government that offered employment 
to educated Sudanese and, more importantly, appeared to offer through 
its promotion system a gradual assumption of increased responsibility by 
that class. The Power of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance and the direction it 
indicated foresaw a curtailment of that progress, perhaps even its re­
versal. This may help to explain the concern of Husayn ShaiTf and his 
colleagues for retaining the Egyptian connection. It also explains the 
disdain of tribal leaders for the White Flag League and other such groups 
which were, in fact, the enemies of tribal authority. Thus, in October 
192k the deputy governor of the Blue Nile Province could write that the 
native officials'
idea of the Sudan for the Sudanese is a Sudan governed 
on existing lines with the government posts, high and 
low, filled from the Sudanese official and intelligentsia, 
classes. They have no idea of a Sudan composed of power­
ful local tribes or groups of tribes managing their own 
affairs with a minimum of interference from the Central 
Government. They are in fact definitely hostile to such 
ideas. 1
Pawson, the deputy governor, went on to advise that no Sudanese be al­
lowed to rise above the position of ma'mur. and warned that "experience 
shows that many of them will become dissatisfied with their positions
and some of them will be the natural leaders of the discontented offi- 
2
cial classes."
What, then, caused the discontent? Pawson seems to have had no 
doubt that behind it was the realisation that the door to the district 
commissioner's office was forever closed. In forwarding Pawson's report, 
his chief, A.J.C. Huddleston noted that "a year ago" policy had been 
that "we were not giving.the Sudanese Sub-Mamur the power the Egyptian
 ^Guy Pawson, "Note on the native mamur and sub-mamur as affecting the 
Government policy of decentralization", 2/l0/2*f, SGA, CIVSEC 50/2,/10.
2 Ibid.
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Mamur had".  ^This was the direction in which the government was heading; 
surely this was no secret to the Sudanese official class. Even though 
it was the prime concern of the British to reduce the numbers of Egyp­
tians in the administration, a policy of devolving powers to tribal 
chiefs was understandably perceived as anti-graduate. What more under­
standable a response than rallying to the defence of Egypt, since the 
continued presence of Egypt ensured continued bureaucratic government? 
The young Sudanese official had come to feel, not without British en­
couragement, that it was his destiny to occupy a position of some in­
fluence in the affairs of the country; now in the 1920s he was faced
2
with a future of, in MacMichael's words, "bottle-washing". The result 
of their "thwarted ambitions" would, he felt, be "dissatisfaction ... 
and, ultimately, illicit pressure on the Government to leave them to
3
manage a country which could never be managed by them at all". As a
1 A.J.G. Huddleston to civil secretary, 9/10/24, SGA, CIYSEG 50/2/10.
Sir Arthur Huddleston(1880-1948) served in Berber, 1905-10; the Upper 
Nile, 1911; Blue Nile, 1912; Berber for a second tour, 1913-19; as 
governor of Khartoum, 1920-22; governor of the Blue Nile Province, 
1922-27; and as financial secretary, 1928-31. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 14.)
2
MacMichael argued that it had never been the intention that the 
Sudanese sub-ma'mur should have "functions comparable to those of 
Egyptian Mamurs.... 'Bottle-washing' is too extreme a term ... but it 
might be used of the relation between the young Sudanese Sub-Maraur 
and his District Commissioner". (MacMichael to governor, Blue Nile 
Province, 11/10/24, SGA, CIYSEG 50/2/10.)
o
Ibid. In his Behind the modern Sudan (with a forward by MacMichael), 
H.C. Jackson wrote of the 1924 situation that "the eventual self- 
government of the Sudan by the Sudanese had always been the policy 
of the Sudan Government. With this in view, the first step taken in 
the Sudan after the First World War was the gradual substitution of 
Sudanese for Egyptian officials in the lower posts.... as Sudanese 
candidates acquired the necessary qualifications, the British would 
in their turn make way for them in the higher posts - as indeed they 
have recently done", (p. 194.)
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final example, of many, of the British attitude, may be cited another 
circular by MacMichael, in which he concluded that "the cry *the Sudan 
fot the Sudanese* of 'which we shall no doubt hear more, carries the germ 
of a legitimate aspiration, but it is the aristocracy rather than the 
subordinate bureaucracy whose claims to our consideration are paramount."  ^
This being the attitude of the central government, it is hardly 
surprising that an apparent major aspect of the Egyptian propaganda in 
the Sudan in the early 1920s was promises of increased pay and promo­
tions for Sudanese officers and officials in the event of the political
2
"unity of the Nile Valley". Thus we can conclude that the move toward 
Indirect Rule was at least a partial cause of the 1924 troubles rather 
than an effect. The activities of both the White Flag League and the 
moderates in 1924 reflected not only concern about the future status 
of the Sudan but also over the role of their tiny and vulnerable class 
in that future. In a 1927 note Davies confirmed this view when he wrote 
that "Mamurs and Submamurs from all parts of the Sudan report that they 
are now mere tax-collectors, all responsible work having been taken
3
over from them by the District Commissioners."
There is, as has been indicated, a danger, in assessing the 
events of 1924, of exaggerating the importance of the "activists" - 
the White Flag League and the other vague and sometimes unidentifiable
1 MacMichael to all governors, 20/10/24, SGA, CIVSEC 50/2/10.
2
Ewart report on political agitation.
^ Davies, Secret intelligence report no. 13, 11/4/27, F.O. 371/12375*
r
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societies  ^- and thus to reduce the significance of the moderates who
were, in fact, much more important in the long term. We have seen that
the White Flag League was estimated in June 1924 to have one hundred
and fifty members. While they were not the ’’rabbles of nobodies led by
shady characters and followed by naughty little boys" that the Ewart
report said they were, they were for the most part young and of no eco-
nimic or social significance. Most of the disturbances occurred in the
three towns. The provinces remained, with few exceptions, serenely
quiet. Browne, then governor of Kassala, wrote in September that things
had been "extraordinarily quiet" in that province, though a few White
2
Flag League members were present in the army and administration. The 
district commissioner at Kamlin on the White Nile, Mr. (later Sir) James 
Robertson, reported no White Flag League presence in that province, and 
no trouble in 1924-. Likewise there was no trouble at Medani, and the
There were occasional references to several other societies, even the 
existence of which as separate entities was (and is) uncertain. Among 
them were the "League of National Defence" (SIR, September 1924,
F.O, 37l/l0039)f the "Society of the Ulema1 in the Sudan", the "Ven­
geance Branch of the League of Sudan Union", the "Committee of 
Songs", which produced a "national tune" (SIR, October 1924, F.O. 
371/10039); and the "Workman's League" (Ewart report on political 
agitation, appendix 7). Davies claimed that other societies had been 
"spawned" by the White Flag League (Davies to More, 20/8/24, F.O. 
800/218), but there is little if any evidence of the independent exis­
tence of many of these groups: it is likelier that they were the 
names of cells, or were simply used to confuse the authorities.
 ^Browne to More, 9/9/24, F.O. 800/218. Browne referred to the
White Flag League members as "among the unbalanced degenerates with 
whom we somehow succeed in peopling the Government offices."
3
Interview with Sir James Robertson, 18/6/76.
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various outbreaks in Khartoum came as a complete surprise to officials 
in the Blue Nile Province.  ^In the southern Sudan, as we shall see, 
there were minor outbreaks among the garrisons, but no involvement at 
all of the local populations. The same applies to the western Sudan, 
where demands for union with Egypt would doubtless have been met with 
incredulity or worse. Thus it is important to remember that the White 
Flag League and its shadowy counterparts were very limited in member­
ship, scope and appeal, and as time went on this became more and more 
obvious to the government. With the support of those leaders who com­
manded the loyalty of the people the government could, in late 192^ , 
take definite action against this small band.
While the importance of the 1924- events should not, therefore, 
be exaggerated, neither should they be dismissed as merely the work 
of deluded or irresponsible amateur politicians. The Ewart report, 
while insisting that "Egyptian instigation and manipulation were direct­
ly responsible for all that happened", nonetheless warned that "it 
would be entirely misleading to suppose that, with the removal of the
occasion and the opportunity for Egyptian instigation, the Sudan will
2
revert to complete political apathy". The report went on to caution 
that
It must be recognised that there is now in the Sudan 
a class, small but vocal, and inevitably possessing 
influence out of all proportion to its numbers, which 
has ideas and aspirations, whose growth has been 
'forced* so that they are now at a stage, the attain­
ment of which would have taken a generation or more of 
normal growth.... The educated classes, who have now 
acquired definite conceptions as regards rights and 
national development, are in a frame of mind which 
will make them readily responsive to the promptings,
 ^Interview with Sir Shuldham Hedfern, 8/10/76.
2
Ewart report on political agitation.
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subversive or otherwise, of anyone who will show 
them a way to the realisation of their desires.
They will undoubtedly be keen critics of Govern­
ment policy in the future, and their attitude will 
be guided by the measure in which such policy tends 
to meet their aspirations. I
This judgement, together with the indictment of many minor offi-
cials for "the manner in which [they] abused their positions" was a
strong endorsement, in the minds of some, of the efficacy of Indirect
Rule. For while the 1924 troubles could be called "elementary in orga-
3
nisation and technique", it would, said the Ewart report, "be futile
to suppose that there will be no *next time *.... The best use to which
the present period can be put is in sabotaging the machinery of future
seditious movements, and making the ground unfavourable for their 
4growth." Unfortunately conditions and predispositions led the govern­
ment to seek prevention of a "next time" not by conciliating the oppo­
sition but by attempting to make it irrelevant through Indirect Rule.
The main result of the 1924 disturbances should therefore be no­
ted. The troubles marked the emergence, and defeat, of the first secu­
lar opposition to the government expressed specifically in secular 
terms. This was imporatnt not only in itself but also in destroying 
many of the assumptions upon which the Sudan Government had rested.
Try as they might to blame everything on the Egyptians, the government 
recognised that it would be opposed by Sudanese on rational political
Ewart report on political agitation.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
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grounds. This in its way was profoundly depressing because of the 
"ingratitude" it implied and the rejection of British paternalism which 
it embodied. Thus the British attitude changed as well: having bitten 
the hand that fed them, the "effendia" would be cast out. But upon whom 
were the British then to rely? The drift toward disillusionment that 
culminated in 192^ had been hastened in 1921 at Nyala: fi*oni that time 
resurgent Mahdism had been seen, on balance, as a serious danger. Now, 
in 192*f, the newly-educated class had shown itself too dangerous to be 
trusted. The solution, for these and other reasons, lay in an accelera­
tion of the movement toward Indirect rule,
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Chapter III: The Sudan In Anglo-Egyptian Relations
The eight years of Stack's govemor-generalship were among the 
most eventful in the history of Anglo-Egyptian relations. The period 
witnessed the explosion of Egyptian nationalism, a series of abortive 
negotiations leading to the nominal independence of Egypt in 1922, fur­
ther fruitless talks and finally, in November 1924, the British ultima­
tum to Egypt which attempted a unilateral solution of what had become 
"the Sudan question". As this series of events unfolded, the Sudan Go­
vernment assumed an increasingly independent position. Beginning with 
only tentative representations and pleas for consultation in 1919» by 
1924 the Sudan Government acted with great independence and self-interest 
in pressing its views.
The Sudan question emerged as an issue only with the rapid move­
ment toward Egyptian independence after the World War. So long as Britain 
occupied Egypt, none of the problems arising from the Sudan's essential­
ly improvised status was too difficult to solve. At the conclusion of 
the war, however, the anomalies of the status not only of the Sudan but 
of Egypt  ^could no longer be ignored in the face of the rising tide of 
Egyptian nationalism. Recognition that Britain intended to retain the 
protectorate brought that -discontent, exacerbated by the serious and jus-
 ^Neither the occupation nor the declaration of protectorate in 191^ 
had changed Egypt's status in international law. Until Turkey's ra­
tification of the Lausanne treaty in August 1923# Egypt remained a 
Turkish possession. (See A.J. Toynbee, Survey of international af­
fairs. vol. I, The Islamic world, London, 1927, pp. 197-198.) Nor 
had any of the Anglo-Egyptian arrangements altered the technically 
similar status of the Sudan. Thus Egyptian nationalists could (and 
did) argue that they sought not a gradual movement toward self-govern­
ment but reversion to their pre-occupation status of a de facto in­
dependent nation. (See the report of the special mission to Egypt,
1921, Cmd. 1131.)
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tified grievances of the war period, rushing to the surface. ^
On 13 November 1918, two days after the armistice, Wingate re­
ceived at the Residency Sacd Zaghlul, cAbd al-Aziz Fahmi, andcAli Shaxawi,
2
three leading members of the Wafd. They put forward the demand for the 
total independence of Egypt and said they would proceed to London to put
3
their case to the British government. Wingate advised the foreign of- 
fice to enter into discussions with the nationalists, but was rebuffed. 
Rushdi Rasha, the Egyptian prime minister, who had cooperated unfailing­
ly throughout the wax, then proposed that he and a colleague, cAdli 
Pasha, should go to London for talks, but this proposal too was rejected. 
There would be no Egyptian representation at Paris because no issues 
affecting Egypt were to be discussed there, "excepting that of estab-
5
lishment of British Protectorate". In early January Wingate vas called 
to London for "consultations". At the same time, an invitation was ex­
tended to Rushdi to come for discussions, but he insisted that Zaghlul
See Ronald Graham, "Note on the unrest in Egypt", 9/4/14, F.O.
371/3715» in which the conduct of both Wingate and Allenby is severely 
criticized; "Memorandum, giving the opinion of a very friendly and 
reliable Egyptian on the situation today", 4/3/19, F.O. 371/3714, 
with minutes by A.T. Loyd and Wingate; H.W.Y. Temperley, A history 
of the Paris Peace Conference, vol. YI, London, 1924, p. 196; and 
PD, HG, vol. 76, 8/12/15, 1367-1368; vol. 80, 15/3/16, 2057; vol.
83, 22/6/16, 289; vol. 115, 15/5/19, 1834-1836, 1840.
2
The Wafd (delegation) was organised towaxd the end of the war. For 
its origins see J.M. Landau, Parliaments and parties in Egypt, Tel 
Aviv, 1953, P. 151.
^ Wingate to Hardinge, 14/11/18, F.O. 371/3722. See also Elie Kedourie, 
"Sa'ad Zaghlul and the British", St. Antony's papers, no. 11, Middle 
Eastern affairs, no. 2, 1961, pp. 139-160.
^ F.O. to Wingate, 28/11/18, F.O. 371/3722.
 ^F.O. to Wingate, 11/12/18, F.O. 371/3722.
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should be included since the latter's enormous prestige made success 
unlikely without him. Once again the foreign office rejected the propo­
sal since, in Curzon's words, the British government could not allow the 
nationalists to "hold a pistol to our head". ^ On 1 March Rushdi re­
signed, and on the 9th Zaghlul and some of his colleagues were arrested 
2
and deported. By the middle of March a state of insurrection existed
3
throughout Egypt. On the 17th General Bulfin arrived in Cairo and took 
charge of the situation, and by the end of the month the violence had 
subsided. Meanwhile Allenby had been appointed "Special High Commissioner 
for Egypt and the Sudan", and reached Cairo on the 25th. Zaghlul and 
his associates were released in early April and proceeded to Paris 
where they strove, unsuccessfully, to present the Egyptian case.
The restoration of order was clearly the occasion to re-examine 
the Egyptian question, even though the positions of the British govern­
ment and the nationalists were poles apart. It was in these circumstan­
ces that the Milner mission was constituted. The failure of the foreign 
office to understand the depth of nationalist sentiment was reflected 
in the mission's terms of reference, which were "To enquire into the 
causes of the late disorders, and to report ... on the form of Constitu­
tion which, under the Protectorate, will be best calculated to promote 
its peace and prosperity, the progressive development of self-governing
 ^Wingate, "Note on the departure from Egypt and arrival in Paris and 
London of Sir R. Wingate", n.d., F.O. 371/3722.
2 A.F.R. Wiggin, "Egypt! 1918-1925", 15/5/26, F.O. 371/11582.
3
General Sir Edward Bulfin (1862-1939) was a former corps commander un­
der Allenby in Palestine. (DNB, 1931“19^ K)» pp. 123-i2^.)
k
Wiggin, "Egypt: 1918-1925".
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institutions, and the protection of foreign interests". ^
There was no reference to the Sudan. But in November 1919» shortly
before the mission finally left for Egypt, Balfour, at the time Lord
President of the Council, said in the Commons that
in our view the question of Egypt, the question of the 
Sudan, and the question of the Canal, form an organic 
and indissoluble whole and that neither in Egypt nor in 
the Sudan, nor in connection with Egypt, is England go­
ing to give up any of her responsibilities. British 
supremacy exists, British supremacy is going to be 
maintained. 2
That uncompromising attitude was inevitable in the light of British in­
terests in the Nile valley, a fact that overshadowed the Milner mission's 
investigations and Anglo-Egyptian relations generally. Despite the rela­
tively brief treatment in the final report, a good deal of attention 
was paid the Sudan by the mission, especially, it seems, by Mi.lner him­
self. On its third day in Egypt the mission met to discuss procedural 
and other matters, and, in Milner's words,
the most important of these was the question of the 
Sudan and its relations to Egypt, We came to the con­
clusion that this was a vital part of our enquiry and 
that our reference must be taken to cover it. More in­
formation was, however, felt to be necessary, especially 
on (i) the financial position as between Egypt and the 
Sudan. Is the latter now financially independent of Egypt 
and able to pay its own way? And, if so, can it really 
be expected to repay what Egypt has advanced:to it since 
1898? The Army. Is it desirable to have ... one army for 
Egypt and the Sudan? Would not two local Armies, or gen­
darmeries, be preferable? Is it a good arrangement that 
the office of Governor-General of the Sudan should be 
combined with that of Sirdar of the Egyptian Army? In
Report of the special mission. The members of the mission in addi­
tion to Miner were Sir Rennell Rodd (later Lord Rennell), who had 
acted as agent and consul-general under Cromer; General_Sir John 
Maxwell, who had commanded brigades at Atbara and Karari, and was 
commander of British forces in Egypt, 1908-1912, 1934-1915» Sir 
Cecil Hurst, legal adviser to the foreign office, 1918-1929; Sir 
Owen Thomas and Mr. J.A. Spender.
p
PD, H.C., vol. 121, 17/11/19, 771. A similar statement was made to 
the Lords by Curzon on 25 November.(PD, H.L., vol. 37, 25/11/19, 339- 
y*9.)
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connection with the question of the Sudan, it was
pointed Qut that we had claimed to exclude the French
from it on the ground that it was legally Egyptian 
territory. It would, therefore, be difficult for us 
to sever it from Egypt,... The question of the Sudan 
is evidently one which calls for a good deal of con­
sideration. 1
The Sudan’s new-found significance resulted from the uncertainty
of Egypt’s future constitutional status. Milner was determined to "save”
the Sudan from the fate of Egypt which he saw as ultimately the product
of a disaffected official class. It will be recalled that Milner wrote
of the increasing importance of "strengthening our hold on the Sudan" as,
inevitably, Britain withdrew from the "’administrative occupation*" of
Egypt (see above, p. 191). To stop the spread of Egyptian nationalism
to the Sudan was vital, and "for this reason", he wrote, it was a
"paramount object of policy to separate the Govt, of the Sudan as much
as possible from that of Egypt - and to differentiate the two countries
2
by every means in our power". He noted how this could be achieved*
The influences, through which it is most likely that 
Egyptian Nationalism will spread to the Sudan, are the 
Army and the officials of Egyptian race in the Civil 
Service.... It would be most desirable ... that all 
Egyptian regiments should be brought back to Egypt, and 
that mamurs should be either British or Sudanese. The 
same applies to other Civil officials..,. The chief ob­
stacle to the policy of making the Sudan independent of 
Egypt is a financial one.... The only satisfactory ar­
rangement would be the complete separation of the Suda­
nese and Egyptian Armies. But in that case how is the 
Sudanese Army to be paid for? It would be probably im­
possible to induce the British Treasury to foot the 
bill.... it is very necessary to consider the means by
 ^Milner, diary of conversations while chairman of the mission,
9/12/19, DEP MILNER 165.
 ^Milner, Notes on the Sudan, n.d. (Jan. 1920), DEP MILNER 163. The 
foreign office agreed. John Murray and J. de V. Loder wrote that 
"though no occasion might arise to render expedient a revision of the 
present theory of an Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the general trend of 
our policy should be to strengthen our connection with the Sudan while 
relaxing that with Egypt". ("Memorandum on the future of Egypt", 
23/1/20, F.O. 371/3722.) For note on Murray see page 251.
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which the Sudan can as soon as possible be rendered 
capable of bearing the burden of its own military 
defence. 1
It is striking that Milner neither explained nor even mentioned
that the official British position in the Sudan was as a partner in the
Condominium. As has been noted, "Egyptian national feeling in regard
to the Sudan was further irritated by the habit into which Englishmen,
even in high places, had fallen of thinking, speaking, and acting as
2
though the Sudan ... were an integral part of the British Ehpire".
Indeed, in a private letter to Wingate in May 1920 Stack wrote that if 
Egyptian influence were to be eliminated, the Egyptian units of the 
army must "go at once", the ma'murs and sub-ma'murs would follow, and 
the clerical and technical employees "would disappear in course of time." 
Like Milner, Stack's first inclination was towards a British subsidy to 
finance an all-Sudanese army, and British assumption of the Sudan's 
capital debt liabilities to Egypt. The only alternative, Stack thought, 
was that Egypt, "in view of the benefits accruing for all time from a 
secured frontier and a guaranteed water supply should cancel the 
debt". ^
This was not the first reference made to the "benefits" to Egypt 
of British occupation of the Sudan. In February Allenby, on a visit to 
Khartoum, wrote that one of the essential points in defining the fu­
ture status of the Sudan was an Anglo-Egyptian agreement by which 
"Great Britain would guarantee to secure Egypt's water supply and Soudan
^ Milner, Notes on the Sudan.
2
Toynbee, Survey, p. 242.
5 Stack to Wingate, 10/5/20, SAD 237/5.
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frontier, on condition that internal control of Soudan be left entirely
to Great Britain”,  ^The casualness with which these sentiments were
voiced is surprising, for implicit in them was the British ability
(and even willingness) in the absence of Egyptian agreement or for any
other reason, to interfere with the Nile flow. It is an understatement
that "the secure possession of a sufficient supply of Nile water was as
important for Egypt as security of transit through ... the Suez Canal
2
was for the British Empire". Indeed, "the idea that the security of 
Egypt depended upon the defence of the Upper Nile was as old as the 
pyramids". ^ It was this concern that had brought Britain into the Sudan, 
and it was this that demanded she stay. To both the British and the Egyp­
tians, therefore, control of the Sudan became a key, indeed the vital, 
issue as Egyptian independence drew high. This was to cause a difference 
of opinion that split the British camp* whereas the Sudan Government 
wanted to get rid of the Egyptians for reasons of its own, the Residency
 ^Cheetham to Curzon, 10/2/20, quoting Allenby from Khartoum, n.d., 
371/4983.
2
Toynbee, Survey, p. 234.
3
R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, London,
1961, p. 283. In a remarkable memorandum, Kennedy Pasha (see above, 
p. 27n.) wrote that Kitchener had realised that Britain eventually 
would lose Egypt and "it would be.necessary to hold either the mili­
tary whip-hand or the 'Nile Control' whip-hand over her". The latter 
could "flick the lash immediately. It would bring Egypt to her knees, 
within a few weeks, screaming for mercy". (M.R. Kennedy, "Memorandum 
on the political aspect of the Egyptian Irrigation Scandals", n.d., 
F.O. 371/3710.) Compare this with remarks recorded on page 273n.
In 1920 Kennedy was convicted of libelling Sir Murdoch MacDonald in 
connection with the Gezira Scheme. (Hill, BD, p. 198.) Wingate wrote 
in 1924 that British investment in the Sudan was the best way to en­
sure that a British government never let the country go to the Egyp­
tians. "This possibility", he wrote, "was in mind when I first started 
the Gezira scheme and I based it on the fact that it was the pressure 
of the bondholders that first took us to Egypt in 1882". (Wingate 
to MacMichael, 17/3/24, MECOX.)
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and foreign office were, as ever, primarily concerned to use the Sudan 
as a trump card in negotiations with Egypt. It was because of increasing 
concern that through the Gezira scheme Britain was '’robbing Egypt of 
water”  ^that Allenby had to assure the Egyptian government in February 
1920 that no more than 300,000 feddans would be irrigated (see appen­
dix I).
To obtain first-hand information the Milner mission sent Keown-
Boyd to Khartoum. In a letter covering his report he stated that
From a Sudan point of view, the ideal solution would be 
an immediate clean cut from Egypt.... Lord Milner's re­
port would ... point out the absurdity of claims made by 
Egyptians and that Egypt's only legitimate interests in 
the Sudan are the safeguarding of her water supply and 
the protection of her frontiers from external aggression.
For these His Majesty's Government would assume full re­
sponsibility, and ... take full charge of the Sudan which 
she would develop on lines of Sudanese Nationalism under 
British guidance, training and cultivating her native in­
stitutions and watching over the interests of her people. 2
Keown-Boyd's voluminous "Report in 3 parts" (i.e. army, civil, and 
"decentralisation") reflected the attitudes of the Sudan Government of 
which he had been a part. It provided a detailed plan for eliminating 
Egyptian influence from the army and government departments. The Egyp­
tian ma'mur was singled out as "the visible sign of Egyptian rule" and 
therefore of necessity the first to go. This, as noted above (p. 227) 
was a stimulus for promoting Sudanese but also for the debate over the 
advisability of continuing the ma'mur system itself. The report's 
"decentralisation" section recommended separation of the posts of sirdar 
and governor-general, and noted that "tribal sheikhs of standing" were 
already being "encouraged in an increasing degree to administer their
1 Milner to Lloyd George, 25/2/20, DEP MILNER 163.
2 Keown-Boyd to Allenby, 14/3/20, DEP MILNER 163.
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own people". He also noted that the government was trying to keep the 
southern Sudan free from "Mohammedan influences" and said that "the pos­
sibility of the Southern (black) portion of the Soudan being ... linked 
up with some central African system is borne in mind". ^
The Milner mission concluded its investigations in E&ypt in March 
and returned to London. Though the future of the Sudan had occupied the 
mission, that issue was not, in 1920, the major bone of contention be­
tween Britain and Egypt. The status of Egypt itself, the army of occu­
pation there, and future arrangements regarding the canal and imperial 
communications were all of more immediate concern to the foreign office 
and the Egyptians, nationalists and government alike. But having wit­
nessed the power of the nationalist appeal in Egypt, Milner was con­
vinced that the participation of Zaghlul had to be solicited before any 
settlement could be reached. As a framework for settlement the idea of 
a treaty between the two countries, embodying arrangements to secure 
British interests, had steadily gained favour with the mission, though
when he first mentioned it to Curzon Milner still envisaged the reten-
2
tion of the protectorate. Whatever the formula arrived at, Milner 
hoped that after his departure from Egypt the nationalists, including
3
Zaghlul, would agree to discussions if invited to London, and in 
June these were in fact arranged.
 ^Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts". Such a reorganisation would take 
place, he later wrote, "in time, of course". ("Sudan", 23/2/20,
DEP MILNER l6l.)
2 Milner to Curzon, 10/12/19, DEP MILNER 162.
^ Milner to Curzon, 17/2/20, DEP MILNER l62. See also Miner to Curzon, 
18/12/19 and 26/1/20, DEP MILNER 162.
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While the British agreed among themselves that the elimination 
of Egyptian personnel from the Sudan was desirable, only the Sudan 
Government viewed this as essential.From the time of the Milner mission 
the Sudan Government was to press for what, after all, was the logical 
continuation of Wingate's policy, the elimination of Egyptian officers, 
army units, and ma'murs, and to influence London in order to reach a 
favourable financial arrangement with Egypt.
The Milner-Zaghlul talks
The still relative unimportance of the Sudan question is brought 
out by its lack of prominence in the negotiations between Zaghlul (and 
cAdli) and the mission. Milner reported in June that the Egyptifxns were 
still balking at the word "protectorate", but that "under the guise of 
a 'Treaty'" they were "prepared to give us almost everything". But "my 
only doubt", Milner wrote, "is about the Sudan, which has not yet been 
mentioned".  ^In July a draft agreement regarding the Sudan was drawn 
up by Sirri Pasha. It called for the control of irrigation by the Egyp­
tian ministry of public works; a permanent commission "pour assurer un 
equitable partage des eaux du Nil entre l'Egypte et le Soudan", the 
president of which would be an Elgyptian; reference to the League of Na­
tions of disputes which could not otherwise be settled; and the reten-
2
tion of part of the Egyptian army in the Sudan. Nothing seems to have 
come of this draft, which would anyway have been unacceptable to the 
British and nationalists alike. In late August Allenby wrote that "the
1 Milner to Maxwell, 24/6/20, DEP MILNER 163.
2 -
"Traite entre Grande Bretagne et l'Egypte", n.d., enclosed in Ingram
to Milner, 21/7/20, DEP MILNER 163.
2^3
Sudan question has not been seriously discussed; and it seems that the 
present dual control is to endure on Egypt receiving a guarantee that 
she gets her Nile water. Here is, I fear, likely to be trouble.”  ^But 
in mid-August Milner considered that progress had been made, and he sub­
mitted a memorandum embodying a settlement proposal.
That proposal detailed a treaty covering outstanding points ex­
cept for the Sudan, of which there was no mention. Indeed, the mission's 
report was to state that
the scheme embodied in the memorandum deals only with 
Egypt. It has no application to the Sudan, a country 
entirely distinct from Egypt ... the status of which
is not, like that of Egypt, still indeterminate, but
has been clearly defined by the Anglo-Egyptian Conven­
tion of 19th January, 1899. For that reason the subject 
of the Sudan was deliberately excluded from all our 
discussions with the delegates. 2
Zaghlul insisted that the memorandum should be tested by Egyptian public 
3
opinion. Whatever the results of that canvass, some opposition did 
emerge in Egypt. It was reported that a party "of extremists and idea­
lists who want complete evacuation of Egypt, including Sudan" had in­
scribed on their banner* "'Free Egypt from the sources to the mouth of 
the Nile.'" But members of the legislative assembly reacted favourably,
only three voting against the proposals, and only one of those three
citing "the absence of any provision for handing the Soudan back to
^ Allenby to "a friend", 27/8/20, quoted in Viscount Wavell, Allenby 
in Egypt. London, 19^ 3» p. 63n.
2
Report of the special mission.
^ Ibid. The memorandum "presently came to be known as the 'Milner- 
Zaghlul Agreement', but ... was not an agreement, but merely an out­
line of the bases on which an agreement might subsequently be framed."'
Frank Fox to the Morning Post. 9/9/20, intercepted by censor, en­
closed in Scott to Curzon, 28/9/20, F.O. 371/^980. Fox said the dele­
gation was in "the position of a man who asks a thousand pounds for a 
camel, expecting to get two hundred, and is offered nine hundred."
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Egypt" as the basis for objection.  ^In any event, Zaghlul insisted on
2
major revisions and the discussions with Milner came to an abrupt end. 
Stack, in England on leave, told Wingate that the impending Milner mis­
sion report would recommend separation of the Sudan from ££ypt. "I go
3
away feeling happier", he wrote.
Despite the breakdown of the Milner-Zaghlul negotiations, the 
vehicle of a treaty still promised the best chance for a settlement.
In October 1920 Curzon, the foreign secretary, wrote a memorandum in 
which he claimed that the Sudan question could not be omitted from such
a treaty because the Egyptians would insist on it and because it was
"equally to our interest to settle its future by agreement with the Egyp­
tian Government". As had so many others before him, Curzon then came to 
the problem of how to finance an all-Sudanese army. His solution should 
be notedj
The answer, I suppose, will be that Egypt must continue 
to pay for the water that she enjoys, having, of course,
a seat on the permanent Board of Control, and that a
part of the price which she must pay for the withdrawal 
of the British garrison from Egypt is the withdrawal of 
the Egyptian garrison from the Soudan. The complete poli­
tical and military independence of the Soudan is in any 
case the ulterior object which British interests demand. ^
1 Scott to Curzon, 19/9/20, F.O. 371/^980. See also A.F.H. Wiggin,
Note on the Egyptian press, n.d., enclosed in Scott's letter to 
Curzon.
2 Wiggin, "Egypt* 1918-1925".
^ Stack to Wingate, JL8/10/20, SAD 251/7. It will be recalled that in 
August Husayn Sharif had published his four articles favouring the 
"Sudan for the Sudanese" and that pro-Egyptian activity in the Sudan 
was increasing. Stack expected the religious notables to feel "alarmed 
at no mention of the Sudan and definition of their position" in the 
Milner report, but believed he could allay their fears.
^ Curzon, confidential memorandum, October 1920, F.O. 371/^980.
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This encapsulates the British attitude in ensuing negotiations, Not 
only was Egypt to have no greater participation in the administration 
of the Sudan, she should have none at all, yet continue to finance the 
Sudan Government. The spectre of the hand on the Nile tap was all too 
evident.
The Milner mission's report stressed that Egypt and the Sudan 
should remain separate, but that Egypt's "vital interests in the waters 
of the Nile" should be safeguarded. The Sudan was "capable of and en­
titled to independent development in accordance with its own character 
and requirements." The 1899 agreement was pronounced adequate as, in 
any case, it was "much too early to attempt to determine" the Sudan's 
"ultimate political status". The separation of the offices of sirdar 
and governor-general was also recommended. ^
The cAdli-Curzon negotiations
In February 1921 the British government reluctantly accepted 
Allenby's advice to announce its intention of replacing the protecto-
2 Trate with a treaty. The way was then open for thecAdli government, 
which took office in March, to form an official delegation for treaty 
negotiations in London. Zaghlul returned to E&ypt in April, however, 
and it proved impossible to reach an agreement on the composition of 
the delegation. ^ SUill insisted that as prime minister he should head
 ^Report of the special mission. Milner resigned from the cabinet on 
l^ f February 1921, but insisted that this was unconnected 
with Egyptian affairs, although he admitted "a good deal of criti­
cism" of his report. (Milner tocAdli, 25/1/21, DEP MILNER 163.)
 ^PD, H.C., vol. 138, 3/3/21, 20^ 5. See also John Marlowe, Anglo- 
Egyptian relations. 1800-1953. London, 195^» P* 2^ 4.
^ Allenby to Curzon, Zy/^ /Zl, F.O. f^07/l89.
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the delegation but Zaghlul argued that cAdli *s negotiating with the Bri­
tish would be the equivalent of "'King George V negotiating with King
George V'".  ^cAdli therefore formed a delegation without Zaghlul, and
2
left for London in July.
Meanwhile, in the spring and summer of 1921, the Sudan question 
gained more prominence. On 8 April Zaghlul stated that "'the people de­
mand, and I must follow their wishes, that Soudan shall be beyond doubt
3
Egyptian territory'". The Sudan Intelligence Report for April noted
that some of the "younger Sudani Effendia" had attempted "to raise the
4cry 'Egypt and the Sudan axe one'". The Report for June noted that
The Egyptian vernacular press began to give greatly in­
creased emphasis to the cry of 'Complete Independence 
for Egypt and the Sudan'. The arguments employed are 
based on what purport to be facts of history from the 
Pharaohs to the Mahdist Rebellion, on the harm which 
Egypt is said to be going to suffer from the use of the 
Nile water in the Sudan, on the necessity for Egypt for 
a country in which her excess population can settle, on 
the alleged exploitation of the natives of the Sudan by 
British companies, and on the community of religion be­
tween the two countries. 5
The Report for August noted the "considerable stress" laid on the Sudan 
question in the Egyptian press, prominence being given to Egypt's finan­
cial assistance; the comparatively junior appointments of Egyptian of-
1 Allenby to Curzon, 27/4/21, F.O, 407/189.
2 Wiggin, "Egypt! 1918-1925".
3
^ Interview of Zaghlul by Egyptian Gazette, reported in Allenby to 
Curzon, 8/4/21, F.O. 371/6294.
^ SIR, April 1921, F.O. 371/6325.
^ SIR, June 1921, F.O. 371/6325.
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ficers; the Gezira Scheme and allegations that the British would ex­
ploit the Sudanese and "starve Egypt of water".  ^Little was done to 
counteract these expressions. When Allenby advised in May the immediate 
establishment of a permanent commission for regulating the Nile, Curzon 
rejected the idea because the appointment of such a commission was 
“probably the only concession to Egyptian sentiment with regard to the 
Sudan" that Britain would offer, "and a premature announcement on the 
subject would obviously detract considerably from the value of the of- 
fer. " 2
Conversations went on intermittently, however, throughout the sum­
mer. On 10 November Curzon presented a draft treaty which, in addition 
to dealing with purely Egyptian matters, stated:
The peaceful development of the Soudan being essential 
to the security of Egypt and for the maintenance of her 
water supply, Egypt undertakes to continue to afford the 
Soudan Government the same military assistance as in the 
past, or, in lieu thereof, to provide the Soudan Govern­
ment with financial assistance to an extent to be agreed 
upon between the two Governments.
All Egyptian forces in the Soudan shall be under 
the orders of the Governor-General.
Great Britain further undertakes to secure for 
Egypt her fair share in the waters of the Nile, and to 
this end it is agreed that no new irrigation works on 
the Nile or its tributaries south of Wadi Haifa shall 
be undertaken without the concurrence of a Board of 
three conservators representing Egypt, the Soudan and 
Uganda respectively. 3
There was certainly nothing concessionary about these proposals. There
was, however, a good deal of the implausible about them, especially in
the matter of a Nile board which, as proposed, would have an inbuilt
1 SIR, August 1921, F.O. 371/6325.
2 Curzon to Allenby, 10/5/21, F.O. 407/189.
3
"Memorandum of Clauses of suggested convention between Great Britain 
and Egypt, handed by the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Adly Yeghen 
Pasha on November 10, 1921", Crnd. 1555 (1921).
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British majority and simply ratify the de facto position. The Curzon 
draft was in fact the diplomatic phrasing of the October 1920 memoran­
dum in which he had foreseen a solution in Egypt’s continuing "to pay 
for the water that she enjoys” and, in return, being given a token seat 
on a board controlled by Britain. *Adli complained that the draft "repro­
duces the text and the formulae which were presented to us at the begin­
ning of the negotiations”, which had been unacceptable then as now. He 
was explicit in his rejection of the Sudan clauses: "With regard to the 
question of the Soudan, which has not yet been discussed, we feel bound 
to point out that it has been made the subject of provisions which we 
cannot accept, and which do not guarantee to Egypt the exercise of her 
indisputable right of sovereignty over the country and of control of 
the waters of the Nile." Whether these words were used to impress the 
nationalists at home or merely rhetorically, clearly no delegation could 
accept the proposed draft, which was, in'Adli's words, a mere "deed of 
guardianship".  ^By failing to accomodate moderate Egyptian opinion the 
foreign office had, as in 1919» played into the hands of Zaghlul.
After the breakdown of negotiations cAdli resigned and it proved
impossible to form a new ministry. On 23 December Zaghlul was arrested
2again and on the 29th was deported to the Seychelles. Allenby deter-
"Reply of the Egyptian delegation to the proposals of His Majesty's 
Government ...", 15/11^21, Cmd. 1533 (1921). In May 1922 the Morning 
Post reported that Adli had "prepared a draft convention concerning 
the Soudan" which was to have been submitted* for consideration if the 
negotiations went well. This convention called for Egyptian sovereign­
ty in the Sudan and the appointment of an assistant governor-general, 
who must be an Egyptian. (Morning Post. 13/3/22, in P.O. 371/7734.) 
Curzon later compared the delegation with tourists at Giza: "they had 
claimed to be transported by aeroplane straight to the summits in­
stead of mounting by laborious stages [but since they] could not get 
there straight away, preferred to remain stationery at the base." 
(Curzon to Allenby, 19/11/21, F.O. 407/191.)
2 Wiggin, "Egypt: 1918-1925".
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nuned that in light of the rapidly deteriorating situation  ^the Bri­
tish government must unilaterally abolish the protectorate but should, 
in the absence of treaty guarantees, reserve those matters of interest
to it, i.e. what came to be called the "reserved points". After much
2
wringing of hands and Allenby*s threatened resignation, the British 
government issued its declaration of Egyptian independence on 28 Febru-
3
ary 1922. J Egypt was declared to be "an independent sovereign state", 
but four matters "were absolutely reserved to the discretion of His 
Majesty's Government" pending agreement between the two sides. These 
were the security of imperial communications; Egyptian defence; protec­
tion of foreign interests; and the Sudan. "Pending the conclusion of 
such agreements the status quo in these matters shall remain intact".
The British declaration was in fact the grant of extensive auto­
nomy in the conduct of internal affairs. But while it indicated the 
British government's desire to enter into a more positive relationship 
with Egypt, the detritus of the protectorate remained. ^ Nevertheless,
 ^See Wavell, Allenby, pp. 66-6?.
^ Allenby to Curzon, 25/1/22, F.O. 407/192.
3
For an account of the policy debates in London see Wavell, Allenby,
pp. 69-80.
^ Declaration to Egypt, 28/2/22, Cmd. 1592 (1922).
^ Lloyd George told the Commons that "the British Empire ... will ... 
always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations 
between itself and Egypt.... we of course accept the protection of 
foreign interests and minorities in Egypt as a responsibility inse­
parable from the special position which we claim in the country." 
Regarding the Sudan, Britain would never allow "the progress which 
has already been made" to be jeopardised, nor could Britain allow 
"any change in the status of that country which would in the slightest 
degree diminish the security for the many millions of British capital 
which are already invested in its development." (PD, H.G., vol. 151, 
28/2/22, 272-274.) See Wingate's comment, above, p. 239n.)
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a new phase in Anglo-Egyptian relations began, in which the Sudan was 
to have a dominant role. As Milner had said, with the withdrawal from 
"administrative occupation” of Egypt, Britain's hold on the Sudan be­
came more important. As the British recognised this, so did the Egyptian 
nationalists and the educated element in the Sudan. That he who controls 
the Nile controls Egypt was no less true after 28 February 1922 than it 
had been before.
The sovereignty issue
One of the first tasks of independent Egypt was the drafting of a
constitution. On 3 April a commission was appointed for this purpose.
On 8 May Allenby told the foreign office that the commission "intended
to add a clause to the effect that Egypt and Soudan are one and the same
country also that the King of Egypt is sovereign of the Soudan...."
Allenby's immediate rejection of this  ^and his reiteration, during a
2
visit to Khartoum, of Lloyd George’s February speech seem to have
frightened the Egyptians regarding Britain's plans. The Wafd protested
3
that Britain had no intention of negotiating the Sudan's status. ^ The 
Egyptian prime minister, Tharwat (who had. formed a government on 
1 March) announced at the end of May that he had assurances from Allenby 
that the status of the Sudan would not be altered before negotiations
1 Allenby to foreign office, 8/5/22, F.O. 371/7733.
p
"Report on general situation in Egypt, 4 May - 10 May 1922", enclosed 
in Allenby to Curzon, 13/5/22, F.O. 371/7742. See also SIR, May 1922, 
F.O. 371/7746.
3
"Report on general situation ...". In November the Wafd submitted a 
memorandum to the Lausanne conference, demanding recognition of the 
complete independence of the Nile valley, and the evacuation from it 
of all British troops. (Landau, Parliaments, p. 166.) See also 
Oriente Hodemo, 2, 8, 15/1/23» PP. 498-502.
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"had been undertaken and completed",  ^a remark indicative of Egyptian 
fears that Britain might unilaterally redefine the Sudan's position.
This concern was not without reason. Current events in the Sudan 
were giving pause to British authorities in London as well as in Khar­
toum. The trial of cAli cAbd al-Latif took place in June 1922. It should 
also be noted that the crucial round in the London talks regarding the 
re-funding of the Gezira Scheme was taking place in early 1922 (see 
Appendix I). Indeed, at a meeting of the committee considering the
Gezira financing, in March 1922, Stack said that if Egypt refused to
2 3cooperate, "Great Britain must then take unilateral action". Murray, 
the foreign office representative on the committee, told Lord Balfour 
in July that events "ultimately ... would come to definitely including 
the Sudan in the British Empire and severing its connection with 
Egypt". The restraint, as always, was financial: Murray estimated a 
"breach with Egypt" to cost between one and a half and two million 
pounds a year. Annexation was the best policy "if the Treasury can be 
persuaded to see that the political importance of strengthening our 
position there outweighs the financial drawbacks involved in annexing 
the sole liability for that country". He added ominously that "if the 
annexation of the Sudan should ever become a matter of practical poli-
 ^Summary of interview for al-Ahram of the prime minister of Egypt in 
"Report on the general situation enclosed tin Allenby to Curzon,
28/5/22, F.O. 371/77^2.
2
"Minutes of inter-departmental committee to consider present posi­
tion of Gezira Irrigation Scheme", 31/3/22, F.O. **07/192.
3 John Murray (1883-1937) served in the Egyptian civil service from 
1905 to 1919. He became head of the Egyptian section of the Eastern 
department of the foreign office in 1919» and was promoted to coun­
sellor in 192**. He was counsellor at the British embassy in Rome 
from 1931 to 193**, and was minister in Mexico City from 1935 to 
1937. (WWW, 1929-19^» P. 986.)
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tics the adoption of such a drastic course will have to be justified 
some intolerable action on the part of the Egyptians'1. ^
The Times .on 23 October reported the recommendations of the con­
stitutional commission. There were two references to the Sudan: that 
the king was to be titled "'King of Egypt and the Sudan'" and that 
"'Although the Sudan belongs to the Egyptian Kingdom the Constitution 
does not apply to it and a special administration will be provided,'" 
These provocative statements forced Tharwat to resign on 29 November,
— 3
and a government was formed by Nassim Basha on 1 December, In mid- 
January Allenby made the surprising suggestion that Britain should allow 
constitutional reference to King Fu'ad as "Sovereign of the Soudan" 
and to the constitution itself as "applicable in all Egyptian terri- 
tory with the exception of Soudan". After insisting that abolition 
of the protectorate was requisite for progress, Allenby evidently felt 
the need to produce a settlement. But as the foreign office rightly ob­
served, his proposal would "be regarded generally as indicative that His 
Majesty's Government are unable or unwilling to resist Egyptian preten­
sions" in the Sudan. A compromise was suggested that would refer to 
Fu'ad's and Egypt's positions "without prejudice to any rights" they 
might enjoy in the Sudan. If the Egyptians insisted, however, on their 
present formula, Britain would be forced to inform them that their con­
stitution was "an attempt to nullify the declaration of February 28th,
^ J. Murray, memorandum, 5/7/22, F.O. 371/773^.
2
The Times, 23/10/22. The Times correspondent felt that if Egypt did 
not cooperate in the matter of filling vacancies in the army with Bri­
tish officers, the Sudan Government would be forced to take over the 
Arab and Sudanese battalions "to form the nucleus of its own indepen­
dent army." (A. Merton to The Times, 6/11/22, Times archive, London.)
3 Wiggin, "Egypt: 1918-1925".
Allenby to foreign office, l9/l/23, F.O. 371/8959.
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1922'* and an attempt either to repudiate or modify unilaterally the con­
vention of 1899. Britain would therefore give notice that if Egypt took 
any action "inconsistent with the status quo in the Sudan", His Majesty's 
Government would "consider themselves free to disregard the said conven­
tion and ... resume complete liberty of action in regard to that coun- 
try". 1
The Egyptian position, complicated by internal political pres­
sures, was put to Allenby by King Fu'ad. The khedive, he said, "had al­
ways been recognised as ruler of the Soudan which had been reconquered 
in his name". The condominium had been devised simply to avoid the capi­
tulations, and the ruler of Egypt remained the nominal ruler of the 
Sudan. If he conceded the point to the British he "would be rightly
regarded ... as a traitor since it would inevitably be represented that
2Soudan was to be definitely severed from Egypt". The problem , es­
sentially one of prestige, was the same for both Egypt and Britain: 
reference to Egyptian sovereignty would appear to be a British conces­
sion; omission of a reference would indicate Egyptian abandonment of
3
her claims. The foreign office historical adviser, J.W. Headlam-Morley, 
provided the unsatisfactory (for the British) opinion that "if the 
question ... were referred to any neutral and impartial arbitrator or 
court, it is almost inconceivable that the verdict would not be in fa­
vour of the Egyptian Government". Nor would an Egyptian statement of 
sovereignty constitute an "overt violation" of the 1899 convention.
1 Foreign office to Allenby, 18/1/23, F.O. 371/8959.
^ Telegram, Allenby to foreign office, 17/1/23, F.O. 371/8959.
3
Sir James Headlam-Morley (1863-1929), historical adviser to the 
foreign office, 1920-1929. (wvrrf, 1929-19^, pp. 615-616.)
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Headlam-Morley advised reliance on the status quo stipulation in the
1922 declaration.  ^On 3 February, however, King Fu’ad yielded to Resi-
2 -
dency pressure over the constitution. On 5 February Nassim resigned
— 3and on 15 March a new government was formed by Yahiya Pasha.  ^On 19 
April a consitution was promulgated establishing Egypt as a constitu- 
tional monarchy. On 5 July martial law was at last abolished. Zaghlul, 
who had been in exile since December 1921, was allowed to return, and 
he arrived in Egypt on 18 December. ^
The Sudan Government, watching developments in Egypt and conten­
ding with disturbances in its own jurisdiction, was becoming increasingly 
frustrated with the anomalies of its situation. In October 1923 Stack 
pointed out the intolerable nature of his own position, which had wor­
sened since the Milner mission report drew attention to it: as sirdar 
he was answerable to the Egyptian ministry of war; as governor-general 
and a servant of the British government he could hardly take orders 
from the Egyptians which contradicted British policy; he could not re­
sign as sirdar because the Egyptians would doubtless appoint to succeed 
him an Egyptian who would then be in command of all the troops in the 
Sudan. Stack suggested a solution as confused as the entire British
1 Headlam-Morley to Murray, 24/l/23, F.O. 371/8959. For an argument 
more favourable to the British position, see a note by Sir Maurice 
Amos, enclosed in Allenby to Curzon, 26/2/23, F.O. 371/8960.
 ^Wiggin, "Egypt: 1918-1925”» Wavell, Allenby, p. 95. The matter of 
Fu'ad's title came up again in 1924 when it was discovered that his 
ambassadors' letters of credence referred to him as "King of Egypt 
and Sovereign of the Sudan". The foreign office ignored this. (Kerr 
to Curzon, 19/1/24, F.O. 371/10049.)
3 Wiggin, "Egypt! 1918-1925",
4 Landau, Parliaments, pp. 61-62. The Wafd opposed the constitution on 
the grounds that it made no reference to Egypt’s boundaries or to the 
unity of the Rile valley. (Ibid., p. 166.)
5
Wavell, Allenby, pp. 98-99.
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position: since the Sudan was a reserved point, he could resign if the
British government was willing to insist that replacement by other
than a British officer would be an alteration of the status quo.
Murray concluded that
The dominant facts of the situation are that the 
Sudan is even more essential to Great Britain than 
is Egypt, and that the British Treasury has already 
guaranteed Sudan loans to an amount of ten millions 
and is about to guarantee a further three of four 
millions sterling. In these circumstances there can 
be no going back, and if Egyptian folly and obstinacy 
should render the annexation of the Sudan [necessary] 
that step will have to be taken.... the knowledge
that a rupture over the Sudan will rob Egypt of all
hope of repayment for past advances and of any say 
in the control of the Nile will act as a powerful 
brake on the exuberance of even the most nationalist 
and irresponsible of governments. 2
In T[hartoum a "rupture" was exactly what was wanted, but still the 
question persisted of how to finance the Sudan Government, and as the 
foreign office was reminded, the Treasury "would not regard any solu­
tion of the question as satisfactory which involved a charge upon the 
British Exchequer for the civil or military administration of the 
Soudan". ^
1 Stack to Curzon, ll/l0/23, F.O. 371/8991.
p
Murray, memorandum covering Stack's of ll/l0/23, F.O. 371/8991.
In parliament during the 1921-1923 period most discussions of the 
Sudan were prompted by concern over the guaranteed loans and cotton 
production. After the announcement that the Sudan was to be a re­
served point, a member asked, "In that case will the hon. Gentle­
man take care not to give any of the British taxpayers' money to 
a country which may pass partially out of our power?" (PD, H.C., 
vol. 154, 24/5/22, 16.)
^ Treasury to foreign office, 12/12/23, F.O. 371/8991.
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The 1924 negotiations
In the first election to the chamber of deputies in January 
1924 the Wafd won a stunning 188 of the 215 seats. Zaghlul, having 
campaigned almost solely on the issue of "complete independence",  ^
formed a ministry at the end of January. The first session of parlia­
ment was opened by King Fu'ad on 15 March, and much of its business
concerned the Sudan. Indeed, the Watanist party, weak but vocal, was
2to be bitterly critical of Zaghlul's position on the Sudan issue.
Meanwhile, elections in Britain had returned the first Labour
government under Ramsay MacDonald, who acted also as foreign secretary.
A feeling of optimism was injected into Anglo-Egyptian relations as it
was thought that Labour would be sympathetic to Egyptian demands, a
feeling strengthened by MacDonald's invitation, read out at the opening
of the Egyptian parliament in March, to Zaghlul to negotiate the out- 
3
standing issues.
Britain's negotiating position was hammered out over the sum­
mer. In April Allenby suggested that the "irreducible requirements" 
were confined to "effective military control of Suez Canal" and "main­
tenance of a predominant political and administrative control of 
Soudan". But he suggested that the British might "assent to slightly 
more effective participation by Egypt in administration of Soudan".
 ^Landau, Rarliamentst p. 64.
2 Ibid.. p. 134.
3
Wingate commented that he could "only hope ... that H.M.G. has some 
definite counterproposals and plans of action to counteract all this 
hot air from these fledglings from the Egyptian schools - the fact 
that the British public has ... some thirteen millions ... invested 
in the Sudan will be the best safeguard against unsympathetic govern­
ment giving away the country". (Wingate to MacMichael, 17/3/24, MECOX.)
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Ha stressed, as he had to Curzon in 1921, that a ’’Nile Water Board, 
upon which Egypt, Soudan and British Equatorial Africa should be repre­
sented” should be established immediately. The creation of a board 
"would much facilitate solution of difficulty in regard to acreage to 
be brought under cultivation at Gezira”. ^
The foreign office agreed that the British garrison in Egypt and 
the status of the Sudan must be the ”two main questions which call for 
solution”. But in the Sudan, because "Mahdism is far ftom dead", and 
"there is much inflammable material which a spark might easily ignite",
The farthest limit to which His Majesty's Government 
can safely go to meet Egyptian demands, which are es­
sentially imperialistic, consists in a reaffirmation 
of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium.... In other words, 
a reaffirmation of the actual de .jure position.
Once that was settled, "the minor problems of water rights and finan­
cial claims" could be considered, but it would be "a fruitless waste
of time" to discuss those issues before "the major political problem"
2
had been solved.
Clearly Allenby and the foreign office disagreed over the extent 
of possible concessions in the Sudan. Whereas the foreign office could 
foresee none at all beyond maintenance of the status quo (hardly a 
"concession” in any case) Allenby was willing to entertain "more ef­
fective participation by Egypt" in the Sudan's administration. The
3
Sudan Government, ever fearful of being "sold out" to placate Egypt, 
reacted by adopting a totally uncompromising stand.
 ^Telegram, Allenby to MacDonald, 6/4/24, F.O. 407/198. See Appendix I. 
2
Murray, memorandum on Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, 7/4/24, F.O. 
407/198.
3
An officer of the Sudan irrigation service told Selby in the foreign 
office in April that "There is certainly great nervousness that some 
compromise will be offered the Egyptians ... which will seriously af-
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In his important "Memorandum on the future status of the Sudan",
dated 25 May, Stack set down his government's independent position*
"Mo compromise", he wrote in a covering letter, "however innocuous in
form, would fail to be interpreted by the people as a prelude to gradual
withdrawal of British control from the Sudani' This would endanger "not
only the progress but the security of the country".  ^He recognised
that the Egyptians would "not willingly accept" his "uncompromising
solution", but
in the present state of public opinion in Egypt any 
arrangement which provides for the retention of Bri­
tish control will be equally unsatisfactory to them.
This factor is in itself a strong argument against 
half-measures....
Any settlement must "admit no doubt" that British control was complete,
and even without a settlement, "a clear declaration must be made that
2
the British Government will accept no other policy".
Stack detailed his proposals: abolition of the condominium as a 
form was unnecessary; the Sudan debt to Egypt and conditions for its 
repayment should be fixed; the Financial Regulations should be replaced 
by an Anglo-Egyptian commission for financial supervision; Egypt's 
southern frontier should be guaranteed; Egypt's existing water rights 
should be guaranteed, and the Sudan's rights should be settled on a
feet the British Government's prestige in the Sudan.... There is a 
strong feeling that England's case in the Sudan and that of the. 
Sudanese, may be given away in Cairo, because it will be considered 
as the minor and less important question". (W.D. Roberts to Selby,
15/4/24, F.O. 800/218.) Sir Walford Selby (1881-1965) was first 
secretary at the Residency in Cairo, 1919-22, and private secretary 
to the secretary of state for foreign affairs, 1924-32. (WWW, 1961- 
1970, p. 1017.)
 ^Stack to Allenby, 25/5/24', enclosed in Allenby to MacDonald, 1/6/24-, 
F.O. 371/10W .
o
Stack, "Memorandum on the future status of the Sudan", 25/5/24-, en­
closed in Allenby to MacDonald, 1/6/24-, F.O. 371/10049.
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"'water consumption' basis", with area restrictions (i.e. the 300,000 
feddan limit) being removed; Egyptian units of the army should be with­
drawn, "and the Sudanese battalions disbanded", after which Egypt should 
contribute £E500,000 annually to the cost of a Sudan defence force;
Egypt would be allowed maintenance of a small garrison "in the same way 
as is done now by His Majesty's Government". ^
The MacDonald-Zaghlul "conversations"
Stack and Schuster, the financial secretary, proceeded to London 
to represent Sudan Government interests. They conducted an adroit cam­
paign, managed by Schuster, to win over the prime minister to their un­
compromising position. Violent disturbances in the Sudan, the second
arrest of cAli Abd al-Latif, the Atbara and cadets' mutinies seemed to
* r
lend support to that position. Whereas the activists in Khartoum and 
Qmdurman may have assumed that the more vociferous their opposition 
the stronger would be Zaghlul's hand in the impending London talks, 
exactly the opposite effect was created. Each incident, no matter how 
trivial, strengthened the resolve of Stack and Schuster and enhanced the 
persuasiveness of their arguments. On 25 June Lord Parmoor, speaking 
for the British government, told the Lords that Britain would never
 ^Stack, "Memorandum on the future status of the Sudan". To the memo­
randum were appended provincial governors' replies to questions as 
to what effects "any extension of Egyptian influence or authority" 
would have in their provinces. The answers offer no surprises:
"the people loathe ... the Egyptians and their methods" (governor,
Nuba Mts. Province to civil secretary, 10/5/24); the Sudanese "know 
the Egyptians well, and despise them as being corrupt and untrust­
worthy" (governor, Haifa, to civil secretary, 22/5/24); "Mahdism, 
which is at present quiescent, would receive a great impetus" 
(governor, Kordofan, to civil secretary, 18/5/24); etc.
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abandon her position in the Sudan, a statement reinforced by MacDonald
1 2 in July, Zaghlul left Egypt on 25 July for Paris.
On 11 August Stack reiterated to MacDonald his May proposals,
and warned that
the Egyptians are already taking active steps to under­
mine British authority and particularly to stir up disaf­
fection in the Army,,,. I must make my opinion quite clear 
that unless a definite policy is effectively adopted in the 
immediate future ,,. which will enable me to have the gar­
rison of the Sudan under my sole control and freed from 
Egyptian influences, I cannot guarantee the maintenance 
of order..., if no agreement is arrived at ... His Majesty's 
Government must be ready to take unilateral action.,.. 3
This appreciation, received by MacDonald as the dust settled on
the Atbara and cadets' mutinies, was a clear exaggeration. But by now
Schuster had charted the Sudan Government's course. From the time of his
return to England his concern had been "to prevent a Labour Government
making dangerous concessions". He was advised, he later wrote to More,
the Sudan agent in Cairo,
that the most useful bit of work which could be done 
would be to get at the left wing of the Labour party 
so that the P.M. could be certain of not being attacked 
from that quarter. So I met George Lansbury and ...
Tom Johnston,... I think we can say we definitely got 
them to believe in the honesty of the Sudan Government 
and to thoroughly distrust the Egyptians.
The next step was when the Sudan question came 
up for debate in the House of Commons. It was very im­
portant that the Conservatives ... should not provoke 
the Labour people into hostilities.... I got hold of 
Baldwin and told him to give the word to his young 
men.... The result was quite a useful discussion and 
an almost unique unanimity. It was pleasing to hear 
Tom Johnston quoting from the books on the history of 
Egyptian rule in the Sudan which I had lent to him....
1 JPD, H.L., vol. 57, 25/6/24-, 986( H.C., vol. 175, 10/7/24, 2529-2533. 
Allenby later told MacDonald that "the Egyptians had merely laughed 
at Lord Parmoor's statement". ("Record of a conference held in the 
room of the secretary of state at the Foreign Office on August 13th 
at 11 a.m.", SGA, PALACE 4/9/^.)
2 Wiggin, "Egypt: 1913-1925".
** Stack to MacDonald, ll/8/2*f, SGA, PALACE 4/9/^.
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•'> The next stage was to endeavour to get the P.M.
to take the much more difficult course of taking the 
drastic action necessary to really clear up the Sudan 
position. We took the line ... that nothing short of 
kicking out the Egyptian units and the Egyptian offi­
cers ... would really permanently put the position on 
a healthy footing, hut the difficulty was to find suf­
ficient reason to justify such high-handed action. We 
made the utmost possible use of the Atbara incident, but 
that was not enough for our purpose. 1
On 14 August MacDonald warned the Egyptian government that Bri­
tain was "responsible for the maintenance of order in the Sudan" and
would take any steps necessary to preserve public security. He further
2
disclosed that the British garrison was being reinforced. On 6 Sep- ' 
tember Zaghlul wrote to MacDonlad disclaiming Egyptian responsibility 
for events in the Sudan, But "the contemplated negotiations" could not 
now take place, although "to dissipate this thick fog" which hampered
3
their relations he would be available for "conversations". MacDonald
4
replied that he too was available at any time. At a hastily convened
Schuster to More, 23/10/24, MECOX. George Lansbury (1859-1940), lea­
der of the Labour party, 1931-35. (DNB, 1931-1940, pp. 524-26.) Thomas 
Johnston (1881-1965), parliamentary under-secretary for Scotland, 1941- 
45. (WWW. 1961-1970, P* ^03.) The parliamentary debate referred to took 
place on 10 July. In his "pleasing" speech, Johnston said that "every­
thing I have read about the subject shows me that ... the record of 
the old-Egyptian Government in the Sudan was a record of slave trading, 
of oppression and theft very difficult to match in modem history.... 
They come along and say, 'We must have the Sudan handed over to us*.
The historical record does not give us any justification for agree­
ing to do that. If ... Gessi ... is correct in saying that in a com­
paratively short period of time no fewer than 400,000 slaves were ta­
ken out of the Sudan by Egyptians ... and if it is correct that, after
the Dervish movement was put down, it was found that the population
had been decimated from somewhere about 10,000,000 people to 1,500,000, 
these historical facts would certainly not justify anybody on this 
side of the House in wishing to return the Sudanese people to the sole 
dominance of the Government of Egypt". (PD, H.C., vol. 175, 10/7/24, 
2521-2524.)
2
Foreign office to Egyptian government, 14/8/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/44.
^ Zaghlul to MacDonald, 6/9/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/44.
^ MacDonald to Zaghlul, 6/9/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/44.
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meeting (of MacDonald, Stack, Lord Thomson,  ^Tyrrell, Murray and 
Schuster) on 8 September, MacDonald, "thinking aloud", said he feared 
Zaghlul might "’play the part of Samson* and bring down the whole Egyp­
tian fabric on the heads of himself, of us, and all the foreign inte«? 
rests". Schuster intervened "to point out that any hope based on ...
'waiting and seeing*" the results of talks with Zaghlul "was the most
2
dangerous illusion". After this meeting Scuster drafted a letter for 
Stack to send to MacDonald "demanding that unless Zaghlul publicly re­
cants all the outrageous claims which he has made during the last three
months, M G  must [[confront] them ... with the accomplished decision 
to rid the Sudan of all Egyptians military and civil". Schuster com­
plained to MacMichael of
the accursed delay till Eaghlul comes ... and there
is still the danger that he may bamboozle the PM and
wriggle out of the dilemma in which he ought merci­
lessly to be placed. But I hope not. It is a dangerous 
game in any case but it seems the only possible one to 
play.... In the meanwhile I may have to restart some of 
my left wing Labour propaganda,... 3
Stack sent the letter drafted by Schuster to MacDonald on 16 Sep­
tember. In it he insisted that no matter what the result of the talks, 
action on the array question must be taken. The foreign office endorsed 
this position. On 22 September Stack wrote to Sterry, who was acting
^ Christopher Birdwood Thomson, 1st Baron Thomson (l8?5“1930), secre­
tary of state for Air, 1924. (WWW. 1929-1940, p. 1343.)
 ^Schuster to MacMichael, 12/9/24, SAD// s 469.
^ Schuster to MacMichael, n.d. (Oct. 1924), MECOX.
4 Ibid. In this note Stack said that the British forces in the Sudan were 
inadequate to contain a widespread mutiny, "even if the restless and 
fanatical tribesmen were to remain quiet". Such a rising, he said with 
embarrassed periphrasis, would have "the almost inevitable consequence 
of what would be practically tantamount to a campaign for the recon­
quest of the Sudan". (Stack to MacDonald, 16/9/24, F.O. 371/10033.)
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governor-general, that "our difficulty is to find excuse for drastic
action" and that when the conversations with Zaghlul "showed agreement
to he impossible", the time would be right.  ^On 23 September another
meeting was held which Schuster considered "depressing ... because it
gave us the impression that the P.M. was going to back out of doing any- 
2
thing". On the 24th Stack had a private interview with MacDonald which
3
lasted an hour, in order to press "the urgency of drastic action".
This is where matters stood when Zaghlul arrived. Tne Sudan Go­
vernment had succeeded, if not certainly in obtaining recourse to 
"drastic action", at least in ensuring that the talks would fail unless 
Zaghlul abandoned his position and publicly recanted, a course of events 
all knew to be impossible. To Stack and Schuster the talks were a mere 
formality, the completion of which would clear the way for "drastic 
action". Indeed, £rom their point of view, the greatest danger was that 
the talks might succeed in reaching a compromise.
The first conference was held on 25 September. Present were Mac­
Donald, Zaghlul, and two experts on each side (Selby and Murray for the 
British). MacDonald at once raised the Sudan question, but Zaghlul in­
sisted that it was the British who had deviated from the status quo by 
encouraging "any movement in favour of Great Britain" and by punishing 
Sudanese loyal to Egypt. MacDonald reiterated the position that Britain 
had responsibility for maintaining order, to which Zaghlul replied 
that Britain
 ^Telegram, Stack to Hakimam, 22/9/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/45.
2
Schuster to MacMichael, n.d. (Oct. 1924), MECOX. See "Record of con­
ference held at 10, Downing Street, on Tuesday, September 23, at 
10 a.m.", F.O. 407/199.
^ Schuster to MacMichael, n.d. (Oct. 1924), MECOX.
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was inclined to act independently. Since when had she 
the right to do so? The status quo implied co-operation, 
but the British Government had arrogated to themselves 
the right to act alone.... A man who cries out for Fuad 
is punished, but if anyone cries out for Great Britain, 
nothing is done. 1
The meeting then degenerated into repartee and accusations. Nothing 
was accomplished.
The second conference was held on 29 September with the same par­
ticipants. Zaghlul said that "they should follow the natural order of 
things and commence by talking about Egypt and deal with the Sudan after­
wards", To this view, after initial protest, MacDonald deferred. Zaghlul 
wanted "every vestige of British control to disappear", but he said he
hoped a treaty relationship could be arranged. That shred of hope was
2
apparently enough for the meeting to end on an optimistic note. This 
worried Schuster, who wondered if he should "tell H.E. fstack] that he
3
must hand in his resignation and follow suit" with his own.
The third and final Zaghlul-MacDonald conference took place on 
3 October. Zaghlul insisted that an alliance should satisfy Britain, 
MacDonald insisting that British troops must guard the canal. The mi­
nutes reveal the crux of the problem: "In the event of war, Egypt might 
not be on the British side", MacDonald noted, and it was "no use dis­
cussing the point whether the British were going to leave the Canal."
The Sudan question was not even taken up. A communique stated that the
 ^"Record of a conference held at 10, Downing Street, on September 
25t 1924, at 10:30 a.m.", F.O. 4*07/199. Schuster described the mee­
ting as "preliminary sparring". (Schuster to MacMichael, n.d.
(Oct. 1924), MECOX.)
2
"Record of second conference...", F.O. 407/199.
^ Schuster to MacMichael, 30/9/24, MECOX.
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conversations had concluded and that 2aghlul was returning to Egypt 
because of ‘'inclement weather" and the reconvening of the Egyptian par­
liament in November. ^
On the evening of this last conference Tyrrell, Murray and Schuster
met and considered a statement prepared by Murray which concluded that
2
Britain should assume "sole control" in the Sudan. At another meeting
3
the next day, with Allenby and Sir Eyre Crowe  ^in attendance, Schuster
again stressed the need for "drastic action" but Allenby opposed this.
It was agreed, however, that a despatch should be sent to the Egyptian
government embodying Murray’s statement. In Schuster's words,
Etyre Crowe and Tyrrell both took the line 'Don't ask for 
too much or you will scare the Prime Minister off alto­
gether and he will not even send the despatch. On. the 
other hand if he does send the despatch, Stack can then 
go to him and say "Your policy is unworkable unless I 
kick out the Egyptian units and convert the rest into a 
Sudan defence force" and then will be the time for him 
to play his final capi of saying he cannot carry on un­
less this is done*. ^
At this stage the situation was complicated by the imminent dis­
solution of parliament over the Campbell crisis. On 6 October "the old 
gang met once more at No. 10 with Allenby included". MacDonald announced 
that he would seek a dissolution on the 8th. "Therefore having only two 
days ... how could he commit the country to a course which might mean 
serious trouble and bloodshed in Egypt?" Schuster argued but MacDonald
* "Record of a third conference...", F.O. 407/199.
^ Schuster to MacMichael, n.d. (Oct. 192*0, MECOX.
^ Sir Eyre Crowe (1864-1925) was asst, under-secretary of state for 
foreign affairs, 1912-20, and permanent under-secretary from 1920 
until his death in 1925. (DNB. 1922-1930, pp. 219-221.)
** Schuster to MacMichael, n.d. (Oct. 1924), MECOX.
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was adamant that he "could, not under any circumstances now agree to
carrying out a coup d'etat on the Army or issuing an ultimatum". 1 There
was, as Schuster observed, "not much use pointing a pistol at the head
2
of a man who knows he is going to die in two days anyhow". Thus Stack
did not submit his resignation, and Schuster felt that "the handling of
the next stage of the situation passed to Allenby and Stack", but he
was confident that Allenby would prove cooperative, and in any case,
fortune is again on our side. We have succeeded in getting 
the Labour Party to commit itself and the British Govern­
ment to a strong policy ... and the probability is that 
we shall now get a Conservative Government in power to 
put this policy into effect.... In the meanwhile we have 
Allenby in Cairo who is exactly the right man for this 
act of the drama. 3
Writing to More, Schuster was even more explicit*
I feel very strongly that we must take the offensive new 
and get the Egyptians 'on the run'.... There are many 
other points on which we should also resume the offen­
sive, notably the waters question and the 300,000 
feddan limit, though these are of minor importance com­
pared with the Army question. ^
MacDonald had addressed the despatch to Allenby, reiterating in stronger
terms Britain's intention to take action if the status quo were not ob-
K
served, and Allenby and Stack arranged to have discussions in Cairo 
to settle their course of action. "The best thing", Schuster remarked, 
"will be if Stack can get through all his part there in a week and then 
push on to Khartoum". ^
^ Schuster to MacMichael, n.d. (Oct. 192*0, MECOX.
2 Schuster to More, 23/10/2*1, MECOX.
^ Schuster to MacMichael, n.d. (Oct. 192*0, MECOX.
^ Schuster to More, 23/10/2*f, MECOX.
MacDonald to Allenby, 7/10/24, Cmd. 2269 (192*0.
6 Schuster to More, 23/10/2*+, MECOX.
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The crisis of November 1924
Stack and Allenby both arrived in Cairo at the end of October. On 
the 29th the Conservatives were returned to power in Britain; Baldwin’s 
government took office on 6. November,with Austen Chamberlain as the new 
foreign secretary. It soon became clecu: that Schuster's expectations of 
a Conservative ministry had been correct. On 10 November the foreign of­
fice told Allenby that
Once His Majesty's Government have taken up the Egyptian 
challenge on all or any of the points on which the Bri­
tish position has been assailed.... it will be essential 
to pursue the matter until the Egyptian government have 
given us full satisfaction. This may involve the use of 
coercion and it is therefore necessary to select as the 
subject of our representations one which public opinion 
... will recognise as an essential imperial interest. ^
It was thereafter agreed that the Egyptian Army should be that sub-
2
ject, and Allenby proposed that a British "communication" to Egypt 
should include the splitting of the sirdarate into Egyptian and Suda­
nese halves, and, if that were rejected, evacuation of all Egyptian
troops from the Sudan. Stack said that any "situation arising" out of
3
the latter eventuality could be dealt with.
On 19 November at 1:30 p.m. Stack, accompanied only by his aide- 
de-camp, Captain Campbell, and his chauffeur, Alfred Marsh, left the 
War Office to drive to the Sirdaria, his official Cairo residence, for 
lunch. A few minutes later, as the car slowed in traffic, shots were 
fired at them by a group of Egyptians standing on the kerb. All three
1 Foreign office to Allenby, 10/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
2 Chamberlain to Allenby, 10/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
3 Allenby to foreign office, 13/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
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occupants of the car were wounded, but the driver managed to proceed
1 2 to the Residency. Stack had suffered three wounds, one serious.
He was taken to the Anglo-American hospital and underwent surgery. He 
showed some improvement until about noon on the next day. His condition 
thereafter deteriorated rapidly, and he died at 11*45 P.n * on 20 No­
vember. ^
Just two months earler Stack had said that "our difficulty is to 
find excuse for drastic action". Now, through exquisite irony that ex­
cuse had been provided. The convenience of Stack's death, from the point 
of view of British policy, has almost alone provided fodder for wild con-
5
spiratorial theories. ^ Leaving aside innuendo, however, the inadequacy
European department, ministry of interior, Egyptian government,;"The 
Sirdar murder trial", n.d., p. 39 ♦ MECOX. Upon being shot Stack ex­
claimed,'"! am hit, go to the Residency". (W.D. Kenny, "The murder of 
the Sirdar", n.d., SGA, PALACE 4/11/53.)
2
"The Sirdar murder trial", testimony of Dr. Sydney Smith. For an in­
teresting account of the investigation, see Sir Sydney Smith, Mostly 
murder, London, 1939 > chapter 7» "The murder of the Sirdar".
3
Dr. F.C. Madden, "Medical report on the condition of His Excellency 
the Sirdar ...", 20/11/24, F.O. 371/10072. Marsh and Campbell both 
survived.
^ Medical bulletin, 21/11/24, SGA, PALACE 4/11/53.
About Stack's assassination one modem writer has said* "Was it a case 
of provocation, as has been suggested? Was it the work of extremists, 
beyond Zaghlul's control? At the end of 1924 a French visitor ... was 
told in confidence by Field-Marshal Allenby that the ultimatum had 
been lying in his desk-drawer several days before the assassination. 
The Sirdar had been favourable towards Egyptian claims, and had been 
kept back in Cairo for three days beyond the appointed time.... This 
delay had given rise to comment." (Jacques Berque, Egypt, imperialism 
and revolution, London, 1972, pp. 388-389.) The French visitor wsls 
Maurice Pemot, author of travelogues, who claimed in his book Sur la 
route de l'Inde, Paris, 192-7» p. 25, that the information about the 
ultimatum came from Sidqi Pasha, not Allenby. According to Pernot, 
Allenby told Sidqi he had the ultimatum before the murder, and simply 
modified it, making it more severe. But to consider that the ultima­
tum was already prepared is to ignore the intense controversy that
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of British security must be noted. Murderous attacks on British offi­
cials and civilians in Cairo were not uncommon, and had been the sub­
ject of Residency representations to the Egyptian government. On 18 No­
vember - the day before Stack was shot - Bardsley, his private secre­
tary, had. cabled Khartoum warning of rumours abroad of a secret society, 
in Khartoum, "with the object of ousting very prominent officials - 
including the most prominent", and "though the matter may be wind it is
advisable to take no risks". ^ Further, at the trial of Stack's assas- 
2
sins, his A.D.C. testified that he had seen one of them loitering
along Stack's customary route and had "noticed that the young man was
3
observing us closely". Despite all this, and the added danger of the
already tense political climate, Stack had no escort, his movements were
4habitual, and his A.D.C. was not even armed.
Even as Stack lay dying, Allenby cabled the foreign office with 
a list of demands he proposed to make of the Egyptian government. These
ensued between Allenby and the foreign office as to its terms. To say 
that Stack was "favourable toward Egyptian claims" is ridiculous. His 
delay in leaving is almost certainly irrelevant: he had already been 
in Cairo for three weeks; no one could have "kept him back". It is 
possible that Stack had in fact stayed on to discuss specifically the 
evacuation of the Egyptian Army from the Sudan. On the 10th Chamberlain 
had told Allenby that the "War Office are anxious that advantage 
should be taken of Sir Lee Stack's presence ... for his proposals to 
be discussed...." (Chamberlain to Allenby, 10/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.)
1 Bardsley to Springfield, 18/11/24, SGA, PALACE 4/11/53. E.O. Spring­
field (1892- ) was asst, private secretary, 1924-25, and private 
secretary, 1926-27. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 42.)
2
On 7 June 1925 eight Egyptians were sentenced to death for the mur­
der of Sir Lee Stack. ("The Sirdar murder trial", p. 103.) On was 
later reprieved.
3 Ibid., testimony of Captain Campbell.
Ibid. Special protection for the governor-general while in Egypt was 
begun only after Stack's death. (Keown-Boyd, "Note to the minister of 
the interior", 28/2/25, F.O. 407/200.)
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wore an apology, apprehension and punishment of Stack's assailants, 
and payment of a large fine, "say quarter of a million", and "immedi­
ate application of scheme suggested in my telegram No. 352" (of 15 No­
vember, proposing evacuation of Egyptian troops from the Sudan).  ^In 
the meantime Allenby received a cable from the foreign office, de­
spatched before the attack on Stack, suggesting Egyptian appointment of
a member to a commission "to examine possibility of extending 300,000
2
feddan area in Gezira...". Then, on the 20th, Allenby wired London 
with "modifications and additions" to his proposals, including a de­
mand that "Egyptian government shall consent to increase as need may
3
arise of land to be irrigated" in the Gezira. ^ It therefore seems pro­
bable that the controversial Gezira clause was an Allenby afterthought 
originating in a foreign office suggestion which he seized upon as a 
convenient way of dealing with a problem he had himself created in 1922. 
(See Appendix I.) Even before Stack's death the ultimatum was becoming 
a catch-all for every irritant to British interests in Egypt and the 
Sudan.
On the 20th Chamberlain instructed Allenby to include in his de­
mands the appointment of an Egyptian member to a proposed Nile commis-
4sion to examine the increase in Gezira irrigation. Clearly the Resi­
dency and foreign office were suffering from delays in communication.
 ^Allenby to foreign office, 19/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
 ^Foreign office to Allenby, 19/11/24, F.O. 371/10043. Murray's minute 
to Allenby's no. 352 stated that the Gezira was "a question of first 
class economic importance to the Sudan which will have to be taken up 
fairly soon with the Egyptian Gov't."
3 Allenby to foreign office, 20/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
^ Chamberlain to Allenby, 20/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
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Allenby wanted the demands to be made before Zaghlul could resign, thus 
giving “a signal proof of his incapacity and failure to conduct the af­
fairs of his country”.  ^Chamberlain, however, insisted that the Cabinet
2
must approve any ultimatum before it was delivered, and rejected the 
idea of a, fine, since that "would be regarded abroad as vindictive ...
3
whereas payment of annuity to Sudan government ... is amply justified."
At about five p.m. on the 22nd Allenby, after cabling the foreign
office that although its authority had not yet reached him he must act 
- 4before Zaghlul resigned, delivered an ultimatum to him. The demands 
were prefaced by a statement that Stack’s murder was the "natural out­
come of a campaign of hostility to British rights and British subjects 
in Egypt and the Sudan". Britain therefore required that the Egyptian 
government should apologize for the crime; bring the criminals to jus­
tice; pay a fine of £500,000; "order within twenty-four hours the with­
drawal from the Sudan of all Egyptian officers, and the purely Egyptian 
units of the Egyptian Army"; "notify the competent Department that the 
Sudan Government will increase the area to be irrigated at Gezira from 
300,000 feddans to an unlimited figure as need may arise"; withdraw ob­
jections to British wishes regarding foreign interests in Egypt; and 
suppress political demonstrations. "Failing immediate compliance with 
these demands", it concluded, "His Majesty’s Government will at once 
take appropriate action to safeguard their interests in Egypt and the
1 Allenby to foreign office, 20/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
^ Chamberlain to Allenby, 21/11/24, F.O. 371/10043.
5 Chamberlain to Allenby, 22/11/24, F.O. 371/10044.
^ Allenby to foreign office, 22/11/24, F.O. 371/10044.
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Sudan". A second communication specified that "the j>urely Sudanese ele­
ment in the Egyptian Army" was "to he formed into a Sudan Defence Force 
under British command and responsible to the Sudan Government only."  ^
Despite their apparent irrelevance to the assassination, the substantive 
demands were, as we have seen, the result of years of largely fruitless 
Anglo-J^yptian negotiations: Stack's death was not the cause of the ul­
timatum, but only affected its timing and exact contents.
The British cabinet had little choice but to support the ultima­
tum and, not surprisingly, Zaghlul had no choice but to reject it. He 
agreed to an apology, fine, and prosecution of the murderers, but of 
the Sudan demands he ironically observed that "the new arrangement pro­
posed for the Egyptian army ... constitutes a modification of the status
2
quo which the British government had declared its desire to maintain".
Zaghlul resigned on 24 November. Allenby told London that "foreign
opinion expects us to do something striking", and proposed, among other
measures, that "hostages should be taken if another Englishman or
3
foreigner is murdered and ... be shot if murders continue". This was 
evidently too much for Chamberlain, who despatched Nevile Henderson to
^ Allenby to foreign office, 22/11/24-, F.O. 371/10044. The ultimatum 
approved by the Cabinet was similar, but omitted the fine, demanded 
instead an annuity of £E1,000,000 for the Sudan, called for such 
changes in the Gezira irrigation limits as could be made without 
detriment to Egypt, and demanded appointment of a member to a com­
mission to decide these changes. (Foreign office to Allenby, 22/11/24, 
F.O. 371/10044.)
2 Allenby to foreign office, 23/11/24, F.O. 371/10044. The bulk of the 
fine was used to set up the Sir Lee Stack Indemnity Fund, which fi­
nanced medical projects, mostly in the southern Sudan. Between £E7,000 
and £E8,000 was used to construct the tower of the Anglican cathedral 
in Khartoum. (SGA, PALACE 4/2/7.)
^ Allenby to foreign office, 24/11/24, F.O. 371/10044.
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Cairo with instructions about "the objects at which His Majesty's Govern­
ment are aiming and the difficulties which they wish to avoid".  ^This 
Allenby naturally took as an expression of lack of confidence, which it 
was, and it led directly to his resignation in 1925. The despatch of
Henderson publicized London's disapproval of Allenby without modifying
2the ultimatum responsible for that disapproval. Chamberlain's princi­
pal concern was public opinion, which had seen the Gezira demand as a
3
threat to starve Egypt of water, and the ultimatum as a whole as
4"political exploitation of a favourable situation", a fair enough as­
sessment.
Chamberlain to Allenby, 24/11/24, F.O. 371/10044. Sir Nevile Hender­
son (1882-1942) was later to become ambassador in Berlin, 1937-39.
(DNB, 1941-1950, PP. 376-378.) Henderson, after reviewing the situa­
tion, supported Allenby's wording of the Gezira demand. (Henderson 
to Selby, 6/12/24, F.O. 800/264.)
2
Henderson himself wrote that it was "absolutely undeniable" that his 
appointment had created "an unfortunate impression and effect" in 
Egypt. "Talk about the cook's hair in the consomme", he wrote pri­
vately to Selby, "if she had moulted entirely into the soup it would 
scarcely have been as unwelcome as my arrival in Cairo.... I always 
expected to be received at first as a Foreign Office spy but I did 
not anticipate much more than that...." (Henderson to Selby, 6/12/24, 
F.O. 800/264.)
3
A British soldier in Cairo wrote that "the best part" of the ulti­
matum was "the clause about irrigation which practically means we 
shut off their water if they don't behave". (E.J. Montgomery to his 
parents, 23/11/24, Imperial War Museum, PP/MCR/21.) Sir Bertram Hornsby, 
a British resident in Egypt, thought the Sudan should be annexed, so 
that "we could always threaten to cut off Egyptian water.... there 
would never be any need to put the threat into execution - the Egyp­
tians would accept anything we cared to impose on them rather than 
let things go to that point." (Note by Sir Bertram Hornsby, 21/11/24, 
MECOX.)
4 See Sir Ronald Graham, Rome, to foreign office, 27/11/24,
F.O. 371/10073.
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"Drastic action”
The evacuation of the Egyptian units had for long been thoroughly 
planned by the military authorities in Khartoum. The scheme effected in 
November 1924 was the work of Colonlel Huddleston and the ubiquitous 
Schuster, and was code-named, appropriately, "Plan *E*". 1 In May Huddle­
ston had prepared a memorandum detailing plans for reorganising the army
and excluding Egyptians from it, for the reasons of political security
2commonly cited, but also for economic and administrative reasons. It-
is important to note that "the possibility of the evacuation ... had
3
been envisaged for some months ... by officers in the army".
At 7*11 p.m. on 23 November, Zaghlul having rejected the ultima-
4turn, Khartoum was instructed to proceed with the evacuation. Allenby 
had stipulated that the Egyptian troops would be allowed to retain arms 
but not ammunition, which, in Huddleston’s words, changed the evacuation 
"from one approximating an act of war" into the mere "movement of troops 
under very abnormal conditions”. ^ Five special troop trains had been 
prepared, and the plans at first went smoothly, but the third battalion 
and artillery, stationed at Khartoum North, refused to move without or­
ders from King Fu’ad, and said they would meet force with force. Allenby
 ^Interview with Sir George Schuster, 19/5/76. As early as 1920 Keown- 
Boyd had submitted an evacuation plan. ("Report in 3 parts".)
 ^Huddleston, "Note on the future of the Egyptian Army", 17/5/24,
DEP MILNER 165.
3
Ewart report on political agitation, appendix 11.
4
Ibid.
^ Huddleston, "Report on the evacuation of Egyptian Units and officers 
from the Sudan", 26/12/24, F.O. 371/10879.
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arranged for the war minister to send a message to the recalcitrant 
troops. This letter cirrived only on the 27th. The departure of the 
Egyptians was interrupted by news that the 11th Sudanese battalion 
had mutinied.
As has been noted, Stack told MacDonald in August that he could
not guarantee order if his army proposals were not put into effect.
There had been ample warning throughout the summer of disaffection in
the army, but no apparent attempt to combat it. Willis wrote in July
that "the most important recent addition to the classes whose political
activities are under suspicion is that of the Sudanese officers on the 
2
active list." Another report noted that the White Flag League "had
3
gained about 20 from among the N.C.O.s and men of the Xlth Btln."
The arrest of cAli cAbd al-La*£if and the cadets1 mutiny added to the con­
cern. Incidents of insubordination, involving both Egyptian and Sudanese 
soldiers, occurred at Wau in August and at Malakal in September. En­
quiries into the former found that the "influences at work in the army" 
were doubts as to future prospects; the oath of allegiance to King 
Fu'ad; "unsatisfied conceit"; and "ill-considered nationalist aspira- 
tions". The second of these, the oath, assumed great significance in 
the November mutiny at Khartoum. The first, concern over future pros­
pects, had been continuous.
Huddleston had noted in May that Sudanese officers' pay was "ex­
cessive" and that "the native officer system is an extremely extrava-
1 Allenby to foreign office, 25/11/24, F.O. 371/10044.
^ Willis to private secretary, 1/7/24, F.O. 371/10905.
^ Willis to private secretary and others, 3/7/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49. 
q.
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gant one". Most of the officers "might be absorbed in Civil Pepart-
ments ... but it is open to question whether an entire cessation from
granting commissions to natives would lead to considerable discontent
in view of the fact that it is a well established custom and that many
better class natives have been encouraged to look forward to their sons
becoming officers."  ^In discussing the summer disturbances we have
seen that the tiny intelligentsia felt justifiable unease about their
future. This fear was shared by the Sudanese officer class. Indeed, the
cadets' mutiny had been precipitated by the poor treatment of Sudanese
candidates for the officer corps. cAlI cAbd al-Latif was later to say that
"the Egyptians had always told the Sudanese that the Sudanese officer
would lose his status if the Egyptians disappeared and would be no more
2
than a warrant officer". As early as 1920 General Maxwell had written 
that "economy is everything for the future of the Sudani any extrava­
gance she indulges in should be in the direction of British personnel, 
not troops.... Writing as a soldier, it will, I know be difficult to get
3
soldiers to agree to their own elimination...." Keown-Boyd shared this
/
view when he wrote for the Milner mission that it was "a debateable 
question whether the necessity for a Sudan Army exists, and whether pub­
lic security cannot be fully maintained by a well-organised police 
force, on a gendarmerie basis, officered mainly by British". Stack's
 ^Huddleston, "Note on the future of the Egyptian Army".
2
Baily, journal entry, 3 0 / 1 1 / 2 In July Willis noted that the officers 
"appear to have been promised unlimited promotion in the Egyptian 
Army purged of British influence, whilst they see little hope of pro­
motion or distinction in a Sudan Gendarmerie". (Willis to private 
secretary, 1/7/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/49.)
Maxwell to Milner, 3/5/20, DEP MILNER l6l.
^ Keown-Boyd, "Sudan 1920", n.d. (March 1920), DEP MILNEPi l6l.
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own memorandum of 25 May 192^ actually called for the disbandment of the 
Sudanese battalions. As Sudanese officials reacted against an apprehen­
ded diminution of their standing, so too perhaps did Sudanese officers 
react to the possiblity of their being left, not only without hope of 
promotion - the unsatisfied conceit of the Ewart report - but without 
any positions at all. The government did nothing to ease these fears.
Reports on the mutiny of the 11th Sudanese on 27-28 November con­
sistently blamed Egyptian officers for its instigation. According to the 
Ewart report, a meeting was held on the 25th among the Egyptian officers 
in Khartoum North, and they elected Ahmad Rifcat Bey of the artillery 
as sirdar.  ^Sudanese officers were then incited to demonstrate and were 
promised that "the moment the first shot was fired, the Egyptian artil­
lery would support them by shelling the fort, the palace, the British 
barracks, and other important places". The Sudanese "ringleaders" were 
reported to be two officers of the 11th. They led their men in a march 
to the Musketry School where they were joined by other Sudanese offi­
cers and where they forced open the magazines and collected guns and 
2
ammunition. Baily, the acting governor of Khartoum, considered, how­
ever, that there was no intention of violence on the part of the Suda­
nese. This was demonstrated by their actions! "the mutineers had nu­
merous opportunities of offering violence to British officers, offi­
cials and others, of none of which did they take advantage". Indeed, 
when they approached the War Office, "nothing could have prevented 
them from entering the building and killing the whole General Staff .,.
Ewart report on political agitation, appendix 11.
p
"Report by director of intelligence", 22/12/24, enclosed in Allenby
to Chamberlain, 13/1/25, F.O. 371/10879.
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had they desired to do so."  ^In fact the objective of the mutineers
2
was to join the Egyptian units in Khartoum North. (See map.)
As they headed toward the Blue Nile bridge the marchers were 
met by Col.McCowan, the officer-commanding Khartoum district, who or­
dered them to halt and asked where they were going. They said-
'To join our.brothers of the 3rd Battalion in Khartoum 
North'. He did his utmost to turn them back, warning 
them that they would be fired upon if they tried to ad­
vance, and would have succeeded had the men been alone; 
but the officers counteracted his efforts and threatened 
him with their revolvers.... 3
Huddleston, as acting sirdar, determined to attempt exerting his per­
sonal influence on the men, who had halted on Khedive Avenue, somewhat 
to the west of Gordon College. His own account of the ensuing events is 
as follows:
By the time we arrived at the platoons it was almost 
dark.... so as to give the mutineers every opportunity 
I went forward myself. I halted about 80 yards from them 
and called out very loudly *1 am the Sirdar'. I got no 
response. I went about 20 yards closer and called out 
'I am Huddleston Pasha'. Someone answered me in very 
clear Arabic who I think was an officer but could not 
see 'We do not know Huddleston Pasha, we know only 
Rifat Pasha'. I repeated my name and he repeated his 
answer. I then said 'will you take my orders?' He said 
'No.' I will only take Rifat Pasha's orders'. I left him, 
returned to the Argylls and ordered Major Couper to open 
Vickers fire. It was almost 18:30 hours. ^
The first shots of the mutiny were thus fired by British troops under
the direct orders of the acting sirdar.
Ewart report, on political agitation, appendix 11.
^ Baily, journal entry, 27/11/2**.
^ "Report of director of intelligence", 22/12/2**.
^ Huddleston to Spinks, 28/11/2**, SGA, PALACE **/H/55.
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Events then unfolded swiftly. After the firing began the Sudanese
troops rushed into the nearby military hospital compound (see map)
where they killed one British and two Syrian doctors and three Egyp- 
1
tians. A cordon of British troops was drawn up around the buildings, 
but during the night "parties of mutineer’s" managed to escape. Some of 
these, Baily remarked, "were hunted down next day and killed or cap­
tured by the police, but the majority made their way back to barracks 
2
in Omdurman". In the morning, after "repeated attempts to dislodge 
them with machine gun fire and bombing", a howitzer was brought in and 
fired at point-blank range on the building in which the mutineers had 
taken cover. An attempt to rush them failed. "It was only after four 
hours continuous slow shellfire ■, bombing, machine gun and rifle fire 
that all fire ceased and the house was occupied without further casual-
3
ties. There were no survivors..,." So ended the mutiny of the 11th
Sudanese. Four officers were tried and sentenced to death for their
parts in the rising. Three were executed on 5 December and one officer*s
**sentence was commuted by Huddleston to fifteen years in prison.
What had happened? The evidence indicates that the mutineers 
were in fact conducting what they felt was a politiacl demonstration!
 ^Baily, journal entry, 27/11/2**. Willis said that "this invasion of 
the hospital and its compound was the immediate result of the opening 
of fire on the mutineers". (Willis, "Report of director of intelli­
gence". )
2
Ewart report on political agitation, appendix 11.
^ Huddleston to Spinks, 28/11/2**, SGA, PALACE **/ll/55» Willis said the 
shelling lasted seven hours. ("Report of director of intelligence on 
mutiny of November 27-28,*' 22/12/2**, enclosed in Allenby to Chamber- 
lain, 13/1/25, F.O. 371/10879.)
^ Sterry to Allenby, 7/12/2**, SGA, PALACE **/ll/33. An interesting ac­
count of the rising is in Gwynn, Imperial policing, pp. 150-180.
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in this sense the events of 27 November fall into the pattern estab­
lished during the summer. The troops had
proceeded down Khedivial Avenue, and even while they 
deployed to face the cordon of British troops ...
British officials, accompanied by their wives and 
children, passed among them, all unsuspecting of 
anything more than a precautionary practice parade.
... Not a house was entered; not a person was molested.
These and similar instances prove that there was no 
spirit of fanaticism, or even of lawlessness, behind 
the movement....
Despite the conclusions of the Ewart report, there was little solid
2
evidence of Egyptian “complicity". A more persuasive argument for the
cause of the rising was given by Willis* the confusion of the Sudanese
troops as to where their loyalty lay. Their "reputation as officers and
gentlemen" was at stake and they looked to the government "to show them 
3
the way out...." The Ewart report, hardly sympathetic to dissidents,
described the officers' position as "impossible", and said that "there
is no getting away from the fact that the higher the mental capacity of
the native officer, the more reason he had, latterly, for doubt as to
4where his allegiance lay". Nor was this realisation the result of the 
Ewart report. In September Davies had written a remarkable (for him) 
report of an interview with a Sudanese officer*
 ^Ewart report on political agitation.
2
Baily, "Memorandum on Egyptian complicity in the mutiny of the 27th 
and 28th November 1924", 21/12/24, SGA, PALACE 4/11/55.
5 Willis to C.S.O. & A.G. (Huddleston), 27/11/24, SGA, PALACE 4/11/55.
Ewart report on political agitation. Huddleston had said in Septem­
ber that anti-British officers "cannot be called disloyal as they 
are loyal to King Fuad to whom they have taken oath. They are in 
fact his officers and not ours.... Even if final settlement perpe­
tuates Anglo-Egyptian Sudan its army must be Anglo only." (Huddle­
ston to Stack, 3/9/24, quoted in Stack to MacDonald, 16/9/24,
F.O. 371/10053.)
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I found him intelligent and well-mannered. He expressed 
his views quietly, with an air of sincerity and, clearly, 
spoke with a considerable sense of responsibility.
He observed that the oath of allegiance he had ta­
ken to the person of King Fuad ... was much more formi­
dable than that taken to his predecessors.... he ... had 
done his best to evade it. The oath was imposed on him 
by his British superior officers. He was, he said, of 
those who take their religion seriously, and he there­
fore felt himself to be completely bound by his oath....
I formed the opinion that this officer and his like would 
certainly refuse to obey any order which was quite obvious­
ly designed to break the tie between themselves and King 
Fuad which their oath constitutes. It seems to me, fur­
ther, that they might obey, in those circumstances, a
counter-order emanating directly from the Egyptian Minis­
ter of War. 1
This was written to Huddleston two months before the mutiny.
When the Egyptian units in Khartoum North refused to entrain, an order
was obtained from the war minister, which they obeyed. Why was this pro
cedure not followed with the Sudanese troops? Would it have been too em
barrassing politically to be seen to be negotiating with the troops?
Was the 11th Sudanese treated as an example in order to prevent a
general rising? In any case a trigger-happy attitude seemed to prevail.
At the Palace, where British residents had been collected, "all the
civilian men were given guns (rifles) and put on guard and they seemed
2
to thoroughly enjoy it", waiting for an attack that never came and no
3
doubt daydreaming a reenactment of the Gordon passion. C.G. Dupuis,
1 Davies to C.S.O. & A.G. (Huddleston), 15/9/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/44.
In October Huddleston himself wrote that in the Malakal disturbance 
officers had cried "'Long live Fuad King of £feypt and the Sudan'.... 
They feel secure in their use of it as its use cannot be termed mu­
tinous or seditious". Huddleston suggested an order forbidding the 
cry to "show that incitement to mutiny ... would be vigorously dealt 
with in future". (Huddleston to Stack, 13/10/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/47.)
o
Mrs. Gladys Leak to her mother, 30/11/24, fihodes House, Oxford,
MSS. Afr. S416.
^ Charles George Dupuis (1886-1940) served in Khartoum, 1909, 1914-17; 
Sennar, 1910-13; Kordofan, 1917-22; Darfur, 1922-26; as governor of 
Fung, 1927-28; and as governor of Darfur, 1928-35. (MacMichael,
SPS. p. 21.)
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"leaning out of the window of the Governor's Office while £the bombard­
ment of the military hospital] was going on mistook a warder for an 
enemy and shot him dead". That "tragic mistake", Baily said, "might have 
happened to anyone. The respective uniforms were almost identical."  ^
While the shelling went on, Huddleston composed a letter to a British 
official "who had complained of the noise made by a gramophone" at the
hospital: ‘"I am now bombarding the building1", wrote Huddleston, "'and
2
I hope that the nuisance you referred to will be abated.•" When a 
Sudanese officer, who had been Stack's aide-de-camp, later suggested 
that the mutineers might have been allowed to join the Egyptians or that 
Rifcat Bey should have been brought to reason with them, Huddleston 
wrote that "if an officer like Okeil, an intelligent and high-class 
Arab who has spent all his service in close contact with British offi­
cers, holds these opinions, what can one expect from the low-class and
3
more stupid black officer". It seems fair to conclude that the situ-
4
ation might have been managed without bloodshed. But if Huddleston
Baily, journal entry, - 28/11/24. With only two platoons of one bat­
talion resisting authority, how could an "enemy" be identified by 
his uniform?
2 Ibid.
3 Huddleston to Spinks, 1/12/24, SGA, PALACE 4/11/33.
4 In contrast to the hospital siege, Baily and two others went to the 
barracks of the Hamla Battalion (a Sudanese unit). "To our unfeigned 
relief", he wrote, "a party of unarmed men issued from the barracks. 
.... we shook hands and said 'We have come to talk over a misunder­
standing, not to make war*. We then walked into the barracks. The 
guard saluted us...." The commander of the Sudanese Mounted Infantry, 
named Adair, "a natural leader of 'native' troops and officers", ex­
plained the situation to the men. "We then left everybody smiling 
and with confidence in the Govt.", wrote Baily, and they returned to 
the governor's office for champagne. (Baily, journal entry, 28/11/24.)
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overreacted or showed disregard or a lack of understanding of the nuances 
of the problem he (and the Sudanese officers) were facing, there is no 
indication that his handling of the rising was ever officially ques­
tioned, ^
Other less serious disturbances occurred as a result of the evacu­
ation, At Talodi, Egyptian officers refused to hand over their weapons 
and were supported by their Sudanese colleagues. The entire 10th Suda­
nese battalion eventually became involved, shots were fired, but there 
were no casualties and calm was restored with the arrival of a British
force and an order from the Egyptian war minister to the resisting offi-
2cers.
A minor but widely publicized disturbance occurred at the Khartoum 
North central prison where, among others, the mutinous cadets ana poli­
tical prisoners were interned. The Ewart report was highly critical of 
the laughably inadequate prison regime. Some political prisoners, like 
cAli cAbd al-Latif, had the run of the prison; the wardens were retired 
soldiers: their senior n.c.o. was "an infirm and senile veteran of 90"; 
"sing-songs and political discussions took place", involving prisoners, 
visitors and staff alike. This friendly atmosphere was troubled on 
11 November when thirty-four of the cadets were sentenced to eight 
years* imprisonment. On the 18th a dispute began over food, and on the
 ^Schuster later wrote that the "real right time for [Huddleston to 
take] precautions was before the incidents happened. It only bore 
out exactly what I had expected from his own telegrams." ("Rough 
notes by Col. Schuster", 3/12/24, F.O. 371/10883.) Henderson later 
observed that "there would appear to have been more ignorance and 
childishness than real malice and disloyalty to the British" behind 
the mutiny. ("Notes on a visit to the Sudan, January 10-25, 1925"t 
5/2/25, F.O. 800/264.)
2
Ewart report on political agitation.
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24th the political prisoners took over the entire prison. Contact was
made with the Egyptian troops of the 3rd battalion and artillery, from
whom the prisoners expected assistance.  ^Muhammad al-Mahdi (above,
p. 205) and*Ubayd Hajj al-Amin (above, p. 195 et passim) were named-.as
the prime movers in the trouble and were later sentenced to seven and
2
six years respectively. On 1 December the rioters were told, that fur-
3
ther hostility would result in their being shot, and they surrendered. 
The prison riot, or "mutiny'', was of no long-term significance. Invol­
ving as it did political prisoners it thereby took on a political as­
pect. Sound security would have prevented the disturbance altogether.
Its beginning the day before the attack on Stack was a coincidence. The 
riot belongs to the catalogue of demonstrations of the summer of 1924, 
of which it was the last.
The evacuation of the Egyptian units and officers went on, over 
twenty-six hundred men leaving on special trains by 4 December. On 28 
December Huddleston reported that except for a few officers, details in 
the Bahr al-Ghazal and personnel of the Medical and Mechanical Trans- 
port corps, the evacuation was complete.
 ^"Proceedings of a magisterial inquiry as to events in the Central 
Prison Khartoum North", 5/12/24, SGA, PALACE 4/10/51.
2 "Prison riot trial", n.d., SGA, PALACE 4/10/51.
3
^ Ewart report on political agitation, appendix 10. See also "Report 
by director of prisons on mutiny in Central Prison, Khartoum North", 
6/12/24, F.O. 371/10879.
4 Huddleston, "Report on the evacuation of Egyptian units and officers 
Prom the Sudan".
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Aftermaths the Condominium retained
The pressure to take "drastic action" did not cease with the de­
livery of the British ultimatum to Egypt. On 21 November Sterry, the 
acting governor-general, demanded of Allenby that the Egyptian flag 
should be hauled down,  ^and while the ultimatum seemed to mollify him, 
the disturbances in Khartoum reopened the question. On 29 November the 
governor-general's council met and were unanimous that "abolition of 
condominium is more imperative than ever". Allenby, however, failed to
see that "events of last few days or previous events justify abolition 
2
of condominium".
Allenby's moderation is understandable. It was he, after all, who 
would be responsible for steering Anglo-Egyptian relations back to a 
workable position, and as Henderson later put it, "the maintenance of 
the Egyptian flag ... remains as a lever with which ... to exert pressure 
on Efeypt in the future and in the nature of a reminder to her to exer-
3
cise caution lest the cut with the Sudan become complete".  ^But at the 
foreign office there was a fear that Allenby was "getting on, or be­
lieves he is getting on, so well with Ziwar's government [which had ta­
ken office on 2** November] that he is naturally anxious not to ask for
anything which would endanger the conclusion of an agreement which he
**is inclined to consider satisfactory". Even though things had "gone 
 ^Baily, journal entry, 21/11/2**.
^ Telegram, Allenby to foreign office, 30/11/2**, F.O. 37l/lOO**5.
3 Henderson, "Notes on a visit to the Sudan".
^ Murray, note dated December 192**, F.O. 371/100**7. Lord Derby (war 
minister, 1922-2**) told Chamberlain to "keep a watch on Allenby. He 
has got rather a knack of doing the strong thing and then whittling
28 7
incredibly well", Schuster wrote, the Residency were "back at their 
old game of trying to negotiate for a friendly settlement.... We haven’t 
nearly finished our fight with Egypt...." ^
This new phase of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations centred on a bargain 
whereby Egypt would pay an annuity to the Sudan Government in exchange 
for insurance of her water rights. Chamberlain warned that if the Egyp­
tians did not come to terms, they "should be prepared for the conse- 
2
quences", and when there was haggling over the manner in which the an­
nuity should be paid, he observed that the Egyptians seemed to be forget­
ting that "the maintenance of the condominium is very much more in their 
interest than it is in ours". Barring a settlement, he noted ominously, 
the Egyptians would have to rely on the "goodwill of His Majesty's
3
Government which they have done nothing to deserve".
A commission was duly established, and an Egyptian annuity agreed 
upon. But the refusal to strike the Egyptian flag "knocked the heart 
out" of the British in Khartoum:
it down afterwards...." (Derby to Chamberlain, 26/11/24, F.O. 800/256.) 
Allenby admitted as much: he told the foreign office that he had de­
liberately made the demands on Zaghlul excessive to frighten the Egyp­
tians and to make it easy for a new Egyptian government to settle 
for reduced demands. (Allenby to foreign office, 27/11/24, F.O. 
371/10045.)
 ^"Rough notes by Col. Schuster".
2 Chamberlain to Allenby, 15/12/24, F.O. 37l/l0046.
^ Chamberlain to Allenby, 31/12/24, F.O. 371/10046.
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How can we carry on? [wrote Baily] We have held the name 
of Egypt up to scorn and contempt. We and the Sudanese 
have rejoiced in at last being able to join together in 
a common execration. We unceremoniously boot them out.
Yet we keep their flag.... The F.O. are saying in dip­
lomatic language that they want just one more murder 
before allowing us to haul down the flag. 1
It was up to the Treasury to settle the matter. Egypt should not be re­
lieved "at the expense of the British taxpayer" of costs she had until
November borne. The greatest possible Egyptian financial contribution
2
should be accepted, "whether military or otherwise". The Egyptian 
government, of course, was more than willing to pay, since a subvention 
would allow some influence, no matter how vestigial, to be exerted in 
the Sudan. Henderson went to Khartoum and emphasised the "necessity of 
doing nothing to hinder the present [^gyP^i311] Government in its diffi-
3
cult but essential task of crushing Saad Zaghlul and his party'1. Thus 
the Sudan question had reverted to the position of one issue in the lar­
ger context of Anglo-Egyptian relations, a position it had, briefly in 
1924, escaped.
The declaration of 1922, despite its professed intention, was in 
fact a device to prolong the status quo. This is did successfully in 
Egypt, where Britain was unwilling to make any concessions and was in­
vulnerable to pressure.lt was no doubt hoped that this would be the case 
in the Sudan as well. Indeed, even by declaring the Sudan as "absolutely 
reserved" to their discretion the British had stolen a march on the 
Egyptians. The declaration strengthened the British case legally, just 
as the propagandized Sudanese loathing of Egypt had been used to
 ^Baily, journal entry, 7/12/24.
 ^Niemeyer (Treasury) to foreign office, 4/2/25, F.O. 371/10883.
3
Henderson, "Notes on a visit to the Sudan".
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strengthen it morally. But the outbursts of 1924 threatened to destroy 
that case unless and until they could be blamed entirely on treacherous 
Egyptian influence. Thus the status quo became unacceptable to London, 
interpreted and coloured as it was by the indefatigable Schuster and a 
heavily dramatized account of Sudanese events. Zaghlul, for his part, 
would not be reconciled, but would not reach an agreement because no 
agreement signed by Britain could even approach his oft-proclaimed goals, 
and for the moment agitation in the Sudan was producing British discom­
fiture. What he had not bargained for, and on this most contemporaries 
agreed, was the action of the uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) fringe 
of Egyptian nationalism. The assassination of Stack revived the force 
of Britain’s waning moral arguments and invested the political demands 
of the ultimatum with an aura of righteous wrath.
The role of the Sudan Government in moving Britain from a policy 
of maintaining the status quo, from which neither the dilatory Balfour 
nor the imperious Curzon had publicly deviated, to a policy of "drastic 
action” was decisive. That the Sudan should have been able to influence 
the debate to this extent is remarkable: it would have been inconcei­
vable for Wingate to have been in such a position in the days when Cro­
mer, Kitchener, or even Gorst were British Agents in Cairo. But since 
the end of the war and especially after 1922 the Sudan assumed much 
greater economic and political importance, as the Gezira Scheme neared 
completion and as Egypt won nominal independence. Stack and Schuster 
also had the advantage, exploited so well by Wingate before them, of 
having a monopoly of information from the Sudan. Thus when Stack warned 
of having to reconquer the Sudan again, the home government had to 
listen, no matter how nonsensical the claim. The Sudan Government wan­
ted the Egyptians out, and any settlement falling short of that goal 
was unacceptable. Insofar, therefore, as Zaghlul has been portrayed as
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the intransigent obstacle to accord in 1924, the popular view of him, 
as of the ultimatum, has been purposefully misleading.
The assassination of Sir Lee Stack and the troubles that preceded 
and followed it were to have long-term effects, some of which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. It might be apposite here to make a few 
observations as to those events. Whether or not one ascribes blame for 
the manner in which the mutiny of the 11th Sudanese was put down, the 
attitude contributory to it, that denied Sudan Government responsibi­
lity for events in the Sudan, should be noted. Whatever the role of 
Egyptian propaganda, there were real and obvious Sudanese grievances 
behind the 1924 troubles. And as one Residency official pointed out:
It is not to be believed ... that if you could cut out 
Egyptian influences everything would be comfortable again.
It is no doubt a true generalisation ... that the Sudanese 
don't like the Egyptians, but it doesn't follow that they 
do like us - a supposition which, though it seems to be 
frequent, is not reasonable. Why in the world should they...? -*■
Simply put, the Sudan Government had much too high an opinion of itself,
the result of the self-congratulatory ethos of the Wingate era, its own
propaganda, and its isolation from outside scrutiny and criticism. The
depiction of the Egyptians as villains immunized the government from
blame, just criticism, and even legitimate argument.
The matter of competence may be raised in connection with the
Sudan Government's preparation for and reaction to the 1924 trouble.
We have seen that warnings of disaffection in the ranks were apparently
ignored or discounted; that the central prison, packed to overflowing
with political prisoners was nonetheless hopelessly insecure; etc. In
his September letter to Selby, Furness doubted "whether those who know
about money" in the Sudan Government were "sufficiently counterpoised
1 R.A. Furness to Selby, 27/9/24, F.O. 800/218.
*
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by those who know about discontent”.  ^If dire events were anticipated,
as the government kept indicating all summer, why were most senior of-
2
ficials on leave? Intelligence was inadequate, and while Stack arran­
ged in the summer for Ewart to conduct his enquiries, this was too lit­
tle too late. Injected into the triangular Anglo-Egyptian conflict in 
1924 was a personal element, not of decisive but of contributory impor­
tance. Since forcing the 1922 declaration and even before, Allenby had 
not been admired in the foreign office, nor in the Sudan where mistrust 
of high commissioners was endemic. Allenby and Chamberlain fell out over 
the despatch of Henderson, and Allenby despised Zaghlul, a fact not to 
be ignored in assessing the former’s timing of the ultimatum.
Allenby and Chamberlain agreed, however, as to the role of the 
Sudan in Anglo-Egyptian relations. When the bargaining over the Egyptain 
annuity was going on and the Sudan Government demanded that the payments 
be earmarked for "general” rather than “military” purposes, Chamberlain 
observed that the Sudan Government's position implied "an independence 
of Egypt which the Sudan does not possess”, a Cromeresque phrase guaran­
teed to alarm the Sudan Government. Despite his difference with Allenby, 
Chamberlain wrote that he did
not want to destroy the condominium and still less to make 
the position of a friendly Egyptian government more diffi­
cult.... Sudan administration seems to me to be thinking 
exclusively of its own difficulties. They must.take account 
also of yours and of the broader aspects of our whole posi­
tion. 3
1 Furness to Selby, 27/9/24, F.O. 800/218.
p
Henderson later noted that in 1924 the civil, legal and financial 
secretaries had all served as acting governor-general. In 1923» in­
credibly, the post had also been occupied by the chief justice and by 
the general manager of the Sudan Railways. (Henderson, "Notes on a 
visit to the Sudan”.)
 ^Chamberlain to Allenby, 23/12/24, F.O. 371/10047.
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Thus the Sudan Government had forcefully to be reminded that the Sudan 
was still essentially an issue in Anglo-Egyptian relations. The British 
"coup d'etat" against the Egyptians had not altered that fundamental 
fact. What it had done, however, was to give the Sudan Government a much 
freer hand in internal administration and, by humiliating the Egyptians 
through forced evacuation, to maJce a strong impression on the Sudanese.
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Chapter IV: The Beginnings Of Indirect Rule
Almost without exception the memoirs and histories written by Bri­
tish officials of the Sudan Government in the 1920s state that Indirect 
Rule came to the Sudan as the result of two unrelated events: the disse­
mination of Lord Lugard^ The dual mandate in British tropical Africa 
(1922) and the arrival of Sir John Maffey as governor-general in 1926. 
Whether one accepts this or not depends largely upon the definition of 
Indirect Rule employed. In 1918 C.L. Temple, in Native races and their 
rulers, defined it as a system "which leaves in existence the adminis­
trative machinery which had been created by the natives themselves.... 
by which European influence is brought to bear on the native indirectly, 
through his chiefs, and not directly through European officers...." ^
But in 1934 Margery Perham stressed a more progressive aspect of the 
concept by defining Indirect Rule as
a system by which the tutelary power recognizes existing 
African societies, and assists them to adapt themselves 
to the functions of local government. This recognition is 
a legal one.... The system gives to native institutions 
the fixity and status that only detailed statutory recog­
nition can give.... 2
There have been, of course, other definitions, but all shared the idea 
of employing traditional authority rather than relying on an unadultera­
ted European conception of administration. The apparent liberality of 
this attitude was always an attractive aspect of Indirect Rule and one 
not overlooked by its proponents in the Sudan. Indeed, they would have
^ C.L. Temple, Native races and their rulers, Cape Town, 1918, p. 30. 
Charles Lindsay Temple (I871-1929) was chief secretary, Northern 
Nigeria, 1910-13, and It. governor, Protectorate of Nigeria, 1914-17. 
(WWW, 1929-1940, p. 1332.)
2
Margery Perham, "Some problems of Indirect Rule in Africa", Journal 
of the Royal African Society, XXXIV, supplement to April number (with 
separate pagination), p. 4 . Cf. I.F. Nicolson, The administration of 
Nigeria 1900-1960, Oxford, 1969, pp. 124-179.
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accepted Margery Perham's definition because it gave to a backward- 
looking idea a liberal veneer and the sophistication of a sound theore­
tical foundation which, in fact, it lacked.
If the Lugardian practice in Northern Nigeria is used for pur­
poses of definition, Indirect Rule came late to the Sudan, though even 
then not so late as 1927. But the relative lateness of the system’s for­
mal theoretical adoption does not mean that the Sudan had been before 
then subject to "direct rule" or, in fact, to any clearly definable and 
systematically enforced method of administration. Indirect Rule itself 
meant different things simultaneously in the Sudan. Its lack of a concise 
definition was convenient, since the resulting vagueness allowed a mul­
tiplicity of interpretations geared both to local conditions and the pre­
ferences of local officials. Indeed, as we have seen, the theoretically 
direct rule of the Wingate years was an ideal rather than the reality, 
descriptive rather of a theory than of a working system, but nonetheless 
productive of slow, steady results and increasing centralisation. Direct 
rule in practice, however, placed an intolerable burden on the few Bri­
tish inspectors. From the outset that burden was shared with Sudanese 
traditional authority.
The impulse of the early Condominium was to continue the centra­
lising policies of the Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist regimes. Tribal po­
licy was to be, in Kitchener’s words, "to seek out the better class of 
native, through whom we may hope to influence the whole population".  ^
Shaykhs were perceived not as natural leaders to be left alone, but as 
the logical (in fact the only possible) agents of the government among 
the population. They comprised a pliable class who could be told what
 ^Kitchener, "Memorandum to Mudirs", enclosed in Cromer to Salisbury, 
17/3/99, F.O. 78/5022.
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to do and replaced if they proved uncooperative or ineffective. The power 
of tribal leaders was thus dissipated, as its exercise was considered by 
the government, and judged by the people, to be by leave of the inspec­
tor and the Khartoum regime behind him.  ^This deterioration of tribal 
authority was a logical result of government interference, which was con­
sequent to a lack of commitment to the professed aim of associating 
shaykhs in the real business of administration.
There were exceptions to the rule of degenerating tribal authority: 
the chief impetus toward Indirect Rule came from the provinces where it 
retained considerable vigour. These were the provinces with a largely 
nomadic population, where the problems of finance and personnel were 
acute. Despite Khartoum*s advocacy of direct rule, and the theoretical 
chain of responsibility, in practice local arrangements were made by lo­
cal officials. In western and northern Kordofan, for instance, inspec­
tors "had surreptitiously given a great deal of power to the shaykhs....
2
the inspector was supposed to do everything but he just couldn't".
There simply was not the staff or money to maintain any but the lightest
supervision of nomadic tribes. A lackadaisacal approach was common even
in provincial centres. As late as 1923 the governor of Bahr al-Ghazal
told Sterry, the legal secretary, of a system of chiefs' courts (lukikos)
that had been instituted there. Sterry remarked that
This I think is the first I have heard of the Organisa­
tion of Chiefs Courts. I have no objection to raise and 
in any case I imagine it is only putting a system which 
has always existed on a rather more regular basis; but 
it would be convenient if I could be informed fully of
such arrangements if only for the purpose of having a
 ^See Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 142-1^7.
2
Interview with Sir Angus Gillan, 2V5/76. See also Warburg, The Sudan
under Wingate, pp. 1^2-14?.
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complete record ... of what the actual system of 
administration of justice is in all parts of the 
Sudan.... 1
So far, therefore, as any generalisation at all can be applied to 
the Sudan administration before the end of World War I, it might be said 
to have followed two different lines: one, in compliance with the letter 
and spirit of official policy, and backed by the convictions of many ad­
ministrators, that increasingly imposed direct rule and diminished al­
ready shaky tribal authority, especially in the riverain areas of the 
north; the other, responding rather to necessity than to theory and again 
consonant with the preference of local officials, had few pretensions 
beyond maintaining law and order, collecting taxes and correcting what 
were seen as serious abuses of tribal authority. Davies, a central fi­
gure in the ensuing debate between the two schools, having been inspec­
tor in Kordofan (1912-20) wrote for example that until 1913 eAli al-Tum's 
authority had been absolute: “Everyone knew in a vague way that some­
where in the background was El Hukuma. the Government, but none of its
2
myrmidons had ever lived in Dar Kababish".
The close of the war occasioned several changes which have been de­
tailed above: the spectacular rise of Sayyid cAbd al-Rahraan and the un­
certainty attached to his motives and ends; the attempt to accelerate 
the removal of Egyptians from civil and military positions; and the be­
ginnings of a secular opposition. All of these, together with the finan­
cial situation, necessitated (or so it seemed) a rethinking of the go­
vernment's position in relation to the various religious and tribal in­
stitutions, and a judgement as to what form of administration should be
^ Sterry to governor, Bahr al-Ghazal, 25/8/23, SGA, CIVSEG 1/9/31.
2 _
Davies, The camel's back, p. 64. cAli al-Tum's image as the arche­
typal tribal ruler assumed majestic proportions in Davies's (and other) 
memoirs. See also Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, p. 145.
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adopted to reflect the changed circumstances. The end of the war also 
saw the appointment as assistant civil secretary of MacMichael, whose 
views on matters of administration were to prove decisive. From the role 
of Willis in policy towards Mahdism it can be appreciated how one man 
could dominate a field and, indeed, the government itself as MacMichael 
came to do. Regarding administration he was to write in later years that 
’’the native"
has his chief, secular or religious, and expects to 
have to obey him and to see authority upheld. To tell 
him that in the eyes of that curious phenomenon, the 
Law, all men are equal, is merely to condemn the Law 
as an ass.... A sense of homage is natural to him. It 
is a good and sensible instinct, and it must be given 
scope. 1
On the practical side, MacMichael held that
It is of vital importance that we get the best men to 
be Sheikhs if we are to expect them to exercise any 
authority and so gradually relieve the administrative 
staff of the Government of a proportion of its work.... 
the average Sheikh in many provinces is little better 
than a local scallywag deputed by the villagers to do 
such things an the Government require Sheikhs to do. 2
The remuneration of shaykhs
To ensure that shaykhs were the "best men" it was important that 
the position be made an attractive one. Despite universal recognition 
not only of the services they rendered but also of their meagre compen­
sation, the position of the tribal shaykh, with some notable exceptions 
like cAli al-Tum, had generally deteriorated throughout the Wingate
 ^MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 24-0. This quotation para­
phrases "The Sudan Historical Survey", 192^ , SGA, PALACE 1/3/63.
 ^MacMichael to financial secretary, 29/3/22, SGA, CIVSEC 20/21/97.
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years.  ^Attempts to alleviate the financial plight ofcumdas and shaykhs 
during Stack's govemor-generalship were frustrated by Bernard, the fi­
nancial secretary until 1922. Though reforms of the system of shaykhs' 
remuneration were constantly demanded, as indeed they had been during 
Wingate's tenure, the power of the financial secretary to interfere in 
political matters through his control of the purse was not broken (but 
in fact increased) even with Bernard's dismissal.
The issue of remuneration was raised at the Governors' Meeting of 
1918, which unanimously agreed that the present system was inadequate in 
view of the shaykhs' "multifarious and continuous duties and loyal ser- 
vices", which were "continually increasing". ' The current rates (1% 
of the date tax collected; l|% of the land tax; of the animal tax;
2-§% of the ushur; and 10$ of the tribute) while perhaps seemingly 
generous, were in fact exceedingly low. The governors recommended pay­
ment at the rate of 10$ in all categories. That shaykhs' duties were 
"continually increasing" was evidence of the conception of tribal lea­
ders as merely another level of bureaucracy, whose role would be the 
greater as, in Feilden's words, "the Government administers the country 
more closely".
Bernard complained that the increase suggested would cost about 
£E21,000 a year, that a higher rate would tempt shaykhs "to limit their 
efforts", and that in any case "the financial situation does not ...
 ^Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. lA-6-1^ 7.
2
Extracts from Governors' Meeting, 1918, enclosed in Feilden to fi­
nancial secretary, 12/8/18, SGA, CIYSEC 20/21/97.
'i
J "Remuneration of Qmdas and Sheikhs for collection of taxes", n.d.,
SGA, CIVSEC 20/21/97.
^ Feilden to financial secretary, 12/8/18, SGA, GIVSEG 20/21/97*
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permit of such a large sum being found".  ^There then began a long pro­
cess of procrastination about which Feilden and MacMichael could do 
nothing. In May 1919 Feilden suggested an increase of the rate to 5% of 
land and date taxes and ushur, and 10$ of animal tax and tribute. " The 
financial secretary's office promised that, while it was too late to act 
upon the request that year, it would be included in the estimates for 
1920. ^ MacMichael insisted that the "loyal cooperation" of shaykhs and 
cumdas had "been given to us almost gratis for twenty years", and that 
cooperation would be endangered if the rise were "shelved". When the 
Governors* Meeting of 1920 again recommended an increase to 10$, the fi­
nancial secretary again opined that "the financial situation does not
permit of any further increase".but that the matter would be considered
<5
"in connection with the Budget Estimates for 1921". J In 1921 the go­
vernors proposed increasing the travelling allowance for members of 
ushur assessment boards to 10 P.T. per day. ^ The acting financial secre­
tary, however, "regretted that the financial situation at present does
n
not admit of the proposal being favourably considered," This argument 
became increasingly bitter as time went on, and only ended when Bernard
 ^Financial secretary to civil secretary, 9/1/19, SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97.
2 Feilden to financial secretary, 29/5/19, SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97.
3 Acting financial secretary to civil secretary, 18/6/19,
SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97.
L.
MacMichael to private secretary, 30/6/19, SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97.
Financial secretary to civil secretary, 1/9/20, SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97.
^ Extract from Northern Governors* Meeting, 1921, n.d., SGA,
CIVSEG 20/21/97.
n
Acting financial secretary to civil secretary, 26/9/21,
SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97.
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was dismissed in 1922. MacMichael had argued for increases by noting 
that "It is because we never pay them decently that in many Districts 
decent men will not serve, consequently we have to fall back on an in­
tensive system of administration needing an ever increasing staff of 
officials, instead of allowing the natives to manage their own affairs."^ 
In May 1922 the governor of the Red Sea Province went so far as 
to say that the present scale of remuneration was "a form of 'forced la­
bour"*, and told Bernard that the increase in travelling allowance 
"would really not help matters at all; except as regards yourself", as
Bernard "would be able to point out that their position had been im- 
2proved". Finally in October 1922 governors were given permission to 
raise the travelling allowance from 2 P.T. to 5 P«T. "in all cases where
3
the current rate of donkey hire is P.T. 5 diem or more". ^ This ar­
gument had gone on for two years even though the financial department 
estimated that the increase would involve an added expenditure of only 
£E2,106. To be fair to Bernard, it should be remembered that the cri­
sis caused by the Gezira cost overruns dominated the financial situa­
tion. He was, as he once said, "always retrenching" (see Appendix I) 
even before the pressure to do so became intense. Moreover, Bernard's 
replacement by Schuster did not mean an immediate accession to the
 ^MacMichael to financial secretary, 30/5/21, SGA, CIVSEC 20/21/97.
2
Governor, Red Sea Province to financial secretary, 3/5/22,
SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97.
^ Asst, financial secretary to governors, 26/10/22, SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97. 
k
"Excess Expenditure involved by the increase of the allowance paid to 
Omdas and Sheikhs for donkey hire from P.T. 2 to P.T. 5 per night", 
enclosed in acting financial secretary to civil secretary, 12/10/22, 
SGA, CIVSEG 20/21/97. While the authorised rate was raised to 5 P.T., 
four provinces reported that donkey hire already exceeded that amount.
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governors' demands* at their meeting in 1924 the northern governors 
again proposed "a universal increase from 5/& to 10% in the remuneration 
granted to sheikhs on land tax, date tax and ushur."  ^The effect of all 
this controversy over remuneration was to make the positions ofcumda 
and shaykh all the more unattractive and less prestigious.
The Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, 1922
At the Northern Governors' Meeting in 1920, Browne, the governor 
of Berber, submitted proposals for the future course of administration.
In addition to having in mind "what has occurred in India and Egypt", 
he claimed that "one of the principle reasons" for his recommendations 
was to "counteract the preponderating influence of religious leaders".
To do this it was necessary "to strengthen the solid elements in the 
country, sheikhs, merchants, etc., before the irresponsible body of half­
educated officials, students and town riff-raff takes control of the 
public mind". The governors suggested that "town committees" might be 
formed to discuss "budgets and municipal matters". They also recommended 
that "where tribal organisation exists the Government should endeavour 
to foster" it. Governors should hold annual meetings of the important
secular leaders, and municipal councils should be established in large 
2
towns. Thus the dual policy of extending authority to both shaykhs and 
the educated class was affirmed.
One result of the governors' initiative was "The Khartoum,
Khartoum North and Omdurman Municipal Council Proclamation" of 1921.
This established a "consultative and advisory" council to make recom-
 ^Minutes of Northern Governors' Meeting, 1924, n.d., SGA, CIVSEC 21/5/24. 
2
Minutes of Northern Governors' Meeting, 1920, n.d., SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
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mendations regarding the local services budget, administration of vari­
ous ordinances applicable to municipal affairs, and other matters to be 
referred by the governor. Its ex officio members were to be the governor 
of Khartoum (as president); the inspectors of the three towns and the 
sub-inspector of Khartoum, and the ma'mur of Omdurman; four other offi­
cials to be named by the governor-general; four members to be named *>y 
the Sudan Chamber of Commerce; also not more than sixteen or less than 
ten additional members, "half of whom must be natives of the Sudan" to 
be appointed by the governor-general "from among the notables and mer­
chants of the Municipal area".  ^Notable by their absence were members 
of the Sudanese official class.
A more important result of the 1920 .Governors ' Meeting was that
Feilden canvassed the governors' views on extending the powers of 
2
shaykhs. Contrary to what must have been expected after approval of
the concept at their conference, almost all the governors responded
3
pessimistically. Browne, of course, was enthusiastic. But the governor
of Khartoum wrote simply that he did not think "any tribal organisation
4exists which can usefully be fostered". The governor of Sennar said 
that "the Arabs of this Province are so very mixed that little or no 
tribal organization or recognised codes of tribal rite and custom exist
5
among them". Lyall, then governor of Kassala, said that "tribal orga-
 ^"The Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman Municipal Council Procla­
mation 1921", Sudan Gazette, no. 375, 15/5/21. A_similar council was 
established in Port Sudan. (Muddathir cAbd al-Rahim, Imperialism and 
nationalism in the Sudan, Oxford, 1969, p. 64.)
 ^Civil secretary to governors, 14/4/20, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
^ Governor, Berber to civil secretary, 9/9/20, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
4
Governor, Khartoum to civil secretary, 19/4/20, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
5 Governor, Sennar to civil secretary, 25/8/20, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
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nization" was "conspicuous by its absence" in that province, and he ad­
ded that "to revive in any way such despotic powers as were formally 
exercised by Nazirs would be a reactionay step". He recommended, how­
ever, that nagirs and shaykhs be given many of the duties of district 
staff such as road maintenance, tending irrigation works, etc. He be­
lieved that "the most important means ... of satisfying the political 
instincts of the natives ... is by associating them more closely in the 
government ... and this can only be done ... by attracting into Govern­
ment service the representatives of the 'sheikhly' class". ^
On the other hand Sagar, the governor of Kordofan, reported that 
extensive powers were already wielded by shaykhs and that the people
had appreciated the conferring of a third-class magistrate*s powers on 
2
certain shaykhs. He added that "When the time comes to establish Na­
tive Petty Courts, it will to my mind be greatly preferable to have them
presided over by prominent natives of standing with some experience in
3
Courts than by young and half educated lawyer's". The governor of Dar­
fur, Savile, under whom MacMichael had served as sub-governor, reported 
that when he had first arrived in Darfur in 1917» "owing to lack of 
staff it was essential that Nazirs and Chiefs should be empowered to 
deal with minor offences as had been done for some years in parts of 
Kordofan" (where MacMichael, Gillan and flavies had all served). Be­
cause there had been abuses of power, however, it had early been de­
cided to withdraw the power of a nagir to try offences by himself, and
 ^Governor, Kassala to civil secretary, 31/3/20, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
2 Third-class magistrate status was that of a ma *mur. See Warburg, The 
Sudan under Wingate, pp. 133-136 for details of the tribal adminis­
tration of justice.
 ^Governor, Kordofan to civil secretary, 26/5/20, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
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to substitute nadirs * courts, each consisting of a na%ir and two
shaykhs.  ^The governor of the Red Sea Province, for his part, thought
that shaykhs should be given more powers, since the stronger they were,
"the stronger will be the force to counteract the activities of the
Sudan equivalent of the present day Egyptian students, etc., when they
begin ... to indulge in the at present popular pastime of so-called
2
National politics".
The southern governors' replies were unenthusiastic. In the Bahr 
al-Ghazal, courts of chiefs (lukikos) had been dealing with certain 
cases, notably of cattle inheritance, in a satisfactory way. But the 
acting governor did "not consider any more advanced form of Administra­
tion should be placed in the hands of the Chiefs, until such time as
schools have been established, and a knowledge of reading and writing 
3
obtained". The governors of the Upper Nile and Nuba Mountains pro-
4vinces had no positive proposals to make. The governor of Mongalla 
reported a lukiko dealing with petty offences and a council with "some
Governor, Darfur to civil secretary, 11/5/20, SGA, CIVSEG 1/9/30.
o
Governor, Red Sea Province to civil secretary, 10/5/21 (1920?),
SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
^ Acting governor, Bahr al-Ghazal to civil secretary, 5/6/20,
SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.’
4 Bakheit, British administration, p. 49. In 192? Willis, then governor 
of the Upper Nile, commented on "the weakness or lack of tribal orga­
nization" but said that "the prospects of successful development are 
extremely good". (Willis to civil secretary, 4/3/27, SGA, CIVSEC 
1/9/33.) Gillan, acting governor of the Nuba Mts. in 1927, reported 
that "considerable progress" had been made in devolving powers, but 
that "the direct administration fetish" had contributed to the diffi­
culties in this regard. ("Personal note by Mr. J.A. Gillan, Deputy 
Gov.", enclosed in governor, Nuba Mts. to civil secretary, 13/3/27, 
SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/33.)
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executive but no judicial powers", as two experiments inspired by-
Ugandan example. ^
The civil secretary's office asserted that .It, not the governors,
determined policy. The governor of the Blue Nile Province wrote that
"it would not be possible to delegate any powers even to Nomad Sheikhs
in Abu Deleig ... and in no other part of the Province is there any sug-
2
gestion of it...." To this the civil secretary replied*
It is inconceivable that the Nomad Sheikhs in Abu Deleig 
have no powers at all.... In any case it is definitely 
the policy of the Government to foster tribal organiza­
tion.... I shall be glad to hear from you what powers 
. the nomad sheikhs in Abu Deleig at present have and to 
what extent you propose to regularize them, modify them, 
or extend them. 3
4-The governor responded with a few half-hearted suggestions, but the 
point was made* Khartoum had decided to "foster tribal organization"; 
it was up to the governors to find it. Indeed, the annual Report for 
1921 stated that where tribal organisation "has ceased to exist it may 
still be possible to recreate it". Describing a 1926 visit to the
 ^Bakheit, British administration, pp. 4-9-50.
 ^Governor, Blue Nile to civil secretary, 2/4/21, SGA, CIVSEG 1/9/30. 
In 192? the then governor, Arthur Huddleston, said much the same 
things "There is very little tribal authority", he wrote, and what 
there was had been based on personality, not "inherent tradition". 
Yet he did "see signs of old traditional authority which may have 
been merely dormant owing to our bureaucratic system of Government". 
(Huddleston to civil secretary, 11/3/27, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.)
^ Civil secretary to governor, Blue Nile, 8/4/21, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
^ Governor, Blue Nile to civil secretary, 11/5/21, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
 ^Annual Report for 1921, Cmd. 1837 (1923).
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-udun, Sir James Currie ^ remarked that “the spectacle could he beheld
of young administrators diligently searching for lost tribes and vanished
chiefs, and trying to resurrect a social system that had passed away for 
2
ever“. It was in the immediate post-war period, not after the death
of Stack, that this procedure began, MacMichael's arch-rival, Willis,
3
took up a lonely position against the trend.
Thus by 1921 it had become clear that there were two opposing 
views as to the method, and indeed, the aims of future administration.
But there were many reasons for supporting one or the other. In the 
west the need was felt to combat Mahdism Dy strengthening tribal authori­
ty; in the east, in the Red Sea Province, the intelligentsia was already 
a concern of the governor. Everywhere a shortage of staff and funds was 
felt. But in the riverain provinces, where a century of more or less 
centralised rule had blurred tribal distinctions and diluted tradi­
tional authority, a shift of emphasis away from a bureaucratic admini­
stration was strongly disapproved.
It was in the midst of this internal debate that Keown-Boyd made
his visit on behalf of the Milner mission. The present system, he found,
leaves great scope for necessary differences of adminis­
tration to suit the various tribal organisations. Thus, 
while among the big nomad tribes of Kordofan, tribal 
sheikhs of standing exercise punitive powers and are 
encouraged in an increasing degree to administer their 
own people, and while in the Eastern Sudan the Hamitic 
tribes under their own headmen enjoy a similar measure
Sir James Currie (1868-1937)# joined the Egyptian education service 
in 1899> a-nd was sent to the Sudan as first director of education 
in 1900. He retired in 191^. He became a director of the Empire 
Cotton Growing Association in 1922. (DNB, 1931-1940» pp. 206-207.)
2
Currie, “The educational experiment in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1900- 
1933"» Journal of the African Society, vol. XXXIII, 1934, pp. 381-371; 
Journal of the Royal African Society, XXXIV, 1933# PP. 41-59; p. 49.
3
Willis described Sagar's policy in Kordofan as an intention "to de­
velop a feudal system". (Willis to civil secretary, 2/2/21, SGA 
CIVSEC 1/9/30.)
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of freedom, such a system is impossible in the 
riverain provinces, e.g., Berber, or the V/hite Nile, 
where the tribal organisations are not big enough and 
the local Sheikh is only the head of a village unknown 
a few miles away. 1
Keown-Boyd approved the synthetic view, shared by Stack, that each pro­
vince or area should be administered according to the social system ob­
taining. Rather than suggesting an innovative plan for administration, 
Keown-Boyd (and hence the Milner report) merely ratified ideas being 
discussed in Khartoum to which Milner himself, as we have seen (pp. 191- 
192) was predisposed, especially if they meant neutralizing Egyptian in­
fluence. Thus the Milner report recommended that the administration 
"should be left, as far as possible, in the hands of the native a,uthori- 
ties, wherever they exist, under British supervision". It warned that
the system of education should avoid creating "an overgrown body of as-
2
pirants to Government employment". In other words, the intervening 
class of Egyptian officials should be removed, to be replace by a closer 
contact between the British official and the Sudanese tribal authority, 
thereby rendering superfluous a large Sudanese official class. Even 
though these were not original ideas, the legitimacy given them by the 
Milner report would be exploited in arguments favouring the reactionary 
attitudes then taking hold.
The first step in regularising tribal authority was the Powers 
of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance. In a letter to the civil secretary in 1921 
Browne submitted proposals for conferring criminal jurisdiction on nomad 
shaykhs. He argued that
Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts".
2
Report of the special mission.
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The powers specified to a large extent coincide with 
those actually being exercised in the more remote 
tribes, and I think it is highly desirable that these 
should be recognised by the Government. The chief de­
parture from present practice is that the president 
will be the Omda or Sheikh instead of ... a fiki or 
local 'Kadi'. The fiki will continue to be a useful 
adjunct as a member of the Meglis, but I consider it 
most important, with a view to increasing tribal dis­
cipline and raising the prestige of the Sheikh, that 
the latter should be the mouthpiece of the decision.
... at present neither are the majority of the Sheikhs 
personally fit to hold autocratic powers nor have they 
the moral prestige to enforce autocratic judgements. I
Browne's plan was the precursor of the Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordi-
2
nance of 1922 which for the first time regularised what had, in prac 
tice but informally, been happening for years.
Implicit in the ordinance's preamble was an admission of the 
failure of purely direct rule: "it has from time immemorial been custo­
mary for sheikhs of nomad tribes to exercise powers of punishment upon 
their tribesmen and of deciding disputes among them and ... it is expe-
3
dient that the exercise of these powers should be regularized". The 
tribal shaykh, sitting either alone or in a "Council ('meglis') of the 
tribal elders", was to have authority over cases dealing with a number 
of criminal offences. No punishment other than a fine was authorised.
 ^Governor, Berber to civil secretary, 24/3/21, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/30.
2
The Courts Ordinance of 1907 had stipulated that there was no hind­
rance to a governor's recognition of "the jurisdiction of a Tribal 
Chief or Council of Elders or village Headman ... over the members 
of their tribe or village", or the exercise of customary authority. 
(Courts Ordinance, section 10, 1907, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/31.)
3
"The Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance 1922", Sudan Gazette, no. 396. 
15/6/22.
4 These were "assault, hurt, mischief, house trespass, trespass on cul­
tivation areas or grazing grounds, adultery, rape, sexual connection 
with a virgin, theft, receiving stolen property, disobedience to a 
reasonable order, abuse, desecration, insult, threatening, affray, 
wrongful restraint, defiling water supply, act of indecency in public 
wilful damage to property (and] removing or damaging boundary ma.rk, 
other than those erected by Government." (ibid.)
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The maximum fine was to be £E25. The government reserved the right to 
overrule any judgement, whether appealed or not, and retained jurisdic­
tion over capital crimes such as murder and rebellion.  ^But appeals 
were few, and the district commissioner was relieved, for the first 
time statutorily,of a great number of routine and time-consuming cases. ^
The annual Report for 1921 noted that one hundred and thirty-five no-
3
tables had. already been granted "magisterial powers". The 1923 Report
4
recorded that "some 300" shaykhs had been granted such powers.
The Par Masalit "experiment"
The annual Report for 1922 noted that "Dar Masalit ... provided 
virgin ground for the trial of a policy of retaining, so far as is con­
sistent with the removal of abuses and the maintenance of a reasonable 
standard of efficiency, the existing administrative machinery and me- 
thod". This was rather a grand way of describing what was essentially 
an expedient. Davies was appointed the first "Resident" in the Dar and 
he "set off westwards from Nahud with my caravan of camels and ponies 
in the early part of 1920, armed with Lord Lugard*s The Dual Mandate in 
British Tropical Africa and Sir Percy Girouard's Political Memoranda.
 ^"The Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance 1922"
2
Interview with Mr. Martin Parr, 3/6/76. Some tribes were only 
'"deemed* to be *nomad'.... The Hamar were certainly not nomads", but 
were included under the ordinance anyway. See also Warburg, The Sudan 
under Wingate, p. 165.
3
Annual Report for 1921.
4
Annual Report for 1923» Cmd. 2281 (1924-25).
 ^Annual Report for 1922, Cmd. 1930 (1923).
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which was, I had been told, the Bible of the political officers in 
Northern Nigeria." ^
The administration of Dar Masalit was supposed to be the first 
comprehensive experiment in Indirect Rule along Lugardian lines. In 
practice this meant, however, simply allowing the pre-existing system 
to function with a British overseer. The sultan, Muhammad Bahr al-Din,• m 9
usually called Endoka, and Davies worked out a system of assessment by
which the villages around Geneina would contribute building materials
or labour or grain as tax. Davies defended this primitive system be-
2
cause there was little or no money in circulation. Justice was dis­
pensed by the sultan himself who would if he wished consult the qadT. 
"Contrary to Nigerian precept", Davies wrote, Starry*s approval was won 
for a "senior court" on which Davies, the sultan and the qadT sat, which
3
was "the most effective court" on which Davies ever sat. Effective 
it may have been, but it could hardly have been designed to maintain 
the sultan*s personal prestige.
Redfem, the assistant resident under Davies, thought that "the 
sultan had a pretty good administration, he had a vizier, etc. so we 
left him alone", except for cases of serious crime. Abuses were checked, 
such as the qadT*s custom of accepting a fee from the winner of each 
case. The "system” worked smoothly: "We got the sultan an old Ford car 
which he was delighted with.... we were there as observers.... We em­
ployed slaves to build our house - the sultan let us have fifty
 ^Davies, The camel's back, p. 1^ 5. Davies's memory was at fault: The 
Dual Mandate was published in 1922. The term "Resident" was of course 
taken from Nigeria.
2 Ibid.. p. 1^ 5.
3 Ibid.. pp. 160-161.
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slaves...,”  ^Indeed, one wonders why they were there at all.
An important result of Davies's experience in Dar.Masalit was his
trip to Northern Nigeria in 1923 to see for himself the model of Indirect
Rule and to report on "the comparative conditions of administration
2
there" and in the Sudan.
Administrative developments, 1922-1925
The Northern Governors' Meeting of 1922 recommended that "muawens 
of Arabs" (officers assigned to nomad tribes) should be done away with; 
that the (Egyptian) accountancy staff should be reduced, as should the 
number of ma'murs; that the post of sub-inspector should be abolished; 
that the number of district commissioners should be increased; and that 
an ordinance should be drafted enabling the extension of powers to seden-
3
tary tribes similar to those already conferred on nomad shaykhs, a 
proposal that finally saw fruition in the Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance 
in 1927. Commenting on these proposals, Stack endorsed the principle of 
decentralisation but warned that "decentralization without a decrease in 
expenditure on administrative charges in personnel does not carry us 
much further in economy". Stack's concern was well-founded: the go­
vernors' proposals meant the devolution of routine matters on to shaykhs 
and elimination of the Egyptian subordinate officials, but also an in­
crease in British supervisory staff. Indeed, "absurd as it might look,
 ^Interview with Sir Shuldham Redfem, 8/IO/76.
2 Davies to MacMichael, 10/lO/ZZ, SGA, CIVSEC 69/6/19.
3
Minutes of Northern Governors' Meeting, 1922, n.d., SGA, CIVSEC 32/1/3.
^ Asst, private secretary to civil secretary, 21/2/22, SGA,
CIVSEC 32/1/3.
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British officers used tribal agents in order to get more British offi­
cers to supervise them and called for decentralization only in order to 
achieve deconcentration, which in effect was simply a device of centra­
lization." ^
The Southern Governors1 Meeting of 1922 made proposals similar to 
those moved at the northern conference. Administration, it was noted, 
should be left "as far as possible in the hands of native authorities, 
wherever they exist, under British supervision" (a quotation from the 
Milner report). Where tribal organisation had ceased to exist, "it may 
still be possible to re-create it". The aims of the government were to 
eliminate Egyptian officials; to post a British commissioner and assis­
tant commissioner in every district and to keep them there long enough 
to know it well and become known to the inhabitants; to post Sudanese 
district officers to assist the commissioner; to staff the offices with 
Sudanese clerks, "some of whom could perhaps in time ... be drawn from
among the local inhabitants"; and to substitute English for Arabic as
2
the official language.
This desire to insulate the southern provinces from the political 
winds of the north was expressed in The Passports and Permits Ordinance 
of 1922. This provided for the classification of any area as a "closed 
district", from which anyone could be barred without a government per­
mit. In October 1922 Stack ordered that Darfur, Bahr al-Ghazal, Mongalla
 ^G.M.A. Bakheit, "The Condominium and Indirect.Rule", in J. Howell 
(ed.) Local government and politics in- the Sudan. Khartoum, 1974, p.27
2
"General statement of policy in the Southern Sudan with regards to ad­
ministration, religion and education", 14/3/22, SGA-, CIVSEC 1/9/31. 
Some of the theoretical content of this "general statement" was taken 
directly from the policy of Sir Charles Brooke, rajah of Sarawak, as 
described in 1871. See MacMichael, "Indirect Rule for pagan communi­
ties", n.d., SAD G// s 469.
313
most of the Nuba Mountains and Upper Nile Provinces, and several other 
districts were to be "closed districts to the extent that no person 
other than a native of the Sudan shall enter or remain therein unless 
he is the holder of a permit ... to be obtained from the Civil Secre­
tary or Prom the Governor of the province ... and that any native of 
the Sudan may be forbidden to enter or remain in the said districts by 
the Civil Secretary or the Governor of such provinces".
As we have seen, mistrust of Egyptian officials had quickly come 
to embrace also the Sudanese intelligentsia. Bawson*s memorandum of 
October 1924 was explicit in its denunciation of Sudanese ma*murs and 
sub-ma'murs who "inherit the Egyptian love of personal power and the 
Egyptian dislike of the powerful Nazir or Omda..,." They were all opposed 
to "granting any independent power to the Qmdas and Sheikhs in their 
districts" and "by an alteration in their dress and mode of life, they 
raised a barrier between themselves and their own people". In the Sudan, 
he wrote, with the whole structure of rule by native chiefs still to be
built up, the danger ftom a powerful native official class" was "very 
2
real." MacMichael agreed:
In the future the administration of native affairs must, 
subject to British rule and supervision, tend to be left 
more and more to the authority of the native chiefs....
The eventual aim cannot be in doubt.... it is the aris­
tocracy rather than the subordinate bureaucracy whose 
claims to our consideration are paramount. 3
In claiming the future for the "aristocracy", MacMichael was dis­
regarding the spirit, if not the letter, of the governor-general's own
 ^Sudan Gazette, no. 402, 15/10/22.
2
Pawson, "Note on the native raamur and sub-mamur".
^ MacMichael to governors, 20/10/24-, SGA, CIVSEG 50/2/10.
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policy. The need to bolster the "Sudan for the Sudanese" idea had moved 
Stack to favour the establishment of native advisory councils. In Sep­
tember MacMichael told the governors that such councils, to be "purely 
advisory and consultative", would be set up to assist in administration 
on the provincial, district and municipal levels in all but the three 
southern provinces. A governor’s council would be composed of all nadirs, 
"native magistrates" and (if applicable) shaykhs of khuts (districts) 
as ex-officio members, and others to be nominated by the governor or 
co-opted by the ex-officio members with his approval. This council would 
discuss "questions of administration or development affecting the pro­
vince as a whole". A district council would consist of governor’s coun­
cil members residing in the district, allcumdas. and "with the special 
permission of the Governor a limited number of leading men of the Dis­
trict", and would be akin to the governor’s council but at a purely dis­
trict level. A town council would consist of governor’s and district 
councils' members living in a town, thecumda and shaykh of the town, and 
"such leading men of the town, merchants and others, as appear to the 
District Commissioner to be most likely to be useful". ^
The idea of advisory councils died with Stack and was resurrected 
only in 1942, How great was the change in tone and direction is in-
MacMichael to governors, 9/9/24, SGA_, CIVSEG 1/9/31. Reporting an in­
terview with Sayyid Ismacil al-Azhari,MacMichael wrote that the sayyid 
had suggested " a system of advisory and consultative native councils, 
both in Omdurman and in the Provinces and in the Districts. I had not 
suggested a word of this to him but his tentative proposals in their 
main features almost exactly agreed with those I‘drafted a week or 
two ago " (MacMichael to Willis, 14/9/24, SGA, PALACE 4/9/44.)
2 —
See Muddathir cAbd al-Rahim, Imperialism, pp. 135-137. Currie wrote in
1926 that "the late Sir Lee Stack often spoke to me of his intention 
of instituting some system of Provincial Councils.... Something of 
the kind is urgently called for, and if such Councils were called in­
to being supplemented by an advisory Council to the Governor-General,
• the actual administrative machine might be left in peace for some con­
siderable period". (Currie to Tyrrell, 28/8/26, F.O. 371/11613.)
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dicated by a statement of Maffey in 1927:
Advisory Councils cropped up as a possible means to 
our end but the proposal was not well received..,.
Later on in certain intelligensia areas, when we have 
made the Sudan safe for autocracy, such Councils 
would be in keeping with the broad principle. Other­
wise Advisory Councils contain the seeds of grave 
danger and eventually present a free platform for 
capture by a pushful intelligensia. I
Thus a policy which might well have had a beneficial long-term signifi­
cance in the development of political institutions was shelved in the 
headlong rush toward tribalisation.
The evacuation of the Egyptian Army in 1924 was accompanied by the 
removal on many middle and lower-level Egyptian civil servants. Of forty- 
five Egyptian ma*murs. forty were evacuated. Sixteen of the vacancies 
thus created were filled by promoting Sudanese sub-ma*murs. but Mac­
Michael reasoned that "as the number of mamurs' posts was unnecessarily 
high in the past - a fact chiefly due to the shortage of British staff - 
it will probably not be necessary to fill all these vacancies". All Egyp­
tian sub-ma*murs were evacuated, and all were replaced by Sudanese.
About one hundred and twenty vacancies were created "by the deportation, 
dismissal or imprisonment of Egyptians on account of their political ac­
tivities. .. ." Some of these posts went to foreigners (Syrians and Greeks),
2
some to Egyptians and Sudanese, and some were left vacant. The rail­
ways and steamers department reported that "55 European Artizans" were 
engaged in one three-month period due to the loss of the Egyptian Rail-
3
way Battalion. The education department suffered very serious losses,
 ^Maffey, "Minute by His Excellency the Governor-General", 1/1/27,
SGA, CIVSEG 1/9/33.
 ^MacMichael to private secretary, 24/4/25, SGA, CIVSEC 50/2/7.
3 Ibid.
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ail of its twenty-five Egyptian teachers being discharged. ^
While the evacuation led to the promotion of some Sudanese, it al­
so made room for a large increase in British staff, continuing a trend.
In 1927 the governor of Darfur remarked that the number of British ad­
ministrative officials had increased by 100% between 1908 and 1926. The 
government was, in his view, tending toward "ever-increasing direct- 
ness". In 1924 Schuster had warned of the financial consequences of 
"over-administration", noting that at El Obeid there was a governor, 
deputy governor, two assistant district commissioners, a sub-inspector, 
a district judge, a local audit inspector, a mechanical engineer, an as­
sistant district engineer, an inspector of forests and gum gardens, and
3
two veterinary officers. ^ There was a marked increase in recruitment 
even for the Political Service. In the four years following the evacua­
tion the service recruited no fewer than sixty-three new members, com­
pared with eighty-five in the years 1899-191^. ^
It was essential, in MacMichael's view, that the gap in the 
bureaucracy created by the evacuation should not be filled by Sudanese 
officials. The civil secretary's office insisted that "the management of
 ^MacMichael to private secretary, 24/4/25, SGA, CIVSEG 50/2/7. See also 
Allenby to Chamberlain, 2/3/25, F,0. 371/10879. Currie later observed 
that to the best of his knowledge, "no Egyptian schoolmaster was guilty 
of disloyalty to the Government that he served". (Currie, "The educa­
tional experiment", p. 46.)
2
Bence-Pembroke, "Proposals for the introduction of the policy of na­
tive administration ...", 23/1/27, SGA, CIVSEC 1/20/60. Reginald 
Bence-Pembroke (l884-195/+) served in Khartoum, 1907, 1916-19; Kordo­
fan, 1908-15; was governor of Mongalla, 1924-25, and governor of 
Darfur, 1925-27. (MacMichael, SPS, p. 18.)
5 Schuster to civil secretary, 9/^ /2^ , SGA, CIVSEC 50/15/67.
MacMichael, SPS, passim.
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tribal and village affairs” must be left to the shaykhs: "the young 
Sudanese and Arab officer has failed us in the Army and though the con­
duct of the somewhat similar class in the Sudan Government appeal's to 
have been excellent so far, we cannot afford to court risks in the fu­
ture by leaving too much in their hands". ^
At least one governor protested against the implication of these
2
prejudicial remarks. Nicholls, governor of the White Nile Province,
said that if the ma'mur had too much power, it was
entirely the fault of the District Commissioner, who, 
through incompetence or laziness or both, allows or com­
pels his mamur to do his work for him.... we should weed 
out the incompetent D.C.'s preferably to adopting a policy 
of repression towards the Civilian Sub-mamurs.... If we 
adopt a repressive policy ... we will most certainly ali­
enate the educated people in the country and we will only 
be confirming the Egyptian anti-British propaganda which 
endeavours to persuade the educated people of the Sudan 
that we are ejecting the Egyptians from the country in 
order to run it by ourselves for ourselves.... The two 
lines of development i.e. increasing the powers and the 
functions of the native chiefs, and giving the educated 
Sudanese a larger share in the Government, are not ... 
irreconcilable, and our soundest policy must be a judi­
cious combination of both. 3
To this reasoned restatement of the Stack policy, the civil secretary
replied with scorn. After commenting on Nicholls*s "unjust reflection
MacMichael.to governors, 6/12/24, SGA, CIVSEG 50/2/10. A 1926 report, 
almost certainly written by Davies, stated that "the educated class 
of the Sudan is predominantly in sympathy with the anti-British na­
tionalism of Egypt...." If Egypt pressed her claims there would pro­
bably be "a reproduction of the reactions of 1924, the left wing of 
our Intelligentsia actively seditious and the moderates trying to 
make political capital out of the situation". (Secret intelligence 
report, no. 1, March 1926, F.O. 371/11613.)
2 William Nicholls (1882-1970) served in Khartoum, 1907, 1911-12; Don- 
gola, 1908-10; Kordofan, 1913-16; Darfur, 1917» 1919-22; and Sennar, 
1917-18. He was governor of the White Nile Province* 1922-26, and 
governor of Berber, 1926-32. (MacMichael, SPS. p. 19.)
Governor, White Nile to civil secretary, 13/1/25, SGA,
CIVSEC 50/2/10.
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of the Political Service” (tantamount to apostasy) he said that the 
government's need for the help of educated Sudanese had been "empha­
sised yearly in the Annual Reports” and that Nicholls's misapprehensions 
... may possibly be due to the fact that fhis] province has had no Egyp­
tian administrative staff for many years and the danger anticipated may 
therefore be less ... than elsewhere in that experienced Egyptian Mamurs 
who have thoroughly established their positions are not there being suc­
ceeded by young Sudanese.” ^
It was at this point that Davies chose to issue his thoughts on • 
the trip to Nigeria. He came to the conclusion that in the Sudan "there 
were very large regions to which the Nigerian system was applicable 
without very considerable modifications.” Its advantages were manifests 
"native administrations give rise to no 'Intelligentsia* class" since 
the "treasurers, scribes and the rest are the humble servants of the Na­
tive Authority" (which was all Davies considered they were fit to be), 
and it was "inconceivable that they should aspire to political power"; 
the Nigerian emirs constituted "a valuable bulwark against outbreaks
of fanaticism" (such as Mahdism); and native administration was "cheaper
2
than the bureaucratic variety". By this time, though, Davies was 
preaching to the converted, as we have seen. The post-war years had 
thrown up or revealed problems, and by the end of Stack's governor- 
general ship Indirect Rule, that vague, indefinable and essentially ar­
tificial doctrine was seen as a panacea.
 ^Lyall to governor, White Nile, 20/l/25» SGA, CIVSEG 50/2/10.
2
Davies, "Note on native administration", enclosed in Davies to civil 
secretary, 22/1/25, SGA, CIVSEC 1/9/32.
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Conclusion: the attraction of Indirect Rule
Another factor, much more complicated, easily recognisable but dif­
ficult to evaluate, in the victory of this approach to administration 
over the "direct" rule of the Wingate years, was the mentality of the 
Sudan Political Service. No matter how strong the political and economic 
arguments in its favour, the fact remains that the majority of the ser­
vice, from MacMichael, its spiritual and later actual head, down to the 
most junior district commissioner was naturally drawn to what they saw 
as the tenets of Indirect Rule and away from its "bureaucratic" alter­
native.
An article in the Manchester Guardian in 1925 referred to the Su­
dan as "a country as savage as a public school", and said that it was 
"impossible not to sympathise with this Government of athletic public 
school boys accustomed to hard work rather than to hard thinking". ^
There was, as a matter of fact, a good deal of the old school atmos­
phere in the service; sport was always to play an important part, and 
not merely as recreation. One former official has said that
We didn’t make our ma’murs, etc. play polo, but we 
certainly encouraged them.... I remember reading 
[a personnel report] and it closed - ’and he plays 
a good game of polo' - and this would have helped in 
a borderline case. 2
But their very conformity seemed to. hamper the educated Sudanese. They
were ridiculed for their imperfect knowledge, intellectual "conceit" and
pretensions, and "alteration in their dress and mode of life" which, of
course, were aspects of the status for which the government had groomed
 ^Arthur Ransome, "Sudan problem examined", Manchester Guardian, 5/25» 
quoted in F.O. 371/10880.
Interview with Sir Gawain Bell, 2/6/76.
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them. The execrations heaped upon the "effendi", and indeed, upon “mo­
dern education" became a phenomenon.
At its inception the Condominium had set out to create "a small ad­
ministrative class, capable of filling many Government posts",  ^and had 
established Gordon College for that purpose. That hopeful beginning was 
cursed after the troubles of the early 1920s. Sir H. Jackson wrote that
Education in the Soudan was made a fetish; but it is 
done now, and nothing can stop the Soudan going the 
way of India and of Egypt. Over-education ... spells 
disaster; not only ... does it make people dissatis­
fied with their present part in life, but it adds to 
the number of the discontented. The people of the Soudan 
are but children, and they would have remained children 
had they been left alone. 2
This is illustrative of the "change in attitude towards education among
many of the higher grade English officials" which Currie noticed on his
visit in 1926, a change more of temperament than of policy. "Enthusiasm
for education had largely evaporated, and 'Indirect Rule' was the pre-
3
valent administrative slogan". A Lebanese teacher at Gordon College
in the mid-1920s recorded that the British staff
enjoyed the prestige of rulers. Not the dignity of 
schoolmasters but the aura of sovereignty surrounded 
their every step. They exercised a kind of military 
authority, and the discipline they enforced savoured 
strongly of the barracks.... It was a military not a 
human institution. ^
To the exponent of Indirect Rule modem education was anathema. 
Bence-Pembroke diagnosed the "individualism" it fostered as the effendis'
 ^Annual Report for 1900, Cd. 44l (1901).
2
Sir H. Jackson to Sir J.G. Maxwell, 7/2/25, enclosed in Maxwell to 
Baldwin, 19/2/25, F.O. 371/10879.
r»
Currie, "The educational experiment", pp. ^7-^8. Nevile Henderson 
said he could "conceive much harm and no utility from higher educa­
tion among a people so profoundly backward as the Sudanese". ("Notes 
on a visit to the Sudan")
k
Edward Atiyah, An Arab tells his story, London, 19^6, p. 138.
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most obnoxious symptom. This characteristic was "opposed to the sense
of personal discipline which the 'feudalist!c1 training to be found in
a healthy tribal organisation would ordinarily implant". Bence-Pembroke
then came to the depressing point so typical of official thinking;
The youth of today assumes an irresponsible and indepen­
dent outlook on affairs in general. Gone are the courtly 
manners of the older generation; the modem product apes 
the modes and fashions of the European....
Among that class of native which is known as the 
'effendia' class, that is to say, junior native Govern­
ment employees, is this deterioration most marked. The 
process of detribalisation has here become complete. The 
'effendi' is done with the effete tribal customs and tra­
ditions of his forefathers....
It may be argued that the progress of education and 
general enlightenment is merely bringing about natural 
evolution, and that the present individualism is but a 
step or phase in the process. Such an argument is ... 
not only fallacious but dangerous. Tribal customs and 
organisations have been evolved through the ages; they 
have enabled tribes to survive as entities the stress of 
war and civil commotion; these customs and traditions are 
... cherished and obeyed to a degree which is almost in­
credible by such tribes as remain today uncontaminated by 
modem progress. 1
Since the 192^ f troubles, Bence-Pembroke said, the intelligentsia were
looking to Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman. If they managed to merge with his other
followers in the west, then "the policy of 'divide et impera', the fun-
2
damental base of all African rule, may be placed in serious jeopardy".
Bence-Pembroke, "Proposals for the introduction of the policy of na­
tive administration ...". In October 192^ Sterry issued a statement 
reminding parents of their right and duty to beat their unruly child­
ren; "Boys", he wrote, "are apt to get conceited from new knowledge 
acquired at school". (Sterry, "To parents, guardians and those in 
authority over the young", 1/10/2A-, SGA, CIVSEG 1/20/60.)
2
Bence-Pembroke, "Proposals for the introduction of the policy of na­
tive administration ...". A later report noted that "as was to be ex­
pected, the Sayed viewed the devolution of judicial and executive 
powers to the Arab chiefs with complete consternation.... where the 
secular power is weak, the 'Nebi Isa' cult can find suitable soil in 
which to take root. The establishment of native administration made 
the converse true." (Reid, "Note on Mahdism with special reference 
to the White Nile Province".)
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The obvious solution was to prop up tribal authority and suppress the 
intelligentsia: "The system of education in force would appear to be far 
too advanced for the present primitive needs of the country", he obser­
ved, so "the policy of substituting native khalwas for Government kut-
tabs would appear to be a step in the right direction". To this sugges-
1
tion MacMichael minuted, "Yes, certainly".
Jackson was not alone in referring to the Sudanese as "mere child­
ren". Paternalism went to the heart of the contradiction in Indirect 
Rule: no matter how forcefully it was argued that tribal shaykhs should 
have greater powers, it was a rare British administrator who trusted the
shaykhs to use them well or who was willing to give up his role as
2
"father of the people". In his article on education, as devastating as
Bence-Pembroke, "Proposals for the introduction of the policy of na­
tive administration ...". MacMichael later wrote that "the young mo­
dernist ... in reality ... is a minor employe on modest pay bom into 
a primitive social group which he despises.... He invents, in compen­
sation for a consciousness of subjection, a legend of a glorious na­
tional past and sees himself the hero of a still more glorious renais­
sance...." (MacMichael, The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. 269.) In 1927 
Arthur Huddleston wrote that "up till about four years ago the number 
of Government Schools scattered over the [Blue Nile] Province was stea­
dily increasing and I cannot think that the influence of Schoolmasters 
was always good.... the Schoolmaster must be regarded as part of the 
Army of native officials who may be necessary but are also as the 
Governor General points out extremely dangerous". (A. Huddleston to 
civil secretary, 11/3/27, SGA, CIVSEG 1/9/33.) See also V.L. Griffiths, 
An experiment in education, London, 1953» pp. 3-8.)
2
In 1926 Slatin Pasha visited the Sudan and later observed that the 
country was "a little bit overadministrated [sic] i.e. you have now 
a good many British Inspectors and I suppose many of them will try to 
justify their existence by 'establishing a strict rule'.... The Sudan 
people wish to be ruled by fathers (although they may be young) and 
each Inspector should be a sort of 'Patriarque'." (Slatin to Mac­
Michael, n.d. (I927)f SAD G// s 469.) Maffey commented:that "a poli­
tical officer's best work is often that which he leaves undone".
(Note initialled J.L.M., 24/1/27, SAD 403/9.)
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i-o was perceptive, Currie wrote that after Stack's death "the British
local administration took fright". Currie's apparently unique ability
to see through the intellectual posturing of Indirect Rule resulted in
this sarcastic assessment:
The time has long passed when it is possible to gull the 
Native demanding equality of economic opportunity with 
patter about indirect rule, or fob him off with a social 
scheme in which a subsidised ruler - too frequently an 
obsolete antiquity - dances to the pipes of young gentle­
men whose sole idea is that things shall 'stay put'. They 
cannot, by a hard fate, be squires in England, but to ape 
the part in Africa is fascinating. 1
These words would seem harsh if they did not echo those of the adminis­
trators themselves. One former official (once governor of Darfur) has 
said that his
idea of the future of the Sudan was that it would be 
governed rather like eighteenth century England with 
a parliament ... but the actual government run by Pitts 
from rotten boroughs. As long as the interests of the 
squire were identical with the interests of the people 
you could have that squirearchy.... 2
Another, formerly assistant civil secretary and governor of two pro­
vinces, has said that
the only sensible form of government is a benevolent 
dictatorship. That's what I was, a benevolent dictator, 
in Equatoria,and Khartoum didn't know enough to do any­
thing about it.... I was a good D.C. in West Kordofan - 
I could never have been one in Surrey.... 3
MacMichael himself hoped that "the lesser fry among the independent
sheikhs" would "gradually be eliminated or absorbed ... and by natural
If,
processes we should arrive at a system of four to six great overlords".
 ^Currie, "The educational experiment", p. Up,
2 Interview with Mr. K.D.D. Henderson, 21/6/76.
 ^Interview with Mr. Martin Parr, 3/6/76.
MacMichael, minute to Bence-Pembroke's "Proposals for the introduc­
tion of the policy of native administration ...".
32*f
There are many examples of such regressive political thought,.
The British officials* dislike of the effendi was, of course, re­
flected in an admiration for the nomad of the desert. This was not a 
unanimous attitude hut it was one held by those who, in the 1920s, came 
to dominate policy-making, notably Davies and MacMichael. The former's 
hatred for the scheming Sayyid cAbd al-Rahman and the officious effendi 
were aspects of his rejection of the "modern" Sudan as a whole and his 
deep, romantic attachment to the desert Arabs. From the time he first 
arrived in Khartoum, which was, he thought, "a little too civilised”, 
he was impatient to get away.  ^In his memoirs Davies described the 
nomad's self-image (and his own):
For him, the sedentary man is a toiler, eating his bread 
in the sweat of his brow, while he himself is a gentle­
man at large, living on the income from his capital....
In Khartoum, 'King's Day' ... used to be celebrated by a
levee and garden party to which the Governor-General in­
vited the more accessible of the senior tribal leaders....
On one such occasion a nomad sheikh was being taken round 
parts of the Governor-General's palace by an official ... 
who was foolish enough to ask him, 'How would you like to 
have a house like that?' and received the prompt answer,
'By God, my brother, if you made me a present of it I 
wouldn't spend a single night in it'. 2
The nomads of Kordofan and Darfur were, to the like-minded administra­
tor, the real Sudanese. The nomad shaykh was an example and was, in
effect, the Sudanese equivalent to the country squire. "We were", in 
the words of an ex-official,
accustomed to the country.... We found ourselves in 
sympathy to the rural life, the tribal life, the aris­
tocracy.... The bright young Sudanese, speaking English
 ^Davies, The camel's back, p. 25.
2 Ibid., pp. 55-57. Davies began a chapter of his book with two quota­
tions. The first: "The town says to you - 'Bring.''; the desert says 
to you - 'Take.'"* The second: "'God make you live in cities." - 
Nomad Arab curse”. (Ibid., p. 55*)
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(but probably not too well), wearing European clothes, 
did in fact, though we would never admit it, constitute 
a certain threat to the establishment. 1
Thus, when young, educated Sudanese expected a role in administra­
tion which they had been led to believe was theirs, they were to be put 
down as upstarts and pro-Egyptian agitators. It was this proprietary 
attitude that made Indirect Rule so contradictory, for if the district 
commissioner always knew best and always had to have the final say over 
what went on in his bailiwick, how could tribal authority be "fostered”? 
The fact is that the administrator of the Davies school was jealous of 
his position and unwilling to relinquish it. This problem was one of the 
first addressed by Maffey upon his arrival in the Sudan. He quoted the 
Milner report to lend a false air of continuity to his position, and 
stated that
I have watched the old generation give place to a new in 
India and I have seen how easily vague political unrest 
swept over even backward peoples simply because we had al­
lowed the old forms to crumble away.
For a long time the British Administrative Officer 
in the Sudan has functioned as 'Father of the People',...
But this cannot last. The Bureaucracy must yield either to 
an autocratic or to a democratic movement and the dice are 
loaded in favour of the latter. If we desire the former, 
the British Officer must realise that it is his duty to 
lay down the role of Father of the People. In this manner 
the country will be parcelled out into nicely balanced 
compartments, protective glands against the septic germs 
which will inevitably be passed on from the Khartoum of 
the future. 2
While this puts the case rather bluntly, the ideas were no shock to 
his subordinates. The Sudan was condemned to a period of regressive 
admi ni s trati on.
 ^Interview with Sir Gawain Bell, 2/6/76.
2
Maffey, "Minute by His Excelleny the Governor-General", 1/1/27. 
Among the many positions he had held in India, Maffey had served as 
political agent, Khyber, 1919-12, and as chief commissioner, North- 
West Frontier Province, 1921-2^.
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Events might well have unfolded differently if Stack had lived.
He certainly never envisaged the developments in administration which 
were to follow his death. Pawson's condemnation of Sudanese ma'murs and 
sub-ma'murs (page 226) had been prompted by Stack's remark to the com­
mandant of the sub-ma'mur school that M,You must remember that in time 
these men may become Inspectors'" \  an unwelcome prospect as viewed by 
the Political Service. Stack's advocacy of native advisory councils, 
with their potential for growth, has already been noted, as has his 
prime motivation, when approving the course which had led to the Powers
of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance, of economy. Sir James Currie, who knew him
well, wrote that
Sir Lee Stack's death was a great loss to the Sudan - 
perhaps even greater than was realised at the time.
The writer is convinced that, had he lived, the perma­
nent increase of English officials would not have taken
place. Stack would have remembered the disastrous effect
of a similar policy in Egypt. 2
Stack was, in fact, a member of the old school of slow and cautious ex­
tension of direct administration. While his govemor-generalship was in 
many ways a watershed, he was personally representative of the transi­
tion from the old-style military rule of the early Condominium to the 
new world of professional administrators and large British staffs.
While he no doubt preferred the old, there is good reason to believe 
that he might well have proved a better manager of the new than did the 
brilliant but unsympathetic men who served and succeeded him. With 
Stack's death the way was clear for implementing a policy he would not 
have condoned, at least before tempering it with the "tact and common-
 ^Arthur Huddleston to civil secretary, 19/10/2^, SGA, CIYSEC 50/2/10. 
The sub-in a 'mur school had been established in 1919 with a view to re­
placing Egyptian with Sudanese officers. See MacMichael, The Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan, p. 1^7.)
2
Currie, "The educational experiment", p.^7»
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sense" for which Wingate had recommended him.
The fear of Mahdism and the desire to combat what was thought 
the inevitable rise of a Sudanese nationalism along lines incompatible 
with British interests were subsidiary to a general aim of preventing 
the emergence of any nation-wide political organisation. While analyses 
written in later years often stress a government desire to foster a 
Sudanese democracy unaffected by external influence, there is little 
contemporary evidence of that concern. The very idea of "the Sudan for 
the Sudanese", in the words of a former official, "meant the Sudan not 
for the Egyptians",  ^and was used to indict dissenters even after it 
had been coined by the British. Where tribal authority was fairly strong, 
inexorable forces worked against it. Individual ownership of land, the 
appeal of extra-tribal religious organisations, secular education and 
the undertaking of vast irrigation projects that favoured individual 
initiative and extra-tribal associations and identifications of interests 
all contributed to this.
There are many examples of this continued breakdown, and they 
raise the question of whether Indirect Rule ever existed at all in a 
systematic, clearly-defined way. The problem hinges on the definition 
of Indirect Rule. As it was articulated in the Sudan in the early 1920s, 
Indirect Rule meant the use of already established (and also, it was 
hoped, of long submerged) forms of indigenous political organisation 
as a means of governing. It was, in practice, as in its motivations, 
a method of maintaining an archaic diffusion of political power, a way 
to postpone or prevent homogenization. The invocation of Lugard's
 ^Interview with Sir Gawain Bell, 2/6/76.
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writings gave it an intellectual respectability it did not deserve, 
that obscured its pragmatic abandoning of earlier attempts to create 
a new, de-tribalised governing class to lead the Sudan into the mo­
dem world.
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Appendix I* The Gezira Scheme financial crisis
Under the Government of the Sudan Loan Acts of 1913 and 191^ *, an 
amount of £3,000,000 was raised, with a British guarantee, for works re­
lating to the Sudan Railways, but primarily "for the purpose of irriga­
ting the Gezira plain",  ^Work on the Gezira Scheme, as funded in 1913, 
was estimated originally to cost £E1,000,000. This estimate was revised
in 191^ to £E2,000,000. The result was to be the irrigation of 120,000
feddans for agriculture, primarily cotton. Work on canalisation and dam 
construction was practically halted for the duration of the war. In 191? 
it was considered, owing to the increased cost of labour and materials, 
the delay occasioned by the war, and a decision to increase the irriga­
ted area to 300,000 feddans , that the cost of the project would be in­
creased to £E2,500,000. A further £E?50,000 was thought necessary for 
minor canalisation, agricultural machinery and loans to cultivators. At 
the same time it was indicated that for unrelated irrigation projects 
at Tokar and Kassala, £E^ -00,000 would be required, and that for rail­
way extension the sum of £E2,l60,000 was needed.The repayment of a debt 
to Egypt of £E7^0,000 incurred by the extension of railhead to EL Obeid 
raised the total for capital expenditure to ££6,600,000.
At a meeting at the foreign office in the summer of 1917, Bernard 
and Bonham-Carter argued for an increase in the British guaranteed loan, 
and took the position that while the amount required was greater than 
that provided for in the Loan Acts, the works to be undertaken were the
 ^"On the capital required by the Sudan Gbvemment for the Gezira Irri­
gation Scheme and for certain other projects", l^ f/5/17, F.0. 371/3201. 
For the history and technical aspects of the scheme, see A. Gaitskell,
Gezira, a story of development in the Sudan, London, 1939.
2
"On the capital required ...".
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same as planned and should not be viewed as a "new proposition" which
the British government would rightly wish to defer until the conclusion
of the war. They suggested as a total figure the sum of £E5,080,395>
which included interest on the previous loans and repayment of the El
Obeid railway loan.The Sudan Government representatives also noted-that
It was even more in the interest of His Majesty's Govern­
ment than of the Sudan Government that no time should be 
lost in carrying out this scheme since the supply of cot­
ton could never be too great to satisfy the demand and the 
question of obtaining this commodity would be one of the 
most important problems on the conclusion of peace. 1
Thus the Sudan Government sought, at least for the purposes of obtaining 
further British support, to ally itself with Lancashire, which was en­
thusiastic in its backing of what was seen as the "greatest hope" for
2the future prosperity of the Sudan.
Prom 1919 on, the Gezira Scheme became inseparably linked to the 
whole course of Anglo-Egyptian relations. In February 1920 Lord Allenby 
undertook on .behalf of the Sudan Government that the area to be irrigated 
would not exceed 300*000 feddans. Allenby had been told by Sir Murdoch 
Macdonald, adviser to the Egyptian public works department, that such 
an undertaking was in all respects safe, since "it had never been sug­
gested that the Sudan would require to irrigate more than 300,000 fed-
3
dans as a condition for making the Gezireh scheme a paying one".
Allenby's commitment was to the effect that "the 300,000 feddans will 
not be exceeded without further consideration by the Egyptian and Sou-
 ^"Memorandum of meeting at foreign office prepared by foreign office 
and sent by them privately to Sir. M. Ramsay", n.d., F.0. 371/3201.
 ^Keown-Boyd, "Gezira Irrigation Scheme", n.d. (1920), DSP MILNER l6l.
^ Allenby to Curzon, 25/4-/21* F.0. 4-07/189.
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dan Governments and the appointment of a commission on which both Egypt
and the Soudan will be represented". ^
In March 1921, however, Macdonald submitted a revised estimate of
costs which greatly exceeded the amounts allocated in the Sudan Loan
2
Acts. He blamed the increase on higher labour and material costs and
reported to the Sudan Government that the Gezira projects would now cost
some £E8,000,000, and that "100,000 feddans of cotton, which will be the
proportion of 300,000 feddans under that crop annually, will no longer
constitute a reasonable return on the cost of construction." He therefore
recommended that the area under cotton should be increased to 150,000
or 200,000 feddans, which would involve a "proportionate increase in the
3
total area to be cultivated". He estimated
that the cost of carrying out the scheme in such a way 
as to make 150,000 feddans available for cotton growing 
at £E9,500,000, and 200,000 feddans for the same purpose 
at £E11,000,000. According to these estimates, the Soudan 
Government are left with the alternative of finding either 
an extra £E4,500,000 or £E6,000,000 to enable them to 
avert a loss on a loan of £E5,000,000 already floated.
Stack therefore asked Allenby to allow an extension in the area to be
*
irrigated,but because of his previous undertaking to the Egyptians, 
Allenby was unable to do this. If the Egyptian government decided to 
hold rigidly to the 300*000 feddan limit, Allenby explained, "the only 
solution ... would be for the point to be dealt with as part of the po­
litical settlement which it is hoped to bring about". ^ This led ulti-
1 Allenby to Curzon, 25/4/21, F.0. 407/189.
2
M. Macdonald, "Further note on the increase in the estimate prepared 
in March 1921 ...", 30/3/21, F.0. 407/189.
^ Allenby to Curzon, 25/4/21* F.0. 407/189.
^ Ibid.
^ Ibid.
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mately to the Gezira clause in the 192^ British ultimatum to Egypt.
The agreement of Egypt notwithstanding, the problem of raising
additional funds now.became acute. Stack reported that
In order to provide for this increased expenditure and 
for the payment of interest on capital and cost of rai­
sing the money, the authorised loan, which includes pro­
vision for other services, will have to be increased to 
£E13,64-8,300.... The amount yet to be raised, therefore, 
is estimated to be £E7,^27,800.... to make the scheme a 
paying one it is necessary to increase the cultivated 
area from 300,000 feddans to ^50,000 feddans in order to 
admit of the cultivation of an extra 50,000 feddans of 
cotton per annum. To provide this added area, the autho­
rised loan must be raised to £E15,628,920, the amount 
yet to be raised rising to £E9,408,kZO, 1
Even worse, Stack noted that if the works were abandoned altogether, the
Sudan would still be faced with an annual interest charge of some
£E239,936 until 1929, and of £E333,2^ from then until 1959, with no
2
source of revenue to meet those charges. On the same day as this re­
port was submitted, the Egyptian council of ministers decided to hold
3
Allenby to his promised 300,000 feddan limit.
A delegation composed of the financial secretary, the director of 
agriculture, and the director of lands accompanied Stack to London to 
consult the British government on the situation. The seriousness of 
the matter had been aggravated when the Treasury informed the foreign 
office in April that "it had always been made clear that His Majesty*s 
Government were only pledged to guarantee the sums set forth in the
 ^"Note on the revised estimates for Gezira development works", en­
closed in Stack to Allenby, 25/5/21, F.0. 407/189.
2 Ibid.
 ^ "Decision of 25 Way 1921", F.0. 407/189. See Gaitskell, Gezira. p. 113. 
^ Stack to Allenby, 25/5/21, F.0. 407/189.
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Loan Acts and were under no obligation to complete any specific works.1*  ^
On 24 June a conference was held at the foreign office to discuss the 
situation. Stack, Bernard, and Phraser, the director of lands, repre­
sented the Sudan Government; O.E. Niemeyer represented the Treasury; and 
Murray and Lindsay attended for the foreign office. Sir James Currie, 
a member of the Board of Trade, was also present. The foreign office 
position was akin to that of the Sudan Government, in that they consi­
dered it desirable for the irrigation works to continue in order to 
avoid "a danger of the old financial yoke with Egypt being reimposed 
upon the Sudan", The Treasury, however, "could neither lend money nor
guarantee money, though otherwise sympathetically disposed toward the
2
Sudan Government".
At a second conference, held on 18 July without Niemeyer, an ac­
curate picture emerged of the critical point the Sudan finances had 
reached. Currie observed that
the Soudan Government could not possibly, borrow money 
without a guarantee.... Financiers would at once and 
inevitably draw the conclusion that the second loan 
was unsound and, consequently, would refuse to touch it.
His second observation related to Mr. Niemeyer’s 
expression of opinion that the cheeseparing process in a 
most acute form would have to be applied to every other 
branch of the Soudan Government activities. Such a policy, 
which could only be advocated by someone without actual 
knowledge of the country, Sir James Curry ... could only 
describe as political and administrative insanity, liable 
rapidly to render the country ungovernable....
Sir James Currie said that in the absence of a 
guarantee, it would be almost impossible to take steps 
towards floating a loan without raising the thorny ques­
tion of the financial relations of the Sudan with Egypt.
1 B.P, Blockett to foreign office, 22/4/21, F.0. 40?/l89.
2
"Minutes of an inter-departmental conference on Soudan finances", 
24/6/21, F.0. 407/189. This was not a new attitude. For relations 
between the Treasury and the Sudan during the Wingate years, see 
Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 23-25.
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Mr. Lindsay admitted that the Egyptian situation was 
complicated. The Council of Ministers had recently de­
cided that they were opposed in principle to the con­
tinuation of the Blue Nile dam at the present time; this, 
he thought, was a pro forma protest in the nature of a 
'mesure conservatoire1.... Of course, what they meant 
was that if, as the result of negotiations in London, 
the Sudan were to be 'ceded* to Egypt, the Egyptian 
Government would stop the work....
...if the Soudan Government were to borrow on their 
own, they would reduce the country to a mere appendage to
a huge dam. Sir Lee Stack remarked that the Soudan would
be in the same position if the work stopped, in view of 
the interest charges on the capital already spent and 
the heavy compensation which would have to be paid both 
to the contractors and to the Soudan Plantation Syndi­
cate.... Mr. Lindsay said that it appeared to be a case 
of Hobson's choice. But in either event the Soudan would 
be reduced to bare bones in everything except the dam....
Sir Lee Stack said that he had already made a num­
ber of enquiries, all of which were disco urging. Mr.
Murray enquired whether a drastic policy of retrenchment 
had yet been started. Sir Lee Stack replied in the nega­
tive, and Sir Edgar Bernard added that they were always 
retrenching.... I
A third conference was held on 22 July, with the Treasury repre­
sented again by Niemeyer. He reported that the governor of the Bank of
England thought money could be raised, but only if the Egyptian question
2
were settled before a loan was issued. Niemeyer suggested that the
Treasury might be willing to let a new loan "rank before the existing
one - in other words, that its service would be a first charge on the
Soudan revenues", and he recommended that "stringent economy should,be
effected in Soudan Government expenditure, as the whole future of the
3
country must depend on the completion of the dam".
The working committee (Lindsay, Murray, Currie and Niemeyer) re­
ported on 3 August. They recommended against dropping the scheme, be-
 ^"Memorandum respecting second conference on Soudan irrigation pro­
ject", 19/7/21, F.0. 407/190.
^ "Soudan irrigation projects", 22/7/21, F.0. 407/190.
 ^Ibid.
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cause of the £E3,000,000 already, spent and because of the charges for 
interest and compensation which would result, concluding that "the credit 
of the Soudan for many years would be ruined by such a stoppage". They 
further recommended that
a) ... the Gezireh scheme must be completed; but
b) We think the Treasury might be asked first to invite 
Parliament to sanction the application of savings on the 
Soudan Railway and Tokar scheme to further expenditure on 
the Gezirah dam, and, secondly, to agree to waive its 
claim on the Soudan revenues in respect of interest on the 
existing loan.
They suggested also that "the Soudan Government should undertake to
exercise the most careful administrative economy so as if possible to
avoid any liability falling on His Majesty's Government". ^
In the autumn of 1921 an outside expert, Mr. F.T. Hopkinson, was
called in to study the commercial prospects, and to report on the methods
2
and progress of the works. His report, issued in February 1922, was 
outspokenly critical of the management of the Gezira Scheme. The Sudan 
Government's emphasis on increased costs as an explanation for the fi­
nancial crisis (a position based on Macdonald's arguments) was discoun­
ted. Hopkinson reported that
The dam is 3>308 yards in length and 111 feet high at its 
deepest p o i n t . T h e  excavation of the canals, comprising 
20,000,000 cubic yards, being one of the biggest excavation 
works of modem times, it called for the finest organisation 
and the best methods obtainable in the Empire. It has re­
ceived the most inadequate and amateurish treatment con­
ceivable with the obvious and certain results. Extravagance 
has run riot since the commencement of work ... and it 
still continues. I find it difficult to write in restrained 
language about most of the things which came under my obser­
vation, as I have not found a single redeeming feature.... 
Duplication of methods and machines involving double expen-
"Memorandum on the Gezireh irrigation scheme", 3/8/21, F.0. 407/190. 
 ^Treasury to foreign office, 2/9/21, F.0. 407/190.
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diture is a characteristic.... The time has come 
[for] a responsible contractor undertaking all the 
responsibility for the work.... 1
Hopkinson noted that wages, especially for foreign workers (Italian 
stone-dressers, Egyptian manual labourers) were excessive, and that la­
bour was ill-managed: he was amazed to find workers employed to lift 
(without machines) stones weighing up to l-§ tons. "This operation I have 
referred to as 'Roman' - it may, indeed, have been employed by the 
Pharohs. It is picturesque, but in the highest degree wasteful." In 
1921, 18,077 men were employed in connection with the works, but Hopkin­
son saw a need for no more than seven thousand. He pointed out that the 
works were being carried out for the Sudan Government by the Egyptian 
irrigation department, with the result that while the Sudan Government 
was responsible for financing the project, it had no voice in the con­
trol of expenditure. He suggested finally that
though late, it is not yet too late, to save the scheme 
by the immediate adoption of efficient construction me­
thods.... It is inconceivable that the damage which Bri­
tish prestige would sustain by the abandonment of the 
scheme could be incurred. The work already done ... will 
still remain as a monument of failure..,. 2
The problems of labour, so prominent in the Hopkinson report, had 
not gone unnoticed by the Sudan Government. In 1921, upon the recom­
mendation of. the Central Economic Board, a labour committee was estab­
lished. It was made up of Hewins (chairman), Major E.O.A. Newcombe,
3
Arthur Huddleston and Willis. ^ Ihe committee reported that the Gezira
^ "Gezirah Irrigation Scheme, Soudan. Report by Mr. F.T. Hopkinson ... ", 
15/2/22, enclosed in Allenby to Curzon, 2/3/22, F.0. 407/192.
2
Ibid. See also Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp'. 68-69.
3
J Establishment of the committee was approved by Stack on 13/1/21.
SGA, INTEL 4/4/19. For labour policy and problems during the early 
Condominium, see Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate, pp. 178-182.
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operations were so vast that "the whole problem of labour takes its co­
lour from them". A huge grain crop in 1921, which required two months 
longer than usual to harvest, an excellent cotton crop at Tokar, and an 
abnormal demand for construction workers at Khartoum and elsewhere com­
bined to make the labour shortage in 1921 particularly acute. Dura was 
very cheap - 40 P.T. per ardeb  ^as opposed to 260 P.T. the year before - 
creating "little incentive to the people to work". It was reported that 
in the Gezira the daily wage for a Sudanese was 10-12 P.T. which, on 
piece work, "to which practically all of them are put", was raised to 
14-15 P.T. The reason for this "high" rate was the competition between 
the construction company and the Plantations Syndicate. It was noted 
that "people working near their villages in the Gezira would work as 
readily for P.T. 6 per diem as fcr P.T. 10-12", and that more actual 
work would be done at the lower rate. The committee stated that
There are very strong reasons ... for endeavouring to 
reach an agreement that wages on the irrigation scheme 
shall be based on wages current in the northern Sudan 
and under present conditions should not exceed P.T. 7 
per diem.... a permanent conference or joint committee 
should be set up, including representatives of the Go­
vernment, the Irrigation Department, Sudan Construction 
Company and Sudan Plantations Syndicate, to deal with 
the questions of labour and wages ... with the particu­
lar object in view of arriving at an agreement as to 
daily pay and the maximum rates to be paid ... for dif­
ferent classes of work.... ^
The insufficiency of local labour is borne out by statistics produced 
by the committee. In March 1921 the works at Makwar employed the fol­
lowing numbers of labourers: 4,786 local Sudanese; 6ll "local Fellata"; 
787 "Kordofan Fellata"; 240 Tacaisha; 834 Dongalawis; 868 Yemenis;
^ An ardeb was equivalent in the Blue Nile to 560 lbs., and elsewhere 
in the Sudan to 338 lbs. (Gaitskell, Gezira. p. 36n.)
 ^Report of the labour committee, 1921, SGA, INTEL 4/4/19.
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4o6 Europeans; and 9>525 Egyptians. Given the fact that imported labour 
was earning at least 17-18 P.T. per day, the expense of imported as 
against local workers, especially if the latter's rates could be arti­
ficially fixed, was very great.  ^But a 1922 handbook pointed out that
wages were likely to remain high "until the supply of labour increases
2
and the struggle for existence becomes more acute".
The Hopkinson report might have been expected to destroy the pros­
pects of further British guarantees, but in fact the opposite reaction 
occurred. On 31 March 1922 the standing committee met again. The Treasury 
representative expressed the view that "a curtain should be drawn over 
the mistakes of the past, that it was no use crying over spilt milk and 
that all were agreed that the work must continue". Stack revealed that 
the contractors (Messrs. Alessandrini) had been discharged and that new 
tenders would be invited. Niemeyer expressed renewed concern over Egypt's 
role in Sudan affairs, but Stack replied that if Egypt refused to co­
operate, "Great Britain must then take unilateral action". In any event,
the committee recommended preparation by the Sudan Government of an or-
3
dinance authorising a new loan.
The coincidence of these conversations and the series of negotia­
tions that led up to Britain's declaration to Egypt on 28 February 1922 
was an important factor both in the support of the foreign office for 
continuing the Gezira works and in the general concern as to the future
 ^Report of the labour committee.
2
A handbook of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, p. **78.
3
"Minutes of inter-departmental committee to consider present posi 
tion of Gezira Irrigation Scheme", 31/3/22, F.0, 407/192.
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role of Egypt in Sudan affairs. It is necessary, therefore, that the de­
cisions taken in London regarding the Gezira Scheme be seen in this lar­
ger context of Anglo-Egyptian relations and, specifically, in the con­
text of the Sudan's uncertain future status.
A new contract was signed between the Sudan Government and Messrs. 
S. Pearson and Sons, stipulating completion of the dam and canal works 
by July 1925. The British government agreed to guarantee a loan of 
£3,500,000.  ^In 1924 a further £3»500,000 was guaranteed. Thus, by the 
end of 1924 the British government had guaranteed a nominal amount of 
£14,920,000, or sums rising to £755»200 per annum in addition to the 
principle of £8,540,000. ^
It is likely that the pressures of Lancashire cotton interests 
and the Sudan Government's political'arguments were finally responsible 
for inducing the backing of the British government. When the 1924 guaran­
teed loan was being debated in Parliament, a group of M.P.s met with the 
financial secretary to the Treasury and the parliamentary under­
secretary of state and withdrew their opposition to the loan on condi­
tion (among others) that the Sudan Government be asked
a) To obtain, if possible, an undertaking ... that all 
cotton produced in the Gezira should be offered for sale 
in the first instance in Great Britain; and
To examine the possibility of fixing a maximum price 
at which cotton produced in the Gezira should be sold in 
order to prevent any attempt ... to effect a comer on 
long staple cotton. 3
The obvious objections to this, from the points of view of politics and
international trade, won the day, but the import of the Gezira Scheme to
 ^Gaitskell, Gezira. p. 93.
 ^Treasury to foreign office, 3/7/24, F.0. 371/10050.
^ Ramsay MacDonald to Allenby, 28/2/24, F.0. 407/198.
3^0
Lancashire had been again made abundantly clear. The debate on the Trade
Facilities Bill of 1922, which included the first of the two £3,500,000
loans, was equally instructive. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr.
Baldwin, had noted that
There is a real fear ... that the supply of raw cotton in 
the world today is not sufficient for the world*s trade,
and, unless immediate steps are taken to increase the
growing capacity ... great disaster will overcome ... 
the cotton trade in this country..., 1
Nor was this a party political issue. Indeed, Tom Shaw, a Labour M.P.
and future minister, said that Mthe organised employers and workmen of
Lancashire are at one on this matter.... We must look to our bread and
butter, and we want all the development possible so far as the growing
2
of cotton is concerned."
The political arguments raised by the Sudan Government hf*d taken 
a familiar turn, and amounted to the idea that the greater Britain*s
direct financial involvement in the Sudan, the stronger would be Bri­
tain* s hand in negotiations with Egypt. A corollary, from the Sudan 
Government's point of view, was that a greater financial interest would 
deter the British government from making concessions to Egypt in the 
Sudan. Further, the tired, unproved, but apparently still effective 
argument was raised that refusal to guarantee the loans would so shake 
the faith of the Sudanese "as to engender a spirit of distrust ... and 
give rise to a reactionary movement with the unexpectedness characteris-
3
tic of Eastern countries".
1 PD, H.C., vol. 159, V12/22, 1388.
2 PD, H.C., vol. 159, 6/12/22, 18?2.
3 Memorandum by Stack concerning Gezira funding, n.d., received by 
Lindsay on 28/4/22, F.0. 371/7753.
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Appendix Tit Tables
Table ones Egyptian financial contributions to the Sudan, 1899-1924
(in £Es)
Advances for Amount to cover Military Expen-
pevelopment Deficit diture in Sudan
1899 - 444,887 -
1900 - 457,892 -
1901 121,352 417,179 -
1902 142,832 389,721 -
1903 129,110 389,721 -
1904 621,863 379,763 -
1905 750,213 379,763 -
1906 698,640 379,763 -
1907 921,598 379,763 -
1908 637,768 379,763 -
1909 645,200 335,000 -
1910 518,866 325,000 -
1911 132,510 360,000 -
1912 45,728 335,000 -
1913 43,856 - 179,481
1914* 4,989 - 44,870
1914-15 - - 179,481
1915-16 - - 179,481
1916-17 - - 179,481
1917-18 - - 422,764
1918-19 - - 445,691
1919-20 170,000 mm 329,481
1920-21 - - 464,403
1921-22 - '■ - 477,947
1922-23 - - 515,725
1923-24 - - not known
Totals 5.58^,525 5,353,215
Sources Schuster, "Note on the payments made by Egypt to the Sudan 
since 1899", July, 1924, F.0. 371/10068.
3 month figure.
3^2
Table twos Sudan Government revenue and expenditure. 1917-1924
(£J£s)
Revenue Expenditure
1917 2,195,355 1,901,941
1918 2,774.689 2,336,315
1919 2,992,792 2,720,513
1920 4,425,340 3,564,848
1921 4,069,235 3,900,242
1922 3.498,595 3,496,999
1923 3,766,133 3,392,470
1924 4,298,856 3,453.273
Sourcesi All figures taken from the annual Report for 1927» Cmd. 328^ 
(1928-29) except for expenditure figure for 1924, which is 
taken from the Sudan almanac, 1927.
1913 1922 1£23 1924
Direct taxes 
on natives
295,546
(18.9#)
458,342
(13.2#)
451,259
(12.0#)
469,939
(10.9#)
Irrigation receipts 
and royalties
109,147
(7.0#)
136,336 
(3.8%)
239,508
(6.4#)
299,817
(7.0#)
Consumption duties; 
sugar monopoly
186,837
(11.9%)
652,508
(18.6#)
762,213
(20.2#)
945,356
(22.0#)
Gross revenue from 
Railways, Posts and 
Telegraphs; wood and 
commercial ventures
818,829
(52.2%)
1,925,251
(55.1#)
2,008,772
(53.4#)
2,204,869
(51.3#)
Miscellaneous taxes; 
court fees; etc.
157,993
(10.0#)
326,158
(9.3#)
304,381
(8.0#)
00 
00 
00 
00
Totals 1,568,352
(l00#)
3,498,595
(l00#)
3,766,133
(l00#)
4,298,856
(100#)
Sources Annual Report for 1927«
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Table four: Nationality of government employees by department. 1920
Education Department Public Works Department
British 31 British 43
Egyptian 53 Egyptian 27
Sudanese 282 Sudanese 10
Syrian 4 Syrian 2
Other 5 Other 16
Central Economic Board Repression of Slavery
and Resources Board Department
British 7 British 4
Sudanese 7 Egyptian 5
Syrian 1 Sudanese 4
Finance Department Railways and Steamers
British 10 British 148
Egyptian 119 Egyptian r^TT
Sudanese 10 Sudanese 142
Syrian 54 Syrian 17
Other 4 Other 40
Legal Department Posts and Telegraphs
British 17 British 18
Egyptian 62 Egyptian 358
Sudanese l4l Sudanese 143
Syrian 10 Syrian 2
Other 6 Other 2
Medical Department Veterinary Department
British 15 British 20
Egyptian 41 Egyptian 20
Sudanese 9 Sudanese 4
Syrian 34 Other 1
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Stores Department and 
Prisons Department
Survey Department
British
Egyptian
Sudanese
Syrian
2
34
13
3
British
Egyptian
Sudanese
Other
13
14 
33
3
Agriculture and Forests Department 
British 25
Egyptian 37
Sudanese 6l
Other 3
Customs
British
Egyptian
Sudanese
Syrian
Other
12
41
36
6
4
Source* Keown-Boyd, "Report in 3 parts", 14/3/20, DEP MILNER l6l.
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